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This dissertation aims to elucidate Saudi Arabia’s mergers and acquisitions (M&A) laws. 
The dissertation studies and analyzes current Saudi M&A laws with reference to comparative 
models from different countries and provides recommendations to improve the transparency and 
efficiency of Saudi Arabia’s M&A laws. Such improvements may help companies attempting to 
conduct M&A activity in Saudi Arabia address certain barriers and difficulties, which may in 
turn help to stimulate the Saudi Arabian economy. 
Saudi Arabia is considered one of the world’s foremost emerging markets. Since Saudi 
Arabia joined the World Trade Organization, its stock market has been growing quickly, 
including rapid growth in M&A transactions. The author of this paper argues that Saudi has a 
significant need for M&A activity and notes that despite the sharp growth in M&A activity in 
Saudi in recent years, most of Saudi’s M&A laws are not modern or sophisticated enough to 
handle the large, complex M&A transactions that are beginning to occur in the Kingdom. Certain 
M&A transactions attempted in Saudi, such as the Sahara-Sipchem deal, have been unsuccessful 
due to the absence of a legal framework capable of reinforcing and protecting M&A transactions 
and boosting M&A activities. This paper offers a critique and analysis of Saudi Arabia’s M&A 
laws.  
The author argues that most of Saudi’s current M&A laws discourage corporations from 
engaging in M&A activity and/or cause M&A transactions to fail due to their (the laws’) deficits. 
This dissertation identifies loopholes in the Saudi legislation that governs M&A transactions. It 
covers antitrust law, corporate law, securities law and tax law and provides recommendations 
supported by models from different jurisdictions as to how M&A laws in Saudi can be made 
more efficient and brought in line with modern economic principles.  
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§1.1. Introduction to the Chapters 
Chapter 1 provides an overall introduction to this dissertation. It contains an abstract 
summarizing the main arguments of the dissertation; an acknowledgment; and a literature review 
that highlights the fact that currently, no academic research has been done on mergers and 
acquisitions (M&A) activity in Saudi Arabia. Chapter 1 also addresses certain obstacles that the 
author faced during the course of writing this paper. The methodology and scope of this 
dissertation are then addressed, followed by a discussion of the significance of the dissertation.  
Chapter 2 lays the foundation for the five chapters that follow it by providing a 
comprehensive introduction of the Saudi legal system. This introduction focuses mainly on the 
authoritative bodies that are related to, and/or may impact, M&A activity in Saudi Arabia. Each 
section provided in this chapter describes an entity or process that affects M&A transactions in 
some way. Chapter 2 begins with Section 2.2, which provides a brief introduction of the history, 
geographic characteristics and present-day population of Saudi Arabia. Partly in response to the 
rapid increase in international trade over the past two decades, Saudi Arabia has recently enacted 
a series of M&A laws, among other important laws and directives; Section 2.3 discusses this 
development. Section 2.4 outlines the constitution of Saudi Arabia, and Section 2.5 outlines its 
legal system, which is based on Islamic law. Section 2.6 explains the Saudi government in 
general, and the Saudi royal house in particular, while Section 2.7 addresses the three branches 
of Saudi’s government. Authoritative bodies in Saudi that are germane to M&A transactions are 
addressed in Section 2.8. Section 2.9 discusses in some detail the permissions required for 
foreign investors to participate in Saudi’s stock market. This section serves as important 
background for this paper, because Saudi has opened its stock market to foreign investors, and 
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the stock market is inextricably related to most M&A transactions. Finally, Section 2.10 provides 
a comprehensive diagram of Saudi Arabia’s entire governmental system. 
Chapter 3 introduces the activities of Saudi Arabia’s business organizations and 
highlights the volume of mergers and acquisitions (M&A) transactions in Saudi that require 
advanced regulation. The chapter addresses the role that M&A plays in the Saudi economy and 
evaluates the importance of this activity to the overall economy. Section 3.2 of this chapter 
illustrates Saudi Arabia’s business organizations, and Section 3.3 presents the value of Saudi’s 
exports. Section 3.4 discusses how Saudi Arabia’s debt has been decreasing every year since 
1999. Section 3.5 introduces Saudi’s business activities. Section 3.6 details the increase in the 
number of listed companies critical to M&A activity in Saudi, and Section 3.7 addresses the 
strength and liquidity of the Saudi stock market. Section 3.8 addresses the role of family 
businesses in Saudi Arabia; Section 3.9 addresses the role, number and economic size of closely 
held corporations in Saudi that impact M&A activities in the Kingdom. The volume and impact 
of foreign investment and cash flowing into and out of Saudi Arabia are addressed in Section 
3.10. Section 3.11 describes the business councils in Saudi Arabia that facilitate business among 
foreign and Saudi investors, while Section 3.12 discusses business sectors that are growing 
within Saudi Arabia. Section 3.13 lists the number of M&A transactions that have occurred in 
Saudi in recent years. Finally, Section 3.14 provides several tables that list a wide variety of 
M&A related activity that occurred in Saudi Arabia during the period from 2013 to early 2016. 
Chapter 4 begins with Section 4.2, which contains four Subsections: (a) a brief overview 
of microeconomics; (b) a discussion of the general principles of antitrust laws and merger control 
regulations; (c) an introduction to the Saudi Competition Law and (d) and a high level 
clarification of how the Saudi Competition Law covers M&A activity in Saudi Arabia. The rules 
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that govern the pre-merger notification process are addressed in Section 4.3, including rules 
pertaining to the right and process of appealing the Competition Council’s decisions. Section 4.4 
explains the principles of the Competition Law and analyzes the rules governing M&A economic 
concentration requests. Several decisions rendered by the Competition Council regarding M&A 
are discussed in Section 4.5. Sections 4.6 and 4.7 detail interviews conducted by the author with 
members of the Competition Council. Section 4.8 provides a critique of the Saudi Competition 
Law regarding M&A. Section 4.9 considers the South African Competition Law, which the 
author addresses for comparison and in order to provide suggestions that Saudi legislators may 
use to improve the rules of the Saudi Competition Law. Section 4.10 offers a comprehensive list 
of recommendations that may be used to improve, amend and enhance the provisions of the 
Saudi Competition Law that govern M&A transactions. 
Chapter 5 begins by outlining the fundamentals of the New Saudi Companies Law of 
2015 in Section 5.2. Section 5.3 addresses the basic rules of corporate governance in Saudi, such 
as starting a corporation, calling for a shareholder meeting, electing directors and handling 
conflicts of interest. Section 5.3 also covers activities that are related and essential to M&A 
transactions, such as the issuance of shares by a publicly held company, private offering 
exceptions and insider trading. Following these introductory sections are three subsequent 
sections that consist of the following: Section 5.4 addresses the stock acquisition of a closely 
held corporation by discussing a crucial court case, (the Safola case), as well as an acquisition 
deal that was canceled due to what the author considers a legislative vacuum where M&A laws 
are concerned; this discussion references the US approach to M&A. Section 5.5 addresses the 
assets acquisition of closely held corporations; this section concludes that Saudi Arabia should 
amend its M&A legislation in order to handle such acquisition activity in the same manner as the 
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US does. Section 5.6 addresses the merger of closely held corporations and discusses certain 
articles that Saudi M&A legislation currently does not address; the author argues that these 
articles are necessary for Saudi to facilitate mergers in the manner that the American system 
follows, and further argues that adopting such articles would help to reform the Saudi Companies 
Law 2015 in economically efficient manner. 
Chapter 6 is an assessment and critique of the Saudi Arabia M&A Regulation. The 
Chapter identifies provisions that may help improve the economic and legal efficiency of M&A 
activity in Saudi; the European Commission’s (EC) Directive on takeover bids is referenced 
throughout the Chapter as a comparison and guide. This Chapter concludes with 
recommendations that may improve the efficiency of the Saudi M&A Regulation and facilitate 
the efficient use of the takeover mechanism.  
Chapter 6 begins by introducing the Saudi Capital Market Authority and its role, which is 
to regulate tender offers under the Saudi M&A Regulation and also under the European 
Commission’s Directive on Takeover Bids. The author explains why the EC Directive was 
chosen as a model in Section 6.2 and addresses the applicability of the Saudi M&A Regulation in 
Section 6.3. Every subsequent section of this Chapter includes some level of comparison 
between the Saudi M&A Regulation and the EC Directive; if the EC Directive does not cover a 
specific section, then a brief reference to the UK Takeover Code and its relevant rules is made. 
Rules governing the announcement of a takeover bid are addressed in Section 6.4, the prohibition 
of dealing rule is discussed in Section 6.5, and the mandatory offer rule is treated in Section 6.6. 
Section 6.6 also discusses the question of which ownership threshold—30% or 50%—is more 
efficient as the trigger of the mandatory offer, and Section 6.7 discusses the types of, and 
considerations for, mandatory offers. Section 6.8 lays out the disclosures of information required 
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for the mandatory offer. Section 6.9 explains the obligation of the board of directors of the 
offeree company to provide an opinion regarding the offer, and Section 6.10 discusses the 
independence of the board of directors of the offeree company. Section 6.11 addresses the 
provisions necessary to establish the ability of the offeror to complete the offer, and Section 6.12 
details the offer period and the right to withdraw acceptance. Section 6.13 addresses the breakup 
and reverse breakup fee provisions, Section 6.14 explains the competition provision, Section 
6.15 discusses the hostile takeover and restrictions on the defensive measures rules, Section 6.16 
details the required disclosures of ownership that must be reported during the offer, and Section 
6.17 details the required disclosures of ownership acquired before the offer. Section 6.18 
addresses the EC Directive’s treatment of squeeze out and sell out rules. Section 6.19 provides a 
summary of the author’s recommendations and a diagram that provides a visual representation of 
the structure of a tender offer of a publicly held corporation. 
Chapter 7 focuses on the Saudi tax rules that apply to M&A transactions in Saudi Arabia 
and addresses how Saudi income tax law in particular applies to M&A transactions. The Chapter 
begins by enumerating the basic Saudi income tax rules in Section 7.2. Section 7.3 deals with the 
application of Saudi income tax rules to M&A transactions, provides a general comparison with 
the US tax treatment of M&A, and emphasizes the need for Saudi income tax law to adopt 
specific rules that govern M&A. Section 7.4 provides a summary of the Chapter and Section 7.5 
outlines recommendations. 
Chapter 8 compiles the recommendations section of Chapters 4, 5, 6 and 7. 
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§1.2. Acknowledgements  
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Distinguished Faculty Scholar, Professor of Law and Director of the Center for the Study of 
Mergers & Acquisitions at Penn State Law School. I am thankful for his assistance and guidance.  
§1.3. Literature Review 
Regarding scholarship related to the topics of this dissertation, the author has found a 
small number of articles that address the legal and tax issues relevant to M&A activity in Saudi 
Arabia; however, to date, no unified paper such as this dissertation has been written or published 
that addresses all legal aspects of M&A in Saudi Arabia. The author did find one short research 
paper, which is addressed in Chapter 6. Therefore, this paper should be considered the first 
published academic research to address M&A in Saudi Arabia in a comprehensive and detailed 
manner, and the author hopes this work will open the door to this subject matter for other 
researchers and dissertation writers. 
§1.4. Methodology 
The author employs the historical method of research and analysis, especially when 
addressing the historical background of Saudi Arabia. The historical method is also used when 
addressing the legislative history of the old and new (1965 and 2015) Saudi Companies Laws. 
The author employs a descriptive method when describing the Saudi legal system and the 
comparative method when comparing Saudi M&A laws with other models from different 
counties. The author also uses the comparative method in comparing the old and new Saudi 
Companies Laws. Finally, the author employs case analysis techniques in Sections in which the 




The author faced and overcame various obstacles in the course of writing this 
dissertation. First, while several Saudi ministries and agencies expressed willingness to help the 
author with research, and each person with whom the author spoke was welcoming to the extent 
of his capacity, the author’s access to materials such as cases, agreements, files and decisions 
was still quite limited. The author managed to overcome this obstacle somewhat by collecting 
information from multiple different sources. Second, on several occasions, the author found that 
translations of materials—such as specific laws, cases, decisions and other resources and 
authorities—were incompletely translated or missing entirely. The author tried to translate 
personally many materials that have never before been officially translated. In this work, the 
author has endeavored to point out instances in which the translation of a law or decision that 
was available was substantially incorrect or imprecise. The author made meticulous efforts to 
reflect (in English) the exact meaning of the Arabic in such cases. Third, the author found that 
there are very few people who can be considered experts on M&A activity in Saudi Arabia. 
When the author did find an expert, he or she usually was an expert in only one aspect of M&A. 
For example, the author found an expert on the corporate aspect of M&A, but this person had no 
knowledge of the antitrust aspects of M&A. Obstacles such as these had to be overcome by 
meeting with different types of judges, officials, attorneys, professors, businessmen, board 
members, economists and accountants. 
§1.6. The Scope of the Dissertation 
This dissertation addresses the legislative aspects of Saudi Arabia’s M&A laws; 
specifically, it focuses on the Saudi antitrust, corporate, securities and tax laws. The dissertation 
incorporates cases and transactions that help address the issue of flawed or nonexistent 
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legislative provisions that should be included in Saudi law in order to promote and enhance 
economically efficient M&A transactions in Saudi. 
§1.7. The Significance of the Dissertation 
This dissertation has a practical significance for attorneys and practitioners, because it 
provides analysis and guidance for attorneys that aim to become M&A experts. The structure of 
the chapters in this work is transactionally oriented. The dissertation has academic significance 
because it adds substance and new data to the legal field as to how M&A transactions are 
governed in Saudi Arabia. Moreover, the dissertation opens doors for other scholars to develop 
research on each issue that it addresses.  
The dissertation is also significant from a legislative perspective. It focuses mainly on 
legislative flaws in Saudi Arabia that need to be amended, and it suggests provisions that should 
be adopted and included. 
The dissertation also has business significance for investors seeking to invest in Saudi 
Arabia. The information, case studies and Q&A with Saudi ministries that this work presents 
may provide foreign investors with important information that they need in order to understand 
how to successfully enter the Saudi market.  
Finally, the dissertation has a governmental significance, in that it not only provides 
recommendations for improvements that should be made to Saudi M&A laws, but also provides 
concrete evidence (in terms of dates and volume) of the significant increase in M&A activity in 
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Chapter 2 lays the foundation for the next five chapters of this paper by providing a 
comprehensive introduction of the Saudi legal and governmental systems. This chapter focuses 
mainly on the authoritative bodies that are related to, and/or may impact, mergers and acquisition 
(M&A) activity in Saudi Arabia. Each section provided in this chapter describes an entity or 
process that affects M&A transactions in one way or another. 
This chapter begins with Section 2.2, which provides a brief introduction to the history, 
geographic characteristics and present-day population of Saudi Arabia. Partly in response to the 
rapid increase in international trade over the past two decades, Saudi Arabia has enacted a series 
of M&A laws, among other important laws and directives; Section 2.3 discusses this 
development. Section 2.4 outlines the constitution of Saudi Arabia, and Section 2.5 outlines its 
legal system, which is based on Islamic law. Section 2.6 explains the Saudi government in 
general, and the Saudi royal house in particular, while Section 2.7 addresses the three branches 
of government. Authoritative bodies in Saudi that are germane to M&A transactions are 
addressed in Section 2.8. Section 2.9 discusses in some detail the permissions required for 
foreign investors to participate in Saudi’s stock market; this section serves as important 
background for this paper, because Saudi has opened its stock market to foreign investors, and 
the stock market is inextricably related to most M&A transactions. Finally, Section 2.10 provides 




A. Saudi Arabia: a short history 
Over 270 years have passed since the first Kingdom of Saudi Arabia was created.2 
Muhammad bin Saud and Muhammad bin Abdulwahab3 met in 1740 and agreed to join together 
to establish a state; their efforts and the state that they formed marked a new era for the entire 
Arabian peninsula.4 The creation of Saudi Arabia has been well documented: 
Saudi Arabia was never directly colonized[,] although parts of the present-day state had 
come under nominal or intermittent Ottoman control since the 16th century. Turkish 
garrisons were at times stationed in Mecca, Medina, Jeddah and other centers, but the 
Ottomans only exercised limited powers[,] and local rulers had a high degree of 
autonomy in internal affairs. The Ottomans[’] final efforts at occupying eastern Arabia in 
1871[,] to forestall the growing British influence at their borders in the Arabian Gulf[,] 
eventually failed. The basis of the Wahhabi state of Saudi Arabia was established in 
1902[,] when Abd al-Aziz al-Saud and his followers gained control of Riyadh, signaling 
the beginning of the third period of Saudi-Wahhabi dominance in the region. Abd al-Aziz 
consolidated his territorial gains over the next decade, expanding out of the surroundings 
of Riyadh and the eastern part of the region into the areas where the Ottomans were 
expelled. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia was declared on 22nd September 1933 over those 
lands that had come under Abd al-Aziz[’s] control by conquest and by [his] forging 
numerous alliances.5 
As this quotation notes, Saudi Arabia has never been colonized. It was and has always been 
governed by its people. Under the Ottoman Empire, the governors were first Arabs and then 
Islamic Caliphates, which (the Caliphate structure) was common in the 19th century.6 The 
                                                          
2 WAHBI HARIRI-RIFAI, MOKHLESS HARIRI-RIFAI, THE HERITAGE OF THE KINGDOM OF SAUDI ARABIA, 26 
(Washington DC, GDG Publication, 1990). See also A Chronology of the House of Saud, available at 
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/saud/cron/ (last visited August 16, 2014). 
3 Muhammad bin Abdulwahab is a religious leader and founder of the Wahhabism movement. See ALEXEI 
VASSILIEV, THE HISTORY OF SAUDI ARABIA, Chapter 3 (Saqi Publication, 2013). For more information about 
Wahhabism, see NATANA DELONG-BAS, WAHHABI ISLAM: FROM REVIVAL AND REFORM TO GLOBAL JIHAD (New 
York, Oxford University Press, 2004); HAMID ALGAR, WAHHABISM: A CRITICAL ESSAY (United States, Islamic 
Publication International, 2002); KHALID ALDAKIL, THE WAHHABIYYAH BETWEEN SHIRK & DISINTEGRATION OF 
THE TRIBE (Beirut, Lebanon, Arab Network for Researching and Publishing, 2013). [in Arabic] 
4 HARIRI-RIFAI, 26. See also A Chronology of House of Saud, available at 
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/saud/cron/.  
5 University of Emory, available at http://www.law.emory.edu/ifl/legal/saudiarabia.htm (last visited September 22, 
2014). 
6 See VASSILIEV, supra note 3, at Chapter 8. 
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Ottoman Empire controlled the western side of the country—including Mecca and Al Madinah—
which had Al Sharif as its representative.7 With support from the Ottomans, the Al Rasheed 
family took over the central part of Saudi Arabia.8 King Abdul-Aziz came from Kuwait to retake 
the Arabian Peninsula and wrest control from Al Rasheed in the center and Al Sharif in the 
west.9 Abdul-Aziz eventually won control over the west in 1926,10 and he gave himself the title 
of king of Saudi Arabia in 1932.11 He accepted monthly payments from Great Britain to remain a 
British ally in the region, agreeing to a specific set of British terms; among other terms, he 
agreed not to attempt to extend the kingdom beyond what he had agreed upon with the British, 
not to engage in any conflicts without British support and finally to allow the British to search 
for minerals and oil in Saudi territory.12 Thus, the governance of Saudi Arabia shifted from the 
control of the Ottoman Empire to being an independent kingdom; however, the country 
continued to be governed by the Arab people, rather than becoming a colony.13 Although King 
Abdul-Aziz was a British ally and accepted British monetary aid, Great Britain did not dictate 
how he should rule the country.14 This means that, as this paper will argue, the principles and 
laws that were developed and applied in Saudi Arabia were, and remain, unique. 
Because Saudi Arabia was never directly colonized, it has remained different from most 
other countries in the world.15 Not having been colonized has affected how Saudi Arabia 
                                                          
7 JAMES WYNBRANDT, A BRIEF HISTORY OF SAUDI ARABIA, 166, 176, 170, (New York, Checkmark Books, 2010). 
8 Id. 
9 See VASSILIEV, supra note 3,  at Chapter 8. 
10 Id. at 168, 169, 182. 
11 Simon Henderson, After King Abdullah Succession in Saudi Arabia, POLICY FOCUS, 6 (96, 2009). 
12 ABDULLAH ALBASSAM, TOHFATAL MUSHTAQ IN THE HISTORY OF NJED, HIJAZ AND IRAQ 409-10 (2000). For more 
information, see also AL-RASHEED, MADAWI, A HISTORY OF SAUDI ARABIA, (New York, Cambridge University 
Press, 2010); ROBERT LACEY, THE KINGDOM: ARABIA & THE HOUSE OF SA'UD, (Hutchinson, 1981); and ROBERT 
LACEY, INSIDE THE KINGDOM: KINGS, CLERICS, MODERNISTS, TERRORISTS, AND THE STRUGGLE FOR SAUDI ARABIA 
(New York, Viking Adult by Penguin Group, 2009). 
13 See VASSILIEV, supra note 3,  at Chapter 8. 
14 See CHRISTOPHER D. O'SULLIVAN, FDR AND THE END OF EMPIRE: THE ORIGINS OF AMERICAN POWER IN THE 
MIDDLE EAST, 92 (Dhuʻl-Q. 9, 1433 AH, New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2012). 
15 See Id. at 91. 
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perceives different types of business transactions, such as mergers and acquisitions.16 Most 
African countries and many Arab countries were colonized by France or Great Britain and forced 
to follow the French or British economic system, including imitating how these colonizing 
countries handled corporate law and transactions.17 Understanding Saudi’s historical background 
provides a sense of why Riyadh, the capital of Saudi Arabia, remained for the most part beyond 
the reach of the Ottoman Empire.18 Many scholars and historians of the Arabian Peninsula would 
agree that the Ottomans (and others) viewed the area around Riyadh as little more than a desert 
wasteland in which no one would ever want to invest.19 Indeed, my father has told me a story 
about one of our family’s ancestors being offered a piece of land in Riyadh. The government was 
gathering people together to pressure them to sign up for land, hoping they would cultivate it 
successfully and attract more people to go there and settle. My ancestor jumped over a fence and 
escaped, wondering to himself who in his right mind would commit to owning a piece of land in 
a desert. Now, Saudi Arabia attracts some of the world’s wealthiest personal and corporate 
investors, greatly increasing the potential for mergers and acquisitions activity to take place in its 
capital markets. 
B. Saudi Arabia’s geographic advantage 
Saudi Arabia rests in the heart of the Middle East, which gives it a strategic advantage in 
the politics and economics of the region. Saudi Arabia’s neighbors are Yemen and Oman to the 
                                                          
16 For instance, while Saudi laws and regulations apply to the governance of businesses when certain issues are 
addressed in the legal codes, Islamic rules apply whenever the code is silent about such issues. See also O'SULLIVAN 
at 91. 
17 See RUTH OTUNGA, DAVID K. SEREM, AND JONAH NYAGA KINDIKI, SCHOOL LEADERSHIP IN AFRICA, 367; Daniel 
Klerman, Paul Mahoney, Holger Spamann, and Mark Weinstein, Legal Origin or Colonial History, 7,  JOURNAL OF 
LEGAL ANALYSIS 3 (2011). 
18 See C. Raja Mohan, Saudi Arabia: a very different place, The Hindu Newspaper, Friday, January 19, 2001. 
Available at http://www.thehindu.com/2001/01/19/stories/0319000d.htm (last visited August 25, 2014); CHARLES 
TOWNSHEND, DESERT HELL, 370 (Harvard University Press, Jul 31, 2011); BERNARD HAYKEL, THOMAS 
HEGGHAMMER & STÉPHANE LACROIX, SAUDI ARABIA IN TRANSITION: INSIGHTS ON SOCIAL, POLITICAL, ECONOMIC 
AND RELIGIOUS CHANGE, 242 (Cambridge University Press, Jan 19, 2015). 
19 See Id. 
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south; Qatar, the UAE and Kuwait to the East; and Iraq and Jordan to the north. Saudi Arabia’s 
territory reaches west to the Red Sea, which connects it with the African continent; it shares this 
sea with Egypt, Sudan, Eritrea and Ethiopia. Saudi also borders the Persian Gulf, which it shares 
with Iran. Saudi Arabia is connected to most of the richer countries in the region, rendering it 
economically powerful. Finally, Saudi is deeply connected to the world’s financial markets 
because of its oil production, and it is an essential religious center because it contains two of 
Islam’s most important mosques—Mecca and Medina.  
C. Saudi Arabia’s population 
According to the most recent Population Figures Report, the Saudi population in 2015 
totaled 31.5 million: 21.1 million Saudi citizens and 10.4 million foreigners.20 The nominal gross 
domestic product (GDP) in 2012 calculated in billions of SAR was 2,666.4 (approximately USD 
709 billion), and the nominal GDP per capita was SAR 91,32821 (approximately USD 24,261).22 
According to the IMF, the Saudi nominal GDP for 2015 was an estimated USD 805.225 
billion.23 These figures demonstrate that Saudi Arabia currently has the 19th largest GDP in the 
world.24 By way of reference and comparison, the United States has the world’s largest GDP, 
reaching an estimated USD 18,286.685 trillion for 2015.25  
                                                          
20 See Estimated Population Figures’ Report, produced by the General Authority for Statistics, available at 
http://www.stats.gov.sa/sites/default/files/PopulationEstimate2010-2025-0.pdf (last visited February 25, 2016) 
21 Exchange Rate (SR/US$) at that time was 3.750. 
22 Id. 
23 International Monetary Fund, available at 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2014/02/weodata/weorept.aspx?sy=2012&ey=2015&scsm=1&ssd=1&sort
=country&ds=.&br=1&pr1.x=43&pr1.y=11&c=456&s=NGDPD%2CNGDPDPC%2CPPPGDP%2CPPPPC&grp=0





§2.3. International Saudi Trade 
Saudi Arabia joined the World Trade Organization on December 11, 2005.26 Saudi 
Arabia was a young country, still forming its financial systems, when it joined WTO,27 and it 
quickly began to enact reforms and new laws and regulations, particularly in the area of mergers 
and acquisitions. For the purposes of this paper, the main impact of Saudi’s membership in the 
WTO has been Saudi’s issuance of new laws and reforming of current laws28 to bring them into 
compliance with WTO standards. Saudi established new agencies and amended some existing 
laws during King Abdullah’s reign,29, 30 which helped it grow its market and take the leading 
financial role in the region. The following excerpt from Saudi Arabia’s General Investment 
Authority summarizes the size of Saudi’s international trade: 
Saudi Arabia is the largest free market in the Middle East, having 25% of the total Arab 
gross domestic product (GDP), the largest oil reserves worldwide (25%) and lowest 
energy prices for investment projects. Thus, Saudi Arabia is an Ideal [sic] destination for 
projects that depend on energy consumption. In addition, Saudi Arabia has a number of 
promising mining natural resources and a good location [that] makes it and [sic] easy 
access for the European, Asian and African markets. Moreover, [the] Saudi market has 
high purchasing power and continuous expansion. The Kingdom is one of the fastest-
                                                          
26 World Trade Organization (WTO), available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/countries_e/saudi_arabia_e.htm (last visited February 20, 2016). 
27 Id. 
28 M.A. Ramady and Mourad Mansour, The impact of Saudi Arabia's WTO accession on selected economic sectors 
and domestic economic reforms, WORLD REVIEW OF ENTREPRENEURSHIP, MANAGEMENT AND SUSTAINABLE 
DEVELOPMENT Vol. 2, No. 3 (2006), 193, available at 
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/5173465_The_impact_of_Saudi_Arabia's_WTO_accession_on_selected_e
conomic_sectors_and_domestic_economic_reforms (last visited February 23, 2015).; also see Khan H. Zahid, The 
Impact of WTO on Saudi Arabia, Arabnew Newspaper, 19 September 2005, available at 
http://www.arabnews.com/node/273257 (last visited February 29, 2016). 
29 US-Saudi Arabian Business Council, available at http://www.us-
sabc.org/i4a/pages/Index.cfm?pageID=3690#.VEqlBfl4pV0. (last visited December 21, 2014). 
30 King Abdullah bin Abdul-Aziz was the sixth Saudi monarch and died on the 23d of January, 2015. CNN reported 
his death in a news piece entitled “Saudi Arabia’s reformer King Abdullah dies,” available at 
http://edition.cnn.com/2015/01/22/middleeast/saudi-arabia-king-abdullah-dies/ (last visited January 25, 2015). His 
successor was his brother, King Salman the Crown Prince; he had another brother, Mugrin, and the Deputy Crown 
Prince is his nephew, Muhammad bin Nayef, who is the Minister of Interior. King Salman was chosen by the 
succession Law, invented by King Abdullah. See generally http://edition.cnn.com/2015/01/23/middleeast/saudi-
arabia-king-abdullah-death/ (last visited January 25, 2015) 
26 
 
growing countries worldwide, with per capita income forecast to rise from $25,000 in 
2012 to $33,500 by 2020.31  
According to the World Bank group’s report for 2016 (Measuring Regulatory Quality and 
Efficiency), Saudi Arabia was ranked—in terms of the ease of doing business—as 82 out of 189 
countries in the world.32 In terms of this same metric, for reference and comparison, note that 
Singapore is ranked 1, the United Kingdom 6, the United States 7, Turkey 55, and Brazil 116.33 
This suggests that Saudi Arabia should further reform its laws, so they are more efficient and 
transparent.34 
The table below (Table 2.1) illustrates a comparison of Saudi Arabia vs. certain other 
countries in terms of nominal GDP and GDP per capita for 2014, according to the World Bank. 
 
Table 2.1 
Comparison of five countries’ GDP, 2014 
GDP per capita (USD) GDP (USD billion) Country   
54,629.5 17,419,000,000,000 United States 1 
46,332.0 2,988,893,283,565 United Kingdom 2 
11,384.4 2,346,076,315,119 Brazil 3 
10,515.0 798,429,233,036 Turkey 4 
24,161.035 746,248,533,333  Saudi Arabia  5 
 
                                                          
31 See Saudi Arabian General Investment Authority, available at http://www.sagia.gov.sa/en/Investment-
climate/Some-Things-You-Need-To-Know-/Investment-Incentives/ (last visited December 25, 2015) 
32 A World Bank Group Flagship Report, Doing Business 2016 Measuring Regulatory Quality and Efficiency 
Report, 5 (13th ed). Available at 
http://www.doingbusiness.org/~/media/GIAWB/Doing%20Business/Documents/Annual-Reports/English/DB16-
Full-Report.pdf. (last visited February 25, 2016) 
33 Id.  
34 The Report highlight some of the need of regulatory reforms and transparency which reads as follows: 
Saudi Arabia transferring a commercial property from one company to another takes less than a week and costs 
nothing in fees, but new data collected by Doing Business this year on the quality of land administration systems 
show that the Saudi system lacks transparency and the mechanisms for resolving land disputes are complex. 
Information either is not accessible to everyone or can be obtained only in person. And resolving a land dispute over 
tenure rights between two local businesses in Riyadh takes more than three years. See Doing Business 2016 
Measuring Regulatory Quality and Efficiency Report, 3. 
35 See the World Bank’s website, available at http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD (last visited 
February 25, 2016) 
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The table below (Table 2.2) illustrates a comparison of Saudi Arabia vs. certain other 




Comparison of five countries’ GDP, 2015 
GDP per capita (USD) GDP (USD billion) Country   
55,904 17,968,195,000,000 United States 1 
44,118 2,864,893,903,000 United Kingdom 2 
8,802 1,799,612,000,000 Brazil 3 
9,290 722,219,000,000 Turkey 4 
20,13936 632,037,000,000  Saudi Arabia 5 
 
§2.4. The Saudi Constitution 
The current constitution of Saudi Arabia was issued on March 1, 1992;37 the Kingdom of 
Saudi Arabia did not have a constitution before that date. Saudi’s 1992 constitution38 outlines the 
Kingdom’s general rules, system and branches. It contains 83 articles. The first article states:  
The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is a sovereign Arab Islamic State. Its religion is Islam. Its 
constitution is Almighty God's Book, The Holy Qur'an,39 and the Sunnah (Traditions) of 
                                                          
36 See the International Monetary Fund’s website, available at 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2015/02/weodata/index.aspx and 
http://statisticstimes.com/economy/countries-by-projected-gdp.php (last visited February 27, 2016) 
37 According to the Bureau of Experts in the Council of Ministers, Royal Order No. A/90 on 1412 H (corresponding 
with 1992), available at 
http://www.boe.gov.sa/ViewSystemDetails.aspx?lang=en&SystemID=4&VersionID=240 (last visited June 25, 
2015) 
38 Known in Saudi/Arabic as “Nezam Alhokom,” which means in English “Basic Law of Governance.” This name is 
what causes some Saudis or foreigners to believe that there is no constitution in Saudi Arabia, because the name of 
Saudi’s constitution is different from what most countries use. 
39 Qur’an can be defined as “The Islamic sacred book, believed to be the word of God as dictated to Muhammad by 
the archangel Gabriel and written down in Arabic. The Qur’an consists of 114 units of varying lengths, known as 
suras; the first sura is said as part of the ritual prayer. These touch upon all aspects of human existence, including 
matters of doctrine, social organization, and legislation.” See Oxford Dictionaries, available at 
http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/us/definition/american_english/Koran (last visited December 12, 2015) Many 
Muslims believe that translations of the Qur’an can only give an abstract sense of the meaning or the concept of the 
Qur’an and its verses, and that the Qur’an’s translation into any language is unimaginable, as not other language can 
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the Prophet (PBUH).40 Arabic is the language of the Kingdom. The City of Riyadh is the 
capital.”41 
The author agrees with some scholars42 who state that while the Qur’an is a resource for the 
constitution, it cannot be the constitution itself, because the Qur’an is not a code.43 Stating that 
the Qur’an is the constitution limits the message of the Qur’an. 44 The Qur’an contains many 
stories that teach morals that extend well beyond the constitution’s purpose. 45 A constitution 
exists to provide guidance about how a government and its branches should be structured, as well 
as to define the basic principles that underpin the rights and obligations that exist between a 
government and its people. 46  
                                                                                                                                                                                           
reflect the exact miraculous language of the Qur’an. See ANNEMARIE SCHIMMEL, ISLAM: AN INTRODUCTION, 29-30 
(State University of New York Press, 1992). Although the Prophet Muhammad was illiterate, he was sent to the 
people most fluent in Arabic at that time, and he recited the most fluent and powerful Arabic word when he recited 
verses. The Qur’an challenged those fluent Arabic speakers and poets to create words similar to those found in the 
Qur’an; however, they could not, as the Qur’an says, “And if ye are in doubt as to what We have revealed from time 
to time to Our servant, then produce a Sūra like thereunto; and call your witnesses or helpers (If there are any) 
besides God, if your (doubts) are true.” (al-Baqarah Sura-23) “Or do they say, ‘He forged it’? say: "Bring then a 
Sūra like unto it, and call (to your aid) anyone you can besides God, if it be ye speak the truth!" (Yūnus Sura-38). 
“Say: ‘If the whole of mankind and Jinns were to gather together to produce the like of this Qur’ān, they could not 
produce the like thereof, even if they backed up each other with help and support.’ (al-Isrā’ Sura-88). See Abdullah 
Yusuf Ali, The Meanings of The Holy Qur'an, Kindle Edition (2014). It is important to cite Pickthall’s description 
regarding the translation of the Qur’an that, “The book is here rendered almost literally and every effort has been 
made to choose befitting language. But the result is not the Glorious Qur'an, that inimitable symphony, the very 
sounds of which move men to tears and ecstasy. It is only an attempt to present the meaning of the Qur'an-and 
peradventure something of the charm in English. It can never take the place of the Qur'an in Arabic, nor is it meant 
to do so.” See MARMADUKE WILLIAM PICKTHALL, THE MEANING OF THE GLORIOUS KORAN: AN EXPLANATORY 
TRANSLATION, vii (New York, The Muslim World League, 1997). Pickthall was the first man from the West, 
particularly from England, whose native language was English and who translated the meaning of the Qur’an from 
Arabic to English. See SHABBIR AKHTAR, THE QURAN AND THE SECULAR MIND: A PHILOSOPHY OF ISLAM, 376 
(New York, Routledge, 2008). 
40 It can be defined as: “The second source is the Sunnah, reports about the sayings, actions, or tacit approvals of the 
Prophet.” See The Oxford Dictionary of Islam, available at 
http://www.oxfordislamicstudies.com/article/opr/t125/e2444 (last visited December 12, 2015) 
41 The Saudi Constitution, art. 1. 
42 Such as Dr. Khalid Al-dakhil. See Saudi in focus, Allegiance Council: Dr.Khaled al-Dakhil – 1, (Mar 27, 2008), 







§2.5. The Saudi Legal System 
The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is an Islamic country with a legal system that follows 
Sharia law (Islamic law), and it is generally informed by the Hanbali School.47 Islamic Schools 
are schools of jurisprudence that teach the interpretation of the two main sources of Islam: the 
Qur’an and the Sunnah. There are four main schools of thought in Islamic Sunni (the study of the 
Sunnah) jurisprudence: the Hanbali School, the Shaf’I School, the Hanafi School and the Maliki 
School. Islamic Sunni schools represent 85-90% of all Muslims in the world, while Islamic Shia 
schools represent approximately 10%.48 According to The Global Religious Landscape, the 
world’s Muslim population numbers 1.6 billion, which represents 23% of the world’s population: 
87-90% of Muslims are from the Sunnah branch, and 10-13% are from the Shia branch.49 Islam 
is considered the second largest religion in the world after Christianity.50 Christians number 2.2 
billion, representing 32% of the world’s population.51 
According to Article 7 of the Saudi constitution: 
Government in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia derives its authority from the Book of 
God52 and the Sunna[h] of the Prophet53 (PBUH), which are the ultimate sources of 
reference for this Law and the other laws of the State.54 
In 1927, King Abdul-Aziz announced that Saudi’s courts must follow the principles of the 
Hanbali school, unless a judge had a compelling reason to follow a certain (other) school or 
                                                          
47 It has been claimed that Saudi courts follow the Hanbali School, as stated here 
http://www.oxfordislamicstudies.com/article/opr/t125/e799; http://www.international-divorce.com/Basics-of-Saudi-
Family-Law-System.htm.  
48 See ABU UMAR FARUQ AHMAD, THEORY AND PRACTICE OF MODERN ISLAMIC FINANCE: THE CASE ANALYSIS 
FROM AUSTRALIA, 73-83 (Florida, Brown Walker Press, 2010). 
49 See The Global Religious Landscape, A Report on the Size and Distribution of the World’s Major Religious 
Groups as of 2010, produced by the Pew Research Center’s Forum on Religion & Public Life, (December, 2012), at 




52 The Book of God means the Qur’an.  
53 It is also called the Sunnah or Hadeeth. 
54 Constitution of Saudi Arabia, art. 7. 
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reasoning in deciding a particular dispute; in such a case, the judge would be required to state the 
reasoning and evidence that caused him to rule according to anything other than Hanbali.55 
Figure 2.1, which is displayed immediately below, illustrates the study and interpretation of 
Islam, which can be divided into four main categories: primary sources, secondary sources, usul 
alfigh (the interpretation of Islamic sources, which may be understood as the equivalent of the 
laws of reason) and figh (the jurisprudence that results from the application of the interpretation 
[usul alfigh] of the primary sources). As noted, Figure 2.1 illuminates how these four categories 
fit together. 
 
                                                          
55 Supreme Judicial Council, available at 
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§2.6. The Saudi Monarchy 
Saudi Arabia is a kingdom ruled by the House of Saud; specifically, it is ruled by the sons 
of King Abdul-Aziz, and their sons, as decreed in Article 5 of the Saudi constitution: 
a. Monarchy is the system of rule in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia[.] 
b. Rulers of the country shall be from amongst the sons of the founder King Abdulaziz 
bin Abdulrahman Al-Faisal Al-Saud, and their descendants. 
c. The most upright among them shall receive allegiance according to Almighty God's 
Book and His Messenger's Sunnah (Traditions). 
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d. The Crown Prince shall devote himself exclusively to his duties as Crown Prince and 
shall perform any other duties delegated to him by the King. 
f. Upon the death of the King, the Crown Prince shall assume the Royal powers until a 
pledge of allegiance ([bay'a]) is given.56  
Each King names a crown prince, who will take over the throne after the King dies.57 This 
manner of succession had been a simple equation and a simple matter until most of King Abdul-
aziz’s sons passed away, creating a challenging question as to who would be the first suitable 
prince from the second generation to take over the throne. This question remained unresolved 
until Saudi Arabia enacted the 2006 Succession Commission Law, which formed a body called 
The Allegiance Council (or Allegiance Commission) that would govern who would succeed the 
King.58 This law was an amendment of Article 5, C of the Constitution of Saudi Arabia.59 The 
Succession Commission Law explained how a King would be chosen, and what role the 
Succession Commission would play. The most important aspects of this law include:  
Article 6: 
Upon the King’s death the Commission shall call for the pledge of allegiance to the 
Crown Prince as King of the country in accordance with this Law and the Basic Law of 
Governance. 
Article 7: 
(a) After receiving the pledge of allegiance and after consultation with members of the 
Commission, the King shall choose one or two or three he deems fit to be crown prince. 
Such choice shall be brought before the Commission[,] which shall exert effort to agree 
on one nominee to be named Crown Prince. In case the Commission does not nominate 
any of them, then it shall nominate whom it deems fit to be crown prince. 
(b) The King may at any time ask the Commission to nominate whom one [sic] it deems 
fit to be crown prince. In case the King disapproves [of] the Commission’s nominee in 
                                                          
56 Constitution of Saudi Arabia, art. 5. 
57 This old and unwritten mechanism had been utilized by previous kings, beginning with Abdul-Aziz, until the 
succession Law was issued. 
58 Succession Commission Law, Royal Order No. A/135 1427 H from 2006. available at 
http://www.boe.gov.sa/ViewSystemDetails.aspx?lang=en&SystemID=8&VersionID=13. (last visited December 3, 
2015) 
59 Al-dakhil, supra note 42. 
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accordance with any of paragraphs (a) and (b) of this Article, then the Commission shall 
vote on its nominee and another chosen by the King, and the one with the majority of 
votes shall be named crown prince. 
Article 8: 
A nominee for crown prince must satisfy the provisions of paragraph (b) of Article 5 of 
the Basic Law of Governance. 
Article 9: 
The crown prince shall be chosen in accordance with the provision of Article 7 within a 
period not exceeding thirty days from the date of the pledge of allegiance to the King.60  
The Succession Commission Law emphasizes that the process must accord with Article 5 of the 
Saudi Constitution, which states that the king must be the son of King Abdul-Aziz, or the son of 
one of his sons. That means that the cousin of King Abdul-Aziz, or more precisely any prince 
who is not a son or grandson of King Abdul-Aziz, cannot become king of Saudi Arabia. 
§2.7. The Three Branches of Government 
According to Article 44 of the Constitution of Saudi Arabia, three parts make up the 
Authorities of State: the Executive, Legislative (Regulatory) and Judicial branches. Article 44 
also states that “[t]hese Authorities will cooperate in the performance of their functions, 
according to this Law or other laws. The King is the ultimate arbiter for these Authorities.”61 
This language may sound similar to the method of checks and balances that exists in the United 
States; however, the last sentence shows that it is not, because the three authorities ultimately 
answer to the King. 
                                                          
60 Succession Commission Law, available at 
http://www.boe.gov.sa/ViewSystemDetails.aspx?lang=en&SystemID=8&VersionID=13 (last visited December 5, 
2015). 




1. In General 
The Council of Ministers functions as an executive and regulatory or legislative body at 
the same time.62 It is the only executive body, but it shares the function of legislation with the Al 
Shura Council.63 Its executive purpose is stated in the Council of Ministers Law. The Council of 
Ministers is a regulatory authority, and the King is its Prime Minister.”64 The Saudi constitution 
states the following regarding the functionality of the Council of Ministers: 
Article 20: 
While deferring to Majlis Ash-Shura Law, laws, treaties, international agreements and 
‘concessions' shall be issued and amended by Royal Decrees after deliberations by the 
Council of Ministers. 
Article 21: 
The Council shall study draft laws and regulations on the agenda and vote on them 
chapter by chapter and then as a whole in accordance with the By-laws of the Council.  
Article 22: 
Every minister may propose a draft law or regulation related to [the] work of his ministry. 
Every member of the Council of Ministers may propose what he deems worthy of 
discussion in the Council of Ministers' meetings after the approval of the Prime Minister. 
Article 23: 
All laws shall be published in the Official gazette and shall be put into force from the 
date of its publication unless it is stipulated otherwise. 
Article 24: 
The Council, being the ultimate executive authority, shall have full jurisdiction over all 
executive and management affairs. The following shall be included in its executive 
jurisdiction: 
• Monitoring the implementation of regulations, By-laws and resolutions. 
                                                          
62 The Council of Ministers Law, Royal Order No. A/13 in 1414 H from 1993. art. 1; (24). 
63 Id. 
64 The Council of Ministers Law, art. 1, available at 




• Creating and arranging public institutions. 
• Following up on the implementation of the general plan for development. 
• Forming committees for the oversight of the ministries' and other governmental 
agencies' conduct of business. Those committees may also investigate any given case. 
The committees shall submit the findings of their investigations within a set time to the 
Council, and the Council shall consider these findings. It shall have the right to form 
committees of inquiry accordingly to make a final conclusion taking into consideration 
the regulations and stipulations of the By-laws.65  
Articles 24 and 1 clearly state that the Ministers Council functions as both an executive and 
legislative body. 
2. The ministries 
There are 22 ministries in Saudi Arabia, and they all fall under the Ministers Council, 
which is held by the King every week. Many of these Ministries have agencies that work with 
them on specific tasks. Some of the agencies that are relevant to mergers and acquisitions 
activity in the Kingdom. The list of ministries in Saudi Arabia is as follows: 
1- Ministry of Agriculture  
2- Ministry of Civil Service 
3- Ministry of Commerce and Industry  
4- Ministry of Communications and Information Technology 
5- Ministry of Culture and Information 
6- Ministry of Education 
7- Ministry of Finance 
8- Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
9- Ministry of Hajj 
10- Ministry of Health 




11- Ministry of Higher Education66 
12- Ministry of Interior 
13- Ministry of Water and Electricity 
14- Ministry of Islamic Affairs, Endowments, Call and Guidance 
15- Ministry of Justice 
16- Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs 
17- Ministry of Municipal and Rural Affairs 
18- Ministry of the National Guard 
19- Ministry of Petroleum and Mineral Resources  
20- Ministry of Planning and National Economy  
21- Ministry of Transport  
22- Ministry of Housing 
The relevant ministry for M&A transactions is the Ministry of Commerce and Industry. 
B. Legislative 
The Shura Council (Majlis Al Shura), which in English means Consultative Assembly of 
Saudi Arabia, examines and studies drafts of laws; this Council also writes comments about draft 
laws before sending the drafts to the Ministers Council.67 The Shura Council also has the power 
to interpret laws.68 In most cases, the Ministers Council promulgates laws only after they have 
been reviewed by the Shura Council.69 The following articles states the Shura Council’s 
functions:  
Article 15: 
                                                          
66 The Ministry of Higher Education was merged with Ministry of Education on January 29, 2015. 
67 The Shura Council Law, art. 15-18. Available at 
http://www.boe.gov.sa/ViewSystemDetails.aspx?lang=en&SystemID=5&VersionID=10. 
68 Id. at art. 15 (last visited December 12, 2015) 
69 Id. at art. 17. 
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Majlis Ash-Shura shall express its opinion on general policies of the State referred by the 
Prime Minister. Specifically, the Council shall have the right to do the following: 
• Discuss the general plan for economic and social development[.] 
• Study laws and regulations, international treaties and agreements and concessions, and 
make whatever suggestion it deems appropriate. 
• Interpret laws. 
• Discuss annual reports forwarded by ministries and other governmental institutions, and 
make whatever suggestions it deems appropriate. 
Article 16: 
No meeting held by Majlis Ash-Shura shall be considered official without a quorum of at 
least two-thirds of its members, including the Chairman or his deputy. Resolutions shall 
not be considered official without majority approval. 
Article 17: 
Majlis Ash-Shura's resolutions shall be forwarded to the Prime Minister for consideration 
by the Council of Ministers. If the views of both councils are concordant, the resolutions 
shall come into force following the King's approval. If the views are contradictory, the 
King may decide what he deems appropriate. 
Article 18: 
Laws, international treaties and agreements, and concessions shall be issued and amended 
by Royal Decrees after being studied by Majlis Ash-Shura.70 
C. Judicial 
This subsection aims to provide the reader with a solid understanding of the venues in 
which M&A disputes have been heard and will be heard in Saudi Arabia. 
Even though Saudi Arabia’s system is based on Islamic law, which generally follows the 
Figh,71, 72, 73 it also uses a dual court system in which there are courts for private matters and 
                                                          
70 Id. at art. 15-18. 
71 FRANK E. VOGEL, ISLAMIC LAW AND LEGAL SYSTEM: STUDIES OF SAUDI ARABIA, 307 (New York, Brill Academic 
Pub, 2000). 
72 Figh means Islamic Jurisprudence. 
73 The rules, legal reasoning, and Islamic principles that current judges apply in cases before the courts are the result 
of the first generations of Islamic jurists who established these rules through their interpretation and understanding 
of the divine recourses (Qur’an and Sunnah); this foundation has developed since then into Islamic jurisprudence. 
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administrative courts for cases in which at least one party is governmental. There are three types 
of judicial bodies: ordinary courts, administrative courts, and semi courts. This Section will 
address each type of court in turn. 
As mentioned earlier, Saudi courts are understood to follow the Hanbali School,74 which 
means that the Hanbali School’s principles are binding upon the courts’ judges. However, Vogel 
describes a case in which a judge was reviewing an action brought by an employee against a 
limited liability company; the action requested remittance of the plaintiff’s salary while the 
company was under bankruptcy proceedings in another court.75 The judge ruled in favor of the 
plaintiff based on the Hadith provision that states: “Pay the worker before his sweat dries.”76 
Another situation Vogel mentions is a case in which a defendant was accused of possessing 
drugs in his vehicle; the defendant claimed that he had no knowledge of the existence of these 
drugs.77 The judge in this case did not ask his research assistant to check what the Hanbali 
School may have said about such a situation; instead, the judge asked his research assistant to 
search for a Hadith from the Sunnah on the issue.78 Consider in connection with this case a 
statement made during an interview by Shaykh Saleh bin Muhammad al–Luhaydan, who was 
once president of the Supreme Judicial Council and a member of the Board of Seniors (Ulama):  
The judges of the kingdom are [Hanbalis], even though [they] do not commit themselves 
in every one their cases to the school of the Imam Ahmed ([Ibn Hanbal]). This is because 
the root of [the] principle is that of acknowledgement of leadership ([ittiba]), not [taqlid] 
with no seeking of the proof. One practicing [it[t]iba] of a particular school does not 
abandon (it) if he differs with it on the ground[s] of a proof[,] which in his view applies, 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
See MASHOOD A. BADERIN, EFFECTIVE LEGAL REPRESENTATION IN 'SHARI'AH' COURTS AS A MEANS OF ADDRESSING 
HUMAN RIGHTS CONCERNS IN THE ISLAMIC CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM OF MUSLIM STATES, 135-36 (Yearbook of 
Islamic and Middle Eastern Law 2004-2005). 
74 To read more about different types of Islamic schools, different parties, and the development of Islamic thinking, 








since all the imams opined that the essential principle is (to adopt) that for which the 
proof exists.79 
In order to better understand Islamic legal thinking and the reasoning to which judges 
must adhere, the author cites a statement made by Ibn al–Qayyim, which is also cited in Vogel’s 
work: 
The judge needs three things, without which he cannot validly give judgment: knowledge 
of the ([usul al- fiqh]) proof (s) ([dalils]), occasions ([asbab]), and the evidences 
([bayyinat]). The proofs show him the general sharia ruling, the occasions show him the 
means to judgment ([tariq-al-hukm]) in the dispute. When he errs in one of these three, 
he errs in the judgment, and all errors of judges turn upon error in one or more of them. 
An example of this is when two dispute[s] [come] before him about the return of 
purchased goods for a defect. His judgment depends on knowledge of [the] sharia proof 
([dalil]) that give[s] the purchaser the power of return. This is an [ijma] of the 
Community based upon (a [hadith])... (Then the judgment depends) on knowledge of 
[the] occasion showing the applicability of the ruling of [the] legislator in this specific 
sale. This is that (the complained –of) characteristic is or is not a defect enabling return. 
Knowledge of this does not depend on the sharia, but on the senses, habit and custom, 
expertise, and such like. (Finally, the judgment depends) on evidence, which is the means 
of ruling between the litigants. This is whatever makes clear to him the truthfulness of 
one of them to a certainty or a probability...)80 
1. The ordinary courts 
The new Law of the Judiciary81 was enacted in 2007 and contained many reforms. The 
first Article states that “judges are independent and, in the administration of justice, they shall be 
subject to no authority other than the provisions of Sharia and laws in force. No one may 
interfere with the judiciary.”82 A Supreme Judicial Council, in charge of the ordinary courts and 
its judges, has the following responsibilities toward the ordinary courts, as defined by Article 6: 
(a) Attend to judges‟ personnel affairs such as appointment, promotion, disciplining, 
assignment, secondment, training, transfer, granting of leaves, termination of service and 
the like, in accordance with established rules and procedures, in such a way as to 
guarantee the independence of the judiciary. 
(b) Issue regulations relating to judges’ personnel affairs upon the approval of the King. 
                                                          
79 VOGEL, supra note 71, at 118. 
80 Id. at 119. 
81 Royal Decree No. M/78 19 in 1428H – 1, October 2007. 
82 Law of the Judiciary, art. 1. 
40 
 
(c) Issue judicial inspection regulations. 
(d) Establish courts in accordance with the nomenclatures provided for in Article 9 of this 
Law, merge or cancel them, determine their venue and subject jurisdiction without 
prejudice to Article 25 of this Law and constitute panels therein. 
(e) Supervise courts and judges and their work within the limits stated in this Law. 
(f) [N]ame chief judges of courts of appeals and their deputies from among the appeals 
judges and chief judges of courts of first instance and their assistants. 
(g) Issue rules regulating jurisdiction and powers of chief judges of courts and their 
assistants. 
(h) Issue rules specifying the method of selecting judges as well as procedures and 
restrictions pertaining to their study leaves. 
(i) Regulate the work of Trainee Judges. 
(j) Determine equivalent judicial work required to fill judicial ranks. 
(k) Make recommendations relating to the Council’s established jurisdiction. 
(l) Prepare a comprehensive report at the end of each year including achievements, 
obstacles and relevant recommendations, and bring the same before the King.83 
a. The hierarchy of the ordinary courts 
The hierarchy of the ordinary courts is stated in Article 9:  
“Courts shall consist of the following: 
(1) The Supreme Court. 
(2) Courts of appeals. 
(3) First instance courts, which are: 
(a) General courts. 
(b) Penal courts. 
(c) Family courts. 
(d) Commercial courts. 
(e) Labor courts.”84 
                                                          
83 Id. at art. 6. 
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i. The Supreme Court 
The Supreme Court has the power to exercise all of the following functions, as listed in 
Article 11: 
In addition to the powers provided for in the Law of Procedure before Sharia Courts and 
the Law of Criminal Procedure, the Supreme Court shall oversee the proper application 
of the provisions of Sharia and the laws issued by the King[,] which are not inconsistent 
with Sharia in cases within the jurisdiction of the general courts in relation to the 
following: 
(1) Review of judgments and decisions issued or supported by courts of appeals relating 
to sentences of death, amputation, stoning, or [qisas] (lextalionis retribution) in cases of 
criminal homicide or lesser injuries. 
(2) Review of judgments and decisions issued or supported by courts of appeals relating 
to cases not mentioned in the previous paragraph[,] or relating to ex parte cases or the 
like without dealing with the facts of the cases whenever the objection to the decision is 
based upon the following: 
(a) Violating the provisions of Sharia or laws issued by the King[,] which are not 
inconsistent with Sharia. 
(b) Rendering of a judgment by a court improperly constituted as provided for in the 
provisions of this and other laws. 
(c) Rendering of a judgment by an incompetent court or panel. 
(d) An error in characterizing the incident or improperly describing it.85 
ii. The courts of appeal 
According to Article 16 of the Judiciary Law, there shall be the following specialized 
courts: 
“The courts of appeals panels are: 
(1) Jural panels.86 
(2) Penal panels. 
(3) Family panels. 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
84 Id. at art. 9. 
85 Id. at art. 11. 
86 “Jural panels” means the general court. 
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(4) Commercial panels. 
(5) Labor panels.”87  
The courts of appeal can hear any case that can be appealed in the first court, as stated in Article 
17.88 
iii. The first courts 
There are three types of first courts: general courts for notaries public and traffic, panel 
courts for crimes, and specialized courts for commercial and labor issues, as stated in the 
following Articles: 
Article 19: 
General courts in provinces shall consist of specialized panels that include panels for 
execution and for ex parte and similar cases[,] which are outside the jurisdiction of other 
courts and notaries public, and decide on traffic accident cases and violations provided 
for in the Traffic Law and its Implementing Regulations. Each panel therein shall consist 
of a single judge or three judges as determined by the Supreme Judicial Council. 
Article 20: 
A penal court shall be composed of specialized panels as follows: 
(a) Panels for qisas89 (lextalionis retribution) and had („Qur[’]anic prescribed 
punishment[]) cases. 
(b) Panels for ta’zir90 („discretionary punishment‟) cases. 
(c) Panels for juvenile cases. 
Each panel shall be composed of three judges[,] except for cases determined by the 
Supreme Judicial Council[,] which shall be reviewed by one judge. 
Article 21: 
                                                          
87 Law of the Judiciary, art. 16. 
88 Id. at art. 17. 
89 Qisas in Arabic means retaliation, or the concept of an “eye for an eye,” which carries a specific punishment in 
the Qur’an. 
90 Ta’zir in Arabic means discretionary punishment in cases in which the Qur’an and Sunnah do not specify a 
punishment for a crime. 
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A family court shall be composed of one or more panels, and each panel shall consist of 
one or more judges as determined by the Supreme Judicial Council and may include 
specialized panels as needed. 
Article 22: 
A commercial court and a labor court shall be composed of specialized panels, and each 
panel shall consist of one or more judges as determined by the Supreme Judicial Council. 
Article 23: 
A general court in a county or district shall be composed of one or more panels. Each 
panel shall consist of one or more judges as determined by the Supreme Judicial Council. 
Specialized penal, commercial, labor and family panels may be established, whenever 
necessary, in the general courts of counties and districts where no specialized courts are 
established. Said panels shall have the powers of specialized courts. The Supreme 
Judicial Council shall determine the cases to be reviewed by the general courts of one 
judge.91 
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2. The administrative courts 
Administrative courts are controlled by the Board of Grievances, an independent 
administrative judicial body reporting directly to the King, as stated in Article 1 of the Law of 
the Board of Grievances.93 
a. The hierarchy of the administrative courts 
As stated in Article 8, the hierarchy of these courts is similar to that of the ordinary 
courts. Article 8 specifies that: 
“Courts of the Board of [Grievances] shall consist of the following: 
(1) The High Administrative Court. 
(2) The Administrative Courts of Appeal. 
(3) The Administrative Courts.”94 
b. The administrative courts’ subject matter 
The Law of the Board of Grievances states the matters assigned to administrative courts 
as follows: 
Administrative courts shall have jurisdiction to decide the following: 
(a) Cases relating to rights provided for in civil service, military service and retirement 
laws for employees of the Government and entities with independent corporate 
personality or their heirs and their other beneficiaries. 
(b) Cases for revoke [sic] of final administrative decisions issued by persons concerned 
when the appeal is based on grounds of lack of jurisdiction, defect in form or cause, 
violation of laws and regulations, error in application or interpretation thereof[,] abuse of 
power, including disciplinary decisions and decisions issued by quasi-judicial committees 
and disciplinary boards[,] as well as decisions issued by public benefit associations- and 
the like – relating to their activities. The administrative authority’s refusal or denial to 
make a decision required to be made by it in accordance with the laws and regulations 
shall be deemed an administrative decision. 
                                                          
93 Law of the Board of Grievances, art. 1. 
94 Id. at art. 2. 
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(c) Tort cases initiated by the persons concerned against the administrative authority’s 
decisions or actions. 
(d) Cases related to contracts to which the administrative authority is party. 
(e) Disciplinary cases filed by the competent authority. 
(f) Other administrative disputes. 
(g) Requests for execution of foreign judgments and arbitral awards.95 
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95 Id. at art. 13. 
96 ANSARY, supra note 92. 
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3. The commercial courts and commercial panels, originally overseen by 
the Board of Grievances, have been established as the commercial 
courts within the ordinary courts 
It is necessary to explain the ways in which the various courts behave in practice versus 
how their functions may change in the future. Initially (in 2003), the Council of Ministers ruled 
that until the commercial courts were established as a subset of the ordinary courts, the 
administrative courts, overseen by the Board of Grievances, would have jurisdiction over any 
commercial dispute (including an M&A issue) that arose between merchants or corporations.97 
The Board of Grievances had commercial courts (the first instance) and commercial panels (the 
appeals level) that made decisions about commercial disputes (including M&A issues) that arose 
out of business activities; such disputes had to be filed by a merchant or a corporation, according 
to the old Commercial Court Law.98 However, jurisdiction over commercial disputes has recently 
been moved over to the commercial courts and commercial panels that have been established in 
the ordinary courts.99 This transition did not occur as quickly as many had hoped; indeed, the 
change has only just occurred (in March 2016). 
On March 22, 2016, the Board of Grievances and the Ministry of Justice announced that 
the acting President of the Supreme Judicial Council (the Minister of Justice) and the President 
of the Board of Grievances signed a memorandum of understanding announcing that the 
                                                          
97 Based on the Council of Ministers’ Decision No. 261, dated 17/11/1423 (corresponding to 1/20/2003). 
98 See HYSHAM ALASKER, RIYADH CHAMBER OF COMMERCE AND INDUSTRY, available at 
http://www.alriyadhtrading.com/show_content_sub.php?CUV=73&Model=M&SubModel=22&ID=2373&ShowAll
=On; EADALI HAMMAD, ALQADA' ALTTAJARAA FA ZILL ALNNIZAM ALQADAYAA ALJADID ( ALJUZ' ALTHTHANAA ), 
available at http://www.afaaqlaws.net/Views/ViewResearch.aspx?artid=18 (The Commercial judiciary under the 
new judiciary Law 2011). (last visited December 6, 2015) 
99 Okaz newspaper on October 14, 2014 contains an article about the delaying of the movement of commercial 
disputes from the administrative courts to the ordinary courts for 6 months, available in Arabic at 
http://www.okaz.com.sa/new/Issues/20141024/Con20141024730470.htm (last visited December 16, 2015) 
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commercial courts/panels have been established in the ordinary courts.100 It has not yet been 
announced when the new commercial courts/panels will begin to operate within the ordinary 
courts. However, according to an official from the Ministry of Justice, who preferred to remain 
anonymous, these newly established commercial courts/panels will begin reviewing commercial 
disputes on 1/1/1438 (which corresponds to the date of October 2, 2016). This means that 
starting on that date, commercial disputes, including M&A disputes, will be heard in the 
commercial courts/panels in the ordinary courts. This long-awaited development represents a 
step forward in terms of enhancing the judicial system in Saudi Arabia and complying with the 
judicial reforms of 2007. 
4. The semi courts 
The semi courts or quasi courts, sometimes called dispute resolution committees, are 
committees that function like courts but are not part of the judicial branch; however, some 
committee decisions can be appealed before the administrative courts.101 Before moving to a 
discussion of these committees, some background information should be provided. First, because 
Saudi Arabia generally follows a system in which the ordinary courts deal with disputes between 
private parties, it also has administrative courts to deal with disputes involving public parties. In 
general, committee decisions are administrative decisions, which are subject to an appeal in the 
administrative courts. Second, there are several committees to which the law gives power to 
decide appeals that have been filed against other committee decisions. Therefore, it can be said 
that those committees do in fact participate in the courts’ jurisdiction by law. 
                                                          
100 The Board of Grievances’ website, available at http://www.bog.gov.sa/MediaCenter/News/Pages/news-360.aspx; 
The Ministry of Justice’s website, available at https://www.moj.gov.sa/ar/Pages/News_Details.aspx?NewsID=68. 
(last visited March 22, 2016)   




For many years, these committees were confusing for many lawyers in Saudi Arabia, 
partly because most did not know of their existence. Dr. Omar Alkoly made the first 
comprehensive effort to understand them, and he wrote a small book in Arabic called “The 
Shadow of Judicature,” which was published in 2010. Dr. Alkoly concluded that there were 99102 
committees for dispute resolutions.103 His book lists most of the committees and notes the 
subject matter of the disputes they handle, the process by which disputes are handled, the number 
of levels within the committees, and their limitations.104 It is remarkable that this extraordinary 
number of committees performs court functions while not falling under the judicial branch. In 
saying this, the author does not intend to disregard the advantages of these committees; some 
have very qualified members, and many committees are able to specialize and focus on particular 
dispute areas, allowing them to resolve conflicts more quickly than the courts generally can. Dr. 
Alkoly remarks that these committees are essentially administrative committees whose decisions 
can be appealed before the administrative courts, and they become quasi-judicial committees 
when their decisions are final and cannot be appealed before the administrative body.105 In other 
words, if the committees’ decisions are final, then these committees function exactly as the 
courts function, even though they do not fall under the judicial branch; therefore, Dr. Alkoly 
refers to this committee structure as “The Shadow of Judicature.”106 
5. M&A disputes 
As noted above, commercial disputes that arise between merchants or corporations are 
currently heard in the commercial courts that are overseen by the Board of Grievances, unless the 
                                                          
102 In 2013, the Okaz newspaper reported that Dr. Omar stated that this number had reached 104 committees. See 
http://www.okaz.com.sa/new/issues/20131129/Con20131129658064.htm. I also contacted Dr. Omar and mentioned 
that in his book, the number of committees mentioned should have been 100 plus the new 4 committees, or should 
have noted the appeal for some committees that were formed after his book was published. 
103 OMAR ALKOLY, THE SHADOW OF JUDICATURE, 10 (Saudi Arabia, Riyadh, Economic and Legal Publisher, 2011). 
104 Id.  




parties choose to arbitrate. This practice will continue until the commercial courts/panels that 
were formed within the ordinary courts in March 2016 begin to operate, likely in October 2016. 
As noted above, because these commercial courts/panels have now been established in the 
ordinary courts, M&A disputes will be heard in these commercial courts/panels (within the 
ordinary courts), rather than in the commercial courts that were temporarily overseen by the 
Board of Grievances. If a dispute is related to the Saudi M&A Regulation (discussed in Chapter 
6), it will be heard in the Committee for the Resolution of Securities Disputes (which is 
discussed in the following Section). For procedural and administrative issues, the supervising 
authorities are the Ministry of Industry and Commerce and the Capital Market Authority. In a 
case in which one party is listed in the Saudi stock market, and/or certain authorities or agencies 
are involved, the type of transaction that is in question will determine the authority chosen to be 
involved with the case.  
6. Arbitration 
This paper must also address arbitration. The author interviewed a person, who asked to 
remain anonymous, who works for one of the business councils that arranges business between 
Saudi Arabia and foreign investors. He stated that most of the transactions he encounters include 
arbitration clauses that would send a dispute to arbitration rather than referring it to the Saudi 
courts; this is especially true of the more complex cases. However, several Saudi attorneys who 
have worked on M&A transactions affirmed that most of the agreements they work on have 
utilized Saudi law as the applicable law, and they have utilized the Saudi courts for disputes. 
These two pieces of evidence on their own do not predict how often companies choose to 
arbitrate, but they do suggest both the importance of arbitration for the resolution of M&A 
disputes and also the importance of using applicable laws to settle such cases.  
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Saudi Arabia became a signatory country of the New York Convention in 1994,107 which 
was the first step toward becoming involved with the international community to resolve 
disputes arising over cross border agreements. As a student of Islamic law, the author can 
confirm that arbitration can be traced back to Sharia law, and is addressed in both the Qur’an and 
the Sunnah.108 Even though Saudi enacted its first arbitration law in 1983,109 the author has not 
been able to locate it. It may have been published in a book; in any case, it is not an active law, 
and it was criticized from many angles.110 In 2012, new arbitration legislation was enacted in 
Saudi.111 Borrowing from, and mostly following, the UNCITRAL Model Law on International 
Commercial Arbitration, this legislation represents a great leap ahead and a promising step for 
foreign investment in Saudi.112 The supervising court is the Board of Grievances, which has 
jurisdiction over foreign awards, including the ability to “Request[s] execution of foreign 
judgments and arbitral [awards].”113 The new arbitration law limits the authority of the Board of 
Grievances to reviewing the awards and ensuring they do not conflict with Sharia law, public 
                                                          
107 New York Convention, available at http://www.newyorkconvention.org/contracting-states/list-of-contracting-
states (last visited December 5, 2015) 
108 George Sayen, Arbitration, Conciliation, and the Islamic Legal Tradition in Saudi Arabia, 24 J. INT'L LAW 918 
(2014), available at http://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol24/iss4/3 (last visited December 29, 2015) 
109 Nabil A. Issa and Sanjarbek A. Abdukhalilov of King & Spalding, Understanding Saudi Laws in M&A, PE 
Transactions, (May 12, 2014 Thompson Reuters Zawya), available at 
http://www.kslaw.com/imageserver/KSPublic/library/publication/2013articles/10-8-13_Zawya.pdf. (last visited 
September 6, 2015). 
110 See ABDULRAHMAN MAMDOH SALEEM, A CRITICAL STUDY ON HOW THE SAUDI ARBITRATION CODE COULD BE 
IMPROVED AND ON OVERCOMING THE ISSUES OF ENFORCING FOREIGN AWARDS IN THE COUNTRY AS A SIGNATORY 
STATE TO THE NEW YORK CONVENTION, (May 2012). 
111 Royal Decree No M/34 in 1433 AH (corresponding to 2012 AD) concerning the approval of the Law of 
Arbitration, Ministry of Industry and Commerce, available at 
http://www.mci.gov.sa/en/LawsRegulations/SystemsAndRegulations/AbitrationSystem/Pages/default.aspx. (last 
visited March  6, 2014) 
112 Raza Mithani, Saudi Arabia: The Emerging Arbitration Landscape, Reprinted From Corporate Disputes 
Magazinejan-Mar 2014, available at http://www.kslaw.com/imageserver/kspublic/library/publication/2014articles/1-
14_corpdisputes.pdf (last visited December 12, 2015) 
113 Board of Grievances Law, art. 13 (g). 
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policy, the arbitration agreement or previous judgments;114 these courts are not allowed to review 
the merits of the case that led to an award.115 Enforcement of foreign judgments, including 
arbitral awards or foreign judgments that need to be enforced in Saudi Arabia, has been moved 
from the administrative courts to the execution courts, as stated in Article 8 (3) and Article 96 of 
the Execution Law.116 The Execution Law in Article 11 states the requirements necessary to 
enforce foreign judgments:  
Notwithstanding the provisions of treaties and conventions, the execution judge may not 
enforce any court judgments and orders passed in any foreign country except in cases of 
equal treatment and after verifying the following: 
1. That the Saudi courts are not competent to hear the case in respect of which the court 
judgment or order was passed and that the foreign courts which passed it are competent 
in accordance with the international rules of jurisdiction set down in the laws thereof. 
2. That the litigants to the case in respect of which the judgment was issued were duly 
summoned, properly represented and enabled to defend themselves. 
3. That the court judgment or order has become final in accordance with the law of the 
court that passed it. 
4. That the court judgment is in no way inconsistent with any judgment or order 
previously passed by the Saudi courts. 
5. That the judgment does not provide for anything[,] which constitutes a breach of Saudi 
public order or ethics.117 
The author was able to find the following excerpt, which is the provision pertinent to the 
applicable law and jurisdiction used in one of the SPAs; it includes some slight modifications, 
including an arbitration section: 
APPLICABLE LAW AND JURISDICTION 
                                                          
114 Squire Patton Boggs and Wissam Hachem, The New Saudi Arbitration Law: A Step Towards International 
Norms, July 4, 2013, LEXOLOGY, available at http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=eff5c2fd-dcdd-40e2-
9592-c960b33b6458. (last visited November 17, 2015) 
115 Id. 
116 Execution Law, which was enacted in 2012, available at http://adl.moj.gov.sa/ENG/attach/257.pdf. (last visited 
October 1, 2015) 
117 Execution Law, art. 11. 
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1.1 This Agreement is governed by, and all disputes arising under or in connection with 
this Agreement shall be resolved in accordance with, the laws of the Kingdom of Saudi 
Arabia. 
1.2 In the event of any dispute, difference, claim, controversy or question among the 
Parties, directly or indirectly, arising at any time under, out of, in connection with or in 
relation to this Agreement (or the subject matter of this Agreement) or any term, 
condition or provision hereof, including without limitation any of the same relating to the 
existence, validity, interpretation, construction, performance, enforcement and 
termination of this Agreement (a “Dispute”), the Parties shall first endeavor an amicable 
settlement by good faith consultation and negotiation. 
1.3 If the Parties fail to reach such settlement within one (1) month, the Dispute shall be 
finally settled in accordance with the rules of the DIFC-LCIA Arbitration Centre (which 
rules are deemed incorporated by reference in this Agreement). The arbitration shall be 
conducted by an arbitration tribunal consisting of three (3) arbitrators. [Party 1] shall 
appoint one (1) arbitrator, the Representative shall appoint one (1) arbitrator and the 
arbitrators so appointed shall appoint one (1) arbitrator. In the event the two arbitrators 
appointed by [party 1] and the Representative fail to agree on a third arbitrator within 
thirty (30) days following their appointment, then such arbitrator shall be appointed by 
the Chairman of the DIFC-LCIA Arbitration Centre. 
1.4 The arbitration shall take place in the English language and the seat shall be Dubai, 
United Arab Emirates. 
1.5 Judgment for any award rendered may be entered in any court having jurisdiction or 
an application may be made to such court for a judicial recognition of the award or an 
order of enforcement thereof, as the case may be. Nothing in this Section 1.5 shall 
preclude any Party from seeking provisional measures to secure its rights from any court 
having jurisdiction or where any assets of the other Party may be found. 
1.6 The arbitration proceedings contemplated by this paragraph and the content of any 
award rendered in connection with such proceeding shall be kept confidential by the 
Parties. 
§2.8. Authorities Relevant to M&A 
The following Sections will address the authorities and agencies that are relevant to 
business law, especially to M&A, and will provide a basic understanding of how these M&A 
activities and foreign investment in Saudi Arabia are related.  
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A. The Supreme Economic Council118 
The Supreme Economic Council is one of the Kingdom’s governmental authorities that 
guides the country’s economy and reviews its economic performance and development.119 As 
stated in law, it also reviews whatever the Ministries Council may refer to it.120 Article 5 of the 
Supreme Council’s regulation states that it shall do the following: 
1. [Deve]lop economic policy and determine appropriate options. 
2. Promote coordination among the various government entities that are directly 
involved with the national economy, taking the necessary measures to ensure that 
their efforts are integrated and complementary. 
3. Monitor the implementation of economic policy and the decisions of the Council of 
Ministers related to economic issues, and submit a periodic report to the Council of 
Ministers. 
4. Review the following: 
a. The general framework for the development plan prepared by the Ministry of 
Economy and Planning, the draft plan, progress reports on the plan, and the 
corresponding economic report. 
b. Fiscal policy and guidelines for preparing the draft budget, and the 
expenditure priorities developed by the Ministry of Finance, which are used as 
a basis for preparing the budget. 
c. The draft budget and the budgets of the various government entities that are 
prepared by the Ministry of Finance. 
d. Domestic and international trade policies; regulations aimed at controlling the 
labor and capital markets, protesting the rights of consumers, and creating a 
suitable environment for investment and competition; agricultural and 
industrial policies developed by the competent authorities. 
                                                          
118 A few months after writing about the Supreme Economic Council in this paper, the author learned that many 
Councils were canceled by King Salman on January 29, 2015, one week after he became king. He created two new 
councils to replace the canceled councils that would focus on security and economic issues. See Ben Hubbard, Saudi 
King Hands Out Pink Slips and Bonuses, NY TIMES, (January 29, 2015), available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/30/world/middleeast/saudi-king-hands-out-pink-slips-and-bonuses.html?_r=0 (last 
visited January 30, 2015)  However, until informed otherwise, the author believes the policies of the old Supreme 
Economic Council will remain the same and will be transferred to the new council.  




e. Reports and other matters submitted by government agencies, committees, or 
the Council of Ministers concerning such economic issues as prevailing 
prices, taxes and duties, government revenues, expenditures, investments, 
debts, and concessions, matters submitted by the Ministerial Privatization 
Committee, The Offset Program Committee, the ministerial committee 
established by Royal Order No. 154/8 of 27/1/1404 A.H. [November 3, 1983], 
and the activities of the joint economic committees; and the final account 
statements of the central government and the various relevant government 
agencies. 
f. Draft regulations and instructions related to economic issues, draft 
commercial and economic agreements, and regulations aimed at protecting the 
environment, in cooperation with the competent agencies. 
g. Matters submitted by the Council of Ministers or the Royal Chamber. 
5. Take what is necessary to prepare studies and reports on economic issues, by 
requesting that from the relevant government agencies, or obtain assistance from 
outside experts and consultants. The Supreme Economic Council shall also listen to 
information, reports, and monetary policies submitted by the Saudi Arabian Monetary 
Agency. 
6. Prepare a periodic reports on the national economy, based on information submitted 
by the relevant agencies. 
7. Perform any other duties assigned to it by relevant legislation121 
The King chaired the Council and appointed its members.122 The members were King Abdullah 
bin Abdul-Aziz, Prince Salman Bin Abdul-Aziz, Prince Saud bin Faisal bin Abdul-Aziz, Prince 
Mohammed bin Naif bin Abdul-Aziz, the Minister of State (who is a member of the Council of 
Ministers), the Minister of Labor, the Minister of Petroleum and Mineral Resources, the Minister 
of Finance, the Minister of Economy and Planning, the Minister of Water and Electricity, the 
Governor of the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency and the Secretary-General of the Supreme 
Economic Council.123 One of the most influential duties of the Supreme Council was to create 
                                                          
121 Supreme Economic Council Regulation, art. 5. See http://www.sec.gov.sa/Council-Regulations.aspx?Page=4. 
122 See Supreme Economic Council. available at http://www.sec.gov.sa/Council-Member.aspx (last visited March  5, 
2014). 
123 See Id.  
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the negative list.124 The negative list is a list of sectors in Saudi Arabia in which foreign investors 
are prohibited from participating.125 
On January 29, 2015, King Salman issued a decree126 establishing the Economic and 
Development Council, which replaced the Saudi Economic Council.127 The King appointed 
prince Muhammad bin Salman as chairman, along with the following members: the Minister of 
Justice, the Minister of Labor, the Minister of Petroleum and Mineral Resources, the Minister of 
Finance, the Minister of Economy and Planning, the Minister of Water and Electricity, the 
Minister of Housing, the Minister of Pilgrims, the Minister of Commerce and Industry, the 
Minister of Transportation, the Minister of Communications and Technical Information, the 
Minister of Social Affairs, the Minister of Municipal and Rural Affairs, the Minister of Health, 
the Minister of Agriculture, the Minister of Education, the Minister of Civil Service and a 
number of Ministers of State.128 
B. The Saudi Arabian General Investment Authority (SAGIA) 
SAGIA is a governmental entity, established in 2000, that is responsible for foreign 
investment; it reports to the president of the Economic Supreme Council.129 SAGIA has the 
following functions: 
1. Preparing state policies designed to promote and enhance local and foreign investment, 
and submitting them to [the] council. 
2. Proposing implementation plans and criteria to improve the investment climate in the 
kingdom and submitting them to the council[.] 
                                                          
124 See Supreme Economic Council. available at http://www.sec.gov.sa/getdoc/be8e7887-27b1-4bb7-9879-
bd75f8ad9acf/list-of-types.aspx (last visited March  5, 2014). 
125 Saudi Arabian General Investment Authority’s website, available at 
https://www.sagia.gov.sa/Documents/Download%20center/Business_not_permitted.pdf (last visited November 23, 
2015). 
126 Royal Decree No. (69/A. 9/4/1436H (2015). 
127 The Saudi Press Agency, available at http://www.was.sa/report-viewer.php?id=1322231&notreport=1 (last 
visited February 1, 2015). 
128 Id. 
129 See https://www.sagia.gov.sa/en/SAGIA/What-We-Do/ (last visited March  10, 2014). 
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3. Monitoring and evaluating the performance of local and foreign investment, and 
drafting a periodical report in this regard whose contents [sic] [are] to be specified in the 
rules[.] 
4. Conducting studies on investment opportunities in the kingdom and promoting these 
opportunities[.] 
5. Coordinating and cooperating with the pertinent governmental bodies to enable the 
Authority to accomplish its mission[.] 
6. Organizing and participating in conferences, symposia, local and international 
exhibitions and workshops relevant to investment. 
7. Developing [a] database and carrying out statistical surveys required for the conduct of 
its functions. 
8. Any task officially assigned to the authority.130 
C. The Ministry of Commerce and Industry (MOCI) 
The Ministry of Commerce and Industry is one of the two most important governmental 
executive offices besides the Capital Market Authority. The MOCI is essential in the sense that 
every company that seeks to invest in Saudi Arabia must register with it.131 The MOCI has many 
duties and responsibilities, including suggesting drafts to the Ministers Council.132 According to 
the MOCI’s website, it serves as the center of trade authority in Saudi Arabia: 
1) To participate in setting and carrying out the commercial policies in a way [that] 
achieves the [sic] efficiency and effectiveness for the sector and leads to diversify [sic] 
the productivity base and boost up [sic] the constructive competition among its 
institutions; and [also to] reinforce the role of the private sector in terms of the national 
economy. 
2) To suggest issuing the commercial systems and regulations, [and] review the systems 
and regulations applied. To supervise applying all the commercial systems whether they 
were issued before establishing [sic] the Ministry of Commerce or after that[,] such as 
[the] Commercial System, Companies System, Commercial Record System, Commercial 
Agencies System, Commercial Chambers System, Benchmark System, Hotels System, 
Commercial Papers System, Commercial Fraud Combat System, Cover-up Combat 
                                                          
130 Id. 
131 See MOCI, available at http://www.mci.gov.sa/en/AboutMinistry/Pages/Tasks-of-the-Ministry.aspx (last visited 
March 11, 2014). 
132 See MOCI, available at http://www.mci.gov.sa/en/AboutMinistry/Pages/Tasks-of-the-Ministry.aspx (last visited 
March 11, 2014). 
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System, Calibration and Metrology System, Precious Metals and Gems, Legal 
Accountants System, Trading Books System, Arbitration System, Professional 
Companies System, Israel Boycott System, Relation between the Foreign Contractor and 
their Saudi Agent, [and] Settlement Protecting against Bankruptcy System, among others 
of [sic] systems, regulations, and instructions determining the commerce and provision 
work, and the relations associated with the businessmen's community. 
3) To regulate the means of internal commerce development, supervise the internal 
markets and protect them against exploitation, monopoly, [and] price control. To review 
ways of commercial work practice and develop methods and procedures in line with the 
public interest. 
4) To issue licenses necessary for setting up the commercial industrial chambers and their 
branches; and to follow up the activities of all the chambers and their budget[s] and 
supervise the elections of their boards. To approve of its [sic] organizing for the exhibits 
and markets and its participation in the conferences related to its activity. To organize 
and receive the commercial and industrial delegates and set up the training centers, and 
all that can contribute to advancing and developing the commerce and industry in line 
with the provisions of the commercial, industrial chambers system. 
5) To develop the external commercial relations with all the brotherly and friendly states 
and advance them in a way [that] copes with the fast-moving changes and developments 
at [sic] the economical, international arena, and protect the Kingdom's interests in all the 
regional and international forums.[…]15) To study the requests of establishing 
companies and branches for them, [to help with] auditing their contracts, and completing 
the procedures of establishing and amending; and to encourage the establishment of more 
joint-stock companies which have economic components, also the national companies 
and hi-tech-oriented companies, along with encouraging the merging of companies and 
the individual bodies into large units. This is in order to provide the capital intensive [sic] 
and complete the establishing, specializing, registering procedures, monitor their work, 
scrutinize the budgets of the joint stock companies, [and] partnership limited by shares, 
and limited liability companies, supervise the work of company liquidation, and carry out 
the provisions of Companies System. 
16) To study the requests of company registration and individual bodies, and their 
branches in all the economic activity sections and issue registration, amendment, renewal, 
and deletion certificates, and have them monitored; and to detect irregularities and carry 
out the provisions of the Commercial Record System.  
17) To study requests of the foreign companies, and launch scientific and technical 
offices for them in the Kingdom, as well as the requests sent to the Ministry of 
Commerce and Industry (MCI) with regard to launching representative offices and 
completing statutory procedures for that. 
18) To study the contracts and documents of the executive and consulting companies, and 
those contracted with the governmental bodies, [and to] issue the necessary licenses to 
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have offices registered for them in the Kingdom, renew licenses and finish them, study 
the contracts of the commercial agents, and have them registered. 
19) To study requests and contracts of the commercial agencies and complete the 
registration procedures for all kinds of agencies, and all the amendments they undergo; 
and to issue the necessary registration certificates, monitor the work of commercial 
agencies, detect irregularities, and [to] adjudicate the public interest litigation, and carry 
out the provisions of the system. 
20) To study requests of trademark registration and have them examined thoroughly; and 
to have them classified, registered, [and] protected, and [to] follow up the latest about 
trademarks in terms of moving, commissioning, or changing, and [to] monitor the usage 
of trademarks; and to combat their counterfeit [sic] and detect irregularities according to 
the system. 
21) To study requests of the professional company establishment [sic] and have their 
contracts examined and registered; and to follow up what undergoes [sic] their data in 
terms of amendments, and to supervise the work of their classification and carry out the 
professional companies provisions. 
22) To study license requests of launching liberal professions offices with [sic] all their 
kinds such as engineering[,] accounting, legal consultations, and others; and have them 
registered; and to follow up all [of] what they undergo in terms of amendment, renewal, 
or deletion, [to] develop these professions, and carry out the provisions of the rules and 
the decisions and instructions issued about them. 
23) To issue the necessary licenses for public service offices and have them registered. 
24) To study investment projects in terms of the hotel projects and their economic 
feasibility, and issue the decisions of establishing and registering hotels and lounges after 
having them established and equipped; and to issue the decisions of classifying and 
pricing for hotels and have them monitored with the aim of upgrading their services and 
providing them with safety terms, and [to] make sure of their implementing for the 
provisions of the Hotels system. 
25) To apply the decimal system for weights and measures, [to] examine, and monitor the 
weight and measurement devices with gas station pumps included. 
26) To study the license requests of gold shops and forges and have them registered; and 
to monitor the gold artifacts hallmark[s] and have them examined and analyzed; and to 
issue licenses for those working at the precious stones forges and gems. 
27) To combat the commercial fraud with all its forms and detect irregularities by 
detection bodies all over the Kingdom's cities and have them verified; and to issue the 
adjudication decisions of all fraud cases through the committees set up for that, in 
cooperation with concerned bodies. 
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28) To participate in combating cover-up and detect its cases, and investigate them; and 
to issue the adjudication decisions of cover-up cases through the committees set up for 
that. 
29) To study the commercial papers cases: check, promissory note, and work on solving 
them peacefully through Protest Offices; and to issue the adjudication decisions with 
regard to the cases that are hard to be solved [sic], and the cassation [sic] decisions 
through the adjudication committees and offices regarding the commercial papers 
cases.[…].133 
1. The Council of Competition 
The Council of Competition134 is chaired by the Minister of Commerce and Industry.135 It 
is given the power by law136 to review and make decisions about whether to approve certain 
mergers and acquisitions based on their likely impact on competition in Saudi Arabia;137 this will 
be addressed in greater detail in Chapter 4. This Council also reviews complaints and criminal 
charges related to the possible violation of the Competition Law.138 Article 8 states that the 
Council has the following powers: 
a) [Grant] Approval of merger[s], acquisition[s], [and the] joining [of] two managements 
or more into one joint management resulting in a dominant position in the market. 
b) [Issue] Order[s] to take actions of inquiry and collecting evidence pertaining to 
complaints and practices in violation of provisions of this Law, as well as order[s] for 
investigation and prosecution therein. 
c) [Grant] Approval to commence criminal case procedures against violators of 
provisions of the Law. 
d) Suggesting relevant draft Laws that affecting [sic] competition in the light [sic] of 
variables developed to the market, and proposing necessary amendments to provisions of 
this Law. 
e) Issuing the Implementing Regulation of this Law. 
                                                          
133 See MOCI, available at http://www.mci.gov.sa/en/AboutMinistry/Pages/Tasks-of-the-Ministry.aspx. (last visited 
March 11, 2014). 
134 Id. 
135 The Competition Law, art. 8. See 
http://www.mci.gov.sa/en/LawsRegulations/SystemsAndRegulations/CompetitionSystem/Pages/default.aspx. (last 
visited March 12, 2014). 
136 Competition Law, art. 8. 
137 Id. 
138 Id. at art. 9. 
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f) Preparing annual report[s] of the Council's activities and future plans.139 
2. The Saudi Organization for Certified Public Accountants (SOCPA) 
a. Introduction 
In 1992, Saudi Arabia issued the Saudi Certified Public Accountants Law140 and 
established the Saudi Organization for Certified Public Accountants (SOCPA) with headquarters 
in Riyadh.141 The SOCPA administratively reports to the Ministry of Commerce and Industry, 
which means that the Ministry supervises the SOCPA.142 The Saudi Organization for Certified 
Public Accountants operates through 8 committees: Accounting Standards, Auditing Standards, 
Professional Ethics, Examinations, Quality Review, Training, Public Relations and Consulting 
Services; all of these committees report to the board of organization.143 The Saudi Certified 
Public Accountants Law states that the board of the Saudi Organization for Certified Public 
Accountants is to be chaired by the minister of Commerce and Industry and must consist of 15 
members as per the following stipulations: 
 The Minister of Commerce or his delegate - Chairman 
 The Deputy Minister of Commerce - Member 
 The Deputy Minister of Finance and National Economy for Financial Affairs and 
Accounts or any official of grade 14 and above appointed by the Minister of Finance 
and National Economy. - Member 
 The Vice President of the General Controller's Bureau or any official of grade 14 and 
above appointed by the President of the General Controller's Bureau. - Member 
                                                          
139 Id. 
140 Council of Ministers Decree No. 40 dated 12/05/1412 AH (corresponding to 11/19/1992), available at 
http://mci.gov.sa/en/LawsRegulations/SystemsAndRegulations/LegalAccountantsSystem/Pages/21-4.aspx (last 
visited December 22, 2015). 
141 See the website of the Saudi Organization for Certified Public Accountants, available at 
http://www.socpa.org.sa/Homepage/About-us (last visited December 22, 2015). 
142 The Saudi Certified Public Accountants Law, art. 19. 
143 See the website for the Saudi Organization for Certified Public Accountants, available at 
http://www.socpa.org.sa/Homepage/About-us?lang=en-US (last visited December 22, 2015). 
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 Two Saudi members of the teaching staff of the accounting department of one or 
more of the universities of the Kingdom , to be appointed by the Minister of 
Commerce upon the nomination of the Minister of Higher Education. 
 A representative for the Council of Chambers of Commerce and Industry , to be 
appointed by the Minister of Commerce upon nomination by the said Council. - 
Member 
 Six members from among Saudi practitioner Certified Public Accountants to be 
elected by the Organization's general meeting for a term of three years , renewable for 
one more term. By way of exception , these members shall be appointed in [sic] the 
first Board of Directors for five years by a reso[l]u[]tion to this effect from the 
Minister of Commerce.144 
b. The duty of the Saudi Organization for Certified Public 
Accountants 
The Saudi Certified Public Accountants Law designates that in addition to approving the 
accounting and auditing standards, the SOCPA shall have several other duties: 
 Review, develop and approve accounting and auditing standards. 
 Establish the necessary rules for [the] fellowship certificate examination[,] provided 
that such rules cover the professional , practical , [and] theoretical aspects of the audit 
profession[,] including all Regulations pertaining to the profession. 
 Organize courses of continuous education. 
 Conduct special research work and studies covering accounting, auditing and other 
allied subjects. 
 Publish periodicals, books and bulletins covering accounting and auditing subjects. 
 Establish an appropriate quality review program in order to ensure that Certified 
Public Accountants comply with accounting and auditing standards and the 
provisions of these Regulations and its by - laws. 
 Participate in local and international committees and symposiums [sic] relating to the 
profession[s] of accounting and auditing.145 
                                                          
144 The Saudi Certified Public Accountants Law, art. 24. 
145 Id. at art. 19. 
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c. Accounting standards in Saudi Arabia 
The SOCPA at one time applied its own accounting standards, which were guided by 
British, American and international standards.146 However, in 2013, the SOCPA board 
announced that it would apply, and require companies in Saudi Arabia to apply, two specific 
international standards: the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRSs) and the 
International Auditing and Assurance Board Standards (IAASB).147 The requirement to apply 
these standards begins in 1/1/2017 for listed companies and in 1/1/2018 for medium- and 
smaller-sized entities.148 
According to the most recently updated list provided by SOCPA, 150 certified 
accounting firms and offices are registered in Saudi Arabia as of January 7, 2016.149 The “big 
four” accounting firms in Saudi Arabia that provide services such as audit, tax and advising are 
KPMG,150 PwC,151 Deloitte152 and EY.153 
d. The Investigation Committee of Violations of the Certified 
Public Accountants Law 
The Committee of Investigation of the Violation of the Certified Public Accountants 
Law, led by Deputy Minister of Commerce, a Saudi legal consultant and a member of the 
                                                          
146 SOCPA, Project for Transition to International Accounting & Auditing Standards, which was authorized during 
SOCPA board meeting no. 10 in the 6th session, 26/03/1433, corresponding to 18/02/2012, 15, available at 
http://www.socpa.org.sa/News-Attachments/international_standard (last visited December 24, 2015). 
147 SOCPA’s announcement on its website, available at 
http://www.socpa.org.sa/Socpa/Home/Projects/aa.aspx?lang=en-us. See also the SOCPA Project for Transition to 
International Accounting & Auditing Standards (last visited December 24, 2015). 
148 Id.  
149 Id.  
150 KPMG’s website in Saudi Arabia, available at http://www.kpmg.com/sa/en/about/pages/kpmginsaudiarabia.aspx 
(last visited February 22, 2016). 
151 PwC’s website in Saudi Arabia, available at http://www.pwc.com/gx/en/about/office-locations/saudi-arabia.html 
(last visited February 22, 2016). 
152 Deliotte’s website in Saudi Arabia, available at http://www2.deloitte.com/sa/en/legal/about-deloitte-saudi-
arabia.html (last visited February 22, 2016). 
153 Ernst & Young’s website in Saudi Arabia, available at http://www.ey.com/EM/en/about-us/Saudi-Arabia (last 
visited February 22, 2016). 
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SOCPA’s board, was established according to the Certified Public Accountants Law.154 It was 
given the authority to investigate and suspend licenses and to impose penalties for any violation 
of the Certified Public Accountants Law.155 Any suits filed against or by a certified accountant 
relating to the violation of the Certified Public Accountants Law are to be heard before the Board 
of Grievances.156 
D. The Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA) 
SAMA, created in 1952, is known by the international community as the central bank of 
the country.157 It plays a crucial role in protecting Saudi’s local currency. It has been assigned the 
following duties and responsibilities by several laws and royal decrees and orders:158 
 To deal with the banking affairs of the Government; 
 Minting and printing the national currency (the Saudi Riyal), [and] strengthening the 
Saudi currency and stabilizing its external and internal value, in addition to 
strengthening the currency’s cover; 
 Managing the Kingdom’s foreign exchange reserves; 
 Managing the monetary policy for maintaining the stability of prices and exchange 
rate[s]; 
 Promoting the growth of the financial system and ensuring its soundness; 
 Supervising commercial banks and exchange dealers; 
 Supervising cooperative insurance companies and the self-employment professions 
relating to the insurance activity; 
 Supervising finance companies; 
 Supervising credit information companies.159 
                                                          
154 The Saudi Certified Public Accountants Law, art. 29. 
155 Id. 
156 Id. at art. 32. 
157 SAMA’s website, see at http://www.sama.gov.sa/sites/samaen/AboutSAMA/Pages/SAMAFunction.aspx (last 





Saudi Arabia does not have an exchange control.160 
E. The Department of Zakat and Income Tax (DZIT) 
The Department of Zakat and Income Tax was established in 1970. It operates according 
to its own law to implement regulations that govern taxes in Saudi Arabia.161 This Department is 
responsible for collecting taxes from investors;162 it is overseen by the Ministry of Finance and is 
discussed in considerable detail in Chapter 7 of this dissertation.163 Tax issues are also discussed 
in Chapter 7. 
F. The Saudi Capital Market Authority 
As a result of the Council of Ministers enacting the Capital Market Law, the Capital 
Market Authority was created164 to supervise and regulate parties that are covered by the Capital 
Market Authority’s Law or by any of its Implementing Regulations.165 The Capital Market 
Authority is administered by the Council of Ministers.166 It has the authority to enact regulations 
that will improve Saudi’s capital market and has the authority to create any legal rules that will 
enhance the successful and professional application of the Capital Market Law (CML).167 The 
Capital Market Authority is responsible for implementing the M&A Regulation (takeover code), 
which will be discussed in Chapter 6. 
The Capital Market Authority’s duties include the following: 
 Regulate and develop the capital market, and seek to develop and improve the 
practices of entities trading in securities. 
                                                          
160 See KPMG, available at https://www.kpmg.com/Global/en/IssuesAndInsights/ArticlesPublications/thinking-
beyond-borders/Documents/saudi-arabia-2013.pdf (last visited February 29, 2016). 
161 Id. 
162 Id. 
163 DZIT’s website, see at https://dzit.gov.sa/en/brief-about-dzit (last visited March 29, 2014). 
164 Royal Decree No. (M/30) in 1424H, corresponding to 2003. 
165 The Capital Market Authority Report 2012, 16, available at 





 Protect investors in securities from unfair and unsound practices, or acts involving 
fraud, deception, cheating, manipulation or insider trading. 
 Develop control mechanisms that mitigate the risks associated with securities 
transactions. 
 Regulate and monitor the issuance of and trading in securities. 
 Regulate and monitor business activities of parties subject to the CMA’s supervision. 
 Regulate and monitor the full disclosure of information pertaining to securities and 
their issuers, the 
 dealings of informed persons and investors, and specify and provide the information 
that should be disclosed by participants in the market to shareholders and the 
public.168 
1. Parties that fall under the Capital Market Authority’s regulations 
The parties that fall under the Capital Market Authority’s rules include the Saudi Stock 
Exchange Co. (Tadawul), certain authorized persons, listed companies, capital market 
dealers/participants, Special Purpose Entities (SPEs) and credit rating agencies.169 
2. The Saudi Stock Exchange (Tadawul) 
The following excerpt is a summary of how the Saudi Stock Exchange began, how many 
companies existed at its inception, and how the exchange has developed since its establishment:  
Saudi joint stock companies had their beginnings in the mid 1930’s, when the "Arab 
Automobile” company was established as the first joint stock company. By 1975 there 
were about 14 public companies. The rapid economic expansion, besides the Saudisation 
of part of the foreign banks[’] capital in the 1970’s[,] led to the establishment of a 
number of large corporations and joint stock banks. The market remained informal, until 
the early 1980’s when the government embarked on forming a regulated market for 
trading together with the required systems. In 1984, a Ministerial Committee composed 
of the Ministry of Finance and National Economy, Ministry of Commerce and Saudi 
Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA) was formed to regulate and develop the market. 
SAMA was the government body charged with regulating and monitoring market 
activities until the Capital Market Authority (CMA) was established in July 2003 under 
the Capital Market Law (CML) by Royal Decree No. (M/30). The CMA is the sole 
                                                          
168 Id. 
169 Id. at 23.  
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regulator and supervisor of the capital market[;], it issues the required rules and 
regulations to protect investors and ensure fairness and efficiency in the market.170 
This excerpt suggests that there was a rapid increase in the number of companies listed with 
Saudi’s exchange, and it suggests that many more have been listed since 1975. It indicates how 
Saudi Arabia is growing and what Saudi Arabia aims to achieve with its stock market. 
3. The Committee for the Resolution of Securities Disputes (CRSD) 
This committee is one of the semi courts mentioned earlier in this chapter, and it is 
among the most important committees within the business field in Saudi Arabia. According to 
the Capital Market Law, the Capital Market Authority (CMA) must establish a committee that 
reviews and addresses any disputes related to the Capital Market Authority’s Law or to any of its 
regulations, as stated in Article 25(a):  
The Authority shall establish a committee known as the "Committee for the Resolution of 
Securities Disputes" [CRSD], which shall have jurisdiction over the disputes falling 
under the provisions of this Law, its Implementing Regulations, and the regulations, rules 
and instructions issued by the Authority and the Exchange, with respect to the public and 
private actions. The Committee shall have all necessary powers to investigate and settle 
complaints and suits, including the power to issue subpoenas, issue decisions, impose 
sanctions and order the production of evidence and documents.171  
Therefore, the CMA established the CRSD in 2004 and issued certain rules and regulations, as 
authorized by the law, that dictate how to file a complaint. The claimant must file the complaint 
with the CMA first and then wait until a prescribed 90-day waiting period passes, or until the 
CMA notifies the claimant that his claim has been accepted.172 If the 90-day waiting period 
                                                          
170 Saudi Stock Exchange, available at 
http://www.tadawul.com.sa/wps/portal/!ut/p/c0/04_SB8K8xLLM9MSSzPy8xBz9CP0os3g_A-
ewIE8TIwMLj2AXA0_vQGNzY18Q10A_ODVPvyDbUREAVie-Cw!!/. (last visited December 25, 2015). 
171 Capital Market Law, art. 25 (a). 
172 Committee for the Resolution of Securities Disputes, available at 
http://www.crsd.org.sa/En/Dispute/Pages/AboutMOC.aspx (last visited November 8, 2015). See also the Capital 
Market Law, art. 25(e).  
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passes without the claimant hearing word from the CMA, then the claimant has the right to 
submit his claim to the CRSD.173 
4. The subject matter of the CRSD 
As summarized and defined by law, the subject matter of the CRSD, and its jurisdiction, 
pertain to any disputes that are linked to, or covered by, the Capital Market Law.174 In addition, 
any regulations that the CMA has enacted or will enact fall under the CRSD’s jurisdiction.175 
This means that means any violation of the M&A Regulation (takeover code) falls under the 
CRSD committee’s purview. The law also stipulates more precisely that the CRSD shall: 
1. Review claims against decisions taken and procedures adopted by [the] CMA or the 
Exchange Market, [in] what is known as [an] Administrative Suit. 
2. Review complaints arising between investors relating to the Capital Market Law and 
its Implementing Regulations as well as [the] CMA and the Exchange Market 
regulations, rules and instructions in terms of public and private actions, [in] what is 
known as [a] Civil Suit 
3. Consider suits brought by [the] CMA – as a general prosecutor – against violators of 
the Capital Market Law and its Implementing Regulations, [in] what is known as [a] 
Penal Suit.176  
The CRSD provides on its website the full text, in both Arabic and English, of its written 
decisions. Even though it does not provide every decision, many are published, which is a 
progressive step compared to other Saudi committees and even to some of Saudi’s courts. 
                                                          
173 Capital Market Law, art. 25(e). 
174 Capital Market Law, art. 25 (a). 
175 Id. at (a). 
176 Committee for the Resolution of Securities Disputes, available at 
http://www.crsd.org.sa/En/Dispute/Pages/authority.aspx (last visited 15 March, 2016). 
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5. The Appeal Committee for the Resolution of Securities Conflicts 
(ACRSC) 
To ensure the precision, justice and accuracy of the CRSD’s judgments, the possibility of 
appealing a decision handed down by the CRSD is necessary. The Capital Market Law 
authorizes the CMA to establish an appeal of the CRSD, as stated in the Capital Market Law: 
f. The Committee’s decision may be appealed before the Appeal Panel within thirty days 
from their [sic] notification date.  
g. An Appeal Panel is to be formed by a Council of Ministers’ decision, and it shall have 
three members representing the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Commerce and 
Industry and the Bureau of Experts at the Council of Ministers. The members of the 
Appeal Panel shall be appointed for a three-year term renewable. The Appeal Panel shall 
have the discretion to refuse to review the decisions of the Committee for the Resolution 
of Securities Disputes, to affirm such decisions, [or] to undertake a [de novo] review of 
the complaint or suit based on the record developed at the hearing before the 
Committee[,] and to issue such decision as it deems appropriate in relation to the 
complaint or the suit. The decisions of the Appeal Panel shall be final.177  
Thus, the Appeal Committee for the Resolution of Securities Conflicts was established and 
began working in 2005; it provides the right to file an appeal before the ACRSC of a CRSD 
decision.178 Any such appeal must be requested within 30 days starting from the day that the 
decision was delivered to the appealing party.179 
6. The authority and jurisdiction of the ACRSC 
The Capital Market Law states the functions of the ACRSC as follows: 
discretion to refuse to review the decisions of the Committee for the Resolution of 
Securities Disputes, to affirm such decisions, to undertake a [de novo] review of the 
complaint or suit based on the record developed at the hearing before the Committee and 
to issue such decision as it deems appropriate in relation to the complaint or the suit.180 
                                                          
177 Capital Market Law, Articles 25(f) and (g). 
178 Appeal Committee for the Resolution of Securities Conflicts, available at 
http://www.crsd.org.sa/En/Conflict/Pages/ACRSC.aspx (last visited November 8, 2015). 
179 Id. 
180 Capital Market Law, art. 25(f). 
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7. The oversight of M&A transactions181 
The Ministry of Commerce and Industry oversees any M&A transaction between unlisted 
(closely held) joint-stock companies.182 Such closely held corporations are governed by the 
Saudi Companies Law 2015 (which is discussed in Chapter 5). The Capital Market Authority 
oversees any M&A transaction that occurs between two listed companies, or between two 
companies in a situation when at least one party is a listed company,183 under the Saudi M&A 
Regulation; this is often known in other countries as the takeover code, which the author 
discusses in Chapter 6. The Ministry of Commerce and Industry oversees any M&A transactions 
between unlisted or private companies.184 However, depending on the sector of the transaction, 
and also on the nationality of the parties if at least one party is foreign, other governmental 
agencies may be involved and other governmental approvals may be required.185 In such cases, 
the Saudi Arabian General Investment Authority will be involved.186 
§2.9. Foreign Investment in Saudi Securities 
A. Introduction  
Permissions for foreign investment in the Saudi Capital Market intersect with Saudi 
M&A activity. This section presents the rules that govern foreign investment in the Saudi stock 
exchange and explains how these rules affect M&A. The section also addresses the policy that 
                                                          
181 This is a summary only. This paper will discuss these issues in the more depth with examples and further 
explication of the relevant laws in dedicated sections later in this dissertation.  
182 Certain Articles regulate merger transactions in the Saudi Companies Law 1965, art. 210-215, and in the Saudi 
Companies Law 2015, art. 190-193). Articles that address mergers and acquisition transactions closely held 
corporations are addressed in Chapter 5. 
183 M&A Regulation, art. 2. 
184 Certain Articles regulate merger transactions in the Saudi Companies Law 1965, art. 210-215) and in the Saudi 
Companies Law 2015, art. 190-193). Articles that address mergers and acquisition transactions are addressed in 
Chapter 6. 
185 For example, the acquisition of Vella by Albahri, which required the approval of the Supreme Council of 
Petroleum and Mineral Affairs. See ALBAHRI, available at http://www.bahri.sa/article-
details.php?id=330&from=30&cat=11 (last visited October 14, 2015). 
186 See information about SAGIA’s mission on its website, available at http://www.sagia.gov.sa/en/SAGIA/What-
We-Do/ (last visited December 20, 2015). 
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lies behind the granting of permission for foreign investment in the Saudi stock market. 
Understanding Saudi policy in this regard will help to explain the Saudi Capital Market 
Authority’s goals for developing a certain volume of M&A activity. Finally, this section 
analyzes the existence of certain legislative contradictions among the various regulations, and 
should therefore be a helpful foundation for the reader’s understanding of Saudi’s public 
takeover rules (according to Saudi’s M&A Regulation), all of which this paper discusses in more 
detail in Chapter 6. 
B. Permissions for foreign investors investing in the Saudi stock market 
Saudi Arabia opened its stock market to foreign investors in June 15, 2015187 and issued 
rules known as the “Rules for Qualified Foreign Financial Institutions Investment in Listed 
Shares” (the Rules).188 These Rules limit the activity of foreign189 financial institutions and 
investors; for example, they specify the minimum amount of assets each financial institution 
must have under management in order to invest in Saudi’s market, and they also limit the 
ownership stake in a company that a foreign investor may acquire. 
C. Limitations and requirements for foreign investment in the Saudi market 
1. Minimum assets under management required to be eligible 
The Rules state that for a financial institution to be eligible to invest and trade in the 
Saudi stock market, it must have a minimum of assets under management (AUM) of SAR 
                                                          
187 Ahmed Al Omran and Nikhil Lohade, Saudi Arabia to Open Stock Market to Foreign Investors on June 15, THE 
WALL STREET JOURNAL, April 16, 2015, available at http://www.wsj.com/articles/saudi-arabia-to-open-stock-
market-to-foreign-investors-on-june-15-1429191506 (last visited December 20, 2015). 
188 The Rules were issued by the Board of the Capital Market Authority on 15/7/1436H, which corresponds with 
4/5/2015G, according to its Resolution No. 1-42-2015. See more information on this website: 
http://www.cma.org.sa/En/Documents/Rules%20for%20Qualified%20Foreign%20Financial%20Institutions%20Inv
estment%20In%20Listed%20Shares.pdf  
189 Gulf States citizens and corporations are not considered foreigners and are treated as Saudi corporations 
according to Qualified Foreign Financial Institutions Investment in Listed Shares Rules, Article 2, and also 
according to the regulation of the Supreme Council of the Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf, as 
specified in Article 2 of the Rules. 
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18,750,000,000 (equivalent to approximately USD 5 billion).190 The Rules also state that the 
Capital Market may at its discretion reduce this requirement to SAR 11,250,000,000 (equivalent 
to approximately USD 3 billion).191 The assets under management could be owned by the 
applying institution or by other persons, but the assets must be shown to be under the 
management of the applying institution.192 Moreover, the Rules require that the applying 
institution must have at least 5 years of experience engaging in the securities business.193 
2. Ownership limitation 
The Rules place limits on the stake that qualified foreign investors may acquire as per the 
following: 
1) Each QFI,194 together with its affiliates, or each approved QFI client together with its 
affiliates, may own a maximum of 5% of the shares of any issuer whose shares are listed. 
2) Where a QFI invests on behalf of an approved QFI client, it must not execute a 
transaction which would result in the relevant client, together with its affiliates, owning 
more than 5% of the shares of any issuer whose shares are listed.  
3) The maximum proportion of the shares of any issuer whose shares are listed that may 
be owned by all foreign investors (in all categories, whether residents or non-residents) in 
aggregate is 49%, including interests under swaps. 
4) The maximum proportion of the shares of any issuer whose shares are listed that may 
be owned by QFIs and approved QFI clients is 20%.  
5) The maximum proportion of the shares of all issuers whose shares are listed that may 
be owned by QFIs and approved QFI clients in aggregate is 10% by market value, 
including any interests under swaps.195 
These limitations as outlined in the Rules restrict the investments of foreign investors. 
While Saudi Arabia has opened its stock market for foreign investors, the Kingdom still places 
limitations on foreign investors’ stakes in the market generally, as well as in any given individual 
                                                          
190 Qualified Foreign Financial Institutions Investment in Listed Shares Rules, art. 6(b) 1. 
191 Id. 
192 Id. at 2. 
193 Id. at (c). 
194 “QFI” stands for Qualified Foreign Investors. 
195 Qualified Foreign Financial Institutions Investment in Listed Shares Rules, art. 21, 1-5. 
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company. For example, the Rules set a limit that no foreign investor may have a stake that 
exceeds 49% of a listed company; this prevents foreign investors from becoming the controlling 
shareholders of a company listed on the Saudi market. Moreover, foreign investors and their 
qualified clients jointly may not own more than 10% of the market value of the shares of any 
listed companies. The Rules place an ownership ceiling on listed shares of a company of no more 
than 5% for any given foreign investor; this means that each qualified foreign investor and his or 
her qualified clients may own no more than 20% of a listed company.196 This 20% limit prevents 
a foreign investor and his or her clients from having the opportunity to control a company. 
3. The question of whether a foreign parent company may establish a 
subsidiary company in Saudi and acquire listed companies 
One might ask whether a foreign company may establish or form a subsidiary in Saudi 
Arabia, and then, as a Saudi subsidiary company, acquire more than 49% of a listed company 
without triggering limitations placed on foreigners by the Capital Market Authority. The answer 
is that this mechanism would not work and would be prevented by the Saudi Capital Market 
Authority. The Foreign Investment Law 2000197 defines a foreign investor as a natural person 
who does not hold a Saudi nationality, or as an entity that is not 100% owned by Saudi natural 
persons.198 Even the certificate of the company labels the company as a foreign company, not as 
a Saudi company. This means that a subsidiary of a foreign parent formed in Saudi will not be 
considered a Saudi company that may acquire freely in the Saudi stock market; rather, such a 
subsidiary will fall under the Capital Market Authority’s rules regarding foreign acquisition of 
Saudi stock. 
                                                          
196 Id. at 1 and 4. 
197 Royal Decree No. (M/1) dated 5/1/1421H (Corresponding to 10/4/2000AD). 
198 Saudi Investment Law, art. 1. 
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D. The Qualified Foreign Institutions Investment in Listed Shares Rules and 
their affect on M&A  
Even though the Rules state that they (the Qualified Foreign Financial Institutions 
Investment in Listed Shares Rules) shall be read in conjunction with other regulations, such as 
the M&A Regulation,199, 200 the author notes that the M&A Regulation does not apply to 
qualified foreign investors. The M&A Regulation only applies to offers that are controlling 
(which this paper asserts are approximately 30% of all offers),201 and the Rules state that no 
foreign investor can own more than 5% of a listed company, and that qualified foreign investors 
and their qualified clients jointly can own no more than 20% of a listed company. Therefore, the 
M&A Regulation—which only applies in cases involving ownership percentages higher than 
20%—cannot apply to qualified foreign investors. Put a different way, the mandatory offer 
required by the M&A Regulation will not apply or be triggered, nor will the permissible offer be 
triggered, unless an acquisition offer exceeds 50% of the target company; likewise, the 
permissible offer is triggered only if the offer or purchase request exceeds 30% of the 
target/acquired company.202 Therefore, if the M&A Regulation does not apply to qualified 
foreign investors, then the Capital Market Authority will need special rules to regulate stock 
purchases made by foreign investors. 
E. Policy 
The restrictions placed on ownership of listed companies in the Saudi stock market 
suggest that the Kingdom is not aiming to invite outside cash and capital into Saudi. In fact, the 
Saudi Capital Market Authority states its objectives for opening its stock market to foreign 
                                                          
199 Qualified Foreign Financial Institutions Investment in Listed Shares Rules, art. 1-2. 
200 Qualified foreign investors and their clients fall under the listing rules for conditions such as reportable 
ownerships when they own 5% of a listed company. See Listing Rules, art. 45(a) 1. 




investors. The Capital Market Authority states five main objectives: enhancing institutional 
investments in the Saudi stock market, transferring sophisticated experience and knowledge to 
the investors in the Saudi market, raising the level of required disclosures transparency and 
professionalism of listed companies, enhancing the Saudi market to help Saudi become a leader 
in the world market, and improving the evaluations and studies conducted about the Saudi stock 
market to produce fair evaluations and studies to dealers and investors.203 In other words, the 
Capital Market Authority aims to invite only those sophisticated foreign investors who can 
successfully complete the evaluation process required by the Qualified Foreign Financial 
Institutions Investment in Listed Shares Rules. This goal is supported by Saudi’s imposition of 
the minimum assets under management requirement of USD 5 billion,204 as well as by the 
requirement of five years of experience in securities activities.205 The goal of attracting only the 
most sophisticated foreign investors is further bolstered by the requirement that investors 
originate from countries that apply standards similar to those being applied by the Saudi Capital 
Market Authority.206 
F. Legislative issue 
The Qualified Foreign Financial Institutions Investment in Listed Shares Rules state that 
the Capital Market Authority has the right to exempt an applicant partially or totally from the 
Rules. Consider the following language: 
The Authority may waive a provision of these Rules in whole or in part as it applies to an 
applicant, a QFI or any of their clients[,] or an authorized person[,] either on an 
                                                          
203 Objectives of Opening the Saudi Stock Market for Foreign Investment, a paper provided by the Capital Market 
Authority, 2, available at http://www.cma.org.sa/En/Documents/QFIBrochure-EN-Web.pdf (last visited December 
20, 2015). See also The Capital Market Authority Chairman’s statement about the goals of Saudi Arabia in opening 
its stock market to foreign investors, available at http://www.cma.org.sa/En/MediaCenter/PR/Pages/Chairman-
statement-on-QFI.aspx (last visited December 20, 2015). 
204 Qualified Foreign Financial Institutions Investment in Listed Shares Rules, art. 6(d). 
205 Id. at 1. 
206 Id. at (a) 2. 
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application from any of the aforementioned persons or on the Authority's own 
initiative.207 
The Article gives the Capital Market Authority unlimited discretion to waive and exempt 
any applicant the Authority designates from having to comply with the Rules. The Article does 
not state what exceptions the Authority may make or in which areas the Authority might be 
flexible. By definition, laws and rules are meant to be general and abstract, and to not 
discriminate amongst parties or give an advantage to one party over another. The Article just 
noted, which gives the CMA discretion to pick and choose whether to enforce the Rules, raises 
the potential for inequality, vagueness and lack of objectivity among investors and applicants. 
Therefore, the Article should either be eliminated or amended to provide more specific details 
about why and when exceptions and exemptions may be needed, about which areas and issues 
may be exempted, and about the process for obtaining an exemption or exception.  
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This chapter introduces the activities of Saudi Arabia’s business organizations and 
highlights the volume of mergers and acquisitions (M&A) transactions in Saudi that require 
advanced regulation. The chapter addresses the role that M&A plays in the Saudi economy and 
evaluates the importance of this activity to the overall economy. 
Section 3.2 of this chapter illustrates Saudi Arabia’s business organizations, and Section 
3.3 presents the value of Saudi’s exports. Section 3.4 discusses how Saudi Arabia’s debt has 
been decreasing every year since 1999. Section 3.5 introduces Saudi’s business activities. 
Section 3.6 details the increase in the number of listed companies critical to M&A activity in 
Saudi, and Section 3.7 addresses the strength and liquidity of the Saudi stock market. Section 3.8 
addresses the role of family businesses in Saudi Arabia; Section 3.9 addresses the role, number 
and economic size of closely held corporations in Saudi that impact M&A activities in the 
Kingdom. The volume and impact of foreign investment and cash flowing into and out of Saudi 
Arabia are addressed in Section 3.10. Section 3.11 describes the business councils in Saudi 
Arabia that facilitate business among foreign and Saudi investors, while Section 3.12 discusses 
business sectors that are growing within Saudi Arabia. Finally, Section 3.13 lists the number of 
M&A transactions that have occurred in Saudi in recent years.  
§3.2. Business organizations 
A. Introduction 
Business organizations in Saudi Arabia were once governed by the Companies Law of 
1965 (the Saudi Companies Law 1965),209 which comprises 232 articles and numerous 
                                                          




amendments that regulate many different kinds of organizations. As noted, the first Saudi 
Companies Law was enacted in 1965.210 While some scholars211 have long considered the 1965 
law to be outdated, it took more than 6 years for a draft of the second Saudi Companies Law (the 
Saudi Companies Law 2015) to be approved by the Ministers Council.212 The Saudi Companies 
Law 2015 was issued on November 9, 2015.213, 214 
B. General rules for companies 
The Saudi Companies Law 1965 acknowledges a specific list of certain types of business 
organizations, along with those that are well known in Islamic Law.215 Any other type of 
business organization was considered null and void, according to provisions in Articles 1 and 2 
of the Saudi Companies Law 1965: 
Article (1): 
A company is defined as a contract under which two or more persons undertake to 
participate in an enterprise for profit, by contributing a share in the form of money or 
work, with a view to dividing any profits (realized) or losses (incurred) as a result of such 
enterprise.216, 217 
                                                          
210 Ministry of Commerce and Industry, available at 
http://www.mci.gov.sa/en/LawsRegulations/SystemsAndRegulations/CompaniesSystem/Pages/16-1.aspx (last 
visited December 29, 2015). 
211 See Alsubaie, Mohammed Bin Fahad Aljiday, Corporate crimes committed during the phase of incorporation of 
companies in Saudi Arabia: A legal analysis, 6, 7, 236, 237 (Doctor of Philosophy thesis, Faculty of Law, 
University of Wollongong, 2012), available at http://ro.uow.edu.au/theses/3669/ (last visited January 2, 2016). 
212 See Abulslam Albalwye, Alshura (the Consultative Council) approves the draft of the Saudi Companies Law, 
stressing taking into consideration the Islamic rules governing loans, in Arabic, Alriyadh Newspaper, Issue No. 
15582, February 21, 2011, available at http://www.alriyadh.com/606824. (last visited December 29, 2015). 
213 The Ministry of Commerce and Industry’s website, available at 
https://mci.gov.sa/en/MediaCenter/News/Pages/09-11-15-01.aspx (last visited December 29, 2015). 
214 Because the Saudi Companies Law 2015 has not been translated, this paper will translate the articles relevant to 
the topic in a way that reflects the exact meaning in Arabic. Also, since there are many articles that have not been 
changed from the Saudi Companies Law 1965, or were only slightly restructured without changing the substance of 
the law, the translation of the articles of the Saudi Companies Law 2015 might have similarities with the translation 
of the Saudi Companies Law 1965, or with the future translation of the Saudi Companies Law 2015. The translation 
of the language of the Saudi Companies Law 2015 addressed here reflects how the articles should read. The 
improper translation of some Articles or words in the Saudi Companies Law 1965 is addressed when found to be the 
case. 
215 The Saudi Companies Law 1965, art. 2. 
216 Id. 




The provisions of this Law, as well as such conditions laid down by the Partners and such 
customary rules that are consistent with this Law, shall apply to the following companies: 
A. 1) General partnership; 2) Limited partnership; 3) Joint venture; 4) Joint-stock 
corporation; 5) Partnership limited by shares; 6) Limited liability partnership; 7) 
company with variable capital; and 8) Cooperative company. Without prejudice to such 
companies known in Islamic jurisprudence, any company that does not assume one of the 
mentioned forms shall be (considered) null and void, and the persons who have made 
contracts in its name shall be personally and jointly liable for the obligations arising from 
such a contract.218  
C. Types of business organizations 
The Saudi Companies Law 2015 retains the rule set out in the 1965 law that states that a 
company that does not take one of the forms prescribed in (3) of Article 3 shall be considered 
null.219 As the Saudi Companies Law 1965 states, a corporation that was formed not in 
accordance with either the Companies Law 1965 or Islamic Law would be declared null and void 
by the Companies Law 1965, and the individuals or entities that formed it would be held jointly 
liable for any company-related obligations.220 
However, the Saudi Companies Law 2015 limits the number of permitted types of 
company to just five, whereas the 1965 law recognizes eight.221 The Saudi Companies Law 2015 
states that companies that incorporate in the kingdom must take one of the following forms: (a) 
general partnership; (b) limited partnership; (c) special partnership;222 (d) joint-stock; (e) limited 
liability.223 
Thus, the Saudi Companies Law 2015 cancels three types of companies that are listed in 
the Saudi Companies Law 1965: partnership limited by shares, company with variable capital 
                                                          
218 The Saudi Companies Law 1965, art. 2. 
219 The Saudi Companies Law 2015, art. 3 (3). 
220 The Saudi Companies Law 1965, art. 2. 
221 The Saudi Companies Law 2015, art. 3 (1). 
222 The English translation of the term “special partnership” as “joint venture” in the Saudi Companies Law 1965, 
Article 2 is not accurate. Joint ventures are completely different from partnerships. 
223 The Saudi Companies Law 2015, art. 3 (1). 
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and cooperative company.224 The Saudi Companies Law 2015 dedicates individual chapters for 
each type of company that it does recognize according to the following rubric: the general 
partnership is addressed in Chapter 2, Articles 17 to 37; the limited partnership is addressed in 
Chapter 3, Articles 38 to 42; the special partnership is addressed in Chapter 4, Articles 43 to 51; 
the joint stock company is addressed in Chapter 5, Articles 52 to 150; and the limited liability 
company is addressed in Chapter 6, Articles 151 to 182. 
The Saudi Companies Law 2015 makes amendments to the joint stock category with 
respect to the minimum amount of capital required; namely, the 2015 law reduces this amount to 
SAR 500,000225 (equivalent to approximately USD 133,000).226 The 2015 law also makes 
amendments to both joint stock and limited liability companies with respect to the minimum 
number of shareholders or persons required to establish a company.227, 228 
In order to fully illustrate the differences between the two laws in this regard, the author 
provides the following excerpt from a review of the 1965 law conducted by a law firm;229 it 
provides a brief picture of permissible business organizations according to the Saudi Companies 
Law 1965: 
1. Collective name partnerships, or general partnerships (Arabic: sharikat al-tadamun, 
French: société en nom collectif), which are partnerships as the term is understood in 
Common Law jurisdictions, with all partners being fully liable for the partnership’s debts 
(Companies Regulation, Articles 16 to 35). 
                                                          
224 See The Saudi Companies Law 2015, art. 3 (3) and the Saudi Companies Law 1965, art. 2. 
225 The Saudi Companies Law 2015, art. 54. 
226 Khalid Al-Abdulkareem, Omar Rashid, Mansoor Alhagbani, Majid Al-Sheikh, Sahel Mughal, Daniel Royle, 
Badria Modir, New Saudi Arabian Companies Law, Clifford Chance Law Firm, Client Briefing, November 11, 
2015, available at http://www.cliffordchance.com/briefings/2015/11/new_saudi_arabiancompanieslaw.html (last 
visited December 29, 2015). 
227 Id. 
228 See also The Saudi Companies Law 2015, Articles 2 and 55 for Joint-stock Company and Article 154 for Limited 
Liability Company. 
229 Hatem Abbas Ghazzawi & Co. This was only the law firm the author could identify that provided a relatively 
comprehensive description of company structures under the previous Saudi Companies Law 1965. 
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2. Simple commandite partnerships, or limited partnerships (Arabic: sharikat al-tawsiya, 
al basita, French: société en commandite simple), which consist of at least one general 
name[d] partner who is responsible to the extent of his entire fortune for the partnership’s 
debts, and at least one limited and unnamed partner who is responsible for the 
partnership’s debts to the extent of his interest in the partnership’s capital (Companies 
Regulation, Articles 36 to 39). 
3. Joint ventures (Arabic: sharikat al mahasu, French: société en participations), which 
have no legal personality and which may be formed without this being publici[z]ed 
(Companies Regulation, Articles 40 to 47). 
4. Joint stock companies (Arabic: sharikat al musahama, French: société[ ]anonyme), 
which are the equivalent of the Common Law public limited company (Companies 
Regulation, Articles 48 to 148). 
5. Share commandite companies (Arabic: sharikat al-tawsiyabi’lashum, French: société 
en commandite par actions), which consist of at least one general shareholder who is 
responsible to the extent of his entire fortune for the company’s debts, and at least four 
limited shareholders who are responsible for the company’s debts to the extent of their 
interest in the company’s capital (Companies Regulation, Articles 149 to 156). 
6. Limited liability companies (Arabic: al-sharikadhatmas’uliyya al mahdudah, French: 
société à responsibilité limitée), which are the equivalent of Common Law limited 
liability companies (Companies Regulation, Articles 158 to 180). 
7. Variable capital companies (Arabic: al-sharikadhatras al mal al qabil li tarir, French: 
société au capital variable), which are companies which provide in their articles of 
association or bylaws that their capital may be increased by additional payments made by 
the shareholders or by the admission of new shareholders, or that their capital may be 
reduced by withdrawal of shareholders’ shares from the capital (Companies Regulation, 
Article 181 to 188). 
8. Co-operative companies (Arabic: al-sharikata’awuniyya), which are joint stock 
companies or limited liability companies[,] which are incorporated as co-operatives 
(Companies Regulation, Articles 189 to 209).230 
D. The difference between joint-stock and limited liability companies  
Joint-stock companies are governed by the joint-stock company provision, which is 
outlined in Chapter 5 of the Saudi Companies Law 2015. Limited liability companies are 
governed by the limited liability company provision, which is outlined in Chapter 6 of the Saudi 
Companies Law 2015. Although the rules for joint-stock and limited liability companies are 
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similar, there are some differences. One of the main differences is that according to the Saudi 
Companies Law 2015, the limited liability company may have a maximum of 50 shareholders,231 
while the joint-stock company does not have this limitation. If the number of shareholders of a 
limited liability company exceeds 50 shareholders, the limited liability company shall transform 
into a joint-stock company within a year, or the limited liability company shall end its operations 
according to the law.232 Another difference is that while the limited liability company’s area of 
business operations cannot be in finance, banking, insurance, investment and certain other 
business areas,233 joint-stock companies have no such restrictions.  
Yet a third difference is that the Saudi Companies Law 2015 enumerates conditions that a 
shareholder in a limited liability company must meet if he or she wants to sell shares: the seller 
must inform the other shareholders of the intent to sell and provide them the opportunity to buy 
such shares within 30 days.234 If none of the shareholders so informed exercises this right, the 
selling shareholder may sell his or her stock to any third party.235 However, a joint-stock 
company, per the Saudi Companies Law 2015, may restrict the trading of its shares, unless such 
restriction would mean an absolute prohibition of the trading of the company’s shares.236 In other 
words, while the 2015 law explicitly stipulates preemptive rights (also known as first refusal 
rights) for limited liability companies,237 it does not stipulate these rights for joint-stock 
companies, although they may be included in the joint-stock company’s bylaws.238 
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Also, while the limited liability company can be managed by one or two managers and a 
board of directors,239 a joint-stock company must be managed by a board of directors containing 
a minimum of three directors.240 A limited liability company cannot issue tradable certificates,241 
whereas a joint-stock company may issue tradable share certificates.242 The shareholders of the 
limited liability company will be held personally liable if the person or persons running the 
company do not separate their personal lives from the company’s business affairs.243 In this 
dissertation, the author will focus on M&A transactions between joint-stock companies. 
E. Joint-stock and limited liability companies established by one person  
Article 2 of the Saudi Companies Law 2015 provides—for all types of companies—that a 
company is a contract between two or more persons that binds each one of them to make a 
contribution of money or services, or a combination of the two, in a project for the purpose of 
generating profits, and that these parties shall divide any profits and losses that may result from 
the project.244 That means that the minimum number of persons required to establish any 
company is two. The Saudi Companies Law 1965 also requires a minimum number of persons 
for each company—five shareholders for a joint-stock company245 and two for a limited liability 
company.246 Thus, one can see that the 2015 law changes the requirement for the number of 
shareholders required for the joint-stock company from five (in the 1965 law) to two, according 
to Article 2 of the 2015 law.247 
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The Saudi Companies Law 2015 permits the joint-stock company to be established by 
one shareholder, which provides an exception to Article 2.248 Specifically, the law states that it is 
permissible for the government, public persons, wholly governmentally-owned companies and 
companies with capital of no less than SAR 5 million (equivalent to approximately USD 1.3 
million) to establish a joint-stock company with one shareholder; this shareholder shall have 
authority over the general assembly meetings, including authority over the founding assembly.249 
This means that if a joint-stock company held by one shareholder fails to meet the conditions 
prescribed in Article 55 of the 2015 law, the shareholder must adjust the company to comply 
with Article 55 or convert the company into a limited liability company; otherwise, by law the 
company must be dismantled.250 
Article 154 of the Saudi Companies Law 2015 permits a limited liability company to be 
established and held by one person. This is another exception to Article 2 of the 2015 law; this 
exception (again) makes it permissible for a limited liability company to be established by one 
person, or to have all of its shares devolve to one person; in such a case, the liability for that 
person shall be equal to the amount of money that person dedicated as the company’s capital.251 
The Saudi Companies Law 2015 places some restrictions on acquisitions for limited 
liabilities companies held by one person.252 The Saudi Companies Law 2015 states that in any 
case, it is prohibited for a natural person to establish or own more than one limited liability 
company held by one person, and it is also prohibited for a limited liability company held by one 
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person (public or natural person) to establish or own more than one limited liability company 
held by one person.253  
F. Holding companies 
The Saudi Companies Law 2015 includes rules governing holding companies and 
subsidiaries,254 while the Saudi Companies Law 1965 does not. The 2015 law defines the holding 
company as: (1) a joint-stock or limited liability company that aims to control other companies; 
or (2) a joint-stock or limited liability company with named subsidiaries that is formed through 
the ownership of more than half of the capital of such companies or through control of the 
election of the company’s board.255 
The Saudi Companies Law 2015 states that it is prohibited for the subsidiary to own 
shares or in-kind stakes in the holding company, and that any action that results in the transfer of 
shares or stakes in kind from the holding company to the subsidiary shall be null.256 
§3.3. Saudi Arabia’s Exports 
The value of Saudi Arabia’s oil exports decreased from USD 285 billion in 2014 to USD 
157 billion in 2015 due to a decline in oil prices.257 The value of Saudi Arabia’s non-oil exports 
was USD 47 billion in 2015.258 The value of Saudi’s imports was approximately USD 141 billion 
in 2015.259 In 2014, Saudi economic growth had increased 3.5% versus 2013;260 however, 
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economic growth then decreased in 2015 by 3.4%.261 In 2015, Saudi’s total revenues were USD 
162 billion (SAR 608 billion). Of this total, revenues from oil contributed 73%, a decrease versus 
2014.262 The remaining 23% of total revenues in 2015 came from non-oil products, which 
represents a 29% growth in non-oil revenue compared to 2014, and this change reflects the steps 
Saudi has taken at a national level to diversify the country’s sources of revenue.263 
§3.4. Saudi Arabia’s Debt 
Saudi Arabia’s debt in relation to its GDP has steadily declined since 1999.264 Starting at 
103.50% of Saudi’s total GDP in 1999,265 the debt declined over the next decade all the way 
down to 13.2% of GDP in 2008.266 After a slight bump back up to 15.9% in 2009, the debt 
decreased each year until 2015, posting the following numbers: 9.8% in 2010, 6.1% in 2011,267 
3.7% in 2012,268 2.2% in 2013 and 1.6 in 2014.269 In 2015, Saudi’s debt increased to 5.8% of 
total GDP, rising from approximately USD 2 billion to USD 37 billion.270  
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§3.5. Business activities in Saudi Arabia 
This excerpt from the 2015 Saudi Arabia Monetary Agency (SAMA)’s annual report 
provides a high-level look at the robust condition of Saudi Arabia’s commercial and industrial 
sectors: 
The commerce and industry sectors continued to record remarkable growth rates. During 
2014, the Ministry of Commerce and Industry issued commercial registers for the 
establishment of 11,986 new different companies, increasing by 25.7 percent from 9,533 
companies established in 2013.The number of commercial registers issued for companies 
up to the end of 2014 reached 103.6 thousand, spreading over the various regions of the 
Kingdom in varied shares. [The] Riyadh region accounted for the largest share with 39.2 
percent, followed by [the] Makkah region with 27.2 percent, and the Eastern region with 
20.7 percent of the total number of commercial registers issued for the establishment of 
companies up to the end of 2014. As for industry, the Ministry of Commerce and 
Industry issued industrial licenses issued [sic] for this year. At the end of 2014, the total 
cumulative number of industrial units existing in the Kingdom licensed by the Ministry 
of Commerce and Industry under the Protection and Encouragement of National 
Industries' Law and Foreign Investment Law rose to 6,871 producing industrial units with 
a total finance of SAR 993.3 billion, providing nearly 935.3 thousand jobs. A breakdown 
of the producing industrial units by type of industrial activity and total finance indicates 
that the total finance for chemical materials and products [from] manufacturing 
accounted for 674 industrial units with a capital amounting to SAR 456.0 billion[,] or 
45.9 percent of the total finance of the existing units in the Kingdom, followed by the 
industry of coke and refined oil products[,] for 140 industrial units with SAR 140.9 
billion or 14.2 percent of total finance.271 
According to the Washington Post, an estimated 90 percent of companies in Saudi Arabia are 
family owned/run companies, while only 70 percent of companies in the European Union are 
family owned.272 The prevalence of family-owned businesses in Saudi Arabia and their 
importance for the Saudi economy will be discussed in more detail later in this chapter. 
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§3.6. Listed companies 
The Saudi stock market started in the 1930s and by 1975, the stock market had 14 listed 
companies.273 By 2012, the number of listed companies reached 158,274 and this number 
expanded to 166 by 2014, according to the Capital Market Authority’s report of 2014.275 The 
number of initial public offerings was 5 in 2014 in the total amount of SAR 25.2 billion 
(equivalent to approximately USD 6 billion).276 The number of listed companies in 2015 reached 
171.277  
§3.7. The growth of the stock market in Saudi Arabia in 2015 Report 
The following excerpt from the 2015 SAMA report explains the rise of trading in the 
Saudi stock market: 
[The Tadawul All Share Index] TASI closed at 8,333.3 at the end of 2014 compared to 
8,535.6 at the end of 2013, which represented a slight decline of 2.4 percent. TASI 
registered its highest closing point of 11,149.4 on September 9, 2014. The market 
capitalization of issued shares increased by 3.4 percent to SAR 1,812.9 billion at the end 
of 2014 from SAR 1,752.9 billion at the end of the preceding year. The number of shares 
traded during 2014 went up by 34.1 percent to 70.1 billion from 52.3 billion in the 
preceding year (not adjusted to account for corporate actions). The total value of shares 
traded increased by 56.7 percent to SAR 2,146.5 billion from SAR 1,369.7 billion in the 
preceding year. The number of transactions also went up by 23.5 percent to 35.8 million 
in 2014 from 29.0 million in the preceding year […]. The daily average value of traded 
shares was SAR 8.6 billion in 2014 compared to SAR 5.5 billion in the preceding year, 
rising by 55.5 percent. The daily average number of traded shares increased by 31.2 
percent to 283.2 million in 2014 from 215.8 million in the previous year. The daily 
average number of executed transactions also went up by 22.5 percent to 143.0 thousand 
from 116.8 thousand in 2013.The value of shares traded through the internet in 2014 
totaled SAR 1,483.1 billion compared to SAR 942.6 billion in the preceding year, 
increasing by 57.3 percent and accounting for 69.1 percent of the total value of shares 
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traded during 2014 compared to 68.8 percent in the preceding year. Their number rose by 
35.9 percent to 49.4 billion in 2014 from 36.3 billion in 2013, accounting for 69.7 percent 
of the total number of shares traded in 2014 against 69.4 percent in the preceding year. 
The number of transactions executed through the internet increased by 25.2 percent to 
27.1 million in 2014 from 21.6 million in the previous year, representing 75.7 percent of 
the total number of transactions executed in 2014 against 74.6 percent during the 
preceding year […].278 
The value of the Saudi stock market in January 2015 was SAR 1,917,73 trillion (equivalent to 
approximately USD 511,660 billion).279 
§3.8. Family Businesses in Saudi Arabia 
The structure of society in Saudi Arabia is based mostly on families and tribes. Both the 
Arab News and the Economic Times have referred to the Jeddah Chamber of Commerce’s 
statement that family businesses produce 25% of Saudi Arabia’s gross domestic product, which 
amounts to SAR 350 billion280 (equivalent to approximately USD 93 billion). These publications 
also stated that there are 5,000 family companies in Saudi, while only 156 are listed on the Saudi 
stock market.281 A family business in Saudi Arabia normally starts as a small business, which 
then grows in size until it becomes a business group; often this type of growth occurs after the 
founder dies. The business may ultimately result in many spin-offs, such as has been the case 
with the Al-Rajihi group and many other similar family businesses.282 The Ministry of 
Commerce and Industry published a manual on its website titled Guidelines of Family 
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Companies’ Governance Project.283 It appears that this project will offer guidelines to help 
family companies run their businesses in a professional way.  
§3.9. Closely Held Corporations 
The number of closely held companies in Saudi Arabia has been growing in recent 
years.284 This growth may be attributed to a gradual shift toward this structure instead of the 
traditional family-owned structure, given the issues and disputes that often arise for companies 
during their formation, particularly for companies other than joint-stock companies (listed and 
unlisted), and especially for family businesses or family corporations. When the founder (usually 
the family father) of a family-owned business dies, disputes often arise regarding how many 
shares each son is entitled to, who can sell shares, and many other issues that may take years to 
resolve. Negotiating the fair division of the business, which is ultimately the goal, can cause 
disputes that may damage the company’s reputation if the disagreements become public. It seems 
that the Minister of Commerce and Industry (MOCI) has realized that family-owned businesses 
must evolve toward a more modern form, and that the structure of a closely held company may 
be more optimal than that of a family-owned company.285 Therefore, the MOCI has encouraged 
the transition to the structure of the closely held company by facilitating the process of becoming 
one.286 Closely held companies in Saudi Arabia numbered 700 in 2014, with total capital of SAR 
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240 billion (equivalent to USD 64 billion).287 From February 2012 to January 2015, more than 
35 entities incorporated as closely held companies, and more than 72 companies transitioned into 
closely held companies.288 Even for a market the size of the Saudi market, this can be considered 
evidence of a growing trend toward closely held companies.  
However, currently, the Saudi Companies Law 2015 does not refer to unlisted (closely 
held) corporations, although they are covered by the joint stock provisions that are contained in 
the Saudi Companies Law. The current Companies Law 2015 does not even mention the word 
“closely”; indeed, the word itself is not commonly used in Saudi Arabia. There was a ministerial 
decision made in 2008 by the Minister of Commerce and Industry, which stated that if a 
company wants to transition into a closely held company, it must follow the rules regarding the 
process of establishing a publicly held company in compliance with the Companies Law 1965.289 
This meant that the Companies Law 1965 would apply to closely held companies, and that they 
would be under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Commerce and Industry.290 Now, closely held 
corporations are covered by the joint stock chapter (Chapter 5) of the Saudi Companies Law 
2015. 
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§3.10. Foreign Investment in Saudi Arabia 
In 2000, Saudi Arabia enacted the Foreign Investment Law to improve its commercial 
sectors and effect major changes.291 Then and now, Saudi Arabia has continued to be the third 
largest recipient of foreign investment of all the countries in its region; Turkey receives the most 
foreign investment, and the UAE is second, according to a World Bank report from 2015.292 This 
report also states that Saudi Arabia is the most accessible MENA293 country for investment and 
is number 11 on the list of the world’s most accessible countries in which to do business.294 
While financial flows from foreign investors into Saudi Arabia have decreased by 24 percent to 
USD 9.3 billion over the past few years, Saudi is still considered the third largest economy on 
the Arabian Peninsula in terms of foreign investment.295 Barron’s magazine provides an example 
of one foreign investment in Saudi Arabia in the amount of USD 210 million that occurred in the 
form of a joint venture between one of the largest gold mining companies in the world (Barrick 
Gold) and Ma’aden, which is controlled by the Saudi government.296 Saudi Arabia has opened its 
stock market—which is currently valued (the total value of all of its listed companies) at 
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approximately USD 531 billion and trades USD 2 billion a day—to foreign investment, making 
it the second largest emerging market behind China.297 
An article in the Washington Post entitled “Join the family firm” touched upon foreign 
investment in Saudi Arabia and emphasized that Shell Oil wanted to invest in Riyadh but failed 
to do so because it did not partner with a local Saudi investor.298 Investing successfully in Saudi 
Arabia requires certain kinds of crucial information and know-how that only a local investor 
could understand and share.299 The article also mentioned Muhammad Alrajhi, whose business is 
a spinoff of his brothers’ group; Alrajhi’s spinoff consists of three steel factories with the 
capacity to produce 250 million tons of steel every year.300 Currently, the Alrajhi group has 
partnered with the Swiss group Mövenpick in a joint venture to develop several groups of 
hotels.301 There are 726,000 operating facilities in Saudi owned by Saudis, compared to 5,195 
entities owned by foreigners,302 and 1,815 entities that are shared between Saudis and 
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foreigners.303 In 2014, there were 155,106 Certificates of Incorporation on file in Saudi 
Arabia.304 Approximately 4,000 Certificates are issued each year.305 
 
Table 3.1 
Operating establishments by capital & administrative area306 
Operating establishments by capital ownership Administrative Area 
Saudi Foreign Joint Total 
183,592 1,544 663 185,799 Riyadh 1 
179,853 1,560 458 181,853 Makkah 2 
46,748 110 52 46,910 Madinah 3 
41,670 35 41 41,746 Qassim 4 
112,876 495 335 113,706 [Eastern Provinces] 5 
46,201 201 30 46,432 Asir 6 
22,002 130 52 22,184 Tabuk 7 
22,495 66 18 22,579 Hail 8 
8,262 5 1 8,268 North Border 9 
26,624 825 117 27,566 Jazan 10 
13,325 28 2 13,355 Najran 11 
8,777 1 6 8,784 Al-Baha 12 
13,875 195 40 14,110 Al-Jouf 13 
762,282 5,195 1,815 733,292  Total  
 
  
                                                          
303 Id. 
304 This is the number of Certificates of Incorporation that were already on file in 2014. 
305 The Ministry of Commerce and Industry’s website in Arabic, available at 
http://www.mci.gov.sa/MediaCenter/Reports/Statistics/Pages/stat-063.aspx. See also The Ministry of Commerce and 
Industry Report 2014, 27 and 37, available at http://mci.gov.sa/MediaCenter/Achievements/Documents/report-
2014.pdf (last visited February 29, 2016). 




FDI flows, by region and economy, 2008-2014, according to the (UNCTAD) 2015 Report307 




























































































































































(Amounts shown are in millions of USD) 
 
Table 3.3 
FDI stock, by region and economy, for the years 1990, 2000, 2013 and 2014, according to the 
(UNCTAD) 2015 Report308 
 FDI inward stock FDI outward stock 
1990 2000 2013 2014 1990 2000 2013 2014 
Saudi 
Arabia 
15,193a 17,577 208,330a 215,909 2,328a 5,285a 39,303a 44,699 
(Amounts shown are in millions of USD) 
  
                                                          




§3.11. Business Councils 
Business councils play a crucial role in facilitating foreign investment in Saudi Arabia. 
Business councils, with the permission of the Ministry of Commerce and Industry, were 
established between Saudi Arabia and other countries, allowing businesspeople from each 
country to fund these councils to facilitate their businesses.309 There are 33 business councils in 
Saudi Arabia:  
1- Saudi – Japanese Business Council 
2- Saudi – Algerian Business Council 
3- Saudi – Ukrainian Business Council 
4- Saudi – Tunisian Business Council 
5- Saudi – Moroccan Business Council 
6- Saudi – Indian Business Council 
7- Saudi – Singapore Business Council 
8- Saudi – Italian Business Council 
9- Saudi – Bahraini Business Council 
10- Saudi – Czech Business Council 
11- Saudi – French Business Council 
12- Saudi – Egyptian Business Council 
13- Saudi – Russian Business Council 
14- Saudi – Swiss Business Council 
15- Saudi –Turkish Business Council 
16- Saudi – Filipino Business Council 
                                                          
309 Ministry of Commerce and Industry’s website, available at 
http://www.mci.gov.sa/en/AboutMinistry/Pages/CoordinatingCouncils.aspx. (last visited December 15, 2015). 
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17- Saudi – Korean Business Council 
18- Saudi – Polish Business Council 
19- Saudi – Syrian Business Council 
20- Saudi – South African Business Council 
21- Saudi – Lebanese Business Council 
22- Saudi – Yemeni Business Council 
23- Saudi – Jordanian Business Council 
24- Saudi – Omani Business Council 
25- Saudi – Sudanese Business Council 
26- Saudi – Kazakhstani Business Council 
27- Saudi – Qatari Business Council 
28- Saudi – Canadian Business Council 
29- Saudi – Spanish Business Council 
30- Saudi – Pakistani Business Council 
31- Saudi – Malaysian Business Council 
32- Saudi – Chinese Business Council 
33- Saudi – British Business Council.310 
§3.12. Business sectors in Saudi Arabia (SA-US and Saudi-British Business Councils) 
A. In general 
The US-Saudi Arabian Business Council (USSABC), which was created in 1993, is a 
non-profit organization that promotes business and trades among Saudi and US companies and 




investors.311 The Saudi-British Joint Business Council (SBJBC), which was established in 1999, 
is a private organization that promotes business and trades among Saudi and UK companies and 
investors.312 
Many Saudi business sectors provide opportunities for foreign investors, including: 
healthcare and life sciences, consumer and luxury goods, power, including nuclear and 
renewable energy, oil, gas and petrochemicals, mining, defense and security, mass transport 
infrastructure including new rail, metro and bus links, financial and professional services, 
information and communications technologies, environmental technology and services, water 
and wastewater and education, training and human capital development.313 
B. Business sectors in Saudi Arabia314 
1. Construction and real estate 
Saudi Arabia has designated USD 630 billion to complete 1000 projects in construction, 
making it the largest construction market among the Gulf States (GCC) at 42%, with an 
estimated yearly growth of 4% during the period from 2013 to 2017.315 Saudi also is planning to 
increase its spending on infrastructure to 30% by 2016.316 All of this suggests that Saudi Arabia 
is looking for companies in the infrastructural sector with which it can partner to develop the 
sector. 
                                                          
311 The U.S.-Saudi Arabian Business Council (USSABC)’s website, available at http://www.us-
sabc.org/i4a/pages/Index.cfm?pageID=3278 (last visited March 1, 2016). 
312 The Saudi British Joint Business Council (SBJBC)’s website, available at http://www.sbjbc.org/about-us/. See 
also http://www.saudiarabia.doingbusinessguide.co.uk/supporting-organisations/saudi-british-joint-business-council/ 
(last visited March 1, 2016). 
313 Doing Business in Saudi Arabia, the Guide, in association with the Saudi-British Council and Investment & 
Trade available at http://www.saudiarabia.doingbusinessguide.co.uk/the-guide/opportunities-in-saudi-arabia/.(last 
visited November 12, 2015). 
314 The author obtained some briefs about business activities in Saudi Arabia from the SA-US Business Council and 
summarized and presented them. The information provided in this paper for each sector is adapted from the briefs 
sent to the author by the Council with some added explanation. The author presents these briefs in the Appendix for 





2. Information and communications technology (ICT) 
Among the countries of the Middle East, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is considered to 
have the largest information and technology market, and the Kingdom has plans to educate its 
students and supply schools and universities with technologically advanced equipment.317 Some 
experts estimate that the government of Saudi Arabia invested USD 5.7 billion in the ICT market 
in 2014.318 Because Saudi Arabia has 54 million mobile phone users,319 it is an attractive country 
for mobile device investors in the Middle East. 
3. Medical, healthcare and pharmaceutical sectors 
In 2014, Saudi Arabia planned to establish 11 new hospitals and 11 medical centers.320 
Saudi Arabia designated USD 73 billion to build 117 hospitals, 750 primary care centers and 400 
emergency facilities that were to be completed by 2015.321 An additional 132 projects have 
already been put into construction.322 All of these planned and in-process projects indicate Saudi 
Arabia’s commitment to investing in and developing its healthcare sector. 
4. Petrochemicals and plastics 
ARAMCO, the Saudi National Oil Company, and Saudi Basic Industries Corporation 
(SABIC), a corporation of which the government owns 70%, are two of the world’s top 
companies in petrochemicals and gas.323 The National Industrial Clusters Development Program 
is a Saudi Arabian program initiated in 2008 to develop five types of manufacturing sectors: 
plastic packaging, consumer goods, construction, automotive, and metals and processing.324 The 











goal of this program was to make Saudi Arabia a desirable and attractive place for foreign 
investors to establish partnerships that would help Saudi develop its level of manufacturing and 
production to be more competitive globally. 
5. Power generation 
It has been estimated that the power sector in Saudi Arabia provides USD 91 billion in 
investment opportunities, which is a large portion of the USD 1.4 trillion total investment in 
power.325 Further investments in the power sector are expected until at least 2020.326 In addition, 
Saudi Arabia plans to develop and establish its nuclear power sector, aiming to build 16 nuclear 
reactors by 2032 at an expenditure of USD 7 billion per reactor.327 
6. Agriculture 
Since Saudi Arabia suffers from scarce water resources, it has started a plan to decrease 
its production of commodities that require a great deal of water—such as wheat—to 80%.328 This 
has caused Saudi Arabia to become one of the largest importers of food in the world.329 Thus, 
Saudi Arabia is an attractive country for investments in food products of almost every kind. 
§3.13. Mergers and Acquisitions in Saudi Arabia330 
One commercial aspect that has grown rapidly in Saudi Arabia is the field of M&A 
transactions. In conducting research for this dissertation, the author tracked M&A transactions 
that have been negotiated in Saudi Arabia from the beginning of 2014 until January 24, 2016 
through the website Argaam.com, which focuses on M&A transactions. The website is in 






330 This will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 6. 
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Arabic.331 Table 3.4 shows the monetary value represented by cross-border M&As. This data is 
from 2007 to 2014 and is taken from the 2015 report of the United Nations Conference on Trade 
and Development (UNCTAD). The author translated each piece in order to discern what type of 




Value of cross-border M&As by region/economy of seller/purchaser during the period from 2007 
to 2014 according to the (UNCTAD) 2015 Report332 
 Net sales (immediate acquired 
company) 








































































































































































(Amounts shown are in millions of US dollars) 
 
Tables 3.5 to 3.22 provide more details about M&A transactions in Saudi Arabia, which, 
as noted above, the author takes from Argaam.com. To reiterate, the author translated each 
                                                          
331 See Argaam’s website, available at http://www.argaam.com/company/mergerandacquisition/pageno/4 (last 
visited February 27, 2016). It is important to note that this number cannot be accurate, because there are no rules that 
require private companies to disclose their M&A transactions, which almost certainly means that Argaam’s reported 
numbers will be imprecise.  
332 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), World Investment Report 2015, supra note 
292, at 245. The number of Saudi cross-border M&As has recorded 230% in growth in 2015 according to 
UNCTAD’s estimate, which was not yet published at the time of the writing of this paper. Saudi cross-border M&A 
activity jumped to achieve 230% growth in 2015. See also Majed Aljameel, ALEQTISADIAH NEWSPAPER, Issue No. 





record from Argaam.com into English, checking what form of business is involved in each 
transaction, discerning what is meant when a transaction is considered a share of an 
establishment, and breaking down five charts that show different kinds of data for the years 
2013, 2014 and 2015. Note that the highlighted rows in these tables represent the acquiring 
company, while the target companies are the names that are not highlighted. The financial 
institution (Argaam) upon which the author relies refers, in many cases, to certain joint-stock 
companies that were publicly traded while not being listed with the Capital Market Authority, at 
least at the time the acquisitions were made. Note that the tables refer in some cases to 
transactions that are termed a “share of establishment”—in keeping with how they are cited on 
the website under M&A transactions—however, these transactions are not acquisitions, and they 
are clearly not mergers. This lack of clarity in the naming conventions on the Argaam website 
demonstrates that the concept of M&A is new to Saudi Arabia and some confusion about its 
technical and functional parameters remains, even at a time when M&A business in Saudi is 
growing rapidly and is expected to continue to grow dramatically in the years to come.333 
  
                                                          
333 In these charts, the first party listed in the “Company” column, in the box highlighted in gray, is the acquiring 
company, while the second party listed is the acquired company. For example, in Row 1 of Table 3.5 (Canceled 






























































































































































                                                          





Consummated transactions (Saudi-Saudi)335 
 Date 
(D/M/Y) 




1 2/12/2013 Makkah Construction and Development Co. Joint-stock (publicly 
held) 
S. A. Real Estate 
Development 
133 M E C 
Jerhm Development Co. (closed joint-stock company) S. A. Not Listed 
2 14/11/2013 Savola Group Joint-stock (publicly held) S. A. Food Industry 190 M A C 
Al Azizia Panda United Company Joint-stock (publicly held) S. A. Trade and Retail 
3 14/11/2013 Savola Group Joint-stock (publicly held) S. A. Food Industry 167 M A C 
Savola Foods (holding) S. A. Food Industry 
4 14/11/2014 Abdul Kadir Al Muhaidib and Sons Group (limited liability 
company) 
S. A. Industry 357 M - C 
Savola Group Joint-stock (publicly held) S. A. Food Industry 
5 31/10/2013 Stc S. A. Communications - A C 
Bravo (limited liability) S. A. Communications 
6 8/10/2013 Aseer Co. S. A. Investment 151 M A C 
Alessa Industries (closed joint-stock company) S. A. Industry 
7 26/9/2013 General Organization for Social Insurance S. A. Investment 23 M A C 
Cooperative Real Estate Investment Company Joint-stock 
(publicly held) 
S. A. Real Estate 
Development 
8 26/9/2013 Public Pension Agency S. A. Investment 23 M A C 
Cooperative Real Estate Investment Company Joint-stock 
(publicly held) 
S. A. Real Estate 
Development 
9 5/8/2013 Fawaz Alhokair Group (limited liability) S. A. Trade and Retail 11 M P C 
Al Azizia Panda United Company Joint-stock (publicly held) S. A. Trade and Retail 
10 20/4/2013 Eastern Province Cement Company Joint-stock (publicly held) S. A. Cement and Building 
Materials 
 A C 
Briansa Arabia Pre-made Concrete S. A. Cement and Building 
Materials 
11 20/4/2013 Manafea Holding Company (closed) S. A. Investment - A C 
First Markets Co. (limited liability) S. A. Trade and Retail 
12 6/4/2013 Al-Tayyar Travel Tourism and Cargo Co. Ltd. (limited liability) S. A. Hotels and Tourism 91 M A C 
Muthmerah Real Estate Investment S. A. Real Estate 
Development 
13 25/3/2013 Almarai Joint-stock (publicly held) S. A. Food Industry - E C 
Allied Farmers Company (limited liability) S. A. Agriculture 
14 17/3/2013 Amiantit (limited liability) S. A. Industry 2 M A C 
Fiberglass Pipe Factory, Ltd. S. A. Industry 
15 11/3/2013 Al Oula Real Estate Development Holding Joint-stock (publicly 
held) 
S. A. Real Estate 
Development 
- A C 
The Stability of Real Estate Development S. A. Real Estate 
Development 
16 6/2/2013 Red Sea Housing Services Company Joint-stock (publicly held) S. A. Contracting 3 M 
 
A C 
Premier Paint Company S. A. Cement and Building 
Materials 
17 13/1/2013 Public Pension Agency S. A. Investment - - C 
ACWA Power International Joint-stock (publicly held) S. A.  Energy 
18 13/1/2013 Sanabil Investments (closed joint-stock company) S. A. Investment - - C 
ACWA Power International Joint-stock (publicly held) S. A. Energy 
19 8/1/2013 Al-Babtain S. A. Industry 15 M A C 
Al-Babtain Liblank S. A. Communications 
20 7/1/2013 Jadwa Investment (closed joint-stock company) S. A. Brokerage and Asset 
Management 
- A C 
Al Hammadi Company For Development and Investment S. A. Investment 
a S. A.=Saudi Arabia; b E=Establishment, A=Acquisition, P=Purchase of share, c C=Consummated; M=Million 
 










State Sector Value Type Status 













Consummated transactions (Saudi-foreigner)337 
 Date 
(D/M/Y) 




1 9/12/2013 Alkhabeer Capital Joint-stock (publicly 
held) 
S.A. Brokerage and Asset 
Management 
- A C 
Emirates Express Group Dubai  Not listed 
2 8/12/2013 Almarai Joint-stock (publicly held) S.A. Food Industry 4 M A C 
Mead Johnson Nutrition U.S.A Food Industry 
3 24/11/2013 LG Electronics Korea Industrial Investment 1 M p C 
Al Hassan Ghazi Ibrahim Shaker S.A. Industry 
4 3/11/2013 Qurain Petrochemical Industries 
Company (holding) 
Kuwait  Petrochemicals 232 M A C 
Sadafco (Public Joint-stock) S.A. Food Industry 
5 25/9/2013 Investcorp Joint-stock (publicly held) Bahrain  Investment - A C 
Theeb Rent a Car Company S.A. Transportation 
6 15/9/2013 Alkhabeer Capital Joint-stock (publicly 
held) 
S.A. Brokerage and Asset 
Management 
- A C 
Anchor Allied Factory LTD. Dubai  Industry 
7 15/9/2013 Investcorp Joint-stock (publicly held) Bahrain  Investment - A C 
Leejam Sports Company S.A. Health Care 
8 11/9/2013 Al Salam Bank-Bahrain B.S.C. Bahrain Islamic Banks - A C 
Education Experts Co. (limited liability) S.A. Education and Training 
9 28/7/2013 Al Hassan Ghazi Ibrahim Shaker S.A. Industry 2 M A C 
Energy Management Services Company 
(EMS) 
Dubai  Energy 
10 23/6/2013 Gulftainer Co. (limited liability) Abu 
Dhabi  
Public Utilities 133 M A C 
Gulf Stevedoring Contracting Company 
(limited liability) 
S.A. Transportation 
11 18/6/2013 Investcorp Joint-stock (publicly held) Bahrain  Investment - A C 
AYTB (limited liability) S.A. Oil and Gas 
12 18/2/2013 Northern Region Cement Company 
Joint-stock (publicly held) 
S.A. Cement and Building 
Materials 
32 M A C 
Iraqi Cement State Company Iraq  Cement and Building 
Materials 
13 23/1/2013 Sadafco (Public Joint-stock) S.A. Food Industry - A C 
SADAFCO Kuwait Joint-stock (publicly 
held) 
Kuwait  Food Industry 
a S. A.=Saudi Arabia; A=Acquisition, P=Purchase of share, c C=Consummated; M=Million 











State Sector Value Type Status 
1 18/11/2013 Al-Hokair S.A. Trade and Retail - A Under Negotiation 
Blanco  Spain  Trade and Retail 
2 10/11/2013 Almunajem (closed 
joint-stock company) 
S.A. Trade and Retail - A Under Negotiation 
Doux France  Food Industry 


















Mohammed Al Mojil Group Company 
(MMG) Joint-stock (publicly held) 
S.A. Construction 
2 20/3/2014 Saudi Vitrified Clay Pipes Co. Joint-stock 
(publicly held) 







Ceramic Company for pipes Joint-stock 
(publicly held) 
S.A.  
a S. A.=Saudi Arabia; A=Acquisition. 
 






Consummated transactions (Saudi-Saudi)340 
 Date 
(D/M/Y) 




1 9/9/2014 Swicorp (holding) S.A. Not Listed - A C 
BRC Industrial (Saudi) Ltd. (limited liability 
company) 
S.A. Not Listed 
2 28/9/2014 Alkhabeer Capital Joint-stock (publicly held) S.A. Not Listed - A C 
Ajaji Medical Group (limited liability 
company) 
S.A. Not Listed 
3 27/8/2014 Elkhereiji Investment Company S.A. Not Listed 26 M P C 
ACE Arabia Cooperative Insurance Company 
Joint-stock (publicly held) 
S.A. Insurance 
4 26/6/2014 Sabic S.A. Petrochemicals 360 M A C 
Saudi Arabian Methacrylate Company 
(SAMAC) 
S.A. Not Listed 
5 16/6/2014 FALCOM Financial Services S.A. Not Listed - P C 
Nayifat Finance Company  S.A. Not Listed C 
6 12/6/2014 Olayan Saudi Investment (limited liability 
company) 
S.A. Not Listed 133 M P C 
Gulf Union Food Company S.A. Not Listed 
7 3/4/2014 ACWA Power International Joint-stock 
(publicly held) 
S.A. Not Listed - P C 
Shuqaiq Water & Electricity Co. Joint-stock 
(publicly held) 
S.A. Not Listed 
8 26/3/2014 Hotels Co. Joint-stock (publicly held) S.A. Hotels and 
Tourism 
4 M P C 
Saudi Hotel Services Company S.A. Not Listed 
9 19/3/2014 Abdullatif Alissa Group Holding Company 
(AAGH) (limited liability company) 
S.A. Not Listed - A C 
Tanya Plant for Bottled Drinking Water, Ltd. 
(limited liability company) 
S.A. Not Listed 
a S. A.=Saudi Arabia; A=Acquisition, P=Purchase of share, c C=Consummated; M=Million 
 





Transactions under negotiation (Saudi-Saudi)341 
 Date 
(D/M/Y) 




1 1/10/2014 Dallah Healthcare Holding 
Company Joint-stock (publicly 
held) 
S.A. Retail - A Under 
Negotiation 
Bagedo & Dr. Erfan General 
Hospital Company 
S.A. Not Listed 
2 28/9/2014 National Industrialization 
Company Joint-stock (publicly 
held) 
S.A. Petrochemicals 482 M A Under 
Negotiation 
The National Titanium Dioxide 
Co. Ltd. (limited liability 
company) 
S.A. Not Listed 
3 13/10/2014 Company Markets Abdullah 
Alothaim 
S.A. Retail 27 M E Under 
Negotiation 
Agad United Company for 
Investment  
S.A. Not Listed 
4 11/9/2014 Al Hassan Ghazi Ibrahim Shaker 
Co Joint-stock (publicly held) 
S.A. Industrial 
Investment 
5 M A Under 
Negotiation 
Company Providing Gulf Trade 
(limited liability company) 
S.A. Not Listed 
5 23/7/2014 Takween Advanced Industries 
Joint-stock (publicly held) 
S.A. Industrial 
investment 
- A Under 
Negotiation 
Savola Packaging Systems Co. 
(limited liability company) 
S.A. Not Listed 
6 1/4/2014 Bawan Joint-stock (publicly held) S.A. Construction - A Under 
Negotiation Inma Pallets Co. Ltd. (limited 
liability company) 
S.A. Not Listed 
7 3/3/2014 Arriyadh Development Co. S.A. Real Estate 
Development 
- E Under 
Negotiation 
Al Bassami International Group 
Joint-stock (publicly held) 
S.A. Not Listed 
a S. A.=Saudi Arabia; b E=Establishment, A=Acquisition; M=Million 
 





Consummated transactions (Saudi-foreigner)342 
 Date 
(D/M/Y) 




1 26/6/2014 China Power Investment 
Corporation (CPIC) 
China Construction 28 M P C 
Amiantit Co. Joint-stock (publicly 
held) 
S.A. Construction 
2 9/5/2014 Zahid Group (limited liability 
company) 
S.A. Not Listed - P C 
.total France  Oil and Energy 
3 31/3/2014 Al-Tayyar Travel Group (closed 
joint-stock company) 
S.A. Hotels and Tourism 11 M A C 
Alhanov for Tourism and Services Egypt  Not Listed 
4 4/8/2014 Saudi Binladin Group (SBG) S.A. Not Listed 60 M P C 
Marmi Di Carrere Italy Construction 
5 26/3/2014 HANCO S.A. Not listed 163 M A C 
Bayern Investment Co., Ltd. UAE Investment 
6 8/2/2014 Al-Tayyar Travel Group (closed 
joint-stock company) 
S.A. Hotels and Tourism 23 M A C 
Elegant Resorts Inc. Britain Hotels and tourism 
a S. A.=Saudi Arabia; UAE=United Arab Emirates, A=Acquisition, P=Purchase of share, c C=Consummated; M=Million 
 














1 21/8/2014 Citadel Capital SAE 
(CCAP) 





Holding Company (CPC) 
Joint-stock (publicly held) 
S.A. Not Listed 
2 13/8/2014 Savola Group Joint-stock 
(publicly held) 
S.A. Agriculture and Food 
Industries 
5 M A Under 
Negotiation 
Kuwait Food Company 
Joint-stock (publicly held) 
Kuwait Consumer Goods 
3 16/6/2014 Buruj Cooperative 
Insurance Company Joint-
stock (publicly held) 
S.A. Insurance 320 K E Under 
Negotiation 
Bahrain Gulf Guarantees 
Company 
Bahrain Not Listed 
4 10/6/2014 Abraaj Capital (limited 
liability company) 
Dubai Not Listed 400 M A Under 
Negotiation 
Kudu S.A. Not Listed 
5 15/9/2014 Al-Babtain S.A. Construction - A Under 
Negotiation Al Babtain Contracting 
Company 
Qatar Not Listed 
6 28/5/2014 Al-Tayyar Travel Group 
(closed joint-stock 
company) 
S.A. Hotels and Tourism 23 M A Under 
Negotiation 
C.T.M Britain Travel and Tourism 
7 14/5/2014 Sabic S.A. Petrochemicals - E Under 
Negotiation Lockheed Martin Co. U.S.A Oil and Energy 
8 25/2/2014 Kingdom Holding Joint-
stock (publicly held) 
S.A. Multilateral Investment 200 M P Under 
Negotiation 
Square Co. U.S.A Information Technology 
a S. A.=Saudi Arabia; b E=Establishment, A=Acquisition, P=Purchase of share, c C=Consummated; M=Million, K= 000  
 
  






Consummated transactions (Saudi-Saudi)344 
 Date 
(D/M/Y) 




1 26/1/2015 Mubarrad S.A. Transportation 48 M P C 
Arab Company for Security and Safety 
Services (Flamenco) 
S.A. Not Listed 
2 4/3/2015 Imran International Investment and Real 
Estate Development 
S.A. Not Listed 3 M P C 
Eastern Development Company S.A. Agriculture and 
Food Industry 
3 19/3/2015 Ahsa Development Co. S.A. Investment  11 M A  C 
Al-Ahsa Medical Services Co. S.A. Healthcare 
4 3/5/2015 Saudi Industries Development Company S.A. Not Listed 8 M P C 
Qassim Cement Company – QACCO S.A. Cement 
a S. A.=Saudi Arabia; A=Acquisition, P=Purchase of share, c C=Consummated; M=Million 
Table 3.16 









1 17/3/2015 Takween Advanced 
Industries 
S.A. Industrial Investment 243 M A  Under 
Negotiation 
Savola Packaging Systems S.A. Not Listed 
2 23/3/2015 Mubarrad S.A. Transportation - P Under 
Negotiation Melhem & Trading & 
Transport (limited liability 
company) 
S.A. Not Listed 
3 7/5/2015 Albaha Co. S.A. Multi-Investment  A  Under 
Negotiation The members of the Board 
of Directors Company 
S.A. Not Listed 
4 24/5/2015 Zoujaj S.A. Industrial Investment - P Under 
Negotiation (SANLEC) Saudi National 
Company for Lighting and 
electricity 
S.A. Not Listed 
a S. A.=Saudi Arabia; A=Acquisition, P=Purchase of share, M=Million 
 















1 4/3/2015 Public Investment Fund S.A. Not Listed 1 B P C 
Posco  Korea Industry 
2 10/3/2015 Al Hassan Ghazi Ibrahim Shaker 
Company 
S.A. Industry - A  C 
UAE Energy Management Services 
Company 
Dubai Energy 
3 10/3/2015 Gulf Insurance Group Kuwait Insurance - P C 
Bruges Cooperative Insurance 
Company 
S.A. Insurance 
4 4/5/2015 Pharmaceutical Co. S.A. Industrial investment 19 M A  C 
Mevo of International 
Pharmaceutical Industries 
Egypt Not Listed 
5 4/5/2015 Al Muhaidib Group S.A. Not Listed - A  C 
Abyat Megastore Kuwait Not Listed 
6 5/5/2015 Printing & Packaging S.A. Media and Publishing 175 M A  C 
Emirates National Factory for 
Plastic Industries 
Dubai Not Listed 
7 6/5/2015 American OPCW company U.S.A Industrial investment 65 M P C 
Pharmaceutical co. S.A. Industrial investment 








State Sector Value Type Status 
1 30/11/2015 Rapid Group S.A. Industrial Investment - A Canceled 
Jackson Carpet China  Industry 
2 11/8/2015 Al Fakhareyah S.A. Construction - A  Canceled 
Arab Company for 
Water "Aqua Pipe 
Tubes" 
S.A. Not Listed 
3 10/9/2015 Moprd S.A. Transportation - A  Canceled 
Future Melhem & 
Trading & Transport 
S.A. Not Listed 
a S. A.=Saudi Arabia; A=Acquisition. 











State Sector Value Type Status 
1 26/1/2015 Moprd S.A. Transportation SAR 
180,3 M  
A  C 
Arab Company for 
Security and Safety 
Services (Flamenco) 
S.A. Not Listed 
2 4/3/2015 Imran International 
Investment and Real Estate 
Development 
S.A. Not Listed $3 M P C 
East Development S.A. Agriculture and Food 
Industry 
3 19/3/2015 Al-Ahsa Development S.A. Investment  $11 M A  C 
Ahsa Medical Services S.A. Healthcare 
4 3/5/2015 Saudi Industries 
Development 
S.A. Not Listed $8 M P C 
Qassim Cement S.A. Cement 
5 17/3/2015 Cutting-edge Industries 
Formation 
S.A. Industrial investment SAR 910 
M 
A  C 
Savola Packaging Systems S.A. Not Listed 
6 24/5/2015 Glass  S.A. Industrial Investment SAR 15,4 
M 
P C 
Saudi National for Lighting 
and Electricity (Sanlk) 
S.A. Not Listed 
7 3/6/2015 Al-Ahas Development S.A. Investment SAR 6,9 
M 
P  C 
Al-Ahsa Medical Services S.A. Healthcare 
8 14/07/2015 Private Air Arabia S.A. Not Listed - A C 
Saudi Private Airline S.A. Not Listed 
9 13/08/2015 Al Tayyar Travel Group S.A. Hotels and tourism SAR 8 M A  C 
Aakonuks Group Ltd. S.A. Not Listed 
10 28/10/2015 United Industries Company 
Cartoon 
S.A. Not Listed SAR 22 
M 
P  C 
Aseer S.A. Multi-Investment 
11 1/11/2015 NCB Capital Fund No. 
(13) and (4) 
S.A. Not listed SAR 1,55 
B 
A C 
Research and Marketing S.A. Media and Publishing 
12 7/12/2015 Al Tayyar Travel Group S.A. Hotels and Tourism SAR 22 
M 
A  C 
Saudi Arabia Traveler 
Company 
S.A. Not Listed 
13 24/12/2015 Kingdom Holding S.A. Multi-Investment SAR 
393,3 M 
A  C 
American Lift Transport 
Services Company (Lyft) 
S.A. Transportation 
a S. A.=Saudi Arabia; A=Acquisition, P=Purchase of share, c C=Consummated; B= Billion, M=Million, $=U.S. dollar, SAR= Saudi riyal 
 










State Sector Value Type Status 
1 7/6/2015 United Electronics - Extra S.A. Retail - A  Under 
Negotiation International Regions 
Company 
S.A. Not Listed 
2 23/3/2015 Moprd S.A. Transportation - P Under 
Negotiation Future Melhem & Trading 
& Transport 
S.A. Not Listed 
3 7/5/2015 Baha S.A. Multi-Investment - A  Under 
Negotiation High-end Centers, Ltd. S.A. Not Listed 
4 15/07/2015 ENOC Retail Arabia S.A. Not Listed $9 M P Under 
Negotiation Drees S.A. Retail 
5 16/08/2015 Al Tayyar Travel Group S.A. Hotels and Tourism SAR 
803,8 M 
P  Under 
Negotiation Zakhr Development 
Company and Real Estate 
Investment 
S.A. Not Listed 
6 7/9/2015 Baha S.A. Multi-Investment SAR145 
M 
A  Under 
Negotiation High-end Centers, Ltd. S.A. Not Listed 
7 13/09/2015 Abdul Qadir al-Bakri and 
His Sons Holding 
S.A. Not Listed - P Under 
Negotiation 
Moprd S.A. Transportation 
8 13/09/2015 Moprd S.A. Transportation - P Under 
Negotiation Sea World Inc. S.A. Not Listed 
9 28/10/2015 Saudi Arabia and a 
Number of Tools (Sacco) 
S.A. Retail - A  Under 
Negotiation 
Mdscan Terminal Co. Ltd. S.A. Not Listed 
10 16/11/2015 Glass  S.A. Industrial Investment - A  Under 
Negotiation Guardian Glass Arabia S.A. Not Listed 
11 25/11/2015 Sophisticated S.A. Multi-Investment SAR 
120,5 M 
P  Under 
Negotiation Saudi Calcined Petroleum 
Coke 
S.A. Not Listed 
a S. A.=Saudi Arabia; A=Acquisition, P=Purchase of share, M=Million, $=U.S. dollar, SAR= Saudi riyal 
 





Consummated transactions (Saudi-foreigner)350 
 Date 
(D/M/Y) 
Company (Acquirer/Acquired) State Sector Value Type Status 
1 4/3/2015 Public Investment Fund S.A. Not Listed $1 B P C 
Posco  Korea Industry 
2 10/3/2015 Hassan Shaker S.A. Industry SAR 1,5 
M 
P C 
Energy Management Services Dubai Energy 
3 10/3/2015 Gulf Insurance Group Kuwait Insurance - P C 
Bruges Cooperative Insurance S.A. Insurance 
4 4/5/2015 Pharmaceutical S.A. Industrial Investment $19 M A  C 
Mevo International 
Pharmaceutical Industries 
Egypt Not Listed 
5 4/5/2015 Mhaideb group S.A. Not Listed - A  C 
Verses Megastore Kuwait Not Listed 
6 5/5/2015 Printing and Packaging S.A. Media and Publishing SAR 
114,1 M 
A  C 
Emirates National Plastic 
Industries Plant 
Dubai Not listed 
7 6/5/2015 US OPCW company USA Industrial Investment $65 M P C 
Pharmaceutical S.A. Industrial Investment 
8 14/07/2015 Investcorp Bahrain  Investment - A  C 
Corrosion Prevention Services 
Company (NDT) 
S.A. Not Listed 
9 9/8/2015 Holding the Secretariats Dubai Services $48 M A  C 
Global Stillness S.A. Not Listed 
10 7/10/2015 Kingdom Holding S.A. Investment SAR 
187,5 M 
P C 
Twitter  USA  Information technology 
11 19/11/2015 Saudi Telecom S.A. Telecommunications SAR 4,6 
B 
A  C 
Viva Kuwait Kuwait Telecommunications 
12 29/11/2015 Pharmaceutical S.A. Industrial Investment SAR 
74,9 M 
A  C 
Mevo International 
Pharmaceutical Industries 
Egypt  Industrial Investment 
13 3/12/2015 French Sovereign Fund France  Investment SAR 563 
M 
A  C 
Kingdom Holding S.A. Multi-Investment 
14 24/01/2016 Investcorp Bahrain Investment - P C 
Bin Dawod Holding Group S.A. Not Listed 
a S. A.=Saudi Arabia; A=Acquisition, P=Purchase of share, c C=Consummated; B= Billion, M=Million, $=U.S. dollar, SAR= Saudi riyal 
 














1 24/06/2015 Global Sipchem S.A. Petrochemicals 100 M A Under 
Negotiation Ikarus Petroleum Industries Kuwait Oil and Gas 
2 16/11/2015 Glass  S.A. Industrial Investment - A  Under 
Negotiation Qardian International Glass 
Float Glass (Qardian Ras 
Al Khaimah) 
Abu Dhabi  Not Listed 
a S. A.=Saudi Arabia; A=Acquisition, M=Million. 
 
Additional Charts 
Further data on M&A activities in Saudi Arabia was obtained from a different resource: 
MergerMarket.352 Table 3.23 was accompanied by the following note: 
Based on announced deals, excluding lapsed and withdrawn bids, [and] based on [the] 
dominant geography of Target Company being Saudi Arabia, [this] includes all deals 
valued over USD 5m[;] where [the] deal value [is] not disclosed, [the] deal has been 
entered based on turnover of target exceeding USD 10m, and activities excluded from 
[the] table include property transactions and restructurings where the ultimate 
shareholders' interests are not changed.353 
It is difficult to calculate M&A numbers with 100% accuracy because parties involved in private 
M&A transactions are not required, by law, to disclose the details of their deals. This makes it 
difficult (and in some cases impossible) to determine the exact number of M&A deals occurring 
in any given country in any given time frame. The Ministry of Commerce and Industry should 
have the exact number of M&A deals for Saudi Arabia.  
 
                                                          
351 Id. 
352 The author obtained this data directly through email from MergerMarket. Their website is available at 





The number and value of M&A deals in Saudi Arabia and in the Middle East  





Deal count Deal value 
(US $M) 
Deal count 
2007 3,179 15 27,778 173 11.4% 
2008 3,050 19 17,955 201 17.0% 
2009 728 13 18,502 124 3.9% 
2010 56 7 14,073 147 0.4% 
2011 2,257 20 13,150 141 17.2% 
2012 1,223 13 19,560 152 6.3% 
2013 2,493 28 24,648 163 10.1% 
2014 1,657 22 22,917 187 7.2% 
2015 1,319 21 20,371 164 6.5% 
  
                                                          
354 Id. As the email mentioned, the charts presented in this chapter contain data run from January 1, 2007 to 
December 31, 2014, and updated by the author as of January, 2016. 
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This chapter begins (Section 4.2) with a very brief overview of microeconomics, 
discusses general principles of antitrust laws and merger control regulations, introduces the 
Saudi Competition Law, and provides basic illustrations. The rules that govern the pre-merger 
notification process are addressed in Section 4.3, including rules pertaining to the right and 
process of appealing the Competition Council’s decisions. Section 4.4 explains the principles of 
the Competition Law and analyzes the rules governing M&A economic concentration requests. 
Several decisions rendered by the Competition Council regarding M&A are discussed in Section 
4.5. Sections 4.6 and 4.7 detail interviews conducted by the author with members of the 
Competition Council. Section 4.8 provides a critique of the Saudi Competition Law regarding 
M&A. Section 4.9 considers the South African Competition Law, which the author addresses in 
order to provide suggestions that Saudi legislators may use to improve the rules of the Saudi 
Competition Law. Section 4.10 offers a comprehensive list of recommendations that may be 
used to improve, amend and enhance the provisions of the Saudi Competition Law that govern 
M&A transactions. 
§4.2. Introduction 
This Introduction aims to provide a brief economic background and basic economic 
principles that may facilitate the reader’s understanding of the issues surrounding M&A 
transactions in Saudi Arabia. It also briefly touches on Saudi’s policy regarding antitrust laws. 
Finally, this section introduces the Saudi Competition Law. 
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A. Economic background 
1. Four market structures 
Microeconomics generally contemplates four types of market structure: perfect 
competition, monopolistic competition, oligopoly and monopoly.356 These are the characteristics 
of the four structures: 1) perfect competition—the number of firms is many, the product type is 
identical and the ease of entry into the marketplace is high; 2) monopolistic competition—the 
number of firms is many, the product type is differentiated and the ease of entry is high; 3) 
oligopoly—the number of firms is few, the product type is identical or differentiated and the ease 
of entry is low; 4) monopoly—the number of firms is one, the product type is unique and entry to 
the marketplace is blocked.357 
2. The effects of the market structure on price and production 
Market profit maximization is an economic concept that determines the output that a firm 
can produce.358 Market profit maximization is reached when the marginal revenue equals the 
marginal cost.359 In a situation of perfect competition, a firm sells a product at a price that is 
equal to the marginal cost for as long as consumers are willing to buy the product.360 In contrast, 
in a monopolistic market, the monopolist sells a product at a price that is higher than the 
marginal cost, and the firm’s output does not always meet consumer demand.361 Therefore, the 
monopolist may cause a decrease in consumer surplus and an increase in producer surplus, which 
may result in deadweight loss, which decreases the economic efficiency of the market.362 
                                                          
356 ASHRAF EID, AMANY EL ANSHASY, R. GLENN HUBBARD, & ANTHONY O'BRIEN, ECONOMICS, 266 (England, 
Essex, Pearson Education Limited, 2011). 
357 Id. See also JEFFREY M. PERLOFF, MICROECONOMICS, 7th ed, 426 (New Jersey, Prentice Hall, 2014). 
358 ASHRAF EID, supra note 356, at 270-72. 
359 Id. 
360 Id. at 369-70. 
361 Id.. 
362 Id. at 370. 
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Firms in a situation of perfect competition are known as price takers,363 which means 
they accept prices as they are; they do not have influence over prices, and they cannot determine 
product output.364 On the other hand, the monopolist firm operating in a monopolistic market is 
known as a price maker, meaning that the monopolist determines price and output.365 In perfect 
competition, firms cannot influence price; if a firm tries to raise a price, consumers switch to 
another firm’s product that is selling at a lower price, which typically causes the firm that raised 
its prices to lose sales and perhaps to lose market share permanently.366 Two main economic 
objectives are achieved in a perfect competition market: (1) productive efficiency, which means 
that products are produced at the lowest cost possible, and (2) allocative efficiency, which means 
that production meets the consumer’s preference, or (in other words), that “every good or service 
is produced up to the point where the last unit provides a marginal benefit to consumers equal to 
the marginal cost of producing.”367 Although conditions of either perfect competition or 
monopoly are rare, they establish a benchmark (respectively) for how firms would behave in a 
perfectly competitive market and of how a monopolist firm would behave in a monopolistic 
market.368  
Products produced by firms acting in an oligopoly may be differentiated or identical; the 
oligopoly’s most important characteristic is that it contains only a few firms in competition with 
each other.369 Firms in an oligopolistic market decide price and output based on the behavior of 
                                                          
363 FRED M. GOTTHEIL, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS, 7th ed, 257 (Mason, Ohio, Cengage Learning, 2013). 
364 Id. at 251. See also ASHRAF EID, supra note 356, at 365. 
365 Id. See also ASHRAF EID, supra note 356, at 365. 
366 ASHRAF EID, supra note 357, at 267. 
367 Id. at 288 and 315. See also ROBERT S. PINDYCK AND DANIEL L. RUBINFELD, MICROECONOMICS, 5th ed, 288-94, 
(New Jersey, Prentice Hall, 2000). 
368 ASHRAF EID, supra note 356, at 358. 
369 PINDYCK AND RUBINFELD, supra note 367, at 430. 
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their competitors.370 This makes this type of market very complicated, because a firm’s decisions 
are determined by the reactions of its competitors.371 
Note that monopolistic competition is similar to perfect competition, except that in a 
monopolistic competition, products are differentiated.372 In a situation of monopolistic 
competition, firms have little influence over prices, and little ability to raise prices, because 
monopolistic competition by definition means the existence of a variety of substitutes; therefore, 
products become less differentiated, and close substitutes become available if prices do rise, 
because consumers will rapidly and predictably switch to a close substitute instead of paying a 
higher price for the original product.373 Productive efficiency and allocative efficiency are 
achieved in a perfect competition, and they are not achieved in a monopolistic competition.374 
However, it is possible in some cases that consumers may benefit from monopolistic 
competition,375 if companies become motivated to compete and innovate in order to attract the 
interest of consumers who may be willing—based on their taste for a specific iteration of a 
product, rather than on an inelastic (simple) need for any version of that product—to pay a 
slightly higher price for the differentiated version of the product.376 
3. Market power 
This brief microeconomic introduction provides a glimpse of the importance of market 
factors in relation to mergers and acquisitions activity. Market factors shape the power and 
ability of a firm to affect prices, which is an essential concern for regulators attempting to ensure 
                                                          
370 Id. at 429-30. 
371 Id. 
372 GOTTHEIL, supra note 363, at 251. 
373 Id. 
374 ASHRAF EID, supra note 356, at 315. 
375 Id. 
376 Id.; PERLOFF, supra note 357, at 425. 
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that such power is limited or prevented.377 However, as the following quote illustrates, not every 
market power needs to be regulated by the intervention of antitrust laws, because some work 
themselves out organically: 
Market power is a seller's ability to exercise some control over the price it charges. In our 
economy, few firms are pure price takers facing perfectly elastic demand.[…] For 
example, the unique location of a dry cleaner may confer slight market power because 
some customers are willing to pay a little more rather than walk an extra block or two to 
the next-closest dry cleaner. Economists say the dry cleaner possesses market power, if 
only to a trivial degree. Virtually all products that are differentiated from one another, if 
only because of consumer tastes, seller reputation, or producer location, convey upon 
their sellers at least some degree of market power. Thus, a small degree of market power 
is very common and understood not to warrant antitrust intervention[…]378 
Governments regulate mergers, because mergers can increase the market power of the merging 
firms, which may in turn lead to a reduction of output and an increase in prices.379 Governments 
usually establish laws designed to evaluate the tradeoff between the market power that may 
result from the merger and the efficiency that the merger (if allowed) may create in the 
market.380  
B. Policy of antitrust laws 
1. In general 
Antitrust laws may be applied to prohibit monopolization and attempted monopoly that 
may cause unfair or unreasonable conduct in the marketplace that limits and restrains 
competition.381 In general, economists recognize certain factors that should be regulated in a 
marketplace for the purposes of competition; for example, a company may be regulated in order 
                                                          
377 Id. at 346, 395. 
378 U.S. Department of Justice, Competition and Monopoly: Single-Firm Conduct Under Section 2 of the Sherman 
Act (2008), Chapter 2, Section I, available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/competition-and-monopoly-single-firm-
conduct-under-section-2-sherman-act-chapter-2#N_7_ (last visited February 26, 2016). 
379 ASHRAF EID, supra note 356, at 372. 
380 ASHRAF EID, supra note 356, at 372-73. 
381 WILLIAM S. COMANOR AND AKIRA GOTO, COMPETITION POLICY IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY: MODALITIES FOR 
CO-OPERATION, 373 (New York, Routledge, 2005. See also The Federal Trade Competition’s website, available at 
https://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/competition-guidance/guide-antitrust-laws/single-firm-conduct/monopolization-
defined (last visited February 26, 2016). 
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to fix a market failure or to find a solution for a political conflict.382 The majority of economists 
agree that the main goal of antitrust legislation is to enhance and promote economic 
efficiencies.383 Many scholars have debated what factor is most important in determining a 
policy of antitrust regulation: economic efficiencies, consumer welfare or incentivizing 
innovation.384 Market inefficiencies may arise from monopolization and a company’s exertion of 
monopolistic power.385 The damage that a monopoly386 or a monopolistic market may cause 
includes low output of product, higher prices387 and less innovation.388 Saudi legislators should 
consider the goals of economic efficiency, consumer welfare and innovation as they examine 
different antitrust policies;389 maintaining a focus on these goals may inspire them to find 
                                                          
382 See Richard E. Caves, American Industry: Structure, Conduct, Performance, 7th ed, Chapter 7 (New Jersey, 
Prentice Hall,1992). See also George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, THE BELL JOURNAL OF 
ECONOMICS AND MANAGEMENT SCIENCE, Vol. 2, No. 1 (Spring, 1971), 3-21; James Q. Wilson, The Politics of 
Regulation, (New York, Basic Books, 1980); Alfred E. Kahn, The Economics of Regulation: Principles and 
Institutions, (Boston, MA, The MIT Press, 1988); Alfred E. Kahn, Lessons from Deregulation: Telecommunications 
and Airlines after the Crunch, (AEI-Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory Studies, 2003); and Thomas B. Nachbar, 
Monopoly, Mercantilism, and The Politics of Regulation, 1313-1379, VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW, Volume 91, October 
2005, Number 6. 
383 DENNIS W. CARLTON AND JEFFREY M. PERLOFF, MODERN INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION, 634 (4th ed, Pearson 
Addison Wesle, 2005). 
384 See THOMAS E. SULLIVAN, HERBERT HOVENKAMP, HOWARD A. SHELANSKI, ANTITRUST LAW, POLICY AND 
PROCEDURE: CASES, MATERIALS, PROBLEMS, Chapter 1, Section 1 (Aspen Publishing, 2014).  
385 CARLTON AND PERLOFF, supra note 383, at 686. 
386 The case of a natural monopoly in some markets may be an exception to this statement; specifically, a situation in 
which one company provides all of the product at price lower than would be the case if two or more companies were 
providing product may benefit the monopolist as well as the consumer; see CARLTON AND PERLOFF at 104-05 and 
691-92.  
387 CARLTON AND PERLOFF, supra note 383, at 635-38. 
388 Id. at 99 and 691. 
389 It is vital for Saudi Arabia to focus on finding the most effective and efficient economic policy that fits its 
geography, size, culture and future, rather than adopting regulations derived from countries that have worked for 
decades to find suitable models for their own unique economies. The content of this footnote is the result of the 
author observing that Saudi has not adopted a clear and particular economic policy. Policies and economic goals 
should be clear to legislators, economists and investors. Professor Bhattacharjea states that developed counties have 
adopted and developed competition laws with various goals such as “legitimizing the growing role of big business 
by giving the impression that its worst features would be controlled; protecting small firms, or employee or investors 
in the bigger firms that were in danger of failing; building “national champions”; controlling prices; or integrating 
the European market.” See ADITYA BHATTACHARJEA, COMPETITION LAW AND DEVELOPMENT: WHO NEEDS 
ANTITRUST?, 65. Professor Bhattacharjea suggests that developing countries should build their antitrust laws on 
indisputable economic principles and, further, that developing countries would be better served by learning from the 
experiences of their (developing) peer countries, rather than that of already developed countries. See Chapter 3 at 
52-3. For more observations and approaches about economic policy regarding competition, see JALAL AMEEN, THE 
PHILOSOPHY OF ECONOMICS (RESEARCH ON THE BIAS OF ECONOMISTS AND UNSCIENTIFIC FOUNDATION OF 
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policies that best fit the needs and situation of the Kingdom.390 Competition laws created by 
developed countries such as the United States and Europe are generally what might be called 
“economic-based model[s].”391 Competition laws that are based on economic models generally 
tend to be rational, neutral, predictable and tool-supported; they encourage factual reasoning in 
application and only allow intervention when an economic justification is proved.392 
2. Policy of merger control 
Merger control regulations focus on the market power and dominance of companies.393 
Such regulations aim to determine how the market will look before and after the merger, in terms 
of price increases that may result from an economic concentration caused by the merger.394 
These regulations attempt to define the product and geographic areas relevant to the merging 
companies in order to understand the market share controlled by these companies, and thus to 
better understand their market power.395 However, market share is not only the factor that can be 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
ECONOMICS), 44, 108-40, (Dar Alshrooq, Cairo, Egypt, 2009).[ in Arabic] See also EAMONN BUTLER, AUSTRIAN 
ECONOMICS: A PRIMER, (Ludwig Von Mises Institute, 2009); JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, THE GENERAL THEORY OF 
EMPLOYMENT, INTEREST, AND MONEY, (CreateSpace Independent Publishing Platform, 2011); NOAM CHOMSKY, 
PROFIT OVER PEOPLE: NEOLIBERALISM & GLOBAL ORDER, (Seven Stories Press, 1999). 
390 Saudi lawmakers should determine whether they wish to enact antitrust laws and regulations in order to enhance 
the economic efficiency of the Saudi market, or to protect consumer welfare, or both. This task is not easy and will 
require exhaustive work at the legislative, executive, judicial and academic (theoretical) levels. Professor Paul 
Krugman describes antitrust policy as “a blunt instrument” that can be used by different people in different ways. 
See Paul Krugman, Barons of Broadband, THE NEW YORK TIMES, February 16, 2014, available at 
http://mobile.nytimes.com/2014/02/17/opinion/krugman-barons-of-broadband.html?referrer=&_r=0 (last visited 
December 17, 2015). See also SUSAN P. CRAWFORD, CAPTIVE AUDIENCE: THE TELECOM INDUSTRY AND MONOPOLY 
POWER IN THE NEW GILDED AGE, (Yale University Press, 2013). For instance, while antitrust policy in the United 
States has caused allocation inefficiencies, it has also encouraged technical efficiency and innovation. Professor 
Porter calls for new policies that would revise treatment of mergers and joint ventures to focus on productivity 
growth. See Michael E. Porter, Competition and Antitrust: A Productivity-Based Approach, Revised May 30, 2002, 
Institute for Strategy and Competitiveness, Harvard Business School, 11-12, available at 
http://www.isc.hbs.edu/Documents/pdf/053002antitrust.pdf (last visited December 17, 2015). See also Michael E. 
Porter, The Five Competitive Forces That Shape Strategy, January 2008 Issue, Harvard Business School, available at 
https://hbr.org/2008/01/the-five-competitive-forces-that-shape-strategy/ar/1. (last visited December 17, 2015). 
391 D. DANIEL SOKOL, THOMAS K. CHENG, AND IOANNIS LIANOS, COMPETITION LAW AND DEVELOPMENT SERIES: 
GLOBAL COMPETITION LAW AND ECONOMICS, 13-7, (Stanford University Press, 2003). 
392 Id. at 26-7. 
393 CARLTON AND PERLOFF, supra note 383, at 642. 
394 Id. at 642-44. 
395 Id. at 644. 
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utilized to determine the market power of merging companies.396 In order to control mergers and 
prevent concentrating actions that might strengthen a company's market power, merger control 
regulations around the world tend to set value thresholds.397 These thresholds take the form of 
certain values in certain currencies; if merging companies trigger the thresholds, they must notify 
the relevant authorities, which may review the companies to ensure they will not have an anti-
competitive affect on a particular market.398 
C. Introduction to the Saudi Competition Law 
1. In general 
Beginning with the creation of the Saudi Antitrust Law in 2004,399 this Subsection 
discusses how Saudi M&A Regulation requires that the takeover of a publicly-held corporation 
must comply with the Saudi Competition Law during the period of offer—this subject is 
addressed in more detail in Chapter 6. Although the provisions of Subsection C.3 may appear 
obvious to a legal practitioner, this paper provides this Subsection in order to help the average 
Saudi reader comprehend the Saudi Competition Law. Subsection C.4 briefly introduces the 
focus, approach and relationship of the M&A Regulation and the Competition Law in Saudi 
Arabia. 
                                                          
396 Id. at 644. 
397 See the list of merger control thresholds around the globe, Practical Law’s website, Thompson Reuters, available 
at http://us.practicallaw.com/2-557-0145?source=relatedcontent (last visited February 29, 2016). 
398 Id.  
399 The Competition Law, Royal Decree No. M/25, Dated 4/5/1425H, amended in 2013; Royal Decree No. M/25, 
Dated 11/4/1435H. See The Competition Council’s website, available at 
http://mci.gov.sa/en/LawsRegulations/SystemsAndRegulations/CompetitionSystem/Pages/default.aspx (last visited 
November 3, 2015). 
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2. The enactment of the Saudi Competition Law 
The Saudi Competition Law was enacted in 2004.400 It established the Competition 
Council401 and assigned to it the duty of enacting a regulation that would explain and clarify the 
Competition Law.402 The regulation that was thus created is known as the “Implementing 
Regulation of the Competition Law.” 
3. The Competition Law’s provision for listed corporations in public 
takeovers 
In Saudi Arabia, any mergers and acquisitions activity that falls within the scope of the 
Competition Law must comply with that law, and parties wishing to undertake M&A activity 
must receive approval from the Competition Protection Council.403 The M&A offer must state 
that if the offer is rejected by the Competition Protection Council, the offer will be withdrawn.404 
In such a case, a new offer may be made within 21 days of the Competition Protection Council’s 
decision of refusal, as stated in Article 16 of the M&A Regulation: 
Compliance of the Offer with Competition Law  
(a) Notification, where an offer would, if completed, be subject to the Competition Law, 
the offeror must state that this is the case in its announcement. The offeree company and 
the offeror must notify the Council of Competition Protection pursuant to the provisions 
of the Competition Law.  
(b) Requirement for Appropriate Term in Offer, Where an offer would, if completed, be 
subject to the Competition Law, it must be a term of the offer that it will lapse if the 
Council of Competition Protection notifies the offeror or the offeree company in writing 
that it objects to the deal or has placed it under study and review as specified in the 
Competition Law. 
(c) Offer Period Ceases During Competition Reference Period, When an offer or possible 
offer is objected to by the Council of Competition Protection, placed under study or 
                                                          
400 Id. 
401 The Saudi Competition Law, art. 8(1). 
402 The Saudi Competition Law, art. 9(6). 





forms the subject of proceedings or inquiries pursuant to paragraph (b), the offer period 
will end. Any new offer must be announced within 21 days after the announcement of a 
final decision made that the transaction is permissible under the Competition Law. A new 
offer period will be deemed to begin on the date on which a final decision made that the 
transaction is permissible under the Competition Law. If there is no announcement of a 
new offer within 21 days after the announcement of a final decision [is] made that the 
transaction is permissible under the Competition Law, this offer period will last until 
either the expiry of the 21 day period or the announcement by all relevant offerors 
(affected by the decision that the transaction is permissible under the Competition Law) 
that they do not intend to make an offer, whichever is earlier.405 
Even though the M&A Regulation only applies to listed companies, the Competition Law 
covers all M&A transactions that fall under the meaning of the Saudi Competition Law and its 
Implementing Regulation, because the law is general and does not specify specific forms of 
corporations. Thus, the author mentions the related M&A Regulation Articles in order to provide 
more details regarding listed companies. Other than these details, all M&A transactions follow 
the same steps that the Competition Law and its Implementing Regulation require. 
4. Clarification of the use of mergers and acquisitions in the Competition 
Law 
This Subsection arises as result of discussions held by the author with several Saudi 
attorneys and legal consultants during the course of researching this dissertation. 
Given that Saudi’s M&A Regulation deals only with listed companies and require any 
acquisition offers to comply with the Competition Law, and given that the Competition Law 
specifies only merger agreements, one may believe there is a contradiction between the two laws. 
Article 6 specifies that mergers and other types of purchase agreements, such as asset purchase 
agreements or stock purchase agreements, must be approved by the Council under certain 
                                                          
405 M&A Regulation, art. 16. 
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conditions; however, the Competition Law does not mention the word “acquisitions.”406 
However, this assumption, that the Competition Law does not cover acquisitions, is not accurate, 
because stock purchases and asset agreements are types of acquisitions, and they are specifically 
mentioned in Article 32 of the Implementing Regulation of the Competition Law. This section 
notes that the Competition Council has the authority to prevent one of the parties from acquiring 
part or all of another company, as such an acquisition could cause an economic concentration 
that could be harmful to the overall economy. Moreover, there are requests before the Council to 
approve acquisition transactions, as this paper will discuss, which will show that the Saudi 
Competition Law does indeed cover acquisitions. Therefore, one may conclude that the 
Competition Law does apply to listed companies’ acquisitions and mergers that are 
accomplished in specific ways and/or between certain types of business. 
D. How does the offer of M&A fall within the Competition Law?407 
This Subsection addresses the origins of M&A and the Competition Law in Saudi Arabia, 
focusing on the point at which M&A and general marketplace competition intersect. 
The Competition Law focuses on one element of M&A activity: once an M&A 
agreement causes the combination of the two entities being merged to become “dominant” (this 
term is defined below), then such an agreement must be submitted to the Competition Protection 
Council for approval, as Article 6 of the Saudi Competition Law states:  
1) Firms involved in merger operations or firms desiring to acquire assets, proprietary 
rights, usufructs or shares, which causes [sic] them to be in a dominating position, shall 
notify the Council in writing at least sixty days prior to completion of the same.  
                                                          
406 The word “acquisition” is mentioned only in the English version of the Saudi Competition Law in Article 9(1), as 
will be briefly addressed later in this chapter (see footnote 74). 
407 This section will give a general picture of the issue before going into more depth and adding a more analytical 
explanation of the issues. Some discussions may seem repetitive; however, some repetition of certain discussions is 
needed to address different issues. 
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2) Competing firms desiring to combine two or more managements into one joint 
management, shall if that results in a dominant status, notify the Council in writing at 
least sixty days prior to completion of the same.  
3) The Regulations shall specify times [sic] of such notification, its form and content, 
information and documents required[,] procedures to be followed in submitting it[,] as 
well as the due fees for the inspection thereof.  
4) The Council may review all necessary information prior to issuing a decision of 
approval or rejection of the notification submitted thereto, in accordance with the 
provisions of paragraphs (1) and (2) above, giving justification in each case.408  
A “domination” is explained in Article 2 of the Saudi Competition Law as: 
Domination: A situation where a firm or a group of firms are [sic] able to influence the 
market prevailing price through controlling a certain percentage of the total supply of a 
commodity or service in the industry of its business. The Regulations shall specify this 
percentage according to criteria, which include the market structure, the easiness of 
market entry by other firms, and any other criteria determined by the Council.409 
Two companies can proceed in their agreement in any one of the following three cases: 
(1) if they receive Council approval, (2) if a period of 60 days has expired after the Council has 
been notified about the transaction without informing the two parties of any objection, or (3) if 
90 days has expired after the Council has been notified of a transaction already in progress.410 In 
the last case, the parties may proceed with the transaction, as stated in Article 7: 
The firm referred to in Article Six of this Law may complete the procedures of merger, 
acquisition or combining two or more managements into one joint management in the 
following cases:  
1) Upon notification in writing of the approval by the Council.  
2) Upon expiration of sixty days from the date of notification without being notified by 
the Council in writing of its objection to the deal or of [sic] that it is under study and 
investigation. 
                                                          
408 The Saudi Competition Law, art. 6. 
409 Id. at art. 2. 
410 Id. at art. 7. 
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3) Upon expiration of ninety days from the date of notification with the deal being under 
review and investigation, without being notified by the Council in writing of its approval 
or rejection.411 
§4.3. Pre-Merger Notification 
Saudi Arabian law takes a different approach than what is found in the laws of most other 
countries with respect to determining when a transaction must be reported to its (Saudi’s) M&A 
governing body, the Competition Council; according to Saudi law, notifying the Council is 
required when a proposed merger or acquisition would give the resulting entity a 40% market 
share of the total sales of a particular product.412 What makes up this 40% is determined by the 
Council, according to broad guidelines413 given to it by the Implementing Regulation of the 
Competition Law.414 
A. The trigger 
The Saudi Competition Law recognizes two factors as potentially triggering the 
dominating position for a particular transaction, as stated in the Implementing Regulation of the 
Competition Law: 
Dominant position or domination is realized where [sic] an entity or a group of entities 
has a market share of at least 40% of total sales of a good or service for a period of 12 
months or the entity or group of entities is in a position to influence the prevailing price 
in the market.415  
This definition of a “dominant” position is important, because Article 6 of the Competition Law 
states that if any company wants to merge with another company, and the resulting merged entity 
may ultimately occupy a dominating position, then this company must submit the request to 
merge to the Council for approval. 
                                                          
411 Id. 
412 Implementing Regulation of Competition Law, Articles 2 and 27. 
413 The substance and guidelines will be discussed in greater detail in the following sections of this chapter. 
414 As stated in the Implementing Regulation of the Competition Law, art. 27. 
415 Id. at art. 8. 
137 
 
The Competition Council has started to require that every M&A transaction be filed with 
the Competition Council.416 When the author states that there have been many M&A transactions 
that have not been filed with the Competition Council, the Council members with whom the 
author spoke responded that they have been working to coordinate M&A review among multiple 
governmental bodies, including the Ministry of Commerce and Industry, the Capital Market 
Authority, the Saudi Arabia Monetary Agency, the Communication and Information Technology 
Commission and other governmental agencies.417 
B. A note on the rules that are applicable to dominating positions and economic 
concentration 
The Council of Competition initially adopted rules governing economic concentration 
that relied partially on the Law of Competition and its Implementing Regulation; the Council 
took this action because there were not enough rules to help guide the Council’s consideration of 
concentration questions.418 However, these rules were ultimately incorporated into the 
Implementing Regulation of the Competition Law when it was updated in 2014, at which time 
the Council ceased to maintain its own separate set of economic concentration rules.419 
C. The waiting period 
The Implementing Regulation of the Competition Law stipulates a waiting period of 90 
days for notification of mergers and acquisitions; this period begins on the date the request is 
                                                          
416 See the interview with the Competition Council in Section 4.6 of this chapter. In this interview, the author 
brought questions to the Competition Council. 
417 See Section 4.6 of this chapter. 
418 The Implementing Regulation of the Competition Law is the most updated version of the Competition Regulation 
and was published by the Competition Council under the Resolution of Competition Council No. 126, dated 
4/9/1435 AH (1/7/2014 AD), available at http://www.ccp.org.sa/go/p.vbhtml?lang=en-




submitted to the Competition Council.420 Parties can close a deal if 90 days pass without an 
objection from the Council.421 
D. The request fee 
In order to submit an Economic Concentration application or request, a fee of SAR 1000 
must be paid (Article 22 of the Implementing Regulation of the Competition Law). However, 
Article 22 does not specify which party must pay the fee, the acquirer or the acquired entity. This 
ultimately creates a gap that must be fixed, or at the least is an issue to be considered. The author 
asked a representative from the Competition Council which party pays for the request fee and 
was told that, according to Article 22 of the Implementing Regulation of the Competition Law 
(as noted earlier), the party making the request pays the fee; in the case of merger transactions, 
this would be the acquiring company. Indeed, in the case of merger transactions, payment of the 
fee is fairly straightforward, as the two entities will ultimately be combined into one. In the case 
of acquisition agreements, the fee scenario is different, because the selling company will not 
necessarily cease to exist after it has sold some part to the buying company. This reinforces the 
author’s point that the fee payment is a contractual matter that both companies should discuss, 
even though the fee is only SAR 1000, which is a small amount of money compared to the value 
of a typical acquisition transaction. 
E. The invitation for the public to express their opinions on M&A transactions 
The Saudi Competition Law sets out provisions intended to provide the public an 
opportunity to express their opinions regarding an M&A transaction; in particular, any opinion 
                                                          




that argues that a particular transaction will affect fair competition in the marketplace. 422 Article 
26 of the Implementing Regulation of the Competition Law states:  
The Council shall receive the opinions of entities related to the economic concentration 
application. The council will not take into consideration any opinions that are not 
supported by reasons, not clarifying [sic] the anticompetitive impacts of the 
concentration, or not including [the] full date[,] about the entity[,] which provide[s] such 
opinions.423 
The Council solicits public opinion by posting announcements on its website and Twitter 
account that describe a proposed transaction. These announcements also invite any interested 
and/or involved parties to submit opinions about the potential ramifications (in terms of 
economic concentration) of the transaction. 
F. An example of an invitation for the public to express their opinions on M&A 
transactions 
On December 7, 2014, the Competition Protection Council posted the following 
announcement on its website:  
The Council of Competition has announced that Atta Educational Company has 
presented an application for the acquisition of Jarir National Schools Complex Company 
for Boys and Girls, New International Middle East Schools, Modern International Middle 
East Schools, International Middle East Schools, Sulaymaniyah Private International 
Schools and National Al-Fikr Schools.  
In its statement published today, the Council said that Atta Educational Company is a 
closed joint stock company established in 1424 AH (2003 AD) in Riyadh with three 
branches, while the Establishments set to be acquired are just individual Establishments, 
except Jarir National Schools Complex Company[,] because it is a limited liability 
company.  
Furthermore, the Council of Competition said in its statement that statistics indicate that 
private education in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia saves SAR 11 billion a year out of 
expenditures on education, and the number of private schools amounts to more than 
3,000 schools in the various stages of education across the Kingdom.  
                                                          




The Council also called the public to express their viewpoints about the request of 
acquisition based on [the] competition system and its executive rule, in cases of economic 
concentration as cases of acquisition, which requires advertising for it in more than media 
means [sic] and to assess its effects and maintain and encourage fair competition.  
The statement inquires the public [sic] to provide their opinions, suggestions and 
implications due to the completion of the process of economic concentration via the 
following link www.coc.gov.sa/yahomna.424  
This example shows how the Competition Council announces a transaction and asks for 
feedback from the public, especially from related parties or parties that may be affected by the 
transaction. However, note that the announcement does not disclose the value of the transaction, 
nor does it provide many details regarding the technicalities or timeframe of the transaction. 
G. The information applicants need to provide 
Article 19 of the Implementing Regulation of the Competition Law states when to submit 
an application and what information must be included: 
Any entity intending to realize the economic concentration shall submit a written 
application to the Council 60 days prior to the accomplishment of the concentration 
transaction and shall fill in a form including the following:  
1) Names of parties related to the concentration transaction;  
2) The description of the requested concentration and the effectiveness date;  
3) Relevant goods and services in addition to its sale volume and percentage;  
4) The relevant market and the volume thereof;  
5) The main commodities dealt in by the applicant entity;  
6) The positive impacts of the concentration;  
7) The negative impacts of the concentration and the proposed procedures to limit such 
impacts;  
8) The markets that will be affected by the concentration transaction;  
9) The name, capacity, and official domicile of the applicant.425  
                                                          
424 Saudi Competition Protection Council, available at http://www.ccp.org.sa/go/p.vbhtml?lang=en-
sa&page=News&id=13&tag=News&showid=1145 (last visited November 3, 2015). 
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Article 20 of the Implementing Regulation of the Competition Law lists the information 
that must be attached to the application regarding the parties involved: 
The applicant shall provide, with the application, information about each entity involved 
in the concentration transaction, particularly the following information:  
1) The name, nationality, address, number of branches, commercial register number, and 
the licensed activity of the entity;  
2) List of the main commodities dealt in by the entity;  
3) List of the names of the board of directors;  
4) The main clients and their percentage in the market;  
5) The volume, value, and percentage of the sales in the market;  
6) List of the competitors and their market shares;  
7) The existing concluded agreements;  
8) The factors that affect market entry;  
9) The nature of distribution channels;  
10) The factors that affect price fixing during the last five years;  
11) The volume of the available production capacity and the percentage of its utilization;  
12) The volume of demand on the commodity and the structure thereof;  
13) The alternative/substitute commodity;  
14) Types of client.426 
H. Documents that must be attached to the Economic Concentration application 
The Implementing Regulation of the Competition Law lists the documents that must be 
attached to the Economic Concentration application: 
1) The Articles of Association or the bylaw[s] of the related entities;  
2) Financial statements for the last two fiscal years of the entities involved in the 
transaction of Economic Concentration as well as their branches;  
                                                                                                                                                                                           
425 Implementing Regulation of the Competition Law, art. 19. 
426 Id. at art. 20. 
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3) A draft contract or agreement of Economic Concentration in addition to any public or 
private subscription documents and the number and type of shares or assets that will be 
acquired;  
4) A report on the economic dimensions of the transaction, particularly the positive or 
negative impacts on the market;  
5) If a representative submits the application, he shall provide his full particulars. A copy 
of his power-of-attorney shall be enclosed and verified against the original [and] then 
signed accordingly by the competent employee.427 
I. The outcome of the economic concentration study after the waiting period 
Article 31 of the Implementing Regulation of the Competition Law explains what actions 
the Council may take after it has reviewed an economic concentration application: 
The applicant shall be informed in writing with [sic] the decision of the Council, which 
shall be any of the following:  
1) The approval on [sic] the economic concentration application, supported by reasons;  
2) The refusal of the economic concentration application, supported by reasons;  
3) The conditional approval on [sic] the economic concentration.428 
Article 32 provides more details about what the Council may do if it concludes that a 
particular economic concentration transaction will affect freedom of competition, as stated in 
Article 32 of the Implementing Regulation of the Competition Law: 
If the Council concludes that the economic concentration will restrict the freedom of 
competition, it shall decide the following:  
1) Illegality of the economic concentration;  
2) Preventing any of the related parties from acquiring all or some of the entity or assets 
thereof;  
3) Requesting any person to undertake procedures for resolving any entity or terminating 
any partnership if the Council deems that such person has a share in or is a party to the 
acquisition process;  
                                                          
427 Id. at art. 21. 
428 Id. at art. 31. 
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4) Requesting any person mentioned in the decision, in case of joint concentration, to 
abide by the controls and restriction set by the Council in relation to the manner which 
will be followed for work flow;  
5) Take the necessary precautions to terminate, prevent or mitigate the economic 
concentration, at the discretion of the Council.429 
To summarize, upon receiving an economic concentration transaction application, the Council 
may approve the transaction, reject the transaction, or approve it with conditions. This last option 
(approval with conditions) was the result for the request made by Elezazya Panda, a very 
interesting case that is discussed in detail in the cases section of this chapter.  
J. Appeals 
After the Competition Council makes a decision regarding the economic concentration of 
a certain M&A transaction, the applicant may appeal this decision before the Board of 
Grievances according to the Saudi Competition Law, which states: 
Decisions of the committee may be appealed before the Board of Grievances within 
fifteen days as of the date of notification of the decision. In case of repealing the decision 
of the committee, the Board of Grievances shall review the violation and impose the 
relevant penalty.430  
Therefore, a Competition Council decision is not automatically final, because its decisions are 
administrative and may be appealed before the administrative courts. The only instance in which 
an appeal is not allowed is if the Competition Law makes clear that a decision made by the 
Competition Council Committee will be final and cannot be appealed, as is explained in the 
Saudi legal system chapter under the semi courts section. The author asked a representative from 
the Competition Council for information about any decisions that had been appealed before the 
administrative court; however, the representative did not know of any such appeals and noted 
                                                          
429 Id. at art. 32. 
430 Saudi Competition Law, art. 15(3).  
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that, in fact, applicant parties generally seemed satisfied with the decisions handed down by the 
Council.  
However, it would seem that parties should try to appeal before the administrative court 
if the Council refuses to approve a transaction. For one thing, getting an administrative court 
involved in an appeal may help to ensure that the courts are genuinely focused on any unusual 
circumstances surrounding a particular proposed transaction. In addition, an appeal involves a 
review of any previous decisions made about the transaction and may help ensure the accuracy 
of such previous decisions. Finally, it is the applicant party’s right to ensure that the evaluation 
and measurement used by the Council was proper. Appeals may help to elevate decisions into 
cases, which eventually become available for the public to read, all of which contributes to the 
formulation of more stable rules regarding M&A and the Saudi Competition Law. The author 
discovered the diagram in Figure 2.5, which is displayed immediately below, that was tweeted 
by the Competition Council over Twitter431; the author has translated the text in this diagram into 
English, reworked it and added certain important steps to it. 
 
                                                          
431 Saudi Competition Council’s account on Twitter (@SaudiCOC) Available on Twitter at 





The process of the economic concentration’s request 
 
 
§4.4. Assessment and Guidelines 
A. The relationship between a dominating position and economic concentration 
1. The issue 
A contradiction exists between the Competition Law and its Implementing Regulation. 
First, the Competition Law stipulates that the Competition Council has jurisdiction over 
approving a merger or acquisition that results in a dominant position in the market.432, 433  
                                                          
432 Saudi Competition Law, art. 9(1). 
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Second, the Competition Law defines dominance thusly:  
A situation where a firm or a group of firms are [is] able to influence the market 
prevailing price through controlling a certain percentage of the total supply of a 
commodity or service in the industry of its business. The Regulations shall specify this 
percentage according to criteria, which include the market structure, the easiness of 
market entry by other firms, and any other criteria determined by the Council.434  
Third, Article 6, 1 states:  
Firms involved in merger operations or firms desiring to acquire assets, proprietary 
rights, usufructs or shares, which causes [sic] them to be in a dominating position, shall 
notify the Council in writing at least sixty days prior to completion of the same.435 
Finally, Article 5 of the Competition Law makes clear that the Law only prohibits certain 
actions when a company enjoys a dominating position.  
However, the Definitions section of the Implementing Regulation of the Competition 
Law describes economic concentration in this way:  
[A]ny act resulting in full or partial transfer of ownership rights or usufruct of an entity’s 
properties, rights, stocks, shares or obligations to another entity that puts an entity or a 
group of entities in a position of domination of an entity or a group of entities, by way of 
merger, takeover, acquisition, or combining two or more managements into one joint 
management or any other means which leads to having a market share of 40% of the total 
sales of a commodity in the market.436  
                                                                                                                                                                                           
433 In the Arabic version of the Saudi Competition Law, Article 9, and in this particular Article, the word 
“ownership” rather than “acquisition” is used. However, the English version of the Saudi Competition Law uses the 
word “acquisition.” The exact language of Article 9(1) of the English version of the Competition Law states: 
“Subject to provisions of other laws, the Council shall have jurisdiction over the following tasks: 1) Approving cases 
of merger, acquisition, or combining two managements or more into one joint management resulting in a dominant 
position in the market.” Ownership in Arabic could occur in many ways: inheritance, purchase, gift, donation, etc. 
The author believes that the word “ownership”—both for the purposes of the Saudi Competition Law, and also in 
the context of mergers and acquisitions, is not the proper legal terminology to use to describe acquisitions, stock 
purchases, or purchases of assets. The use of this word may lead to complications regarding the smooth application 
of the Saudi Competition Law in years to come. In fact, because “ownership” and certain other words are so broad 
and general, their continued usage may encourage the Council in the future to abuse the power and authority it 
wields over the market. The author argues that the Saudi Competition Council’s purpose is to assure fair 
competition, ease competition, and prevent barriers to entrance from becoming part of Saudi’s investment 
marketplace.  
434 The Saudi Competition Law, art. 2. 
435 Id. at art. 6(1). 
436 Implementing Regulation of the Competition Law, art. 2. 
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Also, Articles 6 through 18 of the Implementing Regulation of the Competition Law 
cover issues related to a dominating position and include considerations437 or factors to help the 
Council determine if an entity is in a dominant position, or if certain actions have been taken that 
may constitute a violation of the Competition Law. In addition, Articles 18 to 33 of the 
Implementing Regulation of the Competition Law address the concept of economic 
concentration438 and the issues that such concentration can cause. 
A full understanding of the Competition Law and its Implementing Regulation may cause 
a reader to question whether, and how, these two legal documents work together. What is the 
difference between the way each document defines the concepts of dominance and economic 
concentration? Article 6 of the Competition Law requires that parties notify the Council if they 
are involved in a merger or acquisition that may cause a dominating position. Article 19 of the 
Implementing Regulation of the Competition Law requires that any party that wants to realize 
economic concentration must submit an application to the Council, because mergers and 
acquisitions are mentioned in Article 6 of the Competition Law in the context of dominance, and 
are also mentioned in the Implementing Regulation of the Competition Law in the Definitions 
section in the context of economic concentration. Further questions may include whether it is a 
violation of Competition Law for an entity to be in a dominant position by means of a merger or 
acquisition if that dominant position does not influence prices in the marketplace. Is it a violation 
of the Competition Law for an entity to be in a dominant position if no action that was taken to 
consummate the merger/acquisition was prohibited by this law? Do the terms “economic 
concentration” and “dominating position” mean the same thing? Is economic concentration a 
step toward a dominating position?  
                                                          
437 The paper will address these considerations after clarifying the issue of the difference between dominance and 
economic concentration.  




The only logical explanation and analysis of the language of this Competition Law is that 
economic concentration is a step toward an unwanted result: a company establishing a dominant 
status in the marketplace. In other words, economic concentration occurs when two or more 
companies combine through a merger or an acquisition. The economic concentration resulting 
from a merger or acquisition could lead to a dominant position if the transaction exceeds 40% of 
the total sales of a particular product in the marketplace. However, the Saudi Competition Law 
and its Implementing Regulation acknowledge that there are companies in dominant positions; 
however, these laws only prohibit certain actions taken by the dominant companies. The law 
exercises prohibitions against dominant companies only when these dominant companies take 
actions that restrict competition.439 This paper demonstrates that economic concentration is not 
per se a violation of the Competition Law, and it argues that based on the language of the 
Competition Law and its Implementing Regulation, occupying a dominating position without 
influencing prices is unlikely to be considered a violation of the Competition Law. The 
Implementing Regulation, which makes the language of the law broad, blurs the spirit of fair 
competition policy in Saudi Arabia. 
                                                          
439 Competition Law, art. 5, states that “A firm enjoying a dominant status shall be banned from any practice 
restricting competition, as specified by the Regulations, including:  
1) Selling a commodity or service at a price below cost, with the intention of forcing competitors out of the market.  
2) Imposing restrictions on the supply of a commodity or service, with the intention of creating an artificial shortage 
in its availability in order to raise prices.  
3) Imposing special conditions on selling and purchasing transactions or on dealing with another firm, in a manner 
that puts it in a weak competitive position compared to other competing firms.  
4) Refusing to deal with another firm without justification in order to restrict its entry into the market.” This is one 
of the issues in the Law. Does the Saudi policy want some companies to enjoy dominant status? If not, should not 
the Law prohibit the dominant status in this article? This makes the author question the meaning of dominant 
position in the Saudi Competition Law.” 
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B. The considerations and guidelines used to determine the economic 
concentration of a transaction and its effect 
Article 27 of the Implementing Regulation of the Competition Law states that while the 
Council is reviewing an application request for economic concentration, it should make sure that 
the transaction requested will not affect competition. The Council is free to use any of the factors 
listed below to determine whether the transaction will affect competition: 
The Council shall study the concentration application to ensure that it will not affect the 
competition. Such study shall be through [sic] evaluating one or more of the following 
factors:  
1) The level of competition in the market;  
2) The entry possibility of new entities to the market;  
3) The effect of demand on the price of the commodity;  
4) The existence of any regulatory or realistic barriers to enter the market;  
5) The level and historical trends of the anticompetitive practices in the market;  
6) The possibility of acquiring power in the market by the concentrating parties due to the 
economic concentration;  
7) The variable characteristics of the market including the growth, innovation and 
creativity.  
8) The opinions of the related entities in accordance to [sic] Article 26 hereof.440 
The Implementing Regulation of the Competition Law gives the Council guidelines to use in 
considering the positive or negative effects of the economic concentration on competition:  
The Council shall take into consideration the following upon evaluating the impacts of 
the economic concentration:  
1) Maintaining and promoting the effective competition among the producers and 
distributors of goods and services in the market;  
2) Enhancing the interests of the consumers with regard to quality and price;  
                                                          
440 Implementing Regulation of the Competition Law, art. 27. 
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3) Encouraging, through competition, for [sic] decreasing costs, improving new 
commodities, and facilitating the entry of new competitors in the market.441 
C. The considerations and guidelines for determining the dominating position of 
an entity 
The Implementing Regulation of the Competition Law leaves the Council considerable 
latitude in terms of what to consider as it examines the position of an entity that may have a 
dominant position in the market:  
Article (9):  
The Council may, upon studying the position of any dominant entity in the market, take 
into consideration the availability of any or some of the following items or decide the 
appropriate study approach:  
1) The relevant market of a specific commodity in a specific geographical area;  
2) The market share of the relevant entity;  
3) The level of actual or potential competition with regard to the number of competing 
persons, the volume of production and the demand on the commodity;  
4) The obstacles that hinder, limit, or prevent the entry of new competing entities.  
Article (10):  
When studying the impact of a practice of a violating dominant entity on the fair 
competition, the Council may take into consideration any or some of the following items 
or decide the appropriate study approach:  
1) The impact on competition;  
2) Whether a practice is or [is] not consistent with the normal competitive behavior when 
it is possible to construe that fact based on the normal commercial concerns and interests 
in the situations in which the person who commits such practice is not in a position that 
enables it [sic] to influence the total demand or supply of the relevant goods or services 
or influence the prevailing price in the market;  
3) Whether a practice is or [is] not complying with the direct protection of intellectual 
property rights while the usage of intellectual property rights by market players to 
commit the practices stipulated herein constitutes violation to the Law.442 
                                                          




Cases considered by the Competition Council are released as a form of administrative 
decision. Samples of these decisions will be provided in this Section. The purpose of presenting 
these decisions is to demonstrate what Competition Council decisions look like in terms of the 
information that the Council provides for the public. 
A. The Egypt Air Company’s complaint  
The Competition Council issued a statement that said the following:  
Egypt Air Company submitted a complaint concerning the merger of [the] ground 
Services Company of Saudi Arabian Airlines, the Nation[al] Ground Services Company 
and Attar Ground Services Company under the name of Saudi Ground Services 
(SGS).This new merger (company) started drafting new contracts for the services offered 
at higher prices. 
The Council Decision: 
The Council of Competition Protection issued a Decision No. (66/2011) dated on 
12/7/1432, to start taking actions in investigating and collecting evidences from the 
related parties in this complaint concerning the practices of violating the provision of the 
Competition Law 
The Results of the Investigation: 
The General Secretariat prepared a list of [the prosecution’s] pleading and referred the 
case to the Committee for Settlement of the violations of [the] Competition Law and [to] 
take the necessary action.443 
B. The acquisition of Great Stores’ Assets by Elezazya Panda 
The Competition Council issued a statement that said the following:  
The Purchase of Elezazya Panda of the Assets of the Great Stores in the Kingdom: 
The Request: 
(The request of Alezazya Panda to complete the Economic Concentration operation): The 
General Secretariat prepared an Economic study to see the degree of effects of the merger 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
442 Id. at Articles 10 and 11. 
443 Saudi Arabia Council Protection of Competition, Annual Report 2011, 40. There is no update for this report and 
no further (more recent) data about such cases. 
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of the Two companies in the market. The study concluded that the merger will compose 
(40%) of the Saudi market and the merger will constitute a dominant position situation, 
hence the study recommended to proceed on completing the merger in [on] condition that 
the new company implement a unified marketing and pricing policy throughout the 
Kingdom. 
The Council Decision: 
The Council of Competition Protection approved the merger on condition that the new 
company implement a unified marketing and pricing policy throughout the Kingdom, by 
issuing its Decision No. (38/2008) dated on 9/9/1429.444 
C. The acquisition of the Saudi Gean’s Assets by Elezazya Panda 
The Competition Council issued a statement that said the following:  
The Purchase of Elezazya Panda Company the Assets of Saudi Gean Ltd: 
The Request: 
Elezazya Panda Company requested to purchase the assets of Saudi Gean Ltd. and 
complete the Economic Concentration [application]. Both companies traded in 
commodity 
retail trade. The General Secretarial studied the request and prepared a study based on the 
Rules Governing Economic Concentration. The study concluded that the new merger will 
compose (40%) of the Saudi market in almost all cities and provinces in the Kingdom, 
thus creating a dominant position situation, but irrespective of this situation, the study 
concluded the merger can be established according to the study results on condition that 
the new merger should be committed to apply a unified marketing and pricing policy445 
throughout the Kingdom. 
The Council Decision: 
The Council issued its Decision No. (48/2009) dated on 17/10/1930H corresponding to 
6/10/2009 approving the new merger on condition that the new merger should be 
committed to apply a unified marketing and pricing policy throughout the Kingdom.446 
                                                          
444 Id. at 42. 
445 This is one of the examples of undefined words that the Competition Council uses without referring to anything 
that can help the reader understand the Council’s decisions. For example, the Council does not provide the public 
with an explanation of what it means by terms such as “unified marketing” and “pricing policy.” 
446 Saudi Arabia Council Protection of Competition, Annual Report 2011, supra note 443, at 43. 
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1. Analysis of the Panda case 
A dissertation entitled “Does the Saudi Competition Law Guarantee Protection to Fair 
Competition?” written by Mr. Musaed Alotaibi discusses various competition issues related to 
these cases. An important case is that of Panda purchasing the assets of Saudi Gean.447 Based on 
his research, Mr. Alotaibi concludes that even though Panda’s share in the market was 62% and 
the Competition Law states that this means the company has dominance, the Competition 
Council approved the transaction.448 Therefore, Mr. Alotaibi argues that the Competition Council 
erred in approving the request made by Panda.449  
The author disagrees with Mr. Alotaibi’s analysis of the Competition Council’s decision 
in this case for several reasons. Mr. Alotaibi’s analysis is based on incomplete information. He 
did not have complete information about the two companies, nor did he have complete data 
about the economic state of the market. He stated that assessing the dominance issue is not easy 
and may have been negatively affected by the available information,450 which he did not have. 
Additionally, a representative from the Competition Council told the author that the Council had 
requested further information in the Panda case from other companies and other governmental 
agencies and ministries in order to better assess dominance or economic concentration. 
Therefore, the author argues that it was nearly impossible for Mr. Alotaibi to have reached a 
rational and reliable conclusion given the limited data to which he had access.  
Finally and most importantly, the percentage (of a company’s share in the market) that 
the Saudi Competition Law cites is only the reportable percentage; in other words, if a 
transaction causes a company to achieve control of 40% or more of the market, the parties must 
                                                          
447 MUSAED ALOTAIBI, DOES THE SAUDI COMPETITION LAW GUARANTEE PROTECTION TO FAIR COMPETITION?, 132 






notify the Competition Council and obtain its approval. Research conducted for this dissertation 
led the author to explain to members of the Competition Council that legal researchers, lawyers 
and professors have criticized the Council’s decisions about certain M&A cases and have been 
forced to make assumptions about what certain Council decisions actually mean, because the 
Council does not publish thoroughly fleshed-out explanations of its decisions. Lack of 
information can cause legal professionals and scholars to misunderstand or be unaware of the 
criteria the Council is adopting for any given decision.  
More examples of the Competition Council’s decisions are provided below to 
demonstrate that the Council consistently publishes only very short descriptions, with minimal 
information, of its decisions. 
D. The merger between Aminco and the Arabian Company for Transport and 
the Arabian Company for Safety and Security Services 
The Competition Council issued a statement that said the following:  
Merger of a Group of Security Companies under the name (Arabian company for security 
and safety services), (Aminco). 
The Request: 
Sultan Bin Mohammed Al-Azal and his partners for security guards (Aminco), submitted 
a request to create a merger with the Arabian Company for Transport Services and the 
Arabian Company for Safety and Security Services (Ltd). The General Secretariat 
prepared an Economic study based on the Rules Governing Economic Concentration. The 
results of the study revealed that the merger company will not enjoy a dominate [sic] 
position in the market due [to] the availability of many companies in the market 
practicing safety and security activities. 
The Council Decision: 
The Council of Competition Protection issued a Decision No. (53/2010) dated on 
14/3/1431 corresponding to 28/2/2010 approving the creation of the merger to [sic] the 
155 
 
companies under the name of “The Arabian Company for Security and Safety Services 
(Aminco).”451 
E. The merger between AlManar and Afaq 
The Competition Council issued a statement that said the following:  
The Merger of AlManar Private Company and Afaq Educational Co. 
The Request: 
(The request of Afaq educational Co. to complete the Economic Concentration with 
Almanar Private Co.) The General secretarial studied the request, and the results of the 
study revealed that the merger operation will not result in a dominate [sic] position in the 
market for the new company due its small market share. 
The Council Decision: 
The Council of Competition Protection issued its Decision No. (54/2010) dated on 
4/4/1431H corresponding to 20/3/2010, approving the completion of the Economic 
Concentration between the Two [sic] companies.452 
§4.6. Interview with the Competition Council 
Because M&A is a new type of financial transaction in Saudi Arabia, its implementation 
and applications, as well as the Competition Law, are all still evolving. The author met with 
some of the officers who work at the Competition Council. They welcomed the author and were 
willing to provide any help they could without violating the confidentiality of the companies 
with which they work.453 The author sat with some of these officers from the Competition 
                                                          
451 Saudi Arabia Council Protection of Competition, Annual Report 2011, supra note 443, at 43. 
452 Id. at 44.  
453 The author wishes to stress to the reader the research problems that arise in studying the topics of this 
dissertation; these problems arise largely because of the scope of confidentiality in Saudi Arabia concerning 
government activity. Officers generally fear that providing the public with any information about their business will 
get them in trouble, due to the lack of statutory provisions that explain the limitations about what can and cannot be 
disclosed. Therefore, it is not easy to get information out of officers. This makes sense in countries such as Saudi 
Arabia in which there are harsh penalties for officers who reveal any secret information. Such penalties can include 
fines of up to five million SAR, and officers can be sent to prison for two years as well, according to Article 13 of 
the Saudi Competition Law. The Council has not provided details or measurements that can be used to guide officers 
in knowing what to disclose and what not to disclose about the published decisions made by the Council. As noted, 
published decisions are rarely longer than one short paragraph. In the requests of Economic concentration forms, 
which are provided in the Appendix, there is a question that asks the applicant to state any secret information that 
the applicant does not want the Council to mention in its written decision announced on the website; this helps 
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Council and asked them questions and requested certain clarifications. One of the most important 
questions that the author asked concerned which model or method they thought the legislature 
had followed in enacting the Competition Law in 2004. They answered that they tend to see that 
the Saudi legislature followed or adopted the Model Law on Competition, which was created by 
the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development.454 The author also met directly with 
representatives of the Gulf Cooperation Council and is thus able to speak about certain facts 
learned during that conversation, even though this information has not yet become public. The 
Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)455 has been openly willing to develop a unified Competition 
Law for the GCC456 that is similar to the law that is practiced in the European Union.  
The author discussed issues regarding the unified Competition Law with the GCC, and it 
appears that the unified Competition Law will benefit all of the countries involved in developing 
it. Further, the GCC representatives indicated that they believe that a unified competition law 
may help attract more foreign countries and investors to invest in the Gulf region, because such a 
law would give them confidence that there is, in fact, a unified system in the Gulf region, and it 
would help them feel more comfortable with the clarity and certainty of the rules of competition. 
The author asked whether a unified competition law would pertain to countries outside the GCC 
or only to the GCC countries. The Council officers responded that any future deal that would 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
officers know what can be revealed, but the whole issue is still a gray area for them. This paper argues that the 
Council should publish its decisions with more details, in order to help guide companies that want to merge or 
acquire better understand how the Competition Council’s system in Saudi Arabia works. 
454 UNCTAD, available at http://unctad.org/en/Pages/DITC/CompetitionLaw/The-Model-Law-on-Competition.aspx 
(last visited June 17, 2015).  
455 The GCC members are The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, The State of Kuwait, The State of Bahrain, The United 
Arab Emirates, The State of Qatar and The Sultanate of Oman. For further information, visit Cooperation Council 
for the Arab States of the Gulf, available at http://www.gcc-sg.org/eng/indexfc7a.html?action=Sec-Show&ID=1. 
(last visited June 17, 2015). 
456 Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf, in the 33d session in 2012, available at http://www.gcc-
sg.org/indexa874.html?Sub=ShowOne. Invitations to join have been extended by the GCC to Morocco and Jordan. 
See Amid Turmoil, GCC Extends Invitation to Jordan and Morocco, Middle East in Focus, commentary by the 
Middle East Policy Council available at http://www.mepc.org/amid-turmoil-gcc-extends-invitation-jordan-and-
morocco?print (last visited June 17, 2015). 
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affect the market/s of GCC countries would be subject to the unified competition law. One of the 
issues delaying the drafting of the GCC Competition Law, which may continue to be an issue in 
the future, is that a unified court for the GCC has not yet been established. Uncertainty over 
where disputes will be heard and resolved may make it difficult for the writers of the draft of the 
new unified competition law to move ahead with completing the draft. 
§4.7. Questions the author asked the Competition Council 
Q1: The author asked the Council how it determines dominance or economic 
concentration. 
A1: First, the author did not receive a clear answer about the difference between 
dominance and economic concentration, which forced the author’s analysis in a different 
direction. As explained earlier, economic concentration can lead to dominance, but economic 
concentration is not by itself a violation of the Competition Law or its Implementing Regulation; 
indeed, there are official forms by which economic concentration may be requested by 
applicants, whose requests may be approved or refused. Second, the Council mentioned that it 
looks at the entire market in Saudi Arabia to determine if an entity’s dominance or economic 
concentration will affect competition in Saudi Arabia. The Council members with whom the 
author spoke also stated that they only review transactions that will affect the Saudi market. 
Q2: Has there ever been any obligation for any merger agreement involving a 
concentration of less than 40% to be submitted to the Competition Council? 
A2: Some of the officers answered affirmatively, noting that they have already reviewed 
nine requests regarding economic concentration that involved concentrations lower than 40%. 
However, this surprised the author, because many mergers and acquisitions have been 
consummated in the past 11 months, which should mean there would have been more than just 
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nine requests that concerned transactions with concentrations at stake that were lower than 40%. 
At the same time, the author asked several lawyers the same question, and these lawyers stated 
that they had worked on some M&A transactions that they had not submitted to the Competition 
Council for review. This confirms the author’s analysis and understanding of the law; namely, 
that not every M&A transaction must be submitted to the Competition Council. When the author 
noted to Council members the observation that many M&A transactions were not submitted to 
the Competition Council, they responded that they have been working to coordinate M&A 
review among different governmental bodies, such as the Ministry of Industry and Commerce, 
the Capital Market Authority, the Saudi Arabia Monetary Agency, the Communication and 
Information Technology Commission and other governmental agencies.457 The author is still 
                                                          
457 The author knows of several M&A transactions that were completed but not announced by the Competition 
Council. For instance, on April 6, 2013, Altayyar Travel Holding Group announced on its website that its board 
approved an acquisition transaction in which Altayyar would acquire 39% of Muthmera Real Estate Interment 
Company in consideration of SAR 341 million (USD 90 million), which would give Altayyar 75% of Muthmera 
Company and a total capital value of SAR 641 million (USD 170 million). See Altayyar Travel Group (in Arabic), 
available at http://www.altayyargroup.com/ARABIC/SHAREHOLDERSRELATION/Pages/ATG-
RealEstateInvestment.aspx (last visited November 20, 2015). There has been no announcement by the Competition 
Council regarding the transaction, even though the consideration is not low and Altayyar’s share in Muthmera is 
now 75% and its capital value is SAR 641 million. Altayyar Travel Group’s capital reached SAR 800 million (USD 
213 million) in 2009, according to Altayyar’s prospectus. See Altayyar’s Prospectus (in Arabic) for 2012, p. L, 
available at http://www.cma.org.sa/Ar/DocLib1/Al%20Tayyar.pdf (last visited November 20, 2015)  In 2011, 
Altayyar Travel Group’s income was SAR 4,706 million (USD 1,228 million), and its net profits were SAR 612 
million (USD 163 million), see Id. On January 27, 2015, the Capital Market Authority approved the request of the 
AlTayyar Travel Group Holding Company to increase its capital from SAR 1500 million to SAR 2000 million (USD 
533). See http://www.cma.org.sa/en/News/Pages/CMA_N_1630.aspx. Another example involves a case in 2014 in 
which Philips acquired 51% of the Saudi Arabian General Lighting Company (GLC) in consideration of USD 235 
million. See http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/03/17/philips-saudi-acquisition-idUSL6N0ME35U20140317. 
However, the transaction was not announced by the Competition Council. The author has discovered merger 
transactions between two private companies in which no request or notification was made to the Council. 
In another example, an Economic Concentration request was made by two merging companies and submitted to the 
Council, but the author questions whether the companies were legally required to submit a request or to notify the 
council. The Competition Council states in its announcement that “The Council also approved the request of the 
merger of Mask Holding Company with Asliyah Company for Investment, the Mask's activity is in participation in 
companies and the establishment, management and operation of agricultural, commercial, industrial and medical 
projects, while Asliyah Company works in the field of real estate management and development,” available at 
http://www.coc.gov.sa/go/p.vbhtml?lang=en-sa&page=News&id=13&tag=News&showid=1152. However, each 
company invests in a different market (last visited November 20, 2015).  While the Mask Company operates in the 
management of medical projects, and industrial, commercial and agricultural products, Asliyah Company invests in 
the management of real estate. How can these two companies become a relevant market especially when the law 
does not define it in clear way? How can two different businesses constitute economic concentration and, therefore, 
exceed 40% of the market?  
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convinced that mergers and acquisitions that do not have the potential for dominance or 
economic concentration of at least 40% do not fall under the Competition Law or its 
Implementing Regulation.  
Q3: What economic methods or valuations does the Council use to apply the provisions 
of the Competition Law; for example, how does the Council determine economic concentration? 
A3: The author did not receive a clear answer to this question. The officers stated that 
they make different studies based on the entire Saudi market, which requires cooperation with 
other governmental bodies, but they did not cite or explain the specific methods or valuations 
that they are using.458  
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Moreover, in 2014, the Competition Council referred in its publication to two merger requests that were submitted to 
the Council. The first request was among three construction companies, which was the second request in the 
construction field, and the Council did not mention the value of the transaction, even though it did state that there 
were 3,487 certified construction entities, and that the construction business in Saudi would reach SAR 300 billion 
(USD 80 billion). See, available in Arabic at 
http://www.ccp.org.sa/go/uploads/Articles/53/attachments/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%AF%D8%AF%20%
D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AE%D8%A7%D9%85%D8%B3%20-
%20%D9%85%D8%AD%D8%B1%D9%85%201436%D9%87%D9%80.pdf. The question becomes, what is the 
size of those three companies combined? Will they constitute an economic concentration of 40%? Based on the 
number of certified construction entities and the size of the construction business in Saudi provided by the Council, 
the author suspects that they may have reached the statutory line. If the three companies merged did not exceed the 
40% threshold of economic concentration, and they were not obliged to submit a request, why did the Council 
require them to do so? The Council referred in the same publication to another request for the merger between 
Lafander Company and Al Subhi Company, which both invest in the operation and management of medical 
laboratories and hospitals. Instead of stating the percentage of economic concentration that the two companies 
would have as a result of the merger, the Council states the annual sale of the two companies, which is SAR 15 




458 In 2015, February 8, The Competition Council announced that it received an economic concentration request 
from the Sasco company, a Saudi-listed company with capital of SAR 450 million (USD 120 million) that owns 74 
gas stations throughout the Kingdom. 50% of the 74 gas stations are in the central region of the kingdom. Sasco 
announced it would acquire Zaiti group, a non-listed Saudi company that owns 52 gas stations throughout the 
Kingdom. See The Competition Council Website, available in Arabic at 
http://www.coc.gov.sa/go/p.vbhtml?lang=ar-
sa&page=News&id=44&tag=%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3%D8%AE%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%B1&showid=117
5. It was announced that the Competition Council approved the acquisition on March 19, 2015 (see 
http://www.argaam.com/article/articledetail/495059); however, some issues need to be addressed. First, in the 
announcement, the Council called the transaction a “merger,” which it is not. The transaction was an acquisition. 
Secondly and more importantly, according to the National Committee for the gas station companies in 2014, there 
are 9 thousands gas stations in Saudi Arabia. See Dina Masry, 70% of petrol stations to foreigners as 




The author examined the Competition Law, its Implementing Regulation and the 
functions of the Competition Council. The author also met with several lawyers and employees 
of the Competition Council (as well as with people who used to work for the Council) and held 
discussions with each of these groups about M&A and competition issues in Saudi Arabia. This 
research allows the author to clearly summarize the findings. First, the Saudi Competition Law, 
as stated earlier, is evolving as M&A is growing in Saudi Arabia. The procedures are improving 
year by year.  
Second, the author could not find clear answers to certain questions about the difference 
between dominance and economic concentration, the former term (dominance) as used in the 
Competition Law and the latter term (economic concentration) as used in the Implementing 
Regulation. The author was told that these concepts mean the same thing. In this case, the author 
argues that the Implementing Regulation should use the same terminology that is used in the 
Competition Law to make it easier for authorities to recognize and regulate M&A transactions, 
as well as to make it easier for companies to take certain preliminary steps as they plan a merger 
or acquisition, which may save them time and effort.  
Third, the author found that M&A is a relatively new concept for the Competition 
Council. The author argues that the Council needs to develop a more sophisticated understanding 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
of-petrol-stations-to-foreigners-as-subcontractors-in-saudi-arabia/. (last visited December 28, 2015).  This means 
that the 74 gas stations owned by Sasco and the 52 owned by Zaiti are small numbers compared to the overall 
number of gas stations in Saudi Arabia. Third, assuming that the gas stations are concentrated in Riyadh, the capital 
City of Saudi Arabia, oil and gas are supported by the government, and the oil price is fixed by the government as 
well. Therefore, the potential for a company to gain dominance, control or monopoly in the oil and gas marketplace 
is low if not impossible. This paper calls for raising awareness of the concept of fair competition and monopoly. The 
pre-merger notification requirements and thresholds should be based on economic rationale that is germane to the 
Saudi market. The Saudi Competition Council could adopt a certain number as the value at which a transaction 
triggers notification, but it should base this number on an educated and disclosed economic premise. More 




that recognizes that M&A may take a variety of public and private forms. Fourth, the author was 
made aware, by a source that cannot be revealed, that work is being done to improve the 
indicators, methods, techniques and tests that can be used to determine whether a given merger 
or acquisition will cause dominance or economic concentration; this work may lead to the 
creation and implementation of regulations that consider the dominance issue from vantage 
points other than the simple 40% rule that is stated in the Implementing Regulation. Fifth, the 
Competition Council invites the public to make its opinions known, including any party who 
believes he/she may be affected by a proposed transaction. 
§4.9. South African Competition Act459 
A. The definition of merger 
The South African Competition Act (SACA) defines a merger as follows: “For purposes 
of this Act, a merger occurs when one or more firms directly or indirectly acquire or establish 
direct or indirect control over the whole or part of the business of another firm.”460 
SACA stipulates the meaning of control over a company as being a situation in which a 
company a) acquires more than 50% of the issued capital shares of another company, b) has 
voting power over a majority of the votes of another company, c) has the ability to veto the 
majority appointment of directors…g) is able to influence the company’s policy.461 
                                                          
459 The reason that South African Competition Act is chosen as a model is that South Africa is the closest of any 
other country to Saudi Arabia in terms of size and GDP that also has a sufficient and clear Competition Act. Other 
countries are very different than Saudi Arabia in size, GDP and many other factors; therefore, they would not be 
practical models for Saudi to imitate. Also, the thresholds and size of transactions in the South African Competition 
Act and the South African Commission would fit the Saudi M&A market economically.  
460 Competition Act 89 of 1998 § 12.1(a)(S.Afr). 
461 Id. at § 12.2 
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B. Categories of merger 
Subsection 1 (a) of Section 11 of the South African Competition Act requires the 
Minister of Trade and Industry and the Competition Commission in consultation with each other 
to determine “A lower and a higher threshold of combined annual turnover or assets, or a lower 
and a higher threshold of combinations of turnover and assets…[and] (b) a method for the 
calculation of annual turnover or assets to be applied in relation to each of those thresholds.”462 
As of April 1, 2009, the lower threshold of the combined turnover/asset value is R 560 million 
(USD 47.23 million), and the lower threshold of the target turnover/asset value is R 80 million 
(USD 6.75 million).463 The higher threshold of the combined turnover/asset value is R 6600 
million (USD 556.64 million), and the lower threshold of the target turnover/asset value is R 190 
million (USD 16.02 million).464 
The South African Competition Act recognizes three categories of merger: a small 
merger, the value of which falls below the lower thresholds set according to Subsection 1 of 
Section 11(a); an intermediate merger, the value of which falls between the lower and higher 
thresholds set according to Subsection 1(a) of Section 11; and a large merger, the value of which 
falls above the thresholds set according to Subsection 1(a) of Section 11.465  
C. Pre-merger notification 
SACA requires only intermediate and large mergers to file with the Competition 
Commission.466 Thus, if company A acquires 51% of company B, and the combined turnover 
value is greater than USD 47.23 million, and the target turnover value is greater than USD 6.75 
million, then parties A and B are required to file with the Competition Commission. 
                                                          
462 Id. at § 11.1(a)(b). 
463 Id. 
464 Id.  
465 Id. at § 11.5. 
466 Id. at § 13.13A. 
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1. Waiting period 
a. Intermediate merger 
For an intermediate merger, the Competition Commission must review applications 
within 20 business days of receipt, and it may extend this period for an additional 20 business 
days.467 The Competition Commission renders one of three decisions regarding the proposed 
merger: approval, approval with conditions or prohibition.468 If the 20 business days (or 40 days, 
if the Commission extends the period) pass with no decision from the Commission, the proposed 
merger is approved by default.469 
b. Large merger 
For a large merger, the Competition Commission has 40 days to render a decision, with 
accompanying justification, beginning from the day the parties submit the prescribed notification 
requirements.470 The Commission may make an extension of an additional 15 days to review the 
request.471 After completing its review, the Commission again has three possible responses: 
approval of the proposed merger, approval with conditions, or prohibition; this response is 
forwarded to the Competition Tribunal and the Minister of Trade and Industry.472 If the 40 
business days pass and the Commission has neither made a recommendation nor applied for an 
extension, then the applicant parties may submit a request to the Competition Tribunal directly, 
asking the Tribunal to consider the proposed merger.473 In such a case, the Competition Tribunal 
is required to arrange474 a date to hear information regarding the proceedings of the merger.475 
                                                          
467 Id. at § 14.1(a). 
468 Id. at § 14.1(a).1(b). 
469 Id.  
470 Id. at § 14A.1(a)(b). 
471 Id. at § 14.2. 
472 Id. at § 14A.1(a)(b). 
473 Id. at § 14.3. 
474 This Subsection needs to be modified and needs to set out the number of days within which the Competition 
Tribunal is required to make a decision regarding the merger. It is inconsistent to state when the decision regarding 
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2. Filing fee 
SACA imposes filing fees on both intermediate and large mergers of R 100.000 (USD 
8.430) and R 350.000 (USD 29.25), respectively.476 No fee is imposed on filings for small 
mergers.477 
3. Merger threshold calculator 
The South African Competition Commission has a unique service to help companies to 
determine if a proposed merger is large, intermediate or small.478 The company submits 
information and answer questions regarding its proposed transaction, and the Commission’s 
website will calculate the figures and provide the threshold results.479 The website states that the 
Competition Commission is not bound by this calculation, and that it cannot replace independent 
legal advice.480 
D. The considerations and standards used to evaluate a merger 
SACA focuses on two major drivers that need to be considered in order to efficiently 
review a proposed merger and ensure that the South African market remains efficient. The two 
considerations are whether the proposed merger will substantially prevent or lessen competition, 
and whether the proposed merger cannot be justified for reasons related to the protection of the 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
the merger must be made for the intermediate merger and not state the same information for the large merger. The 
law here leaves determining the time frame up to the Competition Tribunal to decide. This is not economically 
sufficient for merging parties that want to close their deals as soon as possible; also, it does not further the purpose 
of this law, which aims to make the parties aware of the time frame so that they can close their deals. 
475 Competition Act 89 of 1998 § 14.3 (S.Afr). 
476 Rules for Conduct of Proceedings in the Competition Commission §10, §§5(a) and (b) and Subsection 6. See the 
Competition Commission website available at http://www.compcom.co.za/notification-fees/.(last visited December 
6, 2015). 
477 Id. 





public’s interests.481 Thus, SACA defines the two crucial issues with which the Act is concerned 
and provides guidelines as to how to determine each issue.  
1. Factors that may substantially lessen or prevent competition 
To determine if a merger may substantially prevent or lessen competition, the South 
African Competition Act enumerates the factors that the Competition Commission or the 
Competition Tribunal must use to evaluate the strength of the relevant market and judge whether 
companies will operate in a competitive or cooperative manner as a result of a merger.482 SACA 
stipulates the following factors: 
(a) the actual and potential level of import competition in the market; 
(b) the ease of entry into the market, including tariff[s] and regulatory barriers; 
(c) the level and trends of concentration, and history of collusion, in the market; 
(d) the degree of countervailing power in the market; 
(e) the dynamic characteristics of the market, including growth, innovation, and product 
differentiation; 
(f) the nature and extent of vertical integration in the market; 
(g) whether the business or part of the business of a party to the merger or proposed 
merger has failed or is likely to fail; and 
(h) whether the merger will result in the removal of an effective competitor.483 
2. Factors that may affect the public interest 
Regarding protection of the public interest, SACA states that the following issues should 
be taken into consideration to determine whether a proposed merger can be justified: 
(3) When determining whether a merger can or cannot be justified on public interest 
grounds, the Competition Commission or the Competition Tribunal must consider the 
effect that the merger will have on – 
                                                          
481 Competition Act 89 of 1998 § 12A.1(a) (S.Afr). 




(a) a particular industrial sector or region; 
(b) employment; 
(c) the ability of small businesses, or firms controlled or owned by historically 
disadvantaged persons, to become competitive; and 
(d) the ability of national industries to compete in international markets.484 
E.  Appeal of the Competition Tribunal’s decision 
An appeal of the Competition Commission’s decision may be made to the Competition 
Appeal Court within 20 business days of the day the decision was issued.485 The Competition 
Appeal Court may set the decision aside, amend it, or confirm it.486 If an appeal is submitted, the 
Competition Appeal Court is required to decide whether to set aside the Competition 
Commission’s decision.487 If it sets the decision aside, the Appeal Court is then required to issue 
one of three resolution decisions: approval of the proposed merger, approval with conditions, or 
prohibition.488 After this step, there is no provision for any further appeal. 
F. The Competition Tribunal’s right to revoke its decision 
The South African Competition Act gives the Competition Tribunal the power to revoke 
its decision to approve a transaction in certain cases:  
(1) The Competition Commission may revoke its own decision to approve or 
conditionally approve a small or intermediate merger if – 
(a) the decision was based on incorrect information for which a party to the merger is 
responsible; 
(b) the approval was obtained by deceit; or 
(c) a firm concerned has breached an obligation attached to the decision.489 
                                                          
484 Id. at § 12A.3. 
485 Id. at § 17.2. 
486 Id.   
487 Id. at § 13.3. 
488 Id.  
489 Id. at § 15.1. 
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G. The Acquisition of Massmart by Wal-Mart 
Saudi Arabia’s Competition Council may encounter situations in the future in which a 
Saudi Arabian company is acquired by, or merges with, a US company; therefore, it may be 
helpful to briefly refer to how the South African Competition Council dealt with such a case; 
namely, the acquisition of the South African company Massmart by the US company Wal-Mart. 
In 2010, Wal-Mart, a US publicly listed company, announced that it planned to acquire 
51% of Massmart, a South African publicly listed company; this action was finally approved in 
2012 by the South African Competition Appeal Court.490 The Wal-Mart acquisition fell under the 
SA Competition Act because it was a large merger, with Wal-Mart acquiring 51% of 
Massmart.491 The SA Competition Commission approved the acquisition in 2011; however, a 
recommendation was then made by the SA Competition Commission to the Competition 
Tribunal that Wal-Mart should be required to re-hire the 503 employees of Massmart that it had 
fired immediately after the acquisition was announced.492 The SA Competition Tribunal based its 
analysis significantly on the grounds of public interest, stating that although the acquisition of 
Massmart by Wal-Mart did not raise anti-competitive concerns, it did raise public interest 
concerns.493 It further held that such concerns could be avoided or remedied by imposing 
conditions on the transaction, such as that the merged entity might not fire employees as a result 
of the transaction, and that the merged entity must create a program that ensured the 
development of suppliers in South Africa.494 An appeal made by the SA Ministers of Trade and 
Industry, Economic Development and Agriculture claimed that the Tribunal’s reasoning 
                                                          
490 SAMUEL C. THOMPSON, JR., BUSINESS PLANNING FOR MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS, 1131 (4th ed. 2015). 
491 Id. at 1132. 
492 Id.  
493 Id. at 1136-37. 
494 Id.  
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regarding the antitrust and public interest issues involved in this case was not successful.495 The 
SA Competition Appeal Court stated that it acknowledged some concerns in the areas of public 
interest and antitrust; however, it concluded that such concerns could not justifiably cause the 
merger to be prohibited, given the benefits the merger might provide.496 The Appeal Court also 
noted the conditions it had put into place to ensure that such concerns did not prevail.497 
 
                                                          











§4.10. Recommendations498  
Several recommendations are provided here, based on the foregoing analysis of M&A 
and Competition Law in Saudi Arabia. 
A. Pre-merger notification 
1- The Competition Council should choose one method for the pre-merger notification. It 
should change the Competition Law to require either that every M&A transaction be 
approved by the Council before the transaction is completed, or to stipulate that the 
Council does not need to approve every M&A transaction. The author argues that as 
Saudi’s Competition Law, and the practice of that Law, currently stands, the Council’s 
approach does not comply with the Competition Law and its Implementing Regulation. 
For example, the Council has begun to require that every M&A transaction be filed, 
which is not what the Competition Law requires.  
2- The Competition Council should make the full text of the cases it considers and the 
decisions it renders available to companies, lawyers, professors, economists, investors 
and many other parties. Doing so would raise awareness and transparency about the 
Council’s policy, strategy and deliberations, as well as about the accuracy of its 
decisions. This would help companies and investors ensure that their investments comply 
with Saudi policy, and it would also help the Saudi government develop its policy toward 
competition in the marketplace and develop appropriate protection measures through a 
process of case study, arguments, feedback, research and appeals. 
                                                          
498 These recommendations were made after the analysis of the Saudi Competition Law and its Implementing 
Regulation, as well as an analysis of the compliance with these rules by the Competition Law. The recommendations 
present the issues that the law ignores, because lawmakers did not anticipate these issues or because the Law is new. 
The recommendations suggest ways to improve places of weakness in the law that currently render the Competition 




3- The Competition Council should adopt a threshold system analogous to that used in the 
South African system, in which thresholds are set for various sizes of transactions, and 
transactions are reported to the Council only if they exceed a threshold. This change 
would require an amendment to the Competition Law to replace the 40% economic 
concentration doctrine with a threshold standard.  
4- If the Competition Council adopts a threshold method, it will need to revise the threshold 
annually and modify it according to various factors: the size of the market, the size of the 
companies involved, consideration of consumer benefits, changes in pricing and certain 
other factors that tend to fluctuate from year to year. 
5- The Competition Council needs to base its regulations, decisions and pre-notification 
requirements on rational economic reasoning that raises general awareness of the 
concepts of fair competition and monopoly. Simply setting a threshold for notification of 
an intended transaction, such as SAR 200 million (equivalent to USD 53 million), will 
not solve the 40% economic concentration issue. A transaction that occurs at a threshold 
of far less than SAR 200 million could give a company monopoly control in Saudi 
Arabia, especially if that company is engaged in a business sector that is struggling or has 
particularly high barriers to entry.499 
6- The Competition Council should state the methods it uses to evaluate whether an M&A 
transaction violates the Competition Law in Saudi Arabia, and these methods should be 
reliable and widely accepted. The Council should publish outlines or guidelines that 
companies may use to evaluate their proposed transactions at the beginning of the 
transaction process. Most, if not all, articles (from both the academic and business 
                                                          
499 This recommendation is provided because members of the Council explained to the author that there has been an 
intention to set a threshold of SAR 200 million as the reportable threshold in addition to the 40%. 
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sectors) that discuss issues of competition related to M&A activity in Saudi Arabia only 
touch upon broad issues; this does not add value to the field. However, the problem 
continues to be that even experts are not able to write about the specifics of M&A activity 
in Saudi Arabia because they lack of information about how the Competition Council 
evaluates requests for M&A transactions. 
7- When it announces a new M&A application, the Competition Council should provide 
information regarding the value of the transaction and the value of the companies 
involved, so that the public can understand the size of the proposed transaction. Having 
read most of the Council’s announcements published over the past 14 years, the author of 
this dissertation finds that none of them contains information regarding the value of the 
transaction or of the companies that seek to merge or acquire; this information is 
especially difficult to discover about private companies. The Competition Council should 
make amendments that specify what information it will provide regarding an economic 
concentration request. Because the Competition Law requires a transaction to be 
submitted for approval when it will result in a concentration that exceeds 40% of the 
market, the Law should specify what method companies should use to determine if their 
transaction will result in such a concentration. This will make entities aware of whether 
they need to notify the Competition Council of an intended transaction. 
8- The Saudi Competition Council could provide an electronic calculator similar to the 
service provided by the South African Competition Commission’s website. Such a tool 
may facilitate the process of the pre-merger notification and help parties determine 
whether they must notify the Competition Council of their proposed transaction. The 
parties may need to consult with legal advisors as well, but a service such as an online 
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calculator could serve as a basic tool, as well as facilitate a measurement of value that is 
more sophisticated than the simple 40% concentration standard. 
9- The Competition Council should clarify whether it differentiates between the notification 
of the M&A transaction and the request concerning economic concentration. The 
Competition Council should state when companies must notify the Council, when 
companies must submit an economic concentration request, and when companies do not 
need to notify the Council about a transaction. 
10-  Filing fees should be determined relative to the size of the merger, as is the case in the 
South African Competition Act. The Saudi Arabian Competition Council imposes a flat 
fee of SAR 1000 for all types of transactions. A tiered fee system would benefit the 
Competition Council as M&A activity in Saudi grows. 
11-  The Saudi Competition Law should guide the Council as to how economic concentration 
should be reviewed in different regions. The law should determine if economic 
concentration in Saudi Arabia should be reviewed based on the 13 administrative areas, 
or based on the largest cities, such as Riyadh, Jeddah, Damam, Mecca and Medina.  
12-  The Saudi Competition Law should specify whether the Council should focus only on 
horizontal mergers, or whether it should also review vertical mergers and conglomerates. 
Neither the Law nor the Council specifies the types of mergers on which the Council 
should focus. Vertical and conglomerate mergers generally do not affect competition as 
much as horizontal mergers do. Including detailed guidelines would make the Saudi 
Competition Law more efficient both economically and administratively and would raise 
the awareness of investors and corporations about the focus of Saudi economic policy. 
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B. The substance 
13-  Categorizing mergers into small, intermediate and large, as the South African 
Competition Act does, is necessary for a country like Saudi Arabia. These categories 
would give Saudi Arabia a better understanding of the M&A activity in its market. It 
would also facilitate the process of the pre-merger notification for the Competition 
Council and also for the parties and investors concerned. Categorization would raise 
awareness of the scope and mechanisms of M&A transactions in Saudi Arabia, which 
would benefit interested investors, economists and lawmakers. 
14-  The Saudi Competition Law should require the Competition Council to choose a clear 
and certain mathematical or economic method for the evaluation of pre-merger 
notifications and merger review, and this method should be disclosed to the public. The 
author refers again to the example set by the South African Competition Act, Section 11 
Subsection 3 (a), which requires the Minister of Trade and Industry and the Competition 
Commission to publicly “[set] out the proposed threshold and method of calculation for 
the purpose of this section.”  
15- The Competition Council should provide a better explanation of some of the terms used 
in the Implementing Regulation of the Competition Law. This Regulation defines the 
concept of a relevant market by using the term “relevant products.” Defining a term by 
using the same term in the definition is generally considered faulty logic and may result 
in a definition that lacks precise meaning. 
16-  The Competition Council, by means of its proper authority and the stated legislative 
process, should make amendments to the Competition Law and its Implementing 
Regulation regarding definitions and vague terminology. Certain terms are critical to the 
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precise and proper application of the Competition Law and its Implementing Regulation, 
but many of these terms, as currently used (written) in the Law and the Regulation, are 
unclear or contradictory. Terms such as “relevant market,” “relevant product,” “economic 
concentration,” “dominance” and “geographical area” should be defined using proper 
technical language. Definitions should refer to clear standards that companies, experts, 
professors and others can use to evaluate a transaction before going forward with a 
transaction application. Also, parties should have the right to argue and appeal when a 
transaction is not approved. All of these reforms may help the Board of Grievances (the 
designated court) assure fair competition in Saudi Arabia. 
17-  The Competition Council has translated the Arabic version of the Saudi Competition 
Law into English. This English version is provided only as a guideline; the Arabic 
version is the only formally accepted version. However, the English version should still 
reflect the same meaning as the Arabic version. This issue becomes even more crucial 
when a law or legal term is adapted (borrowed) from a law that was originally written in 
English, translated into Arabic, and added to the Saudi Competition Law. For example, 
the term “relevant market” in English is a term of art for M&A; it means a specific thing. 
However, this term means nothing in Arabic unless the law explains what it is and 
attaches a specific meaning to it in the Arabic language. This recommendation—that 
translations must accurately reflect the de facto meaning of the original language’s terms 
of art—should be applied whenever the Saudi Competition Law attempts to follow 
another country’s legal model for the purpose of drafting or amending Saudi legislation. 
18-  The author recommends that the Competition Council use consistent terminology 
throughout all of the Articles in the Competition Law and its Implementing Regulation. 
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For example, the author recommends that the word “ownership,” as used in Article 9 (1), 
be replaced with the word “acquisition.” 
19-  The Competition Council should define the terms it uses in its decisions, such as “unified 
marketing” and “pricing policy.” It should also use more precise language. For example, 
the word “discretion” is used in this way in Article 32(5) of the Implementing Regulation 
of the Competition Law: “If the Council concludes that the economic concentration will 
restrict the freedom of competition, it shall decide the following: 5) Take the necessary 
precautions to terminate, prevent or mitigate the economic concentration, at the 
[discretion] of the Council." This use of the word “discretion” here is broad. Therefore, 
the law should explain to what extent “discretion” is given to the Council. The word 
“discretion” should not be left with a broad meaning. 
20-  The Competition Council should use the words “mergers” and “acquisitions” properly to 
reflect the exact terms of the proposed transaction. Since M&A activity has increased in 
Saudi, the Competition Council should make amendments to the Competition Law and its 
Implementing Regulation, or create an outline, to define more clearly the forms of that 
mergers and acquisitions may take. This would make investors and the public aware of 
the terms that the Council uses in its announcements or decisions. 
21-  The Competition Council should use its power as designated by the Competition Law 
and its Implementing Regulation. However, the author also encourages attorneys and 
companies to appeal Council decisions about their requests, and also to appeal any 
requirements made by the Council that go beyond its authority or are not supported by 
the Saudi Competition Law. This would help improve fair competition in the Kingdom. 
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22-  The Competition Council should be a separate and independent authority that reports 
directly to the Ministers’ Council and not to the Ministry of Commerce and Industry. 
Also, the Council should employ experts from different fields such as law, economics, 
accounting, finance and business. This would enhance fair competition and make the 
Competition Council more efficient, professional, independent and modern.500 
23-  The Competition Law should include rules governing independency issues. The 
members of the Competition Council should not be investors, or, at the least, they should 
not be allowed to participate in evaluating an M&A transaction in which they have an 
interest. Also, they should be fiscally independent. There should be mandatory disclosure 
requirements when any member has an interest that might affect his ability to conduct his 
Council duties, either generally or regarding a specific transaction that is under review. 
To reiterate, this recommendation becomes especially important if Council members 
have investments in one or more of the companies involved in an M&A transaction about 
which they are required to make a decision. 
24-  The Competition Council’s purview should be limited to making recommendations to 
the Board of Grievances only; it should leave decisions regarding transactions to the 
courts. As an example, the author refers to the relationship between the South African 
Competition Commission and the South African Competition Tribunal. This will make 
the review of transactions more independent. Establishing an independent competition 
tribunal that reviews issues of competition that arise in connection with M&A 
transactions would accomplish this change. 
                                                          
500 The author shared this recommendation with certain senior scholars, such as Dr. Muhammad Alshamari, Head of 
the Judicial Office in the Foreign Ministry. See the ALRYADH NEWSPAPER, October 29, 2011 available at 
http://www.alriyadh.com/679447 (last visited August 19, 2015). 
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25-  Unlike the South African Competition Act, the Saudi Competition Law does not cover 
the Competition Council’s right to revoke its own decisions, even though such a right is 
crucial and cannot exist without the regulatory grounds for it. Therefore, the Saudi 
Competition Law should include a specification giving the Council the right to revoke a 
decision if the Council discovers that information submitted regarding a merger was false 
or deceptive, or if it discovers that one or more of the parties involved did not comply 
with conditions attached to the decision. 
26-  The Saudi Competition Law does not provide rules or guidelines that help the 
Competition Council handle different types of mergers, such as horizontal, vertical and 
conglomerate. The Saudi Competition Law should provide principles that guide the 
Competition Council.  
27-  The Saudi Competition Law should have a theme and purpose that it aims to achieve. 
Demonstrating the purpose of the Competition Law would help the Competition Council 
when it reviews mergers, and it would also help judges review cases if a Council decision 
is appealed.  
28-  The Saudi Competition Law should state explicitly that the law does not cover mergers 
that involve a failing company merging with another company. 
29- The Saudi Competition Law should state explicitly that the law does not apply to mergers 
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This chapter begins by outlining the fundamentals of the New Saudi Companies Law of 
2015 in Section 5.2. Section 5.3 addresses the basic rules of corporate governance, such as 
starting a corporation, calling for a shareholder meeting, electing directors and handling conflicts 
of interest. Section 5.3 also covers issues that are related and essential to M&A transactions, such 
as the issuance of shares by a publicly held company, private offering exceptions and insider 
trading. Following these introductory sections are three subsequent sections: Section 5.4 
addresses the stock acquisition of a closely held corporation by discussing a crucial court case 
(the Safola case), as well as an acquisition deal that was canceled due to what the author argues 
is a legislative vacuum where M&A laws are concerned. This discussion references the US 
approach to M&A. Section 5.5 addresses the assets acquisition of closely held corporations; this 
section concludes that Saudi Arabia should amend the Saudi Competition Law 2015 in order to 
handle such acquisition activity in the same manner as the US does. Section 5.6 addresses the 
mergers of closely held corporations and discusses certain articles that Saudi M&A legislation 
currently does not address; the author argues that these articles are necessary for Saudi to 
facilitate mergers in the manner that the American system follows, and further argues that 
adopting such articles would help to reform the Saudi Companies Law in an economically 
efficient manner. 
                                                          




§5.2. New Saudi Companies Law 2015  
A. Introduction 
On November 9, 2015, Saudi Arabia issued the new Saudi Companies Law (Companies 
Law 2015),503 50 years after the first Saudi Companies Law (Companies Law 1965)504 was 
enacted. The Saudi Companies Law 2015505 improves the Companies Law 1965 and responds to 
various issues that occurred during the 50 years since it (the 1965 law) was passed. The 
Companies Law 2015 has a new character, although many articles and provisions remain 
unchanged since the 1965 iteration. Unfortunately, while it addresses some M&A issues, the 
Companies Law 2015 does not change the fundamental rules that govern M&A in Saudi Arabia. 
The enactment of the new Saudi Companies Law 2015 informs the discussion of Chapter 
5 of this paper. Chapter 5 provides a critical analysis of the Saudi Companies Law 2015 
regarding principles relevant to M&A transactions, including a thorough comparison of 
Companies Law 1965 and Companies Law 2015. This may serve as a history of the legislative 
background of both Saudi Companies Laws, and also as an analysis of the changes (since 1965) 
to be found in Companies Law 2015, both in the corporate governance rules (which did change) 
and in the M&A rules (which remained relatively the same). Exploring the topic of M&A in 
Saudi Arabia in a paper of this size represents original scholarship. Because the Saudi 
                                                          
503 Ministry of Commerce and Industry, available at https://mci.gov.sa/MediaCenter/News/Pages/09-11-15-01.aspx. 
(last visited December 27, 2015). 
504 Bureau of Experts at the Council of Ministers, available at 
https://www.boe.gov.sa/ViewSystemDetails.aspx?lang=en&SystemID=236&VersionID=48. (last visited December 
27, 2015). 
505 Because the Saudi Companies Law 2015 has not been officially translated, this paper will translate the articles 
relevant to the topic in a way that reflects the exact meaning in Arabic. Also, since there are many articles that have 
not been changed from the Saudi Companies Law 1965, or have been only slightly restructured without changing 
the substance of the law, the translation of the Articles of the Saudi Companies Law 2015 may have similarities with 
the translation of the Saudi Companies Law 1965, or may have similarities with future translations of the Saudi 
Companies Law 2015. The translation of the language of the Saudi Companies Law 2015 addressed here reflects 
how the author believes the Articles should read. Any improper interpretation in the Saudi Companies Law 2015 of 
certain Articles or words from the Saudi Companies Law 1965 is addressed when the author finds this to be the case.  
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Companies Law 2015 has only just been published, few scholars have had the chance to review 
it; this paper provides an original and primary analysis of Companies Law 2015. 
The Subsections that follow provide a brief introduction to the new approach of the 
Companies Law 2015 in terms enforcement, character and jurisdiction. Then, the Article/s of 
Companies Law 2015 that are germane to each issue will be addressed, and, when applicable, the 
Subsections will include a discussion of what has changed in the new Companies Law 2015 
versus what has remained the same as the provisions of the old Companies Law 1965.  
B. Enforcement  
The Companies Law 2015 states that the Law should enter into force 150 days 
(approximately 5 months) after the date on which the Law was published in the official 
newspaper.506 The Companies Law 2015 gives companies that are already established at the time 
the Law comes into force one year from this time to make adjustments and reforms to bring them 
into compliance with the Saudi Companies Law 2015.507 The one-year period is subject to 
exceptions provided by the Ministry of Commerce and Industry and the Capital Market 
Authority.508 
The Saudi Companies Law 2015 replaces Companies Law 1965 and abolishes any article 
in Companies Law 1965 that contradicts with Companies Law 2015.509 The language of Article 
226 of Companies Law 2015 implies that any rules contained in Companies Law 1965 that do 
not contradict the rules specified in Companies Law 2015 may be used to help respective 
authorities, courts and companies interpret the substance of Companies Law 2015. 
                                                          
506 The Saudi Companies Law 2015 was published in the official newspaper (Um Al-Qura) in December 4, 2015, 
issue No. 4595, available at http://www.uqn.gov.sa/Archive/Issue4595/News/PDFVersion/UM-ALQURA.4595.pdf 
(last visited December 27, 2015).  
507 Id. at art. 224. 
508 Id. 
509 Id. at art. 226.  
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The Saudi Companies Law 2015 gives the Ministry of Commerce and Industry and the 
Capital Market Authority the power to issue whatever measures are necessary to implement the 
Companies Law 2015 according to each entity’s authority.510 
C. Character  
The Ministry of Commerce and Industry has published a diagram illustrating the 
objectives and the new aspects of Companies Law 2015,511 which shows that the new Law has 
several new considerations that improve corporate governance in general, and that impact M&A 
in particular. For example, these new conditions provide for more limitations and supervision of 
a company’s board of directors.  
The Saudi Companies Law 2015 adds more restrictions on the salaries and compensation 
of members of a company’s board of directors than did the Companies Law 1965.512 Both the 
2015 and 1965 Laws have the same rules that govern a director’s or board member’s annual 
compensation; namely, if compensation is a percentage of a company’s profits, both Laws state 
that this compensation shall not exceed 10%.513 The Saudi Companies Law 2015 places further 
restrictions on compensation, stating that under no circumstances may any given director’s 
annual compensation exceed SAR 500,000 (equivalent to approximately USD 133,000).514 This 
limit is recognized to align with parameters provided by the Capital Market Authority.515  
The Saudi Companies Law 2015 substantially raises the penalties for violating the Law516 
above the levels set in Companies Law 1965.517 For instance, in the 1965 Law, a director or chief 
                                                          
510 Id. at art. 225. 
511 The Ministry of Commerce and Industry, available at https://mci.gov.sa/MediaCenter/News/Pages/09-11-15-
01.aspx (last visited December 27, 2015). 
512 The Saudi Companies Law 1965, art. 74, and the Saudi Companies Law 2015, art. 76 (1) (2). 
513 Id. 
514 Id. at art. 76 (3). 
515 Id. 
516 The Saudi Companies Law 2015, ch. 11, art. 111-118. 
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executive intentionally providing false information regarding a shareholder meeting was subject 
to a minimum of three months and a maximum of one year in prison, and/or a fine of not less 
than SAR 5,000 (approximately USD 1,300) and not more than SAR 20,000 (approximately 
USD 5,300).518 Under Companies Law 2015, the same act is subject to a maximum of 5 years in 
prison and/or a fine of SAR 5 million (approximately USD 1.3 million).519 
D. Jurisdiction 
The Saudi Companies Law 2015 includes an article that addresses the issue of 
jurisdiction between the Ministry and other relevant agencies or authorities. The Companies Law 
2015 states clearly that—without prejudice to the rules stipulated in Companies Law 2015, and 
without prejudice to what may fall under the Saudi Monetary Agency’s authority according to its 
laws (especially Banking Control, Cooperative Insurance Companies Control, and Finance 
Companies Control)—the Capital Market Authority is responsible for (1) supervising and 
overseeing listed companies in the Saudi Stock Market and (2) issuing rules that govern the stock 
market’s operations, including regulating merger transactions in which one party involved is a 
listed company.520 
Article 219 of the Saudi Companies Law 2015 aims to assign supervision of listed 
companies to the Capital Market Authority, including the issuance of rules for mergers that 
involve at least one listed company. The Article also instructs insurance companies and banks to 
comply with additional rules specified for such entities in their respective laws. These additional 
rules fill in the legislative gap regarding jurisdiction that previously had been addressed in a 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
517 The Saudi Companies Law 1965, ch. 13, art 229-231. 
518 Id. at art. 229 (6). 
519 The Saudi Companies Law 2015, art. 111 (a). 
520 Id. at art. 219. 
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memorandum between the Ministry and the Capital Market Authority.521 Until the Capital 
Market Authority issues rules that govern mergers involving a listed company, listed companies 
are governed only by the joint stock chapter of the Saudi Companies Law 2015, which comprises 
rules governing the merger of closely held and publicly held corporations. The acquisition of 
publicly held companies will be addressed in Chapter 6 of this paper. 
§5.3. Basic Corporate Governance Rules: General and Regarding M&A Specifically 
A. Starting the corporation: the certificate of incorporation522 
The Saudi Companies Law 2015 requires the submission of the following information to 
register a company: 1) the company’s name, purpose, headquarter and duration; 2) the name/s of 
the founder/s, their place/s of residence, their profession/s and their nationality/ies; 3) the class/es 
of shares, their value/s, their number/s and the capital paid; 4) the date and number of the 
approval decision from the Ministry to establish the company; 5) the date and number of the 
decision by the Ministry to announce the company.523 
As one can see, there are some differences between these requirements and those of the 
Saudi Companies Law 1965, which requires a company to set out the following basic 
information in its Certificate of Incorporation:524  
1) The company’s name, object, head office, and term. 
2) The founders’ names, residence of place, occupations, and nationalities. 
                                                          
521 The memorandum is translated from the Arabic and included in the Appendix of this dissertation.  
522 The abbreviations provided in this chapter shall mean the following: CHAC: Closely Held Acquiring 
Corporation; CHTC: Closely Held Target Corporation; PHAC; Publicly Held Corporation; PHTC: Publicly Held 
Target Corporation; AC: Acquiring Corporation; TC: Target Corporation; SHs: Shareholders.  
523 The Saudi Companies Law 2015, art. 65 (1) (2). 
524 The certificate of incorporation is the information and documents that corporations are required to submit to the 




3) The types, value, and number of shares, as well as the amount offered for public 
subscription, the amount subscribed by the founders, the amount of paid-in capital, and 
the restrictions imposed on the circulation of shares. 
4) Method of the division of profits and losses. 
5) The particulars concerning contributions in kind and the rights attached thereto, and 
special privileges granted to the founders or others. 
6) The date of the royal decree525 authorizing the incorporation of the company, and the 
issue number of the Official Gazette in which the royal decree was published.526 
7) The date of the decision issued by the Minister of Commerce announcing the 
incorporation of the company, and the issue number of the Official Gazette in which the 
decision was published.527 
Publicly held companies, known in Saudi Arabia as listed joint stock corporations, must 
file certain documents related to their incorporation. 528 The Saudi Companies Law 2015 states 
that within 120 days of the date the Law was issued, the Minister of Commerce and Industry 
must issue sample articles of association and bylaws for every type of business organization, 
which shall be applicable from the date the Companies Law 2015 comes into force.529 This is 
slightly different from the Saudi Companies Law 1965, which states that a publicly held 
company must fill out a standard bylaws form designed by the Ministry of Commerce and 
Industry.530 The 1965 Law also stipulates that such companies shall not alter the form in any way 
that violates the template of the bylaws form: “The Minister of Commerce shall issue a decision 
                                                          
525 The Royal Decree is the official document signed by His Majesty as head of the Kingdom. The document reflects 
the will of the king agreeing with the Council of Ministers and the Shura Council, who have already met and 
discussed the document. However, the Royal Decree is distinguished from the Royal Order. The Royal Order is a 
formal written document reflecting the direct and sole will of the King, and often is issued according to a specific 
formula, bearing the King’s signature as head of the kingdom. As stated, the main difference is that the royal decree 
is the endorsement of the King’s approval in his status as the Prime Minster of the Council of Ministers after the 
issue is passed through the Council of Ministers. For definitions, see ALSHULHOOB, ABDULRAHMAN, THE 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IN SAUDI ARABIA BETWEEN ISLAMIC LAW AND COMPARATIVE LAWS, 197-98 (2d ed, Riyadh, 
Saudi Arabia, 2005). 
526 The requirement of stating the date of the royal decree only applies to corporations that are required to obtain 
approval from the Council of Minsters, as stated in Article 52 of the Companies Law 1965.  
527 The Saudi Companies Law 1965, art. 65. 
528 See the Listing Rules, art. 2, 11. 
529 The Saudi Companies Law 2015, art. 225 (1). 
530 The Saudi Companies Law 1965, art. 51. 
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in a form for joint-stock Corporation bylaws. Such form may not be violated except for reasons 
satisfactory to the said minister.”531  
In an amendment that aims to reduce barriers to entry into the marketplace for 
entrepreneurs, the Saudi Companies Law 2015 does not require a feasibility study as a condition 
of registering a company. The Saudi Companies Law 1965 does requires such a study.532 
Specifically, the Companies Law 1965 stipulates that a company must obtain approval from the 
Ministry for incorporation, and notes that the Ministry will review the company’s status and 
financial objectives for economic feasibility:  
Other corporations may be incorporated only by an authorization to be issued by the 
Minister of Commerce and published in the Official Gazette. The Minister of Commerce 
shall issue the said authorization only after reviewing a study proving the economic 
feasibility533 of the company’s objectives, unless the company has submitted such study 
to another competent government agency that has authorized the establishment of the 
enterprise.534  
The Saudi Companies Law 2015 abandons another rule from the 1965 law regarding 
incorporation: the need for a royal decree. The Companies Law 2015 states that a joint stock 
company is incorporated by an issued decision that authorizes the establishment of the company, 
including companies that are established by the government or by any public institutional 
entity.535 The 2015 law establishes a broad condition, which states that if the business of the 
company requires regulatory approval or registration from the respective agency, the decision to 
                                                          
531 Id. 
532 The Saudi Companies Law 1965, art. 52. 
533 The author argues that the Saudi Companies Law 1965 should not have required a study of the economic 
feasibility of the corporations’ objectives. There is no rationale behind such a study, and therefore, the Saudi 
Companies Law (old or new) should not place barriers in the way of corporations. The author also argues that the 
economic feasibility study in particular is often based on speculation, which means that determinations of feasibility 
are not necessarily accurate or helpful to the Ministry in determining the readiness of the corporation for an M&A 
transaction.  
534 The Saudi Companies Law 1965, art. 52. 
535 The Saudi Companies Law 2015, art. 60 (1). 
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allow the establishment of the company shall not be made until the respective agency approves it 
or registers the company.536 
This differs in marked ways from the Companies Law 1965, which states that some 
publicly held corporations needed a royal decree537 to incorporate: 
The following joint[ ]stock corporations may be incorporated only by virtue of an 
authorization issued upon a royal decree based on the approval of the Council of 
Ministers and the recommendation of the Minister of Commerce, with due regard to the 
provisions of the Regulations: 
a) Chartered corporations.538 
b) Corporations managing a public utility. 
c) Corporations receiving subsidy from the government. 
d) Corporations in which the government or any other public legal person participates, 
except for General Organization for Social Insurance and Pension Fund. 
e) Corporations practicing banking activities.539 
In terms of registering with a notary public, the two laws (2015 and 1965) are relatively 
similar. The Saudi Companies Law 2015 states that with the exception of special partnerships, 
the articles of association of every company must be in writing and must be notarized by the 
respective agency.540 The 2015 law defines the meaning of “respective agency” as being “the 
Ministry of Commerce and Industry unless with respect to listed companies, then it shall mean 
the Capital Market Authority.”541 The 2015 law also states that the articles of association and any 
amendments to them will be void if they are not notarized.542 Article 12 (1) of the Saudi 
Companies Law 2015 uses the phrase “must be notarized by the authority designated in 
                                                          
536 Id. at art. 60. 
537 See Footnote 526. 
538 The accurate translation of this type of corporation is the concessionary corporation, to which the Saudi 
government gives privileges over certain investments in the Kingdom.  
539 The Saudi Companies Law 1965, art. 52. 
540 The Saudi Companies Law 2015, art. 12 (1). 
541 Id. at art. 1. 
542 Id. at art. 12 (1). 
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notarization” instead of the term “notary public.”543 The Saudi Companies Law 1965 simply 
states that a corporation must register with a notary public before its contract may be approved 
by the Ministry: “[w]ith the exception of a joint venture, a company’s contract shall be recorded 
in writing before a notary public. Otherwise, such contract shall be null and void in relation to 
third parties.”544, 545 
If a company wants to issue shares and become publicly held, it must comply with the 
listing regulations governed by the Capital Market Authority, as well as by the Companies Law, 
which is governed by the Ministry of Commerce and Industry.546, 547 
B. Calling for a shareholder meeting 
Regarding calling a shareholder meeting, the 2015 and 1965 laws are relatively similar. 
The Companies Law 2015, Article 90 (1),548 allows the board of directors, or at least 5% of 
shareholders, to call a meeting. This agrees with the language of Article 87 of the 1965 law, 
which is quoted below. However, the 2015 law adds that a general assembly meeting may be 
called by the Ministry of Commerce and Industry, if shareholders representing ownership of at 
least 2% of the company’s capital request a shareholder meeting, and in the following cases: (a) 
if the period specified for the general assembly meeting passed without the meeting being held 
according to Article 87 (within the first six months following the end of the company’s fiscal 
                                                          
543 Id. 
544 The Saudi Companies Law 1965, art. 10. 
545 That is after the article was amended in 30/7/1412H, which was in 4/2/1992AD. 
546 The Saudi Companies Law 2015, art. 219. 
547 As already noted earlier in the text of this chapter, the Saudi Companies Law 2015 states clearly that—without 
prejudice to the rules stipulated in Law 2015 and without prejudice to what may fall under the Saudi Monetary 
Agency’s authority according to its laws, especially the Banking Control Law, Cooperative Insurance Companies 
Control Law, and Finance Companies Control Law—the Capital Market Authority is responsible for (1) supervising 
and overseeing listing companies in the Saudi Stock Market and (2) issuing rules that govern the stock market’s 
operations, including regulating merger transactions in which one party involved in the merger transaction is a listed 
company. The Saudi Companies Law 2015, art. 219. 
548 Id. at art. 90 (1). 
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year);549 (b) if the number of board members decreases below the minimum number of directors 
permitted (not less than 3 directors)550 by Article 69 of the 2015 Law; (c) if any violation of the 
law or the company’s bylaws, or deficiency in the management of the company, has been found; 
or (d) if the board does not call for the general assembly meeting within 15 days of the date on 
which it was requested by an auditor or an audit committee or a group of shareholders 
representing at least 5% ownership of the company’s capital.551 
As referenced above, in the Companies Law 1965, Article 87 discusses the calling of a 
meeting or special meeting. This Article reads as follows: 
Stockholders' general or special meetings shall be convened at the summons of the board 
of directors in the manner prescribed in the bylaws of the company. The board of 
directors must call for a regular general meeting, if so requested by the auditor or by a 
number of stockholders representing at least 5% of the capital. 
The General Department of Companies may, at the request of a number of stockholders 
representing at least 2% of the capital or pursuant to a decision by the Minister of 
Commerce, call for a general meeting if such a meeting is not called within one month 
from the date set therefore.552  
C. Notice of the shareholder meeting 
In terms of the meeting notice that must be provided to shareholders, the 2015 law 
generally retains the rules set out in the 1965 law; these are quoted below.553 The 2015 law does 
reduce the minimum number of days—from 25 down to 10—required between the date the 
notice is sent and the date of the meeting.554 The 2015 law also removes the following phrase 
that appears in the 1965 law: “if the stock of the company is registered as nominative,”555 and it 
gives a company the right to send a meeting notice to shareholders by registered mail instead of 
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by making a public announcement.556 Article 88 of the 2015 law adds the requirement of sending 
a copy of the meeting notice to the Ministry of Commerce and Industry, as well as to the Capital 
Market Authority, if the company is listed on the stock market.557 By way of comparison, the 
following is the text of Article 88 of the Saudi Companies Law 1965 regarding meeting notices. 
As noted above, it states that notice of a meeting must be given at least 25 days before the 
scheduled date of the meeting: 
Notices of general meetings shall be published in the Official Gazette and in a daily 
newspaper distributed in the locality of the head office of the company, at least 25 days 
prior to the date set for the meeting. Nevertheless, if all the stock of the company is 
registered as nominative, a notice sent by registered mails at least 25 days before the date 
of the meeting shall suffice. The notice shall contain an agenda of the meeting. A copy of 
both the notice and the agenda shall be sent to the General Department of Companies at 
the Ministry of Commerce within the period specified for publication.558  
D. The list of shareholders 
Regarding attendance at shareholder meetings, the 2015 law makes changes from the 
1965 law that seem aimed at encouraging shareholders to be more active in participating in the 
meetings. The 2015 law abandons some of the rules of the 1965 law (noted below) regarding 
shareholder meetings, and gives the right to attend to every shareholder.559 Specifically, it states 
that each shareholder has the right to attend the meeting and declares that any article in the 
company’s bylaws that states otherwise is invalid.560 The 1965 law requires a list to be produced 
of shareholders eligible to attend the meeting, and it also gives the right to attend the shareholder 
meeting, and to vote, to any person owning 20 or more shares of the company.561 From a 
practical point of view, the author argues that there was no need (under the 1965 law’s 
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conditions) for a list of shareholders eligible to attend meetings, since ownership of only 20 
shares would qualify a shareholder to attend the meeting. 
E. The right to vote by proxy 
The Saudi Companies Law 2015 retains the provisions of the 1965 law concerning the 
right to vote by proxy or in person.562 The 2015 law allows shareholders to appoint another 
person (not including a board member or any of the company’s employees) to vote on his/her 
behalf.563 It also permits holding general assembly meetings using modern communications 
technology.564 In particular, it allows companies to use these sorts of technology to engage 
shareholders in discussing and voting on resolutions.565 The provisions of the 1965 law give 
shareholders who are eligible to attend a shareholder meeting the right to have other persons 
attend on their behalf, as is the case in most countries in the world. Article 83 of the 1965 law 
states: 
The bylaws of the company shall specify the classes of stockholders entitled to attend 
general meetings. Nevertheless, every stockholder who holds 20 shares shall have the 
right to attend, even if the bylaws of the company provide otherwise. A stockholder may, 
in writing, give proxy to another stockholder other than a director to attend the general 
meeting on his behalf. The Ministry of Commerce may delegate one or more 
representatives to attend the general meetings as observers.566 
F. The requirements for votes and quorum to approve an action at the 
extraordinary and general meeting assemblies  
The Saudi Companies Law 2015 makes several changes in the provisions set out by the 
1965 law regarding the quorum required at shareholder meetings. These changes are discussed in 
more detail below. 
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1. The quorum requirements of a general assembly meeting under Saudi 
Companies Law 2015 
The Saudi Companies Law 2015 states that the general assembly meeting shall not be 
valid unless shareholders representing ownership of one quarter of the company’s capital attend 
the meeting, unless the company’s bylaws require a higher percentage; however, in no case shall 
more than 50% ownership of the company’s capital be required to be present for a meeting to be 
held.567 The 2015 law further states that if the requirement for a quorum of shareholders is not 
met in the first general assembly meeting, a second general assembly meeting may be called 
within 30 days of the first meeting, and the call/notice shall be issued in the manner prescribed in 
Article 91.568, 569 The Saudi Companies Law 2015 adopts a new (“new” vs. the 1965 law) 
mechanism for holding shareholder meetings; namely, if the first general assembly meeting is 
not quorate (and therefore not held), the company may hold a second general assembly meeting 
one hour after the prescribed time of the first meeting, provided that two conditions are met: the 
company’s bylaws permit such a mechanism, and the notice of the original meeting clearly stated 
the availability of this mechanism.570 The second general assembly meeting shall be made valid 
by any number of shareholders present.571 A resolution proposed in the general assembly 
meeting shall be adopted when a super majority of the shares represented in the meeting 
approves it, unless the company’s bylaws require a higher percentage.572 
These innovations in the 2015 law versus the 1965 law suggest that the Saudi legislature 
may be attempting to provide companies with a mechanism to decide issues in more efficient 
                                                          
567 The Saudi Companies Law 2015, art. 93 (1). 
568 Article 91 of the Saudi Companies Law 2015 addresses the manner in which the call for a shareholder meeting 
shall be made, see Subsections B and C of Section 5.3.  
569 Id. at art. 93 (2). 
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572 Id. at art. 93 (3). 
197 
 
ways. Likely, the Saudi legislature has noticed that companies have been negatively affected by 
the lengthy process they had to undergo in order to hold a first shareholder meeting. Indeed, 
many Saudi companies could not hold a first general assembly meeting at all if their shares were 
widely dispersed among shareholders, and the quorum requirement for the meeting was high. 
Moreover, block shareholders in many cases do not represent shares that can meet the quorum 
requirements of a first general assembly meeting. 
2. The quorum requirements of an extraordinary general assembly 
meeting under Saudi Companies Law 2015 
The Saudi Companies Law 2015 states that the first extraordinary general assembly 
meeting shall not be valid unless shareholders representing one half of the company’s capital are 
present, unless the company’s bylaws require a higher percentage; however, in no case shall a 
percentage of more than two-thirds be required for a meeting to be held.573 The 2015 law states 
that if a first extraordinary general assembly meeting is not held, because the quorum is not met, 
a second extraordinary general assembly meeting may be called in the manner prescribed in 
Article 91.574, 575 The Saudi Companies Law 2015 also permits the second extraordinary general 
assembly meeting to be held one hour after the time of the initial meeting (i.e., the one that was 
not held because it did not meet quorum requirements) passes.576 The second extraordinary 
general assembly meeting shall be valid if shareholders representing at least one-quarter 
ownership of the company’s capital are present.577 If the second extraordinary general assembly 
meeting fails to meet the requirement of quorum, a third extraordinary general assembly meeting 
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may be called in the manner prescribed in Article 91.578 The third extraordinary general 
assembly meeting shall be valid with whatever number of shares is present upon approval of the 
respective authority.579 A resolution in an extraordinary general assembly meeting shall be 
adopted if approved by two-thirds of the shares represented in the meeting, unless the resolution 
concerns the increase or decrease of capital, the extension of the company’s duration, the 
dissolution of the company before the time prescribed in the company’s bylaws or a merger with 
another company.580 In those cases, the meeting resolution is adopted if approved by three-
fourths of the shares represented in the meeting.581 
Now let us contrast how the 2015 law treats meeting quorums with the approach of the 
Saudi Companies Law 1965. The 1965 law recognizes two types of shareholder meetings: (1) 
regular general meeting and (2) extraordinary general meeting.582 The 1965 law assigns certain 
obligations to each kind of meeting, which are regulated by certain Articles.583 Both meeting 
types require the presence of a quorum of 50% ownership of the company’s capital, unless the 
company’s bylaws contain a provision requiring a higher percentage.584 Both types of meeting 
require a majority vote of the shares represented to pass an action, unless the company’s bylaws 
contain a provision requiring a higher percentage.585 However, for the extraordinary general 
meeting, if the action concerns a merger, an increase in capital or a dissolution, then it must be 
approved by three-fourths of the shares represented at the meeting, according to Article 91: 
The regular general meeting shall be valid only if attended by stockholders representing 
at least one half of the company’s capital, unless the bylaws of the company provide for a 
higher proportion. If this quorum has not been obtained at a first meeting, a notice shall 
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be sent for a second meeting to be held within 30 days of the previous meeting. This 
notice shall be published in the manner prescribed in Article (88). The second meeting 
shall be considered valid, regardless of the number of shares represented thereat. 
Resolutions of the regular general meeting shall be adopted by absolute majority vote of 
the shares represented thereat, unless the bylaws of the company provide for a higher 
proportion.586 
Article (92) continues: 
An extraordinary general meeting shall be valid only if attended by stockholders 
representing at least one half of the company’s capital, unless the company’s bylaws 
provide for a higher proportion. If this quorum has not been obtained at the first meeting, 
a notice shall be sent for a second meeting in the manner prescribed in Article (91). The 
second meeting shall be valid if attended by a number of stockholders representing at 
least one quarter of the company’s capital. Resolutions of an extraordinary general 
meeting shall be adopted by a two thirds majority vote of the shares represented thereat. 
But if a resolution pertains to an increase or a decrease in capital, or to extension of the 
term of the company, or to dissolution of the company prior to expiry of the term 
specified in its bylaws or to merger of the company into another company or firm, it shall 
be valid only if adopted by a three-fourths majority vote of the shares represented at the 
meeting. The board of directors must publish, in accordance with the provisions of 
Article (65), the resolutions adopted by an extraordinary general meeting if these provide 
for amendment of the company’s bylaws.587  
G. Election of directors 
Article 68588 of the Saudi Companies Law 2015 contains rules regarding voting for 
directors, and it does not change the language of the 1965 law, which addresses this topic in 
Article 66. 589 According to the 1965 law (Article 66), the regular general meeting may choose a 
minimum of three directors, and directors will have a tenure as specified in the company’s 
bylaws, but tenure shall not last longer than three years: 
A corporation shall be administered by a board of directors whose number shall be 
specified by the bylaws of the company, provided that it is not less than three directors. 
The regular general meeting shall appoint the directors for the term specified in the 
company bylaws, which shall not exceed three years. The Council of Ministers may 
determine the number of the boards of directors on which a director may serve. Directors, 
however, shall always be eligible for re-appointment, unless the company bylaws provide 
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otherwise. The company bylaws shall specify the manner of retirement of directors; but 
the regular general meeting may, at any time, remove all or some of the directors even if 
the company’s bylaws provide otherwise, without prejudice to the right of a removed 
director to hold the company liable if the removal is made without acceptable 
justification or at an improper time. A director may resign, provided that such resignation 
is made at a proper time; otherwise, he shall be responsible to the company for 
damages.590  
H. The filling of directors’ vacancies 
The Saudi Companies Law 2015 makes some changes to Article 67 of the 1965 law, 
which deals with filling a vacant director’s seat. The 2015 law requires that listed companies 
notify the Ministry of Commerce and Industry and the Capital Market Authority within 5 
business days of a director’s seat becoming vacant.591 When a board of directors fills a vacancy, 
the board must present the successor director or directors in the first general assembly meeting 
following the filling of the vacancy.592 If the board of directors meeting cannot be held because 
the number of directors does not meet the requirements according to the law or the company’s 
bylaws, then the remaining directors shall call for a general assembly meeting within 60 days to 
appoint the required number of directors.593 In the Saudi Companies Law 1965, the board of 
directors may fill a vacant director seat, and the next regular general meeting must approve the 
choice, unless the company’s bylaws state otherwise.594 However, if the number of directors falls 
below the required number, the board of directors must call a regular general meeting to fill the 
vacancies, according to Article 67: 
Unless the company bylaws provide otherwise, if the position of a director becomes 
vacant, the board of directors may appoint a temporary director to fill the vacancy, 
provided that such appointment shall be laid before the first regular general meeting. The 
new director shall complete the unexpired term of his predecessor. If the number of 
directors falls below the minimum number prescribed in this Law or in the company’s 
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bylaws, the regular general meeting must be convened as soon as possible to appoint the 
required number of directors.595  
I. Fiduciary duty of the Board of Directors 
The Saudi Companies Law 2015 addresses the duty of a company’s board of directors in 
a broad way,596 stating that taking into account the authority of the general assembly, the board 
of directors has the broadest power to manage the company in order to accomplish the 
company’s objectives, except in the case that such power is excluded by the Law or by the 
company’s bylaws, or in the case that such power falls under the authority of the general 
assembly.597 The Saudi Companies Law 2015 establishes a general rule that covers the duty of 
care and states that the board’s members are jointly liable to compensate the company, 
shareholders, and third parties for any damages that may result from mismanagement or violation 
of the law or of the company’s bylaws.598  
The Saudi Companies Law 2015 covers the duty of loyalty in broad language, stating that 
it is prohibited for a board member to use any information obtained as a board member for his or 
her own personal interest or for the interests of relatives or other persons, and that if a board 
member should do so, he or she should be terminated and asked for compensation.599 This rule 
represents an attempt to make the joint stock provisions in the Saudi Companies Law match the 
relevant rules in the Capital Market Authority’s regulations; one example is the regulation 
pertaining to insider trading, which is briefly addressed in this chapter in the insider trading 
Subsection. The Saudi Companies Law 2015 added an insider information rule to Article 72 of 
the Saudi Companies Law 1965 that states: “Directors may not disclose to the stockholders or to 
                                                          
595 Id. 
596 See the discussion of the Saudi Companies Law 1965 on the issue of care and loyalty, MESHAL FARAJ, TOWARD 
NEW CORPORATE GOVERNANCE STANDARDS IN THE KINGDOM OF SAUDI ARABIA: LESSONS FROM DELAWARE, 47 
(SABIC Chair for IFMS, 2016). 
597 The Saudi Companies Law 2015, art. 75. 
598 Id. at art. 78 (1). 
599 Id. at art. 74. See also MESHAL FARAJ, supra note 596, at 47. 
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third parties outside a general meeting, such secrets of the company because they are liable for 
its administration; otherwise, they must be removed and held liable for damages.”600 The Saudi 
Companies Law 2015 also covers conflicts of interest, as will be discussed in the following 
subsection.601 
The Corporate Governance Regulation,602 which was issued by the Capital Market 
Authority, only covers listed companies.603 This Regulation provides general guidance for listed 
companies,604 except in cases in which a mandatory article is specified, which contains language 
specific to the duty of care and duty of loyalty of a board member.605  
The Corporate Governance Regulation clearly states that the fiduciary duty of members 
of the board of directors includes the duty of due diligence and good faith, and it reads as 
follows: 
(a) Without prejudice to the competences of the General Assembly, the company’s Board 
of Directors shall assume all the necessary powers for the company’s management. The 
ultimate responsibility for the company rests with the Board even if it sets up committees 
or delegates some of its powers to a third party. The Board of Directors shall avoid 
issuing general or indefinite power of attorney.  
(b) The responsibilities of the Board of Directors must be clearly stated in the company’s 
Articles of Association.  
(c) The Board of Directors must carry out its duties in a responsible manner, in good faith 
and with due diligence. Its decisions should be based on sufficient information from the 
executive management, or from any other reliable source.606 
The clear language of these rules in the Corporate Governance Regulation regarding 
fiduciary duty should be mandatory for listed companies and should be adopted in the Saudi 
                                                          
600 Saudi Companies Law 1965, art. 72. See also Alsulimi, Abdullah bin Adnan, the New in the Saudi Companies 
Law, an unpublished paper obtained by the author via email. 
601 Id. 
602 Issued by the Board of Capital Market Authority Pursuant to Resolution No. 1/212/2006, which was amended by 
Resolution number 1-10-2010, dated 30/3/1431H, corresponding to 16/3/2010G. 
603 See The Corporate Governance Regulation, art. 1(a). 
604 The Corporate Governance Regulation, art. 1(b). 
605 Id. at art. 11. See also MESHAL FARAJ, supra note 596, at 47-8. 
606 The Corporate Governance Regulation, art. 11 (a) (b) (c). 
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Companies Law 2015, so that the Law can cover closely held joint stock companies; this would 
help the Saudi courts review relevant cases, as well as develop a practical and clear 
understanding of the fiduciary duty of a board of directors.607 
J. Conflicts of interest 
This section compares the 2015 law with the 1965 law with respect to conflicts of interest 
and addresses changes made to the 2015 law. This section also addresses how conflict of interest 
transactions would be treated under Delaware law in the United States, and concludes with a 
summary and recommendations as to how the rules governing conflicts of interest might be 
improved in the new Saudi Companies Law 2015. 
1. In general 
The Saudi Companies Law 2015 addresses conflicts of interests in Article 71. The 2015 
law amends the conflict of interest rules set out in the 1965 law by adding the stipulation that an 
interested director may not participate in a meeting of board directors and shareholders in which 
a transaction that may involve a conflict of interest for that director will be discussed or voted 
upon.608 The Saudi Companies Law 2015 also adds that if the interested director fails to disclose 
such an interest, as prescribed in Article 71 (1), the company or any related party may file a suit 
before the respective court to declare the contract void.609 This plaintiff may be awarded 
compensation for any lost profit that may have resulted from the director’s undisclosed 
interest.610 
While the 2015 law expands upon the rules that are present in the 1965 law aimed at 
solving conflict of interest problems, the author argues that still more changes are required. First, 
                                                          
607 For more discussion about the Saudi judicial approach to the duty of care and loyalty, see MESHAL FARAJ, 47-70. 
608 The Saudi Companies Law 2015, art. 71 (1). 




while the Saudi Companies Law 1965 uses the word “personal” to describe an interest that must 
be disclosed611 (the 1965 text will be cited and discussed below), the Saudi Companies Law 2015 
deletes the word “personal” and instead uses the more broad phrase “direct or indirect 
interest.”612 However, the 2015 law does not specify that the only kind of interest that falls under 
this rule is a financial interest; Delaware law, which will be addressed later, does make this 
specification. This is an important distinction for Saudi businesses for reasons unique to the 
Kingdom. Specifically, Saudi Arabia contains many tribes, creating an environment of many 
social networks that are interwoven and complicated. The broadness of the phrase regarding 
“interest” in the 2015 law could open the door to lawsuits brought for various reasons, including 
interests and disputes that are not simply financial, but are also social and political. Also, the 
2015 law does not address whether interested directors may be present at directors meetings in 
order to satisfy the quorum requirement. For instance, if a board of directors comprises three 
directors and one is an interested director, this director must be counted for the meeting to reach 
the quorum requirement prescribed in Article 68 of the 2015 law. 
The language describing “interest” was a problem under the 1965 law as well. Article 69 
of the 1965 law regulates conflict of interest issues, but it states only that any board member who 
has personal interests in a transaction must disclose these interests, and that the transaction must 
be approved by the ordinary general assembly.613 The broadness of this language led to a certain 
well-known conflict of interest claim (discussed in detail below) that was raised over a 
controversial stock acquisition transaction. This is the text of Article 69: 
A director may not have any interest whether directly or indirectly, in the transactions or 
contracts made for the account of the company, except with an authorization from the 
regular general meeting, to be renewed annually. Transactions made by way of public 
                                                          
611 The Saudi Companies Law 1965, art. 69. 
612 The Saudi Companies Law 2015, art. 71. 
613 The Saudi Companies Law 1965, art. 69. 
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bidding shall, however, be excluded from this restraint if the director has submitted the 
best offer. 
The director must inform the board of directors of any personal interest he may have in 
the transactions or contracts made for the account of the company. Such declaration must 
be recorded in the minutes of the board meeting, and the interested director shall not 
participate in voting on the resolution to be adopted in this respect. 
The chairman of the board of directors shall inform the regular general meeting when it 
convenes of the transactions and contracts in which any director has a personal interest. 
Such communication shall be accompanied by a special report from the auditor.614 
2. Saudi Chemical transaction 
The Saudi Chemical transaction is an example of an acquisition transaction that was not 
completed as result of a conflict of interest. The broad language of Article 69 of the Saudi 
Companies Law 1965, which regulates conflicts of interests, exacerbated the controversy 
surrounding the issues. On July 2, 2008, Saudi Chemical, a Saudi publicly traded company with 
initial capital of SAR 632,400,000 million (equivalent to USD 168 million),615 made an 
announcement that one of its subsidiaries,616 Saudi International Trading Company (SITCO 
Pharma), which at the time was a 99% owned subsidiary, planned to acquire the 50% stake 
owned by Almuarid Company of the Aldawa Company for SAR 235 million (equivalent to USD 
62 million) in cash.617 One of Saudi Chemical’s board members had an interest618 in the 
transaction. Therefore, the shareholders filed a complaint with the Ministry of Industry and 
Commence619 to force the board to put the transaction up for a vote in the ordinary general 
                                                          
614 Id. 
615 Saudi Chemical has large stakes in the following subsidiaries: Saudi International Trading Company (SITCO 
Pharma) 99%, Suez International Nitrates Company (Sinco) 100%, Chemical Company for Commercial Investment 
Ltd 100%, AJA Pharma Company Ltd 100% and Saudi Chemical Co. Ltd 100%. More information available at 
http://www.tadawul.com.sa (last visited July 15, 2015). 
616 The Saudi Companies Law 1965 does not mention the subsidiaries.  
617 Saudi Chemical’s announcements to the Tadawul, available at http://www.tadawul.com.sa (last visited July 15, 
2015). 
618 The Companies Law does not define “interest.” 
619 Claims against a violation of the Saudi Companies Law should be filed before the Court, not the Ministry. 
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assembly meeting, in accordance with the provisions of Article 69.620 The Ministry required that 
Saudi Chemical include this transaction in the minutes on which attendees of the ordinary 
general assembly meeting would vote.621 According to someone briefed on the issue, the board 
of directors believed that since the director with an interest in the acquisition was not planning to 
attend the ordinary general assembly meeting, he would not participate in approving the 
transaction, and therefore the board did not need to include the transaction in the minutes or put 
it up for a vote. However, the shareholders insisted on exercising their rights as prescribed in 
Article 69 of the Companies Law 1965. Eventually, in December 2008, the shareholders voted 
against the acquisition in the Ordinary General Assembly.622, 623  
Under the Saudi Companies Law 2015, the court, rather than the Ministry of Commerce 
and Industry, would have reviewed the case. The company would have known that the interested 
                                                          
620 Aloyad Khalid, The Ministry Required the Saudi Chemical to Include the Transaction in the OGA, RIYADH 
NEWSPAPER (May 22, 2009), available at http://www.alriyadh.com/431414 (last visited July 15, 2015). 
621 Id. 
622 See ALEQTISADIAH NEWSPAPER, (July 2, 2009), available at 
http://www.aleqt.com/2009/07/02/article_247035.html (last visited July 15, 2015). 
623 The Corporate Governance Regulation, which applies only to listed corporations, covers conflict of interest 
issues with respect to a company’s Directors. However, the Regulation does not provide clear and complete 
treatment of conflict issues, because the Regulation is meant for guidance and its guidelines are not mandatory. 
Also, it does not differ from Article 69 of the Saudi Companies Law, which provides no details that might help 
prevent confusion or disputes that may arise about conflict issues as a result of the lack of specifications about how 
to deal with such issues. Article 18 of the Corporate Governance Regulation provides the following:  
(a) A Board member shall not, without a prior authorization from the General Assembly, to be renewed 
each year, have any interest (whether directly or indirectly) in the company’s business and contracts. The 
activities to be performed through general bidding shall constitute an exception where a Board member is 
the best bidder. A Board member shall notify the Board of Directors of any personal interest he/ she may 
have in the business and contracts that are completed for the company’s account. Such notification shall be 
entered in the minutes of the meeting. A Board member who is an interested party shall not be entitled to 
vote on the resolution to be adopted in this regard neither in the General Assembly nor in the Board of 
Directors. The Chairman of the Board of Directors shall notify the General Assembly, when convened, of 
the activities and contracts in respect of which a Board member may have a personal interest and shall 
attach to such notification a special report prepared by the company’s auditor.  
(b) A Board member shall not, without a prior authorization of the General Assembly, to be renewed 
annually, participate in any activity, which may likely compete with the activities of the company, or trade 
in any branch of the activities carried out by the company.  
(c) The company shall not grant cash loan[s] whatsoever to any of its Board members or render 
guarantee[s] in respect of any loan entered into by a Board member with third parties, excluding banks and 




director was not allowed to participate in the shareholder meeting at which the transaction would 
be discussed. Therefore, the company likely would not have made the argument that because the 
interested director would not attend the meeting, the transaction did not require a shareholder 
vote. 
The Saudi Companies Law 2015 should include more details regarding the conflict of 
interest issue. It should specify the types of conflict of interest that will prevent an interested 
director from voting on a proposed transaction. The Saudi Companies Law 2015 should specify 
rules regarding the presence of interested directors at certain relevant shareholder meetings. 
3. Treatment of the Saudi Chemical transaction under Delaware law 
This section discusses how a transaction such as the Saudi Chemical transaction would 
have been handled under Delaware law. The author argues that the transaction would have not 
have been controversial had Saudi Law adopted the provisions of Delaware’s Section 144 
regarding the treatment of conflicts of interest.624 This section will provide a recommendation, 
which, if adopted, may enhance the Saudi Companies Law 2015, reduce issues regarding 
conflicts of interest and provide protection for both corporations and shareholders.  
Delaware law does not render a transaction or contract void or voidable solely because it 
involves a director with a financial interest in the transaction or contract.625 Delaware law also 
does not render a transaction or contract void solely because the interested director is present or 
participating in the board’s meeting.626 Instead, Delaware law states that the transaction or 
contract is not void or voidable as long as one of these conditions is met: 
                                                          
624 For more discussion about the application of Rule 144, see Blake Rohrbacher, John Mark Zeberkiewicz, and 
Thomas A. Uebler, Finding Safe Harbor: Clarifying the Limited Application of Section 144, 719-748, DELAWARE 
JOURNAL OF CORPORATE LAW, Volume 33, Number 3, (2008), available at 
http://lawlib.wlu.edu/CLJC/index.aspx?mainid=222&issuedate=2008-12-08. (last visited February 21, 2016). 




(a) No contract or transaction between a corporation and 1 or more of its directors or 
officers, or between a corporation and any other corporation, partnership, association, or 
other organization in which 1 or more of its directors or officers, are directors or officers, 
or have a financial interest, shall be void or voidable solely for this reason, or solely 
because the director or officer is present at or participates in the meeting of the board or 
committee which authorizes the contract or transaction, or solely because any such 
director's or officer's votes are counted for such purpose, if: 
(1) The material facts as to the director's or officer's relationship or interest and as to the 
contract or transaction are disclosed or are known to the board of directors or the 
committee, and the board or committee in good faith authorizes the contract or 
transaction by the affirmative votes of a majority of the disinterested directors, even 
though the disinterested directors be less than a quorum; or 
(2) The material facts as to the director's or officer's relationship or interest and as to the 
contract or transaction are disclosed or are known to the stockholders entitled to vote 
thereon, and the contract or transaction is specifically approved in good faith by vote of 
the stockholders; or 
(3) The contract or transaction is fair as to the corporation as of the time it is authorized, 
approved or ratified, by the board of directors, a committee or the stockholders. 
(b) Common or interested directors may be counted in determining the presence of a 
quorum at a meeting of the board of directors or of a committee which authorizes the 
contract or transaction.627 
Compliance with Section 144 restores protection under the business judgment rule for the 
interested transaction, and prevents such a transaction from undergoing an invalidity or 
violability review by the court simply because there is an interested director.628 However, 
complying with Section 144 does not provide protection from a court review for equitable 
standards (a fairness review) for breach of fiduciary duty.629 The application of Section 144 
determines whether the interested transaction will be reviewed by the court under the breach of 
duty review (if the transaction complies with Section 144), or if the interested transaction will be 
reviewed by the court under both breach of duty and violability reviews.630 
                                                          
627 Id. 
628 Rohrbacher, supra note 624, at 718-19, 734, 742 and 747-48. 
629 Id. 
630 Id. at 747-48. 
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Section 144 of Delaware law provides more details than Article 69 of the Saudi 
Companies Law. It first states clearly that the interest that triggers the rule is financial interest. 
Secondly and more importantly, Rule 144 of Delaware law provides that the existence of a 
financial interest, or the presence or participation of the interested director in the meeting that 
authorizes the transaction, does not per se make the transaction void or voidable, so long as the 
financial interest is disclosed and approved by a majority of disinterested directors or 
shareholders. According to the plain language of Rule 144 of Delaware law, the Saudi Chemical 
transaction would have been approved, had it received a majority of the votes of the disinterested 
directors or shareholders. 
4. Recommendations 
The Ministry of Commerce and Industry issued an order in the Saudi Chemical case 
stating that the transaction required shareholder authorization at the general meeting; the 
transaction did not ultimately receive this approval. However, the transaction should not have 
been sent to the Ministry of Commerce and Industry, because Article 69 of the Saudi Companies 
Law 1965 states that the vote of shareholders is required in case of a conflict of interest. 
Contentious debate and disagreement arose in this case over how an interested acquisition 
transaction should be handled; this debate was caused in large part by the (overly) broad 
language of the Saudi Companies Law 1965 regarding conflicts of interest. The board of 
directors argued that because the interested director would not attend the board meeting, the 
board of directors should not have needed to obtain shareholder approval of the transaction. The 
adoption of a rule similar to Rule 144 of Delaware law would clearly define how such an issue 
should be handled, and had Saudi had such a rule at the time of this case, the controversy may 
have been prevented. Indeed, a rule such as Rule 144 could help guide other corporations in their 
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future transactions in Saudi Arabia. Also, the Saudi Companies Law 2015 does not address the 
issue of whether interested directors may be counted for the purpose of a board quorum, and it 
should do so. The Saudi Companies Law 2015 should also specify that “interest” means 
specifically financial interest. Therefore, the word “financial” should be inserted before the word 
“interest,” and the Law should state that the presence or participation of the interested director in 
the meeting that authorizes the transaction does not per se make the transaction void or voidable, 
so long as the financial interest is disclosed and approved by a majority of disinterested directors 
or shareholders. 
K. Requirements for publicly held corporations regarding issuing shares for the 
purpose of M&A 
This section only applies when the transaction in question involves stock acquired 
through share issuance from a publicly held acquiring company (PHAC) to a closely held target 
corporation (CHTC). If cash rather than stock is involved, the PHAC is not covered by this 
section.  
1. The Listing Rules and private placement 
The PHAC is subject to the Listing Rules when a PHAC needs to raise the company’s 
capital in order to issue shares for the CHTC, and it is subject to the private placement exemption 
under the Offers of Securities Regulations when the PHAC wants to offer limited shares to the 
CHTC.631 Chapter 6 discusses situations in which a publicly held corporation is acquired. 
2. The Listing Rules 
The Listing Rules state the requirement for stock acquisition by a PHAC as the 
following: 
                                                          
631 See The Listing Rules, Chapter 5 and Offers of Securities Regulations, art. 3. 
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Where the purpose of a capital increase is to acquire a company or purchase or an asset, 
the following additional requirements must be complied with as applicable:  
1) the issuer must submit to the Authority a report prepared by the issuer’s financial 
advisor comprising the issuer’s valuation and a valuation of the target company to be 
acquired or the asset to be purchased;  
2) the issuer must submit to the Authority a financial due diligence report and a legal due 
diligence report issued by the legal advisor for the target company to be acquired or 
assets to be purchased; and  
3) the prospectus shall include: (a) the general structure of the transaction; (b) the 
rationale behind the acquisition or purchase; (c) an outline of the business of the target 
company to be acquired and market details of its relevant industry and trends; (d) a 
management discussion and analysis section on the target company to be acquired or the 
target asset to be purchased; (e) annual audited financial statements for the past three 
years (if any) preceding the date of the application for the target company to be acquired; 
(f) disclosure of any related parties; (g) pro forma financial statements reflecting the 
financial position of the issuer following the acquisition or the purchase; (h) any change 
in the issuer or the target company to be acquired as a result of the transaction (including 
changes to the board or senior executives); (i) the risk factors related to the acquisition 
transaction or to the asset to be purchased; (j) the valuation of the company to be acquired 
or the asset to be purchased; (k) the time period of the acquisition process; and (l) the 
issuer’s share price performance.632 
As in the case involving the CHAC, in order to increase its capital, the PHAC must obtain the 
approval of three-fourths of the shares represented in an extraordinary shareholders meeting, as 
prescribed in the Saudi Companies Law 2015.633 In this regard, the 2015 law retains the 
provisions of the 1965 law.634 
3. Private offering exception 
A PHAC also may fall under the private placement exemption, which is governed by the 
Offers of Securities Regulations. The private placement is defined as one of the following: 
1) The securities are issued by the government of the Kingdom, or a supranational 
authority recognised by the Authority; 
2) The offer is restricted to sophisticated investors; or 
                                                          
632 Listing Rules, art. 32. 
633 The Saudi Companies Law 2015, art. 95 (4). 
634 The Saudi Companies Law 1965, art. 92. 
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3) The offer is a limited offer. 
(b) The Authority may, in circumstances other than those described in paragraph (a) of 
this Article and upon application of a person seeking to make an offer of securities, 
determine that such an offer shall be treated as a private placement subject to compliance 
with such limitations as the Authority may impose.635 
The limited offer is defined in the Offers of Securities Regulations as an offer that is directed to 
no more than 60 offerees in which:  
the minimum amount payable per offeree is not less than one million Saudi Riyals or an 
equivalent amount. The minimum amount payable per offeree may be less than one 
million Saudi Riyals or an equivalent amount where the total value for the securities 
being offered does not exceed Saudi Riyals five million or an equivalent amount.636 
L. Insider trading 
Because the PHAC might issue shares as part of a merger or acquisition, or the proposed 
transaction might be between two listed corporations, this Subsection addresses the insider 
trading rule that applies to securities traded on the Saudi Stock Exchange (Tadawul). The 
Subsection also discusses a case in which an insider trading violation related to an acquisition 
transaction occurred. 
Capital Market Law prohibits trading in securities by an insider trader or by any person 
who obtains insider information related to the securities being traded:  
a. Any person who obtains, through family, business or contractual relationship, inside[r] 
information (hereinafter an “insider”) is prohibited from directly or indirectly trading in 
the Security related to such information, or to disclose such information to another person 
with the expectation that such person will trade in such Security. 
Insider information means information obtained by the insider and which is not available 
to the general public, has not been disclosed, and such information is of the type that a 
normal person would realize that in view of the nature and content of this information, its 
release and availability would have a material effect on the price or value of a Security 
related to such information, and the insider knows that such information is not generally 
available and that, if it were available, it would have a material effect on the price or 
value of such Security.  
                                                          
635 Offers of Securities Regulations, art. 9. 
636 Id. at art. 11 (a) (1) (b). 
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b. No person may purchase or sell a Security based on information obtained from an 
insider while knowing that such person, by disclosing such insider information related to 
the Security, has violated paragraph (a) of this Article.  
c. The Authority has the power to establish the rules for specifying and defining the terms 
provided for under paragraphs (a) and (b) of this Article, and such acts or practices which 
the Authority deems appropriate to exempt them from their application, as may be 
required for the safety of the market and the protection of investors.637 
The Market Conduct Regulation also prohibits situations in which any party uses insider 
information related to securities.638 To ensure that the prohibition covers any usage of insider 
information to trade securities, the Market Conduct Regulation specifies the different usages of 
insider information that violate Article 50 of the Capital Market Law, as well as the Market 
Conduct Regulation: 
Prohibition of Disclosure of Inside Information (a) An insider is prohibited from 
disclosing any inside information to any other person when he knows or should have 
known that it is possible that such other person may trade in the security related to the 
inside information. (b) A person who is not [an] insider is prohibited from disclosing to 
any other person any inside information obtained from an insider, when he knows or 
should have known that it is possible that such other person to whom the disclosure has 
been made may trade in the security related to the inside information. Article 6: 
Prohibition of Insider Trading (a) An insider is prohibited from engaging in insider 
trading. (b) A person who is not [an] insider is prohibited from engaging in insider 
trading if he obtains the inside information from another person and he knows or should 
have known, that the information is inside information.639 
1. The definition of insider traders and insider trading 
The Market Conduct Regulation defines the concept of insider trading—by a member of 
the board of directors, an executive officer, or an employee with the issuer who is privy to inside 
information—as a person who obtains inside information through a family relationship or 
through a person related in any way to the person obtaining the inside information, or as a person 
who obtains inside information through a work relationship.640 
                                                          
637 Capital Market Law, art. 50. 
638 The situations are stated in the Market Conduct Regulation, Articles 5 and 6. 
639 The Market Conduct Regulation, art. 5; 6. 
640 Id. at art. 4s (b) 1, 2 and 3. 
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2. The elements of insider information 
The Market Conduct Regulation stipulates three elements that constitute insider 
information, the use of which to trade securities violates the Capital Market Law according to 
Article 50.641 The three elements are: (1) the information is related to securities, (2) the 
information is not available to the public and (3) the reasonable person would think making such 
information public would substantially affect the price and value of the security.642 
3. An M&A insider trading case643 
The Capital Market Authority (CMA) filed a suit before the Appeal Committee for the 
Resolution of Securities Conflicts against a company, which the author will denote as company 
A. The suit was filed against company A’s chairman of the board and his brother for trading in 
securities using inside information about a potential acquisition.  
The chairman’s brother bought 264,502 shares of company A based on inside 
information that was not disclosed to the public; he learned this information from his brother, 
who was the chairman of the company’s board. The information was that company A was 
negotiating a deal to acquire another company, and the chairman knew that the deal was about to 
be closed, because he was assigned by the company to sign the deal. His brother also committed 
an insider trading violation when he used this information as a reason to trade in the securities of 
the company. The Capital Market Authority accused the chairman of trading in the company’s 
securities as well, because the chairman bought 28,700 shares.  
                                                          
641 The Market Conduct Regulation, art. 4 (c) 1, 2 and 3. 
642 Id. 
 for 1430H in 28/03/2009, available at 2009/ل0س/134 643
http://www.crsd.org.sa/En/Appeals/year%201430/penal/148-30E.pdf. (last visited June 22, 2015). 
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The Appeal Committee confirmed that because the actions taken by the defendants 
violated Article 50 (a) and (b) of the Capital Market Law, the suit fell under the Appeal 
Committee’s jurisdiction according to the Capital Market Law.644 
In this case, the Appeal Committee stated that the Capital Market Law provides a two-
pronged test to determine if defendants are liable for insider trading actions. Articles 50 (a) and 
(b) state: 
a. Any person who obtains, through family, business or contractual relationship, inside 
information (hereinafter an “insider”) is prohibited from directly or indirectly trading in 
the Security related to such information, or to disclose such information to another person 
with the expectation that such person will trade in such Security. Insider information 
means information obtained by the insider and which is not available to the general 
public, has not been disclosed, and such information is of the type that a normal person 
would realize that in view of the nature and content of this information, its release and 
availability would have a material effect on the price or value of a Security related to 
such information, and the insider knows that such information is not generally available 
and that, if it were available, it would have a material effect on the price or value of such 
Security.  
b. No person may purchase or sell a Security based on information obtained from an 
insider while knowing that such person, by disclosing such insider information related to 
the Security, has violated paragraph (a) of this Article.645 
Even though the Capital Market Authority contended that the two-pronged test was met, 
the Appeal Committee was not convinced that the evidence provided by the CMA was enough to 
hold the chairman’s brother liable for trading in securities based on inside information. The 
Appeal Committee stated that among other events, the increase in the value of the company’s 
shares by 5.66%, and then by 9.59%, and then by another 7.47%, attracted the attention of many 
investors to the company, and caused news and rumors to spread to the general public about the 
pending acquisition. The Appeals Committee found that the evidence provided by the CMA that 
the chairman disclosed inside information to his brother was not definite or convincing. 
                                                          
644 Capital Market Law, art. 25 (a). 
645 Id. at Articles 50 (a) and (b). 
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However, the CMA’s evidence did prove that the chairman made stock purchases before 
announcing the deal to the public. Especially important was the fact that the chairman was 
assigned by the company to sign the deal, which gave him access to information about the 
transaction that the public did not have. 
§5.4. Stock Acquisition of a Closely Held Target Corporation 
A. Introduction 
This Section will discuss the stock acquisition of a closely held corporation through a 
stock purchase agreement. A typical stock acquisition is structured as presented in Figure 5.2, 





Stock exchange acquisition646  
 
 
B.  Stock acquisition of a closely held corporation through a stock purchase 
agreement 
If a CHAC plans to acquire shares of a CHTC, the applicable rules will depend on the 
CHTC’s type of corporation—limited liability or closely held joint stock company. The reason to 
distinguish between the two types of companies is that while the Saudi Companies Law 2015 
contains some rules that apply to acquisitions of limited liability companies, it does not contain 
any rules that govern the acquisition of a closely held joint stock company. Therefore, the court 
                                                          
646 THOMPSON, JR., supra note 490, at 8. 
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will apply the general principles of Islamic law to an acquisition case involving a closely held 
joint stock company. The court’s disposition of previous acquisition cases that it has handled 
suggests that it is willing to prevent a stock exchange agreement unless each shareholder 
consents to sell his or her shares in the closely held joint stock company.647 
If the CHTC is a limited liability company, the stock acquisition offer is subject to the 
right of first refusal, which means that the shares that the CHAC wants to acquire must first be 
offered to other shareholders of the CHTC.648 The following is the relevant language from the 
Saudi Companies Law 1965, which is maintained unchanged in Article 161 of the 2015 law:649 
A partner650 may waive his portion to one of the partners or others in accordance with the 
terms of the company's contract[;] however if he wants to waive his portion to others with 
a compensation, he shall notify the other partners through the director of the company 
with the terms of the waiver. In this case, each partner may ask for [a] refund [of] the 
money of the portion with its true value.651 If thirty days passed from the date of 
notification without any of the partners using his right of restitution[,]652 the owner of the 
portion has the right to dispose [of] it, taking into account the provisions of the second 
paragraph of Article (157).653 If more than one of the partners used the right of restitution 
and the waiver was related to a group of portions, these portions shall be divided between 
[sic] those who asked for restitution by the portion of each of them in the capital. If the 
waiver was related to one portion, it shall be given to the partners who have asked for 
restitution, taking into account the provisions of the second paragraph of Article (158). If 
the waiver of the portion was without compensation, then the asking partner shall pay the 
value according to the latest inventory conducted by the company. The right of restitution 
provided for in this article on [sic] shall not be applied to the transfer of ownership of the 
portions by inheritance or a will.654 
                                                          
647 Such was the case in the Safola transaction, which is discussed in Subsection C of this section. 
648 The Saudi Companies Law 2015, art. 161. 
649 The Saudi Companies Law 2015, art. 161. 
650 The word “partner” is not correctly translated, because partners and partnership have different provisions and 
applications. 
651 “True value” is a vague term, which should refer to a financial term. 
652 “Right of restitution” means the right of first refusal. 
653 This means that if 30 days pass, and the other partners have not invoked their right of first refusal nor did they 
buy the shares, the buying partner may sell his shares to a third party. 
654 The Saudi Companies Law 1965, art. 165. 
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C. The Safola case 
1. Introduction 
The following case is a quintessential example of an M&A transaction in Saudi Arabia. It 
involves a court ruling to resolve a situation in which the acquiring company tries to acquire 
100% of a company; the majority of the shareholders agreed to sell their shares, but there was a 
minority of shareholders who did not. The ruling handed down in this case will affect all M&A 
transactions in Saudi Arabia in the foreseeable future, especially cases in which a specific rule 
governing a stock acquisition purchase is missing. Because there are no rules governing stock 
purchases, the court tries to fill in by enforcing the Islamic rule that no person shall be forced to 
sell his or her shares without consent.  
2. The case 
The 2006 Alshehri v. Safola case655 involved Alsharq for Plastic Industries, Co., a limited 
liability company owned by a father and seven sons. The ownership was divided thusly: the 
father owned 93% of the company and each of the seven sons owned 1%. The Safola company 
offered to purchase 100% of the Alsharq Company. The father and six of the sons agreed to sell 
their shares to Safola for cash. The seventh son (the Plaintiff, Waleed), with his 1% ownership, 
opposed the sale of the shares. The Plaintiff requested in court to use his right of first refusal to 
purchase his brothers shares, which collectively totaled 6%, but he did not object to his father 
selling his 93% share of the Alsharq Company to Safola. 
Waleed Alshehri with his 1% ownership in Alsharq for Plastic Industries Co. filed a suit 
before the court against Safola (the Defendant) challenging the sale of shares by six of the 
shareholders, who collectively owned 6% of Alsharq; namely, his brothers. Again, he did not 
object to his father, who owned 93% of Alsharq, selling his shares. The Plaintiff’s suit alleged: 
                                                          
655 Board of Grievances, 5th Commercial Circuit, Case NO: 38/D/TG/5. 
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1) the Plaintiff was not informed of the sale of shares to Safola Co.; 2) the rest of the 
shareholders did not have a valid power of attorney to sell the Plaintiff’s shares without his 
consent; and 3) the Plaintiff had “Alshufah’s right,” which means the right of first refusal. Safola 
announced that it had acquired all of the Alsharq company from the Alshehri family by paying 
SAR 175 million for the 1,233,500 shares owned by the Alshehri family: 93% owned by the 
father Ali, and 7% owned by the seven sons, including the Plaintiff.  
The court stated its opinion according to Article 165 of the Companies Law and Article 8 
of the Articles of Incorporation of the Alsharq Company. Each partner has the right of first 
refusal when the other partners want to sell their shares to a third party. In addition, the court 
noted that according to Islamic principles, the plaintiff had the Alshufah right, which gave him as 
a partner the right to buy out the other partners that wanted to sell to a third party. 
The Court opined that the other brothers (shareholders) and the father did not notify the 
Plaintiff that they were selling their shares, and therefore prevented the Plaintiff from exercising 
his right. The Defendant, Safola, claimed that in fact the father, who owned 93% of the shares, 
had a power of attorney to act on behalf of the Plaintiff. However, the Plaintiff proved to the 
court that he had not known about the acquisitions until he saw them reported in the news, 
whereupon he filed a complaint with the notary public at the Ministry of Commerce and Industry 
stating that he disapproved of the transaction, because he did not know about it. Further, he 
asked for an injunction to stop the transaction from moving forward until the matter was 
reviewed and decided upon by the court. 
The Defendant argued that according to the Islamic principles of the Alshufah right, a 
partner cannot accept some shares and refuse others; i.e., Waleed could not purchase 6% of the 
shares (as he proposed to do) and not the other 93%. Such an action would make the value of the 
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remaining shares less valuable, which is prohibited by Islamic Law; the Prophet Muhammad 
said: “There should be neither harming [darar] nor reciprocating harm [diraar],” and Islamic law 
says: “Harm should be removed” and “Harm shall be removed as possible [sic] as it could be.” 
The Defendant (Safola) stated that the Plaintiff’s request to purchase only his brothers’ shares—
6% of the Alsharq shares—and not the father’s 93%, would affect the company by dividing it. 
The court agreed with the Plaintiff, stating that the shares were divided into equal shares, which 
could not harm the company. The court explained that the Plaintiff had the right to choose how 
many shares he wished to buy, and it noted that the Plaintiff did not choose to buy a small 
percentage from each partner. Instead, the Plaintiff chose to buy the entirety of each of his 
brothers’ shares, but none of his father’s shares, which the court deemed acceptable. The court 
also stated that the Plaintiff, still a shareholder in the Alsharq company, owned 1% of the capital 
of the company, against which the Defendant did not argue, which also meant that the Defendant 
implicitly agreed with the court that the Plaintiff was still a shareholder in the Alsharq company. 
The court also referred to the concept of “Alfadulee” in Islamic jurisprudence, which 
means that when someone sells an item that he does not own, the sale is pending until the real 
owner approves or voids it. In this case, since none of the partners had a valid power of attorney, 
and they sold the Plaintiff’s shares without his consent, the sale of the Plaintiff’s shares was not 
valid unless the Plaintiff approved it. 
Therefore, the court concluded that according to Article 165 of the Companies Law 1965 
and Article 8 of the Articles of Incorporation of the Alsharq Company, and also according to 
Islamic principles, the other shareholders, including the father, did not have the right to sell the 
Plaintiff’s shares to the Defendant, Safola. The court also held that the Plaintiff had the right to 
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buy his brothers’ shares. The Plaintiff had to pay Safola SAR 10,500,000 for his brothers’ 6% 
share. 
3. The issue 
By its ruling on this case, the court created a ruling that built a principle656 that no 
shareholder can be forced to sell his or her shares for any reason. This case applies to the sale of 
shares that requires each shareholder to agree to sell in order for the sale to be valid. Otherwise, 
the sale is void and will be nullified by the court. This rule also will apply in cases when stock is 
exchanged via a stock exchange acquisition; i.e., when shareholders of a target acquisition will 
receive stock in the acquiring company. Such an arrangement could become quite complicated if 
minority shareholders oppose the acquisition action. For instance, when the listed Saudi 
company657 HADCO was acquired by a company called Almari,658 the acquired company called 
for a vote after the Capital Market Authority mandated that the acquired company had to obtain 
the approval of 50% of its shareholders for the transaction.659 Even though the acquired company 
(HADCO) approved the transaction, the vote was not 100% in favor.660 The minority could have 
objected to the transaction, because the law does not address the issue of the percentage of 
approving votes necessary to implement a total stock acquisition transaction. The Capital Market 
Authority’s requirement that HADCO obtain its shareholders’ approval seems to have had no 
legal ground. If the acquired company is not dissolved and does not disappear, the transaction is 
                                                          
656 This principle applies to any transaction and to any type of company, which means that it does not matter if the 
company is private or listed. 
657 Because the law is silent about stock acquisitions, if the law is not changed, the court likely will tend not to 
enforce rules about stock exchanges, because a stock exchange is categorized as a sale, which requires the consent 
of each shareholder to exchange his or her share for shares in the acquiring company. 
658 See the article entitled Souhail Karam, Saudi Almarai, Hadco agree on takeover terms, July 1, 2009, ARABIAN 
BUSINESS NEWSPAPER, available at http://www.arabianbusiness.com/saudi-almarai-hadco-agree-on-takeover-terms-
16457.html. (last visited November 13, 2015). 
659 See the article CMA approves Almarai’s $253.2m bid for Hadco, ARAB NEWS, September 13, 2009, available at 




a stock acquisition, which places it under the Companies Law and the M&A transaction rules, 
neither of which gives the board of directors or the majority of shareholders the right to approve 
the total acquisition of a company without the consent of each shareholder. Even though the 
Safola case involved a limited liability company, it makes clear that the absence of a rule 
allowing acquisitions to be approved by majority rule opens the door for the court to intervene 
and apply the selling with consent rule in cases involving closely held corporations. 
Finally, the ruling by the court in the Safola case creates a barrier favoring the minority 
over the company’s interests by giving the minority the opportunity to block the stock 
acquisition of a CHTC.  
If the CHTC is a joint stock company, the general rules governing joint stock companies 
in the Saudi Companies Law 2015 will apply. In the absence of specific rules governing stock 
acquisitions for a joint stock company, other than what is specified for limited liability 
companies in the Companies Law 2015, the acquisition of a closely held joint stock company 
falls under the ruling of the court, which requires the consent of every shareholder for an 
acquisition to occur.  
When a company wants to acquire all of the CHTC’s shares, the CHTC faces the rule that 
“no one is forced to sell his shares,” as specified in the Safola case. This ruling highlights the 
absence of an Article giving the board of directors the power to approve the sale of all of the 
company’s stock, regardless of who owns the shares. The failure to address stock acquisitions in 
cases involving a CHTC has created a legislative gap that discourages companies from moving 
forward with acquisitions of CHTCs. Also, the absence of a “squeeze out” rule means that the 
Saudi Companies Law 2015 fails to address how a company may acquire all of a CHTC, which 
makes it difficult for a company to acquire 100% of the stocks of PHTCs and CHTCs. Moreover, 
224 
 
while several companies would like to include in their bylaws and shareholder agreements 
clauses such as “tag along” and drag along” rights—which the author briefly addresses later in 
this chapter—it is uncertain whether these types of agreements will be enforceable. The Saudi 
Companies Law 2015 needs to be changed to permit buyout agreements. 
D. A deal canceled due to a legislative gap in the approval of a stock acquisition 
(the Sahara-Sipchem Deal) 
This section analyzes a stock acquisition deal that failed and was canceled, because there 
was no regulatory framework for a direct stock acquisition approved by a majority of 
shareholders. The section also provides suggestions for how these types of transactions could be 
structured in the future. 
1. Sahara-Sipchem deal 
Sahara Petrochemicals is a publicly traded Saudi company established and listed on the 
Tadawul in 2004 with a capital value of SAR 4,387,950,000 billion (USD 1.167 billion).661 
Sipchem is also a publicly traded Saudi petrochemical company established in 1999 as closely 
held company and listed on the Tadawul in 2006 with a capital value of SAR 3,666,666,660 
billion (USD 977 million).662 Sipchem has nine subsidiaries in the Kingdom, located in Jubail 
and Khobar.663 
On June 4, 2013, Sahara announced it had signed a memorandum of understanding with 
Sipchem for Sipchem to acquire all of Sahara.664 The text of the announcement is presented 
                                                          
661 See Sahara’s file on the Tadawul website, available at http://www.tadawul.com.sa (last visited December 11, 
2015). 
662 See Sipchem’s file on the Tadawul website, available at http://www.tadawul.com.sa (last visited December 11, 
2015). 
663 Id. 
664 See Sahara’s website, available at http://www.saharapcc.com/en/newsdetails.aspx?pageid=31&newsid=917 (last 
visited December 11, 2015). 
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below to facilitate discussion of some of the issues and criticism of the issues involved in these 
types of transactions. 
Sahara’s announcement reads as follows: 
Sahara Petrochemical Co. announces the signing of a memorandum of understanding 
with Saudi International Petrochemical Company for [sic] begin confirmatory due 
diligence and continue the non-binding negotiations relating to the detailed terms of a 
proposed business merger between the two companies based on the principles of a 
merger of equals (the Proposed Merger665, 666) as following: 
1.Signed the Memorandum on Wednesday 04-12-2013 
2.Related parties: Sahara Petrochemicals Company and Saudi International 
Petrochemical Company 
3.The signing of the MoU comes as a result of the preliminary conclusions of the studies 
and negotiations in relation to the Proposed Merger which indicate that, subject to 
agreeing [to] certain key terms, the Proposed Merger will be a positive transformational 
step in the business of the Company. The Proposed Merger is expected to enhance the 
Company s leading position in the local and international petrochemical industry and the 
combined business is expected to result in significant synergies related to operational 
efficiencies and the combined company would become a stronger platform for further 
growth in the long-term. 
The MoU has been signed by Eng. Esam Fouad Himdy, CEO and Managing Director of 
the Company, on behalf of the Company, and Eng. Ahmad Al-Abdulaziz Al Ohali, CEO 
and Managing Director of Sipchem, on behalf of Sipchem, in the city of Riyadh. 
In this regard, Eng. Himdy and Eng. Al-Ohali have jointly commented as follows: If 
completed, we hope that the Proposed Merger will benefit our shareholders and our 
employees. Indeed, the expectation is that the Proposed Merger will be positively 
transformational and potentially have significant benefits for both companies. The terms 
                                                          
665 One of the mains issues in this transaction is the transaction’s label. Sahara calls it “merger” while in fact it is an 
acquisition; note especially that Sahara announced at the same time that Sipchem and Sahara wanted both 
companies to stay as they were, and also that Sahara would become a subsidiary of Sipchem. This gives an indicator 
of certain issues, such as how the M&A concept is perceived in Saudi Arabia and how M&A is new to Saudi Arabia. 
Such unfamiliarity with M&A concepts can cause companies to label their transactions differently, due to the 
absence of legislation that clearly defines crucial transactions such as M&A. The Ministry of Industry and 
Commerce and the Capital Market Authority also have the burden of making sure that announcements precisely 
describe the structure of proposed transactions. This issue becomes especially important when companies use 
different labels to describe certain deals, either to drive up the price of shares or to mislead shareholders.  
666 One of the conclusions that can be drawn from the way the deal was structured and labeled as it was announced is 
that had the deal been a merger, it would only have needed the approval of two-thirds of the shares represented in 
the General Assembly Meeting. The absence of legislative framework under the Saudi Companies Law 2015 could 
encourage companies to give deals labels that do not reflect the true nature of the transaction, taking advantage of 
the authorities’ weak understanding of the new concepts of M&A. The issue of understanding M&A in Saudi Arabia 
is driven by the vague definitions of M&A concepts throughout legal texts in the Saudi laws. 
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of the Proposed Merger will be underpinned by a shared commitment to achieve a fair 
result and create value for each company s shareholders based on the principles of a 
merger of equals. This is an important precedent in the petrochemical sector in the 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, which will, God-willing, result in a larger, more capable, and 
more competitive company that can increase investments in new projects in the Kingdom 
and globally, and will provide exciting growth opportunities for management and 
employees, adding value to the shareholders of both companies. 
Both companies have agreed that, in the event the Proposed Merger occurs, it will be 
implemented by way of an exchange of shares where, after the Proposed Merger is 
completed, the Company will become a subsidiary of Sipchem.667 Under the terms of the 
Proposed Merger, Sipchem will issue 0.685 new shares for every one issued share in the 
Company. Accordingly, based on the agreed exchange ratio, if the Proposed Merger is 
completed, Sipchem will issue 300,574,575 new shares to the Company s shareholders in 
exchange for all issued shares in the Company. 
The MoU does not constitute an offer by Sipchem to the Company s shareholders or to its 
board of directors, nor does it constitute an announcement of a firm intention to make an 
offer. Under the MoU, the Company and Sipchem have agreed to continue to co-operate 
with each other to complete the financial, technical, commercial, market and legal due 
diligence, agree [to] an integration plan, and [oversee] the governance and strategy of the 
combined group as well as the preparation of the definitive documentation required to 
implement the Proposed Merger. Should the companies agree to proceed with the 
Proposed Merger, they intend to enter into a definitive legally binding merger agreement 
that, amongst other things, will specify the terms of Sipchem s potential offer addressed 
to the Company s shareholders and its board of directors (the Merger Agreement ). Both 
companies will continue to conduct business as usual and both companies’ shares will 
continue to trade as usual until completion of the Proposed Merger. 
Currently, both companies intend to finish their evaluation of the Proposed Merger with 
the intention of being in a position to sign the Merger Agreement in the first half of 2014. 
The MoU will expire on the earlier of the date on which the Merger Agreement is signed 
by the companies or by notice for [sic] termination of the studies from either company to 
the other. 
The entry into the MoU does not mean that the Proposed Merger will be agreed between 
the two companies, that an offer will be eventually made in relation to the Proposed 
Merger, or that the terms or timing of any potential offer have been confirmed. If the 
terms of the Proposed Merger are agreed, it is expected that it will be subject to various 
conditions and approvals including, without limitation, the approval of the Capital 
Market Authority, the approval at the general assembly of each company, and the 
approval of the competent Saudi Arabian regulatory authorities. 
                                                          
667 This is more proof that the transaction in fact was an acquisition and not a merger, as it was labeled in the 
announcements. It is obvious that Sahara wanted to be acquired 100% rather than to merge into Sipchem. 
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In respect of the Proposed Merger, the Company has appointed Morgan Stanley Saudi 
Arabia as its financial advisor, Al-Jadaan & Partners Law Firm as its Saudi legal advisor, 
Clifford Chance LLP as its international legal advisor, and IHS Inc. as its technical and 
market consultant. Sipchem has appointed HSBC Saudi Arabia Limited as its financial 
advisor, Zeyad S. Khoshaim Law Firm as its Saudi legal advisor, Allen & Overy LLP as 
its international legal advisor, Jacobs Consulting as its technical consultant, and Nexant 
as its market consultant.668 
On June 8, 2014 Sahara announced that even though Sahara and Sipchem had advanced 
in their negotiations and reached a good understanding regarding the deal, they decided to 
postpone the deal due to difficulties encountered in consummating the transaction in the manner 
that the two companies wished; these difficulties arose because they could not find a proper 
regulatory framework to govern the deal: 
Although both companies are still convinced that the Proposed Merger is in the interest of 
their shareholders, the companies reached a conclusion that it is difficult to implement 
this merger under the current regulatory framework using a structure acceptable to both 
companies where both companies will continue to exist669 whilst achieving operational 
integration.670 
2. The regulatory framework issue 
Because Sipchem wanted to acquire 100% of Sahara, and there were no rules governing 
total acquisition transactions, the rule that did apply came from the Companies Law 1965 
according to the Safola case, which held that no shareholder may be forced to sell his share 
without his consent. That meant that in order for Sipchem to acquire all of Sahara, it needed the 
approval of all of Sahara’s shareholders. This rule caused difficulties for both companies. In 
contrast, if the transaction had been structured as a merger, Sahara could have completed the deal 
by obtaining the approval of a majority of its shareholders (two-thirds of the shares represented 
                                                          
668 See Sahara’s website, available at http://www.saharapcc.com/en/newsdetails.aspx?pageid=31&newsid=917 (last 
visited December 11, 2015). 
669 Another proof that the transaction is an acquisition. 
670 See Sahara’s website, available at http://www.saharapcc.com/en/newsdetails.aspx?pageid=31&newsid=978 (last 
visited December 11, 2015). 
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in the meeting) as prescribed in Articles 85 and 92 of the Saudi Companies Law 1965. Article 94 
(4) of the Saudi Companies Law 2015 retains the same language as the 1965 law.671 
3. Solution 
To solve this issue, the Saudi legislature needs to issue rules that allow total acquisitions 
to occur with the approval of a majority of shareholders. If the Saudi Companies Law 1965 had 
specified how many shares were needed to approve an acquisition, the acquisition of Sahara by 
Sipchem would have been consummated.  
Another way to achieve the same result as a stock acquisition would have been for 
Sipchem to have formed a subsidiary, and for this subsidiary to have merged with Sahara. The 
result would have been that Sahara would have become a subsidiary wholly owned by Sipchem. 
This is an example of a reverse subsidiary merger672, which will be discussed in the following 
Section of this Chapter that discusses the US. The Saudi Companies Law 2015 does not address 
this scenario, which means that the Saudi Companies Law 2015 does not prohibit this type of 
action. However, the mechanism of a “reverse subsidiary merger” has never been used in Saudi 
Arabia, which raises speculation about whether the Ministry of Commerce and Industry may 
raise objections to this type of structure.  
The drag along clause provides another practical way to solve the problem of the lack of 
any provision in the law that forces minority shareholders to sell their shares when the majority 
of shareholders want to sell their shares.673 A drag along clause typically is a clause that can be 
included in a shareholder agreement; it requires minority shareholders to sell their shares to a 
                                                          
671 The Saudi Companies Law 2015, art. 94 (4). 
672 See THOMPSON, JR., supra note 490, at 11, 40. 
673 Ma Isabel Sáez Lacave, Nuria Bermejo Guiterrez, Specific Investments, Opportunism and Corporate Contracts: 
A Theory of Tag-along and Drag-along Clauses, 424-25, EUROPEAN BUSINESS ORGANIZATION LAW REVIEW 11.3  
(Sep 2010), available at http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayAbstract?fromPage=online&aid=7923089. (last 
visited February 28, 2016). 
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third party when the majority of the shareholders want to sell their shares to that third party.674 
Therefore, the majority has the power to “drag” minority shareholders along with a sale and 
force them to sell all of their shares to the buyer.675 Neither the Saudi Companies Law 2015 nor 
the Saudi Companies Law 1965 prohibits such restrictions or clauses. A Saudi lawyer, who 
spoke with the author but preferred to remain anonymous, informed the author that Saudi law 
firms will include a drag along clause when drafting shareholder agreements if the shareholders 
ask them to; however, he also noted that law firms cannot guarantee whether the court will 
enforce such clauses.676 
E. Is the stock acquisition provision against Islamic Law?  
1. Introduction 
This section argues that adopting provisions that permit stock acquisitions, such as share 
exchange provisions based on a majority vote, does not violate Islamic rules. Further, the author 
argues that once natural or institutional parties become shareholders in a corporation, they 
inherently and implicitly agree to comply with the Companies Law 2015 and with the 
corporation’s bylaws. This assertion rebuts the position that, out of concern for cohesion, 
shareholders must not be forced to sell their shares. The author argues that there is no issue of 
cohesion in the case of acquisitions, given that parties become shareholders of their own free will 
and in doing so, they freely submit to all conditions and rules stipulated in the Companies Law 
2015 and in the corporation’s bylaws.  
                                                          
674 Id. 
675 Id. 
676 Anonymous attorney in Saudi with whom the author met in 2015. 
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2. The argument 
Even though the court invokes the Islamic rule that no shareholder may be forced to sell 
his shares without consent, an argument can be made within Islamic jurisprudence that allows 
the application of majority vote rule.677 While sales under Islamic rules must be based on consent 
and must not transgress the will of the shareholders, the argument could be made that when a 
party becomes a shareholder in a company, he implicitly gives this consent and agrees to comply 
with the Companies Law 2015.678 The Saudi Companies Law 1965 contains such a rule (details 
of which are below) and Article 105 of the 2015 law retains the same rule and wording. The 
Saudi Companies Law 1965 states that when any party owns shares in a corporation, he 
implicitly agrees to the provisions prescribed in the Companies Law 1965 and also agrees to the 
corporation’s bylaws: 
Subscription in or ownership of stock shall imply that the stockholder accepts the 
company’s bylaws and shall abide by the resolutions adopted by stockholders' meetings 
in conformity with the provisions of this Law and the company’s bylaws, whether in his 
presence or absence, and whether he has voted for or against them.679, 680 
This argument—that entering into a shareholding contract means that the parties involved 
willingly agree to comply with its conditions and rules, including the majority vote rule—is 
commonly invoked and discussed within Islamic jurisprudence.  
A well-established tenet of Islamic jurisprudence states that the default rule in cases of 
transactions is that “the original status of dealings and transactions are [sic] permi[tted].”681 The 
rule summarizes all verses from the Qur’an and the Sunnah or Hadith that assert that 
                                                          
677 AHEMED ALRAIZIN, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE OF JOINT STOCK CORPORATION[S] (A STUDY UNDER THE ISLAMIC 
JURISPRUDENCE), HOKAMAT ALSHARKAT ALMUSAHYMAH (DERASAH FIGHYAH), 43-5 (Sabic Chair for Islamic 
Securities Studies, Muhammad bin Saud University Project No. 23-01, Saudi Arabia, Riyadh, 2012). 
678 Id. 
679 The Saudi Companies Law, art. 96. 
680 See also ALRAIZIN, supra note 677, at 41. 
681 KHALID ALMOSLIH, Commercial marketing incentives and its applications under Islamic Jurisprudence, 16 (Dar 
ibn ALjawzi, Saudi Arabia, Riyadh, 2005). 
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transactions are based in agreements such as: “O ye who believe! fulfill (all) obligations,”682, 683 
as well as from the Hadith where the Prophet Muhammad said: “Muslims are bound by their 
conditions, except a condition that forbids what is permissible or permits what is forbidden.”684 
Here is a synthesis of the previous authoritative resources from the Qur’an and Sunnah or 
Hadith: there is no direct prohibition in the Qur’an or the Hadith against approving actions such 
as stock or assets acquisitions via the mechanism of a majority vote; therefore, it is permissible 
for the government to issue and adopt rules that permit approving stock acquisitions, assets 
acquisitions and mergers based on majority votes. Natural or institutional parties that become 
shareholders in a corporation agree to be bound by the Saudi Companies Law 2015 and by the 
corporation’s bylaws. There is no coercion or duress imposed on the shareholders to become part 
of the corporation.  
                                                          
682 Al-Mâ’idah, Verse 1, Ali, Abdullah Yusuf (2014-03-21), The Holy Qur'an (English Translation) with 
Commentary, (Kindle Locations 4501-02), Kindle Edition. 
683 The commentary and explanation of the meaning of the word “obligations” in Qur’an is:  
This line has been justly admired for its terseness and comprehensiveness. Obligations: 'uqud: the Arabic 
word implies so many things that a whole chapter of Commentary can be written on it. First, there are the 
divine obligations that arise from our spiritual nature and our relation to God. He created us and implanted 
in us the faculty of knowledge and foresight; besides the intuition and reason which He gave us, He made 
Nature responsive to our needs, and His Signs in Nature are so many lessons to us in our own inner life; He 
further sent Messengers and Teachers, for the guidance of our conduct in individual, social, and public life. 
All these gifts create corresponding obligations which we must fulfil[l], (Cf. 30: 30). But in our own human 
and material life we undertake mutual obligations express and implied. We make a promise; we enter into a 
commercial or social contract; we enter into a contract of marriage: we must faithfully fulfill all obligations 
in all these relationships, (Cf. 7: 172 and 16: 91). 
Ali, Abdullah Yusuf (2014-03-21), The Holy Qur'an (English Translation) with Commentary, (Kindle Locations 
4848-51), Kindle Edition. 
684 HUSSEIN RASSOOL, ISLAMIC COUNSELLING: AN INTRODUCTION TO THEORY AND PRACTICE, 169 (New York, 
Routledge Taylor and Fransic Group, 2015). The Hadith was narrated by Abo Dawood, Imam Ahemd and 
Aldargagotni Hadeeth number 1023. See also Abdulhaman Alsakawye “almagasid alhasanah fee bayan katheer min 
alhadeeth almushtaherah beyn alalsnah,” Dar Alkitab Alarabi publication, 607. For additional readings in English 
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The previous argument is presented to counter a potential objection to allowing stock 
acquisitions based on majority votes; to reiterate, this objection is based on the premise that such 
provisions would be in conflict with the Islamic rule that no one may be forced to sell.  
Therefore, the CHTC should be able to sell all of its shares with the approval of a 
majority of its shareholders. To provide a mechanism for acquiring all of a company’s stock, the 
following Subsection presents the American model of dealing with stock acquisitions, which 
may serve as an example after which the Saudi Companies Law 2015 could be modeled. This 
Subsection provides examples of common forms of structuring transactions that may result in 
stock acquisition. 
In the case of a stock acquisition, the Saudi Companies Law 2015 gives the board of 
directors of the acquiring company broad power to achieve the company’s purpose, unless a 
specific provision in the Law or in the company’s bylaws provides otherwise.685 As noted, this 
includes the acquisition of stock. Under the 1965 law, the acquiring company also does not 
require the approval of its shareholders to take the action of acquiring.686 Rather, this action falls 
under the authority of the board of directors.687 In a broad rule for a joint stock company, the 
Companies Law 1965 states that: 
With due regard to the prerogatives of the general meeting, the board of directors shall 
enjoy full powers in the administration of the company. It shall be entitled, within the 
scope of its competence, to delegate one or more of its members or others to perform an 
act or certain acts. Nevertheless, the board of directors may not contract loans for terms 
exceeding 3 years, or sell or mortgage the real property or the place of business of the 
company, or release the debtors of the company from their liabilities, unless so 
authorized in the bylaws of the company and subject to the terms set forth therein. If the 
company’s bylaws do not contain any provisions in this regard, the board may perform 
                                                          
685 The Saudi Companies Law 2015, art. 75. 
686 The Saudi Companies Law 1965, art. 73. 
687 Id.  
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the above acts with an authorization from the regular general meeting, unless such acts 
fall by virtue of their nature within the scope of the company’s objects.688 
The closely held acquiring joint stock company is not required to obtain the approval of 
shareholders unless the acquiring company must increase its capital in order to acquire the 
closely held company.689 Three-fourths of the shares present in the extraordinary general 
assembly are required to increase the capital of the company, as specified in the Saudi 
Companies Law 1965: 
But if a resolution pertains to an increase or a decrease in capital, or to extension of the 
term of the company, or to dissolution of the company prior to expiry of the term 
specified in its bylaws or to merger of the company into another company or firm, it shall 
be valid only if adopted by a three-fourths majority vote of the shares represented at the 
meeting.690 
Both the 2015 and 1965 Saudi Companies Laws give broad authority to the board of directors of 
acquiring companies and do not require that an acquiring company obtain shareholder approval 
to issue significant numbers of shares. The Saudi Companies Law 2015 should amend its law to 
add a rule requiring the acquiring corporation to obtain the majority of its shareholders’ votes to 
issue a significant number shares; the NYSE rule that shareholders must approve a certain stock 
issuance (as will be discussed in the US section) may serve as an example.  
F. Closely held stock acquisitions in the US 
The United States’ Model Business Corporation Act (MBCA),691 Section 11.03, provides 
what is known as the “compulsory share exchange” provision.692 The MBCA states:  
 
                                                          
688 Id. 
689 The Saudi Companies Law 1965, art. 92. 
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691 AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, MODEL BUSINESS CORPORATION ACT, (4th ed. 2011). 
692 THOMPSON, JR, supra note 490, at 29, 40-1 and 49. Delaware law does not have the compulsory share exchange 
provision; see Mary Siegel, An Appraisal of the Model Business Corporation Act’s Appraisal Rights Provisions, 
231-52, 74 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS, note: 17 (Winter 2011), available at 
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(a) Through a share exchange: 
(1) a domestic corporation may acquire all of the shares of one or more classes or 
series of shares of another domestic or foreign corporation, or all of the interests of one or 
more classes or series of interests of a domestic or foreign other entity, in exchange for 
shares or other securities, interests, obligations, rights to acquire shares or other 
securities, cash, other property, or any combination of the foregoing, pursuant to a plan of 
share exchange, or 
(2) all of the shares of one or more classes or series of shares of a domestic 
corporation may be acquired by another domestic or foreign corporation or other entity, 
in exchange for shares or other securities, interests, obligations, rights to acquire shares or 
other securities, cash, other property, or any combination of the foregoing, pursuant to a 
plan of share exchange.693 
When a CHAC is going to acquire a CHTC, the board of directors of the CHTC is required to 
adopt a plan for the stock exchange and submit it to shareholders for their approval at a quorate 
meeting at which at least a majority of shareholders entitled to vote is present.694 The board of 
directors is required to make a recommendation about the plan to the shareholders, except in a 
case involving a conflict of interest; in such a case, the board of directors must notify the 
shareholders that they are unable to make a recommendation because of the conflict of 
interest.695 The plan is considered approved by the shareholders when the majority of 
shareholders vote in favor of the plan.696 
The CHAC is not required to obtain shareholder approval of stock exchange plans as long 
as it is the acquiring company, according to MBCA §11.04(g), unless there is an issuance of 
shares by the acquiring company in excess of 20%, according to MBCA §6.21(f) (1) (ii). 
The shareholders of a CHTC have the right to dissent and to have their shares appraised 
according to MBCA §13.02(a) (2). 
                                                          
693 MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT §11.03(a) (2011). 
694 MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT §11.04(b) (2011). 
695 Id. 
696 Id. at §11.04(e). 
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When a PHAC is going to acquire a CHTC and the consideration is stock, the New York 
Stock Exchange requires the shareholders’ approval in the following cases: 
(c) Shareholder approval is required prior to the issuance of common stock, or of 
securities convertible into or exercisable for common stock, in any transaction or series of 
related transactions if: 
(1) the common stock has, or will have upon issuance, voting power equal to or in 
excess of 20 percent of the voting power outstanding before the issuance of such 
stock or of securities convertible into or exercisable for common stock; or 
(2) the number of shares of common stock to be issued is, or will be upon issuance, 
equal to or in excess of 20 percent of the number of shares of common stock 
outstanding before the issuance of the common stock or of securities convertible into 
or exercisable for common stock.697 
While Delaware law does not have a stock exchange provision like the MBCA’s, it does provide 
for stock acquisition purchases to be achieved through a reverse subsidiary merger,698 which will 
be discussed in the section of this paper that addresses the merger of a closely held target 
corporation into a closely held acquiring corporation.  
G. Recommendations 
1- The Saudi Companies Law 2015 should provide mechanisms that facilitate stock 
acquisitions that are economically efficient and attractive. If the acquiring corporation is 
not able to acquire 100% of a target corporation, the stock acquisition may become less 
desirable, as was the case in the Sahara-Sipchem deal.  
2- The Saudi Companies Law 2015 should provide a mechanism for stock exchange among 
closely held corporations via stock purchase agreements that requires only the majority 
(not 100%) of the acquired corporation’s shareholders to approve. 
                                                          
697 New York Stock Exchange Listed Company Manual §312.03; THOMPSON, JR., supra note 490, at 36. 
698 THOMPSON, JR., supra note 490, at 11 , 40; AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, MBCA (OFFICIAL TEXT WITH OFFICIAL 
COMMENT AND STATUTORY CROSS-REFERENCES), 11-09, 11-10 (United States, 2011). 
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3- The Saudi Companies Law should make it lawful and enforceable for companies to 
include in their bylaws a mechanism for selling shares and ownerships interests; for 
example, instruments such as buy/sell orders, and put/call options. These agreements help 
companies respond to various financial changes that may occur. The Saudi Companies 
Law 2015 does not recognize agreements that may be taken to facilitate share exchanges 
or the disposal of minority or ownership interests, nor does it distinguish between 
minority and majority.  
4- Regarding the acquiring company, the Saudi Companies Law 2015 should model the 
NYSE rules and not require shareholder approval of a transaction unless a significant 
issuance of shares, such as 20% or more, is involved. This would give the acquiring 
companies the latitude to guide their organizations according to efficient business 
strategies. Again, an exception here would be a case in which a significant issuance of 
stock is involved. 
5- The Saudi Companies Law 2015 should adopt a dissenting right in case of a stock 
exchange plan. It should also stipulate a right for those who dissent to have their shares 
appraised, so that they may obtain fair value for their shares. 
6- The rule that the court currently may invoke to prohibit squeezing out the minority 
shares, which it applies according to the Islamic rule that no shareholder may be forced to 
sell his shares, should not be applicable. The solution to this issue would be to amend the 
Saudi Companies Law 2015 so that it adopts the right to force the minority shares to be 
sold when the majority shares vote in favor of a stock acquisition. The proposed 
amendment would enhance the attractiveness and competitiveness of companies and help 
to regulate efficient combinations between corporations.  
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7- The Saudi Companies Law 2015 should incorporate a rule requiring an acquiring 
corporation to obtain the majority of its shareholders’ votes before issuing a significant 
number of shares. 
8- The drag along clause provides a practical solution for the lack of a provision in the law 
that forces minority members to sell their shares when the majority of shareholders wants 
to sell their shares. A drag along clause is typically included in shareholder agreements. 
Because it is uncertain whether the courts will enforce such clauses, the Saudi Companies 
Law 2015 should explicitly state that such clauses and restrictions are permissible. 
§5.5. Assets Acquisition of a Closely Held Corporation 
This section addresses the assets acquisition of a closely held corporation according to 
the 2015 and 1965 Saudi Companies Laws. The section also presents assets acquisition treatment 
under the MBCA, which may serve to guide the Saudi legislature to take the same approach as 
the MBCA in order to enhance the efficiency of the Saudi Companies Law 2015. Assets 









A. Assets acquisition in Saudi Arabia 
Regarding a company’s sale or the acquisition of assets and certain other financial 
matters, the Saudi Companies Law 2015 makes a number of changes to the language of the 1965 
law. For example, the 1965 law states that “the board of directors may not contract loans for 
terms exceeding 3 years, or sell or mortgage the real property or the place of business of the 
company, or release the debtors of the company from their liabilities, unless so authorized in the 
bylaws of the company and subject to the terms set forth therein.”700 The 2015 law changes this 
language materially, stating that a board of directors may make long-term loans of any duration; 
sell or mortgage the company’s assets; sell or mortgage the company’s commercial store; and 
                                                          
699 THOMPSON, JR., supra note 490, at 9. 
700 The Saudi Companies Law 1965, art. 73. 
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release the company’s debtors from their liabilities to the company unless the law, the 
company’s bylaws or the general assembly meeting limits the board’s authority in such regard.701 
Consider another example of differences between the 2015 and 1965 laws. The Saudi 
Companies Law 1965 vests the management of a corporation with the board of directors; the 
board must secure shareholder approval in the ordinary general assembly in the case of an assets 
acquisition transaction involving real estate, unless such a transaction is authorized by the 
corporation’s bylaws or occurs within the course of conducting ordinary business.702 The Saudi 
Companies Law 2015 replaces the 1965 law’s phrase: “sell or mortgage the real property … of 
the company”703 with the simple phrase: “company’s assets.”704 Indeed, the 2015 law essentially 
reverses the 1965 law in this regard; the 2015 law states that a board of directors may sell the 
“company’s assets” unless the law or the company’s bylaws or the general assembly meeting 
provide limitations to the board’s authority in such regard.705 In practice, this means that the 
Saudi Companies Law 2015 makes it a default condition that a board of directors’ has the right 
to sell a company’s assets. The 2015 law does not require the board of directors to secure a 
majority shareholder vote in order to sell some or substantially all of the company’s assets; the 
MBCA model does require such a vote, which will be addressed in the following section.  
Granting the board of directors the right to sell the corporation’s assets is consistent 
neither with the Islamic rule requiring each shareholder’s consent to sell nor with the Saudi 
Companies Law 2015. The Saudi Companies Law 2015 requires shareholders to vote on any 
major changes in the corporation, but it does not require their votes to sell assets. However, it is 
possible to dispose of major portions of a corporation via the sale of company assets. Therefore, 
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the Saudi Companies Law 2015 should adopt a provision that requires a majority shareholder 
vote to approve the sale of assets. The following section will describe how the American model 
deals with the sale of assets; this model may provide a guide for the Saudi legislature to follow in 
making improvements to the Saudi Companies Law 2015 that will protect shareholder rights and 
limit the excessive powers of the board of directors. Both of these improvements may help to 
enhance corporate governance in Saudi Arabia regarding M&A activities.  
B. Assets acquisition of closely held corporations in the US 
While the Saudi Companies Law 2015 does not include rules about assets acquisition, the 
Model Business Corporate Act (MBCA) does encompass provisions that govern the disposition 
of the assets of corporations.706 The MBCA specifies in which cases it does and does not require 
the approval of shareholders to consummate an assets acquisition transaction.707 The author 
argues that Saudi Arabia should regulate assets acquisitions in the same way that the American 
MBCA does; this would require amending the Saudi Companies Law 2015. Adding assets 
acquisition provisions to the Saudi Companies Law would provide a mechanism for assets 
acquisition that allows corporations to structure acquisitions according to their interests and 
financial goals, while at the same time protecting shareholders whose shares or ownership 
interests are targeted for acquisition. 
C. The required shareholder approval 
The MBCA includes a provision that regulates the assets acquisition of a CHTC, which 
requires the approval of shareholders in specific cases, such as when the acquiring company is 
                                                          




going to acquire all or substantially all of the target’s assets.708 The MBCA provides a statutory 
test that triggers the mandatory approval of the shareholders: 
(a) A sale, lease, exchange, or other disposition of assets, other than a disposition 
described in section 12.01, requires approval of the corporation’s shareholders if the 
disposition would leave the corporation without a significant continuing business activity. 
If a corporation retains a business activity that represented at least 25% of total assets at 
the end of the most recently completed fiscal year, and 25% of either income from 
continuing operations before taxes or revenues from continuing operations for that fiscal 
year, in each case of the corporation and its subsidiaries on a consolidated basis, the 
corporation will conclusively be deemed to have retained a significant continuing 
business activity.709 
According to the provisions of the MBCA, a board of directors is required first to adopt 
an assets plan and submit it with a recommendation to the shareholders for approval, unless a 
conflict of interest exists, in which case the board of directors must notify shareholders that it 
cannot make a recommendation due to the conflict.710 Otherwise, if at least 25% of the acquired 
corporation’s business activity will remain and continue, then the board of directors may manage 
the assets acquisition and need only adopt a resolution in order to complete the transaction.711 
When the assets plan requires approval, it is considered approved when a quorum has been 
achieved and the majority of shareholders entitled to vote (unless the company’s Articles of 
Incorporation require more than a simple majority) are in favor of the assets acquisition plan.712  
The MBCA provides appraisal rights for any dissenters, as stated in Section 13.02 (a) (3). 
However, Section 12.02 (g) of the MBCA excludes an assets acquisition plan from Section 12.02 
when the corporation will be dissolved after the transaction. In other words, while the appraisal 
right is provided only for a disposition of assets that is structured according to Section 12.02, the 
MBCA does not provide appraisal rights for a transaction in which the disposition of assets 
                                                          
708 MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT §12.02 (a) (2011). 
709 Id. 
710 MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT §12.02 (b) (2011). 
711 MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT §12.01 (2011). 
712 MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT §12.02 (g) (2011). 
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eventually dissolves the corporation; that scenario is governed by MBCA Chapter 14,713 which 
gives shareholders the right to approve the transaction714 but eliminates the appraisal right when 
the assets acquisition is part of “the course of dissolution.”715 
D. The judicial interpretation of the sale of “all or substantially all assets” 
The MBCA uses the term “disposition of assets” in discussing assets acquisition, and 
stipulates a test to determine when shareholders have the right to vote on an assets acquisition 
plan; however, Delaware law speaks of acquiring “all or substantially all” of the acquired 
assets.716 The court has interpreted the meaning of “all or substantially all” assets via two 
approaches: the quantitative approach in Gimbel v. The Signal Companies, Inc.717 and the 
qualitative approach in Katz v. Bregman.718 
In Gimbel v. The Signal Companies, Inc., the court admits that the statutory language that 
describes the cases in which shareholders have the right to vote on the sale of substantially all 
assets does not provide a mathematical measurement.719 It agrees that such a measurement may 
be taken by examining the quantitative effects on the corporation or its purpose; this 
measurement may eventually determine if substantially all of the assets were sold.720  
The court bases its interpretation of “the sale of substantially all the assets” on the 
rationale that not every unusual action requires shareholder approval; rather, this approval is 
required only when an action would affect the purpose or existence of the corporation:  
But any "ordinary and regular course of the business" test in this context obviously is not 
intended to limit the directors to customary daily business activities. Indeed, a question 
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concerning the statute would not arise unless the transaction was somewhat out of the 
ordinary. While it is true that a transaction in the ordinary course of business does not 
require shareholder approval, the converse is not true. Every transaction out of normal 
routine does not necessarily require shareholder approval. The unusual nature of the 
transaction must strike at the heart of the corporate existence and purpose. As it is written 
at 6A Fletcher, Cyclopedia Corporations (Perm. Ed. 1968 Rev.) § 2949.2, p. 648: 
The purpose of the consent statutes is to protect the shareholders from fundamental 
change, or more specifically to protect the shareholder from the destruction of the means 
to accomplish the purposes or objects for which the corporation was incorporated and 
actually performs. 
It is in this sense that the "unusual transaction" judgment is to be made and the statute's 
applicability determined. If the sale is of assets quantitatively vital to the operation of the 
corporation and is out of the ordinary and substantially affects the existence and purpose 
of the corporation, then it is beyond the power of the Board of Directors.721 
In Katz v. Bregman, the court employed the qualitative factor to measure whether the sale 
of the acquired corporation constituted a sale of substantially all of the target’s assets.722 The 
court in this case stated that the consummation of the assets acquisition transaction would cause 
the transfer of the business line of the acquired corporation: 
Furthermore, the proposal, after the sale of National, to embark on the manufacture of 
plastic drums represents a radical departure from Plant's historically successful line of 
business, namely steel drums. I therefore conclude that the proposed sale of Plant's 
Canadian operations, which constitute over 51% of Plant's total assets and in which are 
generated approximately 45% of Plant's 1980 net sales, would, if consummated, 
constitute a sale of substantially all of Plant's assets. By way of contrast, the proposed 
sale of Signal Oil in Gimbel v. Signal Companies, Inc., supra, represented only about 
26% of the total assets of Signal Companies, Inc. And while Signal Oil represented 41% 
of Signal Companies, Inc. total net worth, it generated only about 15% of Signal 
Companies, Inc. revenue and earnings. 
I conclude that because the proposed sale of Plant National (Quebec) Ltd. would, if 
consummated, constitute a sale of substantially all of the assets of Plant Industries, Inc., 
as presently constituted, that an injunction should issue preventing the consummation of 
such sale at least until it has been approved by a majority of the outstanding stockholders 
of Plant Industries, Inc., entitled to vote at a meeting duly called on at least twenty days' 
notice. Compare Robinson v. Pittsburg Oil Refining Company, Del. Ch. , 126 A. 46 
(1933).723 
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The case of Hollinger, Inc. v. Hollinger International, Inc.724 is presented in the context 
of whether the court applies the quantitative or qualitative approach when it measures the sale of 
substantially all of a subsidiary’s assets.725 The court applied both quantitative and qualitative 
approaches to the Hollinger case, and it emphasized that most corporations hold and operate 
businesses or assets through wholly held subsidiaries.726 This renders unacceptable the argument 
that Delaware 271 should only be triggered when the subsidiary has no control over its 
business.727 A portion of the court’s opinion in this case is cited in this paper to provide 
additional insight into the type of value the court focuses on when it applies quantitative and/or 
qualitative approaches to measure an assets sale. The court bases its assessment of the value of 
the assets in question on the economic merit, value and importance both of the remaining assets 
and of the assets sold.728 The court does not measure the prestigious value of the assets or judge 
whether the sale of assets is perceived as a major transaction.729 In the context of the Hollinger 
case, the court summarized its interpretation of Section 271 of Delaware law as follows: 
Put simply, after the Telegraph Group is sold, International will retain considerable assets 
that are capable of generating substantial free cash flow.  Section 271 does not require a 
vote when a major asset or trophy is sold;  it requires a vote only when the assets to be 
sold, when considered quantitatively and qualitatively, amount to “substantially all” of 
the corporation's assets.730 
E. Recommendations 
1- The Saudi Companies Law 2015 should adopt a provision that gives shareholders the 
right to vote on the acquisition of all or substantially all of the corporation’s assets. 
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2- The Saudi Companies Law 2015 should give those who dissent an acquisition of assets 
the right to appraise their shares and obtain the fair value of their shares, except if the 
corporation is going to be dissolved as result of the assets acquisition plan. 
3- The Saudi Companies Law 2015 should provide a proper test to determine when a 
disposition of assets requires the approval of the shareholders of the target company.  
§5.6. Merger of Closely Held Corporation into Acquiring Corporation  
This section addresses the merger of a closely held corporation into an acquiring 
corporation. The section will also suggest provisions that should be incorporated into the Saudi 
Companies Law 2015 to deal with such things as appraisal rights and mergers between a parent 
and its subsidiary; the author argues that Saudi law should reference the American approach in 
dealing with such issues. A merger of a closely held corporation into an acquiring corporation is 









The Saudi Companies Law 2015 covers mergers in four Articles: 190, 191,192 and 193. 
The Saudi Companies Law 1965 covers merger issues in three Articles: 213, 214 and 115. This 
section will examine the rules regarding the merger of a closely held corporation into an 
acquiring corporation. The section will analyze these rules, discuss their flaws, and finally, in 
Subsection N of Section 5.6, recommend the incorporation of certain rules into the Saudi 
Companies Law 2015. If a closely held corporation were to merge into an acquiring corporation, 
both companies would be obligated conform with the three Articles covering mergers in the 
Saudi Companies Law 1965, or with the four Articles covering mergers in the Saudi Companies 
Law 2015. 
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B. Definition and method of merger in the Saudi Companies Law 
Article 191 of the Saudi Companies Law 2015732 retains the stipulations of the 1965 law 
regarding the forms that a merger transaction may take. The 1965 law states the following: “[t]he 
integration is conducted by the annexation of one or more Companies to another existing 
company or by combining two or more Companies in a new company under foundation.”733 
Thus, the two forms that the 1965 law recognizes are incorporation and consolidation. 
C. Requirements to approve a merger transaction 
Regulations involving the approval of a merger in the Saudi Companies Law 2015 are 
similar in most respects to those of the 1965 law. For example, the Saudi Companies Law 2015 
stipulates that a merger shall be adopted by each constituent to the merger according to the 
manner prescribed for amending the company’s articles of incorporation or bylaws.734 Amending 
the company’s articles of incorporation or bylaws falls under the extraordinary general 
assembly’s authority, as addressed in Article 88 of the 2015 law. On these topics, the 1965 law 
stipulates similarly, stating that in order for a merger resolution to be adopted, the merged 
company and merging company must comply with the same rules and procedures prescribed for 
amending a company’s certificate of incorporation or bylaws.735 The Saudi Companies Law 
1965 assigns the extraordinary general assembly the duty of voting to amend the company’s 
bylaws.736 It also states that shareholder approval is required for a merger and for issuing new 
shares; such a vote should take place in the extraordinary general meeting, according to Article 
92 of the 1965 law: 
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Resolutions of an extraordinary general meeting shall be adopted by a two thirds majority 
vote of the shares represented thereat. But if a resolution pertains to an increase or a 
decrease in capital, or to extension of the term of the company, or to dissolution of the 
company prior to expiry of the term specified in its bylaws or to merger of the company 
into another company or firm, it shall be valid only if adopted by a three-fourths majority 
vote of the shares represented at the meeting.737 
Regarding extraordinary general assembly meetings, the Saudi Companies Law 2015 
states that the first extraordinary general assembly meeting called shall not be valid unless 
shareholders representing one half of the company’s capital are present (unless the company’s 
bylaws require a higher percentage, but in no case shall more than two-thirds be required for the 
meeting to commence).738 The 2015 law also states that if the first extraordinary general 
assembly meeting is not held because the quorum is not met, a second extraordinary general 
assembly meeting may be called in the same manner as prescribed in Article 91.739, 740 The 
second extraordinary general assembly meeting may be held one hour after the time that the 
meeting that was not held (because a quorum had not been achieved) passes.741 This second 
extraordinary general assembly meeting shall be valid if shareholders representing at least one 
quarter of the company’s capital are present.742 If the second extraordinary general assembly 
meeting fails to meet the quorum requirement, a third extraordinary general assembly meeting 
may be called in the same manner prescribed as in Article 91.743 The third extraordinary general 
assembly meeting shall be valid with whatever number of shares is present after the approval of 
the respective authority.744 
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According to the 2015 law, a merger transaction resolution in the extraordinary general 
assembly meeting shall be adopted if two-thirds of the shares represented in the meeting 
approve, unless the resolution concerns the increase or decrease of capital; or the extension of the 
company’s duration; or the dissolution of the company before the time prescribed in the 
company’s bylaws; or a merger with another company.745 In any of those cases, the resolution is 
adopted if three-fourths of the shares represented in the meeting approve the resolution.746 
The Saudi Companies Law 2015 adds a rule that the 1965 law did not include about 
voting rights on issues concerning mergers; the 2015 law states that a shareholder who owns 
shares in both the acquired and acquiring companies may vote in only one company.747 
1. Legislative conflicts 
Although the Companies Law 2015 does not substantially modify the rules that govern 
mergers between companies in Saudi Arabia, it does contain a sentence that creates confusion in 
a very important aspect of the merger concept. Article 192 states that all of the liabilities and 
rights of the merged company transfer to the merging company, or to the new company that 
emerges from the merger, after the merger process is completed, and the new company has been 
registered in accordance with the law.748 The Companies Law 2015 then stipulates that the 
merging or emerging company is deemed the successor of the merged company to the extent that 
the assets will devolve to it unless the merger agreement states otherwise.749 Thus, Article 192 of 
the Companies Law 2015 contains sentences that contradict each other. Article 192 first states 
that all liabilities and rights transfer to the merging company, which is the case in any merger, 
because one company is disappearing. However, the second part of Article 192 states that the 
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merging or emerging company (the acquiring company) is the successor to the merged company 
(the company that has been acquired) to the extent that the acquiring company receives the assets 
of the acquired company, unless the merger agreement states otherwise.  
This second part of Article 192 means that there may be cases in which the acquiring 
company does not assume all of the liabilities of the acquired company. This contradicts the first 
part of Article 192, as well as the very concept of merger. It also could create a situation in 
which the merging company may argue that it is not obligated to assume all of the liabilities of 
the merged company unless the merger agreement specifically requires it to do so. The last part 
of Article 192 suggests that the Saudi legislature confused the treatment of assets in a merger 
transaction with the sale of assets in which a company can select certain liabilities. Had the Saudi 
legislature stated only that not all liabilities are assumed unless specified in the merger 
agreement, it would have been clear that the Saudi legislature wanted to take an approach to 
merger practices that was different from that taken by other countries. However, as noted, the 
Saudi legislature also stated that all of the liabilities and rights of the merged company transfer to 
the merging or emerging company. That means that companies must state that all of the acquired 
company’s liabilities and rights were transferred to the survivor or new company in order to 
ensure that no dispute arises as result of Article 192. The Companies Law 2015 should amend 
the second part of Article 192 and delete the sentence that declares that the survivor company is 
the successor of the acquired company to the extent that it receives the acquired company’s 
assets unless the merger agreement states otherwise. This sentence directly contradicts the first 
part of Article 192, and it also contradicts the standard concept of merger that all of the rights 
and liabilities of the merged company transfer to the surviving or merging company. 
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D. Mergers between corporations with different forms (such as LLC with JSC) 
The Saudi Companies Law 2015 retains the rule found in the 1965 law that allows a 
merger between different types of companies; this rule provides that, with consideration of the 
respective laws, a company may merge with another company of its type or of another type even 
during the dissolution period.750 The relevant Article from the 1965 law is Article 213, which 
states that it is legal for any company to merge into any other type of company, excepting 
insurance companies: “It is permissible for the company, even if it is in the phase of liquidation, 
to integrate into another company of its kind or of another kind, but the cooperative company 
shall not be integrated into a company of another kind.”751 
E. The issue 
The Saudi Companies Law 2015 does not provide the appraisal right, which is necessary. 
Also, the Saudi Companies Law 2015 does not provide the right for the parent corporation to 
merge with its 90% wholly owned subsidiary without the approval of the shareholders, even 
though the outcome of such a case is automatic. 
F. Merger of closely held corporations into acquiring corporations in the US 
The MBCA provides rules and procedures for a case in which a closely held corporation 
will merge into an acquiring corporation; these rules do not differ from the rules prescribed for a 
stock exchange plan in terms of the requirements for a quorum and for shareholder approval. 
The MBCA covers mergers between corporations in Section 11.02, where it states that:  
(a) One or more domestic business corporations may merge with one or more 
domestic or foreign business corporations or eligible entities pursuant to a plan of merger, 
or two or more foreign business corporations or domestic or foreign eligible entities may 
merge into a new domestic business corporation to be created in the merger in the manner 
provided in this chapter. 
                                                          
750 Id. at art. 190. 
751 The Saudi Companies Law 1965, art. 213. 
252 
 
(b) A foreign business corporation, or a foreign eligible entity, may be a party to a 
merger with a domestic business corporation, or may be created by the terms of the plan 
of merger, only if the merger is permitted by the foreign business corporation or eligible 
entity.752 
G. The action required by the board of directors and shareholders 
For a closely held corporation to merge into a closely held acquiring corporation, the 
board of directors of the CHTC must adopt a merger plan and submit it to shareholders for their 
approval.753 The board of directors is required to make a recommendation on the merger plan to 
the shareholders, except when there is a conflict of interest, in which case the board of directors 
must notify shareholders that they are unable to make a recommendation because of the 
conflict.754 Shareholders may approve the merger plan with a majority vote in favor.755 The 
approval of a merger by the shareholders of the surviving corporation is not required.756 Also, if 
the merger involves a subsidiary merging into the parent, the approval of the shareholders of the 
subsidiary is not required,757 as will be discussed in the following Subsection. 
H. Mergers between a parent corporation and its subsidiary 
The MBCA states that if a parent corporation owns 90% of its subsidiary, and the parent 
wants to merge with its subsidiary, the merger may be consummated without the approval of the 
subsidiary’s board of directors or shareholders: 
(a) A domestic parent corporation that owns shares of a domestic or foreign 
subsidiary corporation that carry at least 90% of the voting power of each class and series 
of the outstanding shares of the subsidiary that have voting power may merge the 
subsidiary into itself or into another such subsidiary, or merge itself into the subsidiary, 
without the approval of the board of directors or shareholders of the subsidiary, unless the 
articles of incorporation of any of the corporations otherwise provide, and unless, in the 
                                                          
752 MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT §11.02 (a), (b) (2011). 
753 MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT §11.04 (b) (2011). 
754 Id. 
755 MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT §11.04 (e) (2011). 
756 MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT §11.04 (g) (1) (2011). 
757 MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT §11.05 (a) (2011). 
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case of a foreign subsidiary, approval by the subsidiary’s board of directors or 
shareholders is required by the laws under which the subsidiary is organized.758 
I. Appraisal rights 
The MBCA provides appraisal rights for the shareholders of the merged corporation,759 
unless the merged corporation is a 90% held subsidiary merging with the parent entity, as 
stipulated in MBCA Section 11.5(a). 
J. Delaware law 
Under Delaware law, Section 251 defines merger and consolidation as follows:  
(a) Any 2 or more corporations existing under the laws of this State may merge into a 
single corporation, which may be any 1 of the constituent corporations or may 
consolidate into a new corporation formed by the consolidation, pursuant to an agreement 
of merger or consolidation, as the case may be, complying and approved in accordance 
with this section.760 
Under Delaware law, a resolution must be adopted by the boards of directors of 
both the merging corporation and the surviving corporation, because each party is a 
constituent in the transaction.761 Delaware law also requires the approval of shareholders 
for the merger to go forward; this means that the majority of the owners of any 
outstanding stock of the merging corporation and the surviving corporation must approve 
the merger.762 
                                                          
758 Id. 
759 MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT §13.03 (a) (1) (2011). 
760 DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 8, §251 (a) (2016). 
761 Id. at §251 (b). 
762 Id. at §251 (c). 
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K. The merger between parent and subsidiary 
Delaware law provides a mechanism by which a parent entity that owns 90% of a 
subsidiary may merge with its subsidiary without the approval of the subsidiary’s 
shareholders.763 
L. Appraisal rights 
Delaware law provides appraisal rights in Section 262 for dissenters who did not 
vote in favor of the merger: 
(a) Any stockholder of a corporation of this State who holds shares of stock on the date 
of the making of a demand pursuant to subsection (d) of this section with respect to such 
shares, who continuously holds such shares through the effective date of the merger or 
consolidation, who has otherwise complied with subsection (d) of this section and who 
has neither voted in favor of the merger or consolidation nor consented thereto in writing 
pursuant to § 228 of this title shall be entitled to an appraisal by the Court of Chancery of 
the fair value of the stockholder's shares of stock under the circumstances described in 
subsections (b) and (c) of this section.764 
Delaware law also provides appraisal rights in the case of a parent merging with its 90% 
owned subsidiary.765 
M. Reverse subsidiary merger 
The reverse subsidiary merger is structured such that a closely held parent corporation 
forms a subsidiary and the subsidiary merges into the closely held target corporation.766 This 
structure can achieve the same result that a stock exchange acquisition can achieve.767 In the 
reverse subsidiary merger, under Delaware law, a resolution of the boards of directors of both the 
subsidiary and the target shall be adopted.768 The approval of the shareholders of both subsidiary 
                                                          
763 Id. at §253 (c). 
764 Id. at §262 (a). 
765 Id. at §262 (b) (3). 
766 THOMPSON, JR., supra note 490, at 74; MODEL BUSINESS CORPORATION ACT OFFICIAL TEXT WITH OFFICIAL 
COMMENT AND STATUTORY CROSS-REFERENCES, 11-09, 11-10.  
767 Id. at 40. 
768 DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 8, §253 (b) (2016). 
255 
 
and target is required.769 Delaware law provides appraisal rights for dissenters in both the closely 
held target corporation and the subsidiary.770 A reverse subsidiary merger is structured as 
presented in Figure 5.5. 
 
Figure 5.5 
Reverse subsidiary merger771 
 
 
                                                          
769 DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 8, §253 (c) (2016). 
770 Id. at §262 (b). 
771 THOMPSON, JR., supra note 490, at 10. 
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N. Recommendations  
1- The Saudi Companies Law 2015 does not provide the appraisal right, which it should 
include. The appraisal right would play a crucial role in ensuring a balance among 
majority and minority shareholders, and it would provide a relatively equitable 
mechanism by which dissenters could exit the corporation and be fairly compensated for 
their shares. The appraisal right would be the most suitable remedy for minority 
shareholders who vote against a merger, according to (for example) the following 
rationale: 
At common law it was in the power of any single stockholder to prevent a merger. When 
the idea became generally accepted that, in the interest of adjusting corporate mechanism 
to the requirements of business and commercial growth, mergers should be permitted in 
spite of opposition of minorities, statutes were enacted in state after state which took 
from the individual stockholder the right theretofore existing to defeat the welding of his 
corporation with another. In compensation for the lost right, a provision was written into 
the modern statutes giving the dissenting stockholder the option completely to retire from 
the enterprise and receive the value of his stock in money.772 
2- The Saudi Companies Law does not give a parent entity the right to merge with its 90% 
owned subsidiary without the approval of shareholders, even though the conclusion of 
such a merger is automatic. The adoption of a rule that permits a parent corporation to 
merge with its 90%-owned subsidiary without shareholder approval would facilitate 
efficient transactions. Requiring the approval of shareholders in cases in which a parent 
corporation wishes to merge with a 90%-owned subsidiary has no basis in corporate 
                                                          
772 Julián J. Garza Castañeda, Appraisal Rights: “The Fair” Valuation of Shares In Case of Dissent, available at 
http://biblio.juridicas.unam.mx/revista/DerechoComparado/numero/96/art/art4.htm#N1 (last visited December 7, 
2015). See also Bayless Manning, The Shareholder's Appraisal Remedy: An Essay for Frank Coker (1962), Faculty 
Scholarship Series, Paper 4744, available at http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/fss_papers/4744. (last visited 
December 7, 2015). For additional elaborations, see EDWARD P. WELCH, ROBERT S. SAUNDERS, ALLISON L. LAND, 
JENNIFER C. VOSS, AND ANDREW J. TURE, FOLK ON THE DELAWARE GENERAL CORPORATION LAW: FUNDAMENTALS, 
GCL-855 (New York, Wolters Kluwer, 2014); Appraisal of Shares of Dissenting Stockholders in Consolidation-
American General Corporation v. Camp, et al., 1 Md. L. Rev. 338 (1937), available at 
http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/mlr/vol1/iss4/6 (last visited December 7, 2015).; and Jeffrey G. 
MacIntosh, The Shareholders' Appraisal Right in Canada: A Critical Reappraisal, OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL 




governance. The Saudi Companies Law 2015 should adopt rules that can fill the 
legislative gaps that have been ignored thus far owing to the fact that issues such as (for 
example) mergers between a parent corporation and a 90%-owned subsidiary were not in 
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This Chapter is an assessment and critique of Saudi Arabia’s M&A Regulation, which 
applies to the takeover of publicly held corporations. The Chapter identifies provisions that may 
help improve the economic and legal efficiency of Saudi M&A activity. The European 
Commission’s Directive on Takeover bids is referenced throughout the chapter as a comparison 
and guide. This Chapter concludes with recommendations that may improve the efficiency of the 
Saudi M&A Regulation and facilitate the takeover mechanism.  
The Chapter begins by (1) introducing the Saudi Capital Market Authority and its role, 
which is to regulate tender offers under the Saudi M&A Regulation; and (2) the European 
Commission’s (EC) Directive on Takeover Bids. The author explains why he chose the EC 
Directive as a model in Section 6.2, and addresses the applicability of the Saudi M&A 
Regulation in Section 6.3. Every Section of the Chapter thereafter includes some level of 
comparison between the Saudi M&A Regulation and the EC Directive; if the EC Directive does 
not cover a specific section, a brief reference to the UK Takeover Code and its relevant rules is 
made. Rules governing the announcement of a takeover bid are addressed in Section 6.4, the 
prohibition of dealing rule in Section 6.5, and the mandatory offer rule in Section 6.6. Section 
6.6 also discusses the question of which ownership threshold—30% or 50%—is more efficient as 
the trigger of the mandatory offer, and Section 6.7 discusses the types and prices of mandatory 
offers. Section 6.8 lays out the disclosures of information for the mandatory offer. Section 6.9 
explains the obligation of the board of directors of the offeree company to provide an opinion 
regarding the offer, and Section 6.10 discusses the independence of the board of directors of the 
offeree company. Section 6.11 addresses provisions necessary to establish the credibility of the 
offeror to complete the offer, and Section 6.12 details the offer period and the right of 
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shareholders to withdraw their acceptance. Section 6.13 addresses the breakup and reverse 
breakup fee provisions; Section 6.14 treats the competition provision; Section 6.15 focuses on 
the hostile takeover and restrictions on the defensive measures rules; Section 6.16 details the 
required disclosures of ownership acquired during the offer and Section 6.17 notes the required 
disclosures of ownership acquired before the offer. Section 6.18 addresses the EC Directive’s 
treatment of squeeze out and sell out rules. Section 6.19 provides a summary of the author’s 
recommendations, and a diagram that provides a visual representation of the structure of a tender 
offer of a publicly held corporation. 
Figure 6.1, which is displayed immediately below, illustrates the structure of a tender 
offer. The Acquiring Corporation (AC) makes an offer to the shareholders to tender their shares. 


































A. A brief introduction to the Saudi Capital Market Authority 
The enacting of the Saudi Capital Market Law 2004 officially established the Saudi 
Capital Market Authority (the Authority).775 The Authority has supervisory power over the Saudi 
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Stock Exchange (Tadawul) and listed companies in Saudi Arabia.776 The Authority has also the 
power to issue rules that regulate the Saudi stock market in accordance with the Capital Market 
Law,777 as well as judicial power to hear, review and adjudicate disputes and claims that arise out 
of the Capital Market Law or its regulations.778 Indeed, the author considers the Capital Market 
Authority one of the most advanced and sophisticated authorities in Saudi Arabia as compared to 
other Saudi agencies and authorities. The author makes this observation after carefully 
examining its role, the Law that governs it and the regulations it has implemented. The role of 
the Authority and its function are addressed in greater detail in Chapter 2’s introduction to the 
Saudi legal system. 
B. Tender offer under the Saudi Capital Market Authority Regulation 
In 2007, the Saudi Capital Market Authority enacted an M&A Regulation (the 
Regulation),779, 780 which regulates takeover bids of publicly held corporations; this section 
analyzes these rules. This section also refers to the European Commission’s Directive on 
takeover bids in order to show that the Authority’s Regulation contains many provisions that are 
similar to those of the EC Directive. If the EC Directive does not cover an issue that is discussed 
in this chapter, the author may refer to the City Code on Takeovers and Mergers (the Code). 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
775 The Saudi Capital Market Authority’s official website, available at 
http://www.cma.org.sa/En/AboutCMA/Pages/default.aspx (last visited December 17, 2015). 
776 Id. See also The Capital Market Law, art. 5. 
777 Id. 
778 The Capital Market Law, art. 25. 
779 The M&A Regulation does not address mergers at all. Therefore, the title of the Regulation should be changed to 
“Takeover Regulation.” 
780 The Saudi Capital Market Authority’s official website, available at 




Hereinafter, the author will refer to the Code as the UK takeover code; the Code was amended in 
2011 and again in 2013.781  
In the recommendations section of this chapter, and referring to the EC Directive as a 
guide, the author suggests certain measure that the Authority should adopt in order to enhance 
Saudi’s tender offer rules and improve the application of the M&A Regulation in Saudi Arabia. 
C. Tender offer under the EC Directive 2004/25/EC782 
The EC Directive was adopted on April 21st 2004.783 It lays out the fundamental legal 
principles that EC member states must adopt when issuing their laws, and it mandated that 
member states incorporate and implement the Directive by 2006.784 The rules in Saudi’s 
Regulation are mostly in accord with the principles of the EC Directive. For example, Saudi’s 
Regulation agrees with the Directive on takeover bids; indeed, an analysis of the Regulation 
reveals that it was inspired and guided by the Directive. Thus, the author refers to the principles 
of the Directive to make recommendations about rules the Saudi Regulation should adopt, 
especially regarding concepts such as the squeeze out and the sell out. 
D. The rationale behind comparing the Saudi M&A Regulation with the 
European Commission’s Directive on takeover bids 
The author’s decision to compare the provisions of the Saudi M&A Regulation against 
those of the EC Directive regarding takeovers results from the observation that the Regulation 
agrees with the principles of the Directive on takeovers. Therefore, the Directive provides the 
                                                          
781 See The Takeover Code, (11th ed. May 20, 2013, 3) available at http://www.thetakeoverpanel.org.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2008/11/code.pdf (last visited March 4, 2016). 
782 Directive 2004/25/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 April 2004 on takeover bids. 2004 
O.J. (L 142) (EC). Also See The European Union’s website (EUROPA), available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/NOT/?uri=CELEX:32004L0025 (last visited March 4, 2016). 
783 See Id. 
784 See Id. 
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most logical and efficient model to use to inform recommendations of amendments to the Saudi 
M&A Regulation. Ensuring that the Regulation functions at the same level as the EC Directive 
will help make Saudi Arabia a more attractive environment, and provide a familiar legal 
environment, for corporations incorporated in one of the European state members. This may 
provide incentives for European corporations to invest money in the Saudi Capital Market, 
especially now that foreign investment in the Saudi stock market is permitted. 
§6.3. When Does The Saudi M&A Regulation Apply? 
The Saudi M&A Regulation applies only in cases in which a controlling stake in the 
target has been acquired; however, the stipulation that the stake must be controlling for the 
Regulation to apply is not explicitly spelled out.785 The Saudi Capital Market Authority’s 
Regulations and Rules includes a Glossary of defined terms that defines “acquisition” as follows: 
“[t]akeover: the acquisition of control of a company listed on the Exchange.”786 The Glossary 
defines “control” as “the ability to influence the actions or decisions of another person through, 
whether directly or indirectly, alone or with a relative or affiliate (a) holding 30% or more of the 
voting rights in a company, or (b) having the right to appoint 30% or more of the members of the 
governing body; ‘controller’ shall be construed accordingly.”787 Therefore, the Saudi M&A 
Regulation will only apply to a stock purchase of 30% and more of a company’s shares; in other 
words, if a company acquires 29% of a listed company, this acquisition need not comply with the 
Regulation. 
                                                          
785 See Mergers and Acquisitions Regulation, Article 2 and The Glossary of Defined Terms used in the Regulations 
and Rules of the Capital Market Authority, 3. 
786 See The Glossary of Defined Terms used in the Regulations and Rules of the Capital Market Authority, 3. 
787 Id. at 8. 
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§6.4. The Announcement of the Offer 
A. The announcement of an offer under the Saudi M&A Regulation 
1. The public announcement  
Article 6 (b) of the Saudi M&A Regulation requires that a proposed acquisition must be 
announced to the public in the following cases and manner: 
(b): A public announcement is required: 
1) When a company is considering a potential takeover and an approach to a potential 
offeree company has been made and the parties have reached an understanding (including 
the relevant conditions) that an offer will be made; 
2) When a firm intention to make an offer (the making of which is not, or has ceased to 
be, subject to any pre-condition) is notified to the board of the offeree company from a 
serious source, irrespective of the attitude of the board to the offer; 
3) Immediately upon an acquisition of shares by that person which gives rise to an 
obligation to make an offer under Article 12 or a permission to make an offer under 
Article13. The announcement should not be delayed while full information is being 
obtained; additional information can be the subject of a later supplementary 
announcement; 
4) When, following a bid approach, a company’s shares are the subject of rumour and 
speculation or where there is a price movement of 20% or more above the lowest 12 
Capital Market Authority share price since the time of the approach or a price movement 
of 10% or more in a single day; 
5) When, before a bid approach has been made, the offeree company is the subject of 
rumour and speculation or where there is a price movement of 10% or more in a single 
day and there are reasonable grounds for concluding that it is the potential offeror’s 
actions[,] which have led to the situation; 
6) When negotiations or discussions are about to be extended to include more than a very 
restricted number of people (outside those who need to know in the companies concerned 
and their immediate advisers); or 
7) When a purchaser is being sought for a holding, or aggregate holdings, of shares listed 
on the Exchange carrying 30% or more of the voting rights of a company or when the 
board of a listed company is seeking one or more potential offerors; and i. The company 
is the subject of rumour and speculation or there is a price movement of 20% or more 
above the lowest share price since the time of the approach or a price movement of 10% 
or more in a single day; or 
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ii. The number of potential purchasers or offerors approached is about to be increased to 
include more than a very restricted number of people.788 
2. Who is responsible for announcing the offer? 
The Saudi M&A Regulation states that before preliminary negotiations are held, the 
offeror bears the responsibility for announcing the offer.789 After the preliminary negotiations, 
the offeree bears the responsibility for announcing the offer, as stipulated in Article 6 (c):  
c) Responsibilities of Offeror and the Offeree Company, 1) Before the board of the 
offeree company is approached, the responsibility for making an announcement lies only 
with the offeror. The offeror should, therefore, keep a close watch on the offeree 
company’s share price for any signs of movement. The offeror is also responsible for 
making an announcement once an Article 13 obligation has been incurred or Article 12 
applies to it. 2) Following an approach to the board of the offeree company which may or 
may not lead to an offer, the primary responsibility for making an announcement will 
normally rest with the board of the offeree company which must, therefore, keep a close 
watch on its share price for any untoward movement of 20% or more above the lowest 
share price since the time of the approach or a price movement of 10% or more in a 
single day. Where the offer is to be recommended and an application to the Authority to 
grant a temporary suspension of trading in accordance with the Listing Rules is submitted 
and the Authority has granted such suspension, a possible alternative to an immediate 
announcement may be to obtain a suspension to be followed shortly by an announcement. 
3) A potential offeror must not attempt to prevent the board of an offeree company from 
making an announcement or requesting the Authority to grant a temporary suspension of 
trading, in accordance with the Listing Rules. 4) The responsibility to make an 
announcement under Article 6 (b)(1) is a joint responsibility of the potential offeror and 
offeree company.790 
3. The responsibility of both companies to make an announcement 
When the offeree and the offeror companies have reached an understanding that an offer 
will be made, both companies are required to make an announcement according to Article 6:  
The responsibility to make an announcement under Article 6 (b)(1) is a joint 
responsibility of the potential offeror and offeree company.” Referring to “1) When a 
company is considering a potential takeover and an approach to a potential offeree 
company has been made and the parties have reached an understanding (including the 
relevant conditions) that an offer will be made.791 
                                                          
788 Mergers and Acquisitions Regulation, art. 6 (b). 
789 Id. at art. 6 (c). 
790 Id. 
791 Id. at art. 6 (c) (4). 
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4. Announcement made before receiving notification from the acquiring 
company of its intention to make an offer 
Except for the cases described in Articles 12 and 13, the target company must announce a 
potential acquisition if it is in talks with an offeror company about an acquisition, even before it 
has received notification from the offeror of the intention to make an offer.792 However, the 
target company need not disclose name of the acquiring company, as stated in Article 6:  
(e) The Announcement of a Possible Offer, 1) Except in the case of a mandatory offer 
under Article 12 or a permissive offer under Article 13, before a firm intention to make 
an offer has been notified, a brief announcement by the offeree company that talks are 
taking place or that a potential offeror is considering making an offer (without disclosing 
the name of the potential offeror) must be made. 793 
B. The announcement of the bid under the EC Directive 
The EC Directive’s approach to takeover bids demonstrates that its principles aim to 
protect minority shareholders when a control of the corporation is acquired.794 The Directive 
requires EC member states to take the necessary steps to ensure the protection of the minority 
shareholders: 
Member States should take the necessary steps to protect the holders of securities, in 
particular those with minority holdings, when control of their companies has been 
acquired. The Member States should ensure such protection by obliging the person who 
has acquired control of a company to make an offer to all the holders of that company’s 
securities for all of their holdings at an equitable price in accordance with a common 
definition. Member States should be free to establish further instruments for the 
protection of the interests of the holders of securities, such as the obligation to make a 
partial bid where the offeror does not acquire control of the company or the obligation to 
announce a bid at the same time as control of the company is acquired.795 
The Directive states that announcing a bid as soon as possible lowers the chance of 
insider trading.796 Reducing the risk of insider trading during a takeover bid is one of the 
                                                          
792 Id. at art. 6 (e). 
793 Id. at art. 6 (e). 
794 Council Directive on takeover bids, recital 9, 2004 O.J. (L 142) (EC). 
795 Id. 
796 Id. at (12). 
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primary goals of takeover rules; ensuring transparency in the market helps to provide 
equal investment opportunities for all shareholders. 
C. Observations 
The Saudi M&A Regulation and EC Directive contain similar principles 
regarding the announcement of the bid, to which the author does not recommend 
amendments. 
§6.5.  “Prohibited Dealings by Persons Other Than the Offeror”797 
A. Under the Saudi M&A Regulation 
The Saudi M&A Regulation prohibits any person in the target company from dealing in 
securities with any other party except the offeror from the time of the offeror’s first approach 
until the acquisition announcement has been made or the offer has been retracted: 
1) No dealings of any kind in securities or shareholding control of securities of the 
offeree company by any person, not being the offeror, who is privy to confidential price-
sensitive information concerning an offer or contemplated offer may take place between 
the time when there is reason to suppose that an approach or an offer is contemplated and 
the announcement of the approach or offer or of the termination of the discussions. This 
prohibition includes dealings in securities of the offeror unless the offer is sufficiently 
small in the context of the business of the offeror that the fact of the proposed offer, if it 
were made public, would not have a significant impact on the market price of the 
securities of the offeror. 
2) No person who is privy to confidential price-sensitive information concerning an offer 
or contemplated offer may make any recommendation to any other person as to dealing in 
the relevant securities.798 
The Regulation also prohibits the offeror from selling any security of the target’s company: 
“[r]estriction on dealings by the offeror and concert parties [d]uring an offer period, the offeror 
and persons acting in concert with it must not sell any securities in the offeree company except 
                                                          




with the prior consent of the Authority. Sales below the value of the offer will not be 
permitted.”799 This restriction likely exists to prevent any extreme changes in the value of the 
securities of the target company.  
B. Under the UK Takeover Code 
The UK Takeover Code contains a similar rule that prohibits dealings within certain 
specified timeframes by persons other than the offeror.800 The rule reads as follows: 
(a) No dealings of any kind in securities of the offeree company by any person, not being 
the offeror, who is privy to confidential price sensitive information concerning an offer or 
contemplated offer may take place between the time when there is reason to suppose that 
an approach or an offer is contemplated and the announcement of the approach or offer or 
of the termination of the discussions. (b) No person who is privy to such information may 
make any recommendation to any other person as to dealing in the relevant securities.801 
C. Observations 
The Saudi M&A Regulation and the UK Takeover Code contain the same rule 
that prohibits dealings within certain specified timeframes by persons other than the 
offeror. The author does not recommend changes in this regard.  
§6.6. Mandatory Offer 
A. The trigger of a mandatory offer under the Saudi M&A Regulation 
1. The mandatory offer rule 
Saudi’s Capital Market Authority aims to make the Saudi stock market fair and to ensure 
that shareholders are protected. Therefore, it includes a provision that a party that acquires 50% 
or more of a target company may be subject to a mandatory offer that would require that party to 
make an offer to buy the rest of the target company’s shares: 
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(a) Where a person or a group of persons acting in concert increase ownership of shares 
in a given company through a restricted purchase of shares or a restricted offer for shares 
so that such person or those with whom such person is acting in concert become the 
owner of 50% or more of a given class of voting shares listed on the Exchange, the Board 
shall have the right to exercise its power in accordance with Article 54 of the Capital 
Market Law to order such person to offer to purchase the shares of the same class it does 
not own on the terms set out in this Article 12 and in accordance with the other relevant 
provisions of these Regulations.802 
Note that this mandatory bid rule states that once a party acquires 50% of a target corporation, 
the Capital Market Authority has the right to require the acquirer to make a mandatory offer. The 
author argues that the Authority should not hold this discretionary power. The intent of a 
mandatory bid rule is to establish a policy that when a party acquires 50% of a target corporation, 
the mandatory offer shall be triggered and extended to the rest of the shareholders.803 Giving the 
Authority discretion over whether to trigger the mandatory bid rule does not promote the stability 
and equality that the mandatory offer is designed to achieve. 
2. The acquisition of the Saudi Research and Marketing Group 
The following case study of the acquisition of the Saudi Research and Marketing Group 
should highlight the reasons why the author proposes an amendment to Regulation Article 12 (a) 
regarding the mandatory offer. The proposed change is that the mandatory offer should be 
triggered immediately once the threshold of 50% ownership of the target company is reached. 
The mandatory bid rule should trigger automatically, rather than by the request of the Authority.  
The Saudi Research and Marketing Group (SRMG) is a Saudi publicly held corporation 
listed on the Saudi stock exchange (Tadawul) with capital of SAR 800 million (USD 213 
million).804 SRMG was established in 2000 as limited liability company and converted into a 
                                                          
802 Mergers and Acquisitions Regulation, art. 12 (a). 
803 CHRISTOPHE CLERC, FABRICE DEMARIGNY, DIEGO VALIANTE, MIRZHA DE MANUEL ARAMENDÍA, A LEGAL AND 
ECONOMIC ASSESSMENT OF EUROPEAN TAKEOVER REGULATION, 53 (Marccus Partners and Centre for European 
Policy Studies, 2012). 
804 The Saudi Research and Marketing Group’s file on the Saudi Stock Exchange’s website, available at 
http://www.tadawul.com.sa (last visited November 25, 2015). 
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closely held joint stock company with 11 shareholders805 in the same year.806 SRMG has become 
listed on the exchange since 2006.807 The company focuses on media and publishing, 
specializing in publishing, printing, media sales and advertising, and distribution,808 and 
conducts its businesses through 31 subsidiaries.809 
On November 1, 2015, SRMG announced changes in the ownership of its shares as a 
result of private transactions.810 The announcement stated that NBC Capital’s Fund (4) 
purchased 25.3% of SRMG’s shares and NBC Capital’s Fund (13) purchased 29.9% of SRMG’s 
shares, resulting in NBC Capital acquiring, in total, 55.21% of SRMG’s shares.811 On the same 
day, the Kingdom Holding Company, which is a Saudi listed company with capital of SAR 73 
billion (USD 19 billion),812 announced that it sold its 29.9% stake in SRMG in a private 
transaction.813  
On November 1, 2015, in the same announcement, SRMG stated that it had received 
confirmation from both acquirers, NCB Capital’s Funds (4) and (13) that they did not intend to 
purchase the rest of SRMG’s shares, and also that they did not intend to change SRMG in any 
material way.814 
                                                          
805 According to the Saudi Research and Marketing Group’s bylaw, Article 8, available in Arabic on the Group’s 
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at http://www.argaam.com/en/article/articledetail/id/393656 (last visited November 25, 2015). 
811 Id. 
812 See the Kingdom Holding Company’s file on the Saudi Stock Exchange’s website, available at 
http://www.tadawul.com.sa (last visited November 25, 2015). 
813 Id. See also SRMG reveals new shareholders: NCB Capital funds 4 & 13 buy 55% stake, November 1, 2015, 




The author argues that a situation such as this one demonstrates the value of amending 
Saudi’s M&A Regulation Article 12 (a) such that the mandatory bid rule would have triggered 
automatically upon the sale of 50% (or, in this case, more than 50%) of SRMG’s stock to NBC 
Capital. Instead, the Capital Market Authority retained the right to decide whether to require 
NBC Capital to make a mandatory offer to the rest of the shareholders. As of February 18, 2016, 
NBC Capital’s Fund 4 and Fund 13 own a total share of 59.8% of SRMG (29.9% each), and the 
Capital Market Authority has not required that a mandatory offer be made.815 
3. The efficiency of the 50% threshold  
The efficiency of the 50% ownership threshold should be addressed; specifically, the 
question should be addressed as to which ownership percentage—50% or 30%—would be more 
efficient as a trigger for the mandatory offer. 
The mandatory offer essentially means that once a party acquires 50% of the target 
corporation, it must be prepared to acquire the rest of the target’s shares.816 Requiring that an 
acquirer must be prepared to purchase as much as 100% of a target’s shares if it plans to 
purchase as much as 50% raises the cost/risk of an intended takeover, which in turn likely would 
decrease the number of takeover attempts.817 Setting 50% as the ownership threshold that 
triggers the mandatory offer can be justified in two ways. First, it is understood that a mandatory 
bid rule increases the likelihood of a complete takeover and that takeover activity can disrupt 
markets. Transparency is also at stake in the choice of the threshold. Unlike the 30% threshold, 
such as the threshold stipulated by the UK Takeover Code,818 the 50% threshold reveals the 
intent of an acquiring party. In other words, any party attempting to own 50% or more of a 
                                                          
815 Id. (last visited February 18, 2016). 
816 Clerc, supra note 803, at 53. 
817 Id. 
818 Id. at 55 and 57. 
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company is clearly interested in controlling that company. A party attempting to gain just 30% 
ownership of a target may not necessarily have control or takeover in mind. Thus, the 50% 
threshold increases transparency about investors’ intentions in the marketplace.  
Second, because the mandatory offer is provided to protect the minority shareholders,819 
the 50% threshold is more justifiable, because once a party acquires 50% of a target, that party 
becomes the majority shareholder and—assuming that the rest of the shares are dispersed among 
at least more than one other shareholder—the acquiring party will have control of the company. 
30% ownership does not give an acquirer absolute control of a target corporation, or the power to 
materially affect the other shareholders, in the same way that 50% ownership likely does. Once a 
party acquires 50% of a corporation, the other shareholders should have the opportunity to tender 
their shares to that buyer, which they may wish to do if they expect that the new controlling party 
will make changes to the company’s policies or goals. In summary, the author believes that in 
Saudi Arabia at this time, a threshold of 50% ownership is more efficient as a trigger of the 
mandatory offer rule than 30%. 
B. The trigger of a mandatory offer under the EC Directive 
The EC Directive requires that once a controlling stake in a corporation is acquired, the 
offeror must make an offer to the rest of the shareholders which provides:  
Where a natural or legal person, as a result of his/her own acquisition or the acquisition 
by persons acting in concert with him/her, holds securities of a company as referred to in 
Article 1(1) which, added to any existing holdings of those securities of his/hers and the 
holdings of those securities of persons acting in concert with him/her, directly or 
indirectly give him/her a specified percentage of voting rights in that company, giving 
him/her control of that company, Member States shall ensure that such a person is 
required to make a bid as a means of protecting the minority shareholders of that 
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company. Such a bid shall be addressed at the earliest opportunity to all the holders of 
those securities for all their holdings at the equitable price as defined in paragraph 4.820 
The Directive allows EC member states to determine what percentage of a company’s 
voting rights constitutes control, and, if acquired, triggers the mandatory offer.821 
C. Observations 
The author observes a crucial point here. While the mandatory offer is triggered 
automatically under the EC Directive, the mandatory offer under the Saudi M&A Regulation is 
not automatically triggered when the threshold is crossed; rather, the mandatory offer lies under 
the Capital Market Authority’s discretion. The author discusses above the efficiency of a 50% 
ownership threshold as a trigger of the mandatory offer. The author believes that 50% is a more 
efficient threshold than 30%, because 50% sufficiently demonstrates the intent to control the 
target company. Therefore, the author believes that 50% should remain the same as the triggering 
threshold of the mandatory offer.  
D. Recommendations 
The Capital Market Authority’s discretionary power to decide whether to require a party 
that acquires 50% of a target corporation should be taken away. The mandatory offer rule cannot 
function according to its intended purpose if the mandatory offer is not automatically triggered 
when the threshold of 50% ownership of the target company’s shares has been reached. 
Removing this from the Authority will allow the objective functioning of the rule. Instilling 
confidence in shareholders that they will have the opportunity to tender their shares when a 
controlling stake in a target company is acquired will help stabilize the market. Also, an 
                                                          
820 Council Directive on takeover bids, art. 5(1), 2004 O.J. (L 142) (EC). 
821 Id. at art. 5(3).  
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acquiring party will not attempt to reach the 50% ownership threshold unless it is prepared to 
acquire the rest of the target company’s shares.  
§6.7. The Type of Consideration and the Price Required in the Mandatory Bid 
A. The Saudi M&A Regulation 
Saudi’s M&A Regulation states that the mandatory bid must offer a consideration of cash 
or cash with cash alternative at a price not less than any price that the offeror, or any person 
acting in concert with the offeror, paid for the same class of shares in the 12 months before the 
offer began.822 
B. The EC Directive 
The EC Directive states that the consideration of the offer may be cash or securities or 
both combined.823 The Directive determines that a fair price to be paid to shareholders is a price 
that is not less than the highest price paid for the same class of shares during the period that is 6 
to 12 months prior to the date of the bid.824 The Directive determines that a price prescribed in 
this manner is equitable: 
The highest price paid for the same securities by the offeror, or by persons acting in 
concert with him/her, over a period, to be determined by Member States, of not less than 
six months and not more than 12 before the bid referred to in paragraph 1 shall be 
regarded as the equitable price. If, after the bid has been made public and before the offer 
closes for acceptance, the offeror or any person acting in concert with him/her purchases 
securities at a price higher than the offer price, the offeror shall increase his/her offer so 
that it is not less than the highest price paid for the securities so acquired.825 
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The author observes that the Saudi M&A Regulation and the EC Directive 
regulate the instrument of consideration of the mandatory offer in a similar manner. The 
author does not recommend changes in this regard. 
§6.8. The Required Disclosure of Information Regarding the Bid 
A. The Saudi M&A Regulation 
The Saudi M&A Regulation requires certain information regarding the bid to be 
published in the announcement of the bid when there is a definite intention to make an offer.826 
The Regulation states that the announcement of the offer must set out the following: 
2) When a firm intention to make an offer is announced, the announcement must contain: 
i. The terms of the offer; 
ii. The identity of the offeror; 
iii. Details of any existing holding in the offeree company: (a) Which the offeror owns or 
over which it has shareholding control; (b) Which is owned or where the shareholding is 
controlled by any person acting in concert with the offeror; (c) In respect of which the 
offeror has received an irrevocable commitment to accept the offer; (d) In respect of 
which the offeror or any person acting in concert with it holds an option to purchase; 
iv. All conditions (including any conditions relating to acceptances, listing and increase 
of capital and any consent required by law) to which the offer or the publication of the 
offer document is subject; and v. Details of any indemnity arrangement involving the 
offeror, the offeree company or any person acting in concert with the offeror or the 
offeree company in relation to relevant securities.827 
The offeror must submit a suggested timeline of the offer to the Capital Market Authority that 
includes the following information: 
i. The delivery of the final offer document to the Authority for approval; 
                                                          




ii. The publication of the offer document approved by the Authority and the sending out 
of the same to the board of the offeree company; 
iii. The publication of the board of the offeree company board circular; 
iv. Shareholders approval (if required); 
v. The earliest permitted first closing date of the offer; 
vi. The last date on which the offeree company may announce profit or dividend 
forecasts, asset valuations or proposals for dividend payments; 
vii. The withdrawal of acceptances if the offer has not become unconditional as to 
acceptances; 
viii. The publication of “no increase” in the offer statements; 
ix. The last date on which the offer can be declared unconditional as to acceptances; 
x. The last date for satisfaction of all other conditions; 
xi. The last date for money or other consideration to be provided to the offeree 
shareholders; 
and 2) All Parties related to the offer must comply with the takeover timetable as 
specified in 6 (d) (1).828 
The information that the announcement of the bid must contain, according to the 
Regulation, is the same as the minimum information required by the EC Directive, as the 
next subsection will address. Saudi’s M&A Regulation Article 26 also requires that the 
offer document contain quite a bit of intensive information.  
B. The EC Directive 
The EC Directive requires the following minimum level of information regarding the bid 
to be specified and made public in the offer document: 
3. The offer document referred to in paragraph 2 shall state at least: 
(a) the terms of the bid; 
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(b) the identity of the offeror and, where the offeror is a company, the type, name and 
registered office of that company; 
(c) the securities or, where appropriate, the class or classes of securities for which the bid 
is made; 
(d) the consideration offered for each security or class of securities and, in the case of a 
mandatory bid, the method employed in determining it, with particulars of the way in 
which that consideration is to be paid; 
(e) the compensation offered for the rights[,] which might be removed as a result of the 
breakthrough rule laid down in Article 11(4), with particulars of the way in which that 
compensation is to be paid and the method employed in determining it; 
(f) the maximum and minimum percentages or quantities of securities[,] which the 
offeror undertakes to acquire; 
(g) details of any existing holdings of the offeror, and of persons acting in concert with 
him/her, in the offeree company; 
(h) all the conditions to which the bid is subject; 
(i) the offeror’s intentions with regard to the future business of the offeree company and, 
in so far as it is affected by the bid, the offeror company and with regard to the 
safeguarding of the jobs of their employees and management, including any material 
change in the conditions of employment, and in particular the offeror’s strategic plans for 
the two companies and the likely repercussions on employment and the locations of the 
companies’ places of business; 
(j) the time allowed for acceptance of the bid; 
(k) where the consideration offered by the offeror includes securities of any kind, 
information concerning those securities; 
(l) information concerning the financing for the bid; 
(m) the identity of persons acting in concert with the offeror or with the offeree company 
and, in the case of companies, their types, names, registered offices and relationships 
with the offeror and, where possible, with the offeree company; 
(n) the national law[,] which will govern contracts concluded between the offeror and the 
holders of the offeree company’s securities as a result of the bid and the competent 
courts.829 
                                                          




The author observes that the Saudi M&A Regulation and the EC Directive 
stipulate similar rules regarding the type, specification and publication of information 
regarding the bid that is required. The author does not recommend changes in this regard.  
§6.9. The Obligation of the Board of the Offeree Company to Make a 
Recommendation to the Shareholders  
A. Under the Saudi M&A Regulation 
The Saudi M&A Regulation requires the directors of the target company to make a 
recommendation to shareholders regarding the acquisition transaction, unless any of the directors 
has a conflict of interest.830 The directors are required to provide advice that is in the best interest 
of the company: 
(k) Directors of an offeror and the offeree company must always, in advising their 
shareholders, act only in their capacity as directors and not have regard to their personal 
or family shareholdings or to their personal relationships with the offeror or offeree 
company, as applicable, and must at all times have regard to advice given in accordance 
with Article 7. It is the shareholders’ interests taken as a whole, together with those of 
employees and creditors, which should be considered when the directors are giving 
advice to shareholders. Directors of the offeree company should give careful 
consideration before they enter into any commitment with an offeror (or anyone else)[,] 
which would restrict their freedom to advise their shareholders in the future.831 
B. Under the EC Directive 
To ensure that shareholders make informed decisions regarding a bid offer, the Directive 
requires that the Board of the offeree company publish its opinion regarding that bid: 
The board of the offeree company shall draw up and make public a document setting out 
its opinion of the bid and the reasons on which it is based, including its views on the 
effects of implementation of the bid on all the company’s interests and specifically 
employment, and on the offeror’s strategic plans for the offeree company and their likely 
repercussions on employment and the locations of the company’s places of business as 
                                                          




set out in the offer document in accordance with Article 6(3)(i). The board of the offeree 
company shall at the same time communicate that opinion to the representatives of its 
employees or, where there are no such representatives, to the employees themselves. 
Where the board of the offeree company receives in good time a separate opinion from 
the representatives of its employees on the effects of the bid on employment, that opinion 
shall be appended to the document.832 
C. Observations 
The author observes that the Saudi M&A Regulation and the EC Directive 
stipulate similar rules requiring the board of directors of the offeree to provide its opinion 
regarding the bid to the shareholders of the offeree company. The author does not 
recommend changes in this regard. 
§6.10. Independent Directors 
A. Under the Saudi M&A Regulation 
Saudi’s M&A Regulation prevents a director from voting on the acquisition transaction 
only if that director has shares in both companies, or otherwise has a conflict of interest,833 such 
as (for example), having a relative who works for the acquiring company or vice versa: 
(m) A director shall not vote at a meeting of directors or of a committee of directors or a 
general assembly meeting on any resolution concerning an offer made under these 
Regulations or any other relevant matter where the director or any relative of his has a 
conflict of interest. In this context such a conflict of interest would arise if he had, 
directly or indirectly, an interest (including his shareholding in the offeree company, if 
the director is a director of the offeror company, or his shareholding in the offeror 
company, if the director is a director of the offeree company) or duty (including where 
the director of the offeror company holds a position of a director or a manager of the 
offeree company, and where the director of the offeree company holds a position as a 
director or a manager of the offeror company) which is material and which conflicts or 
may conflict with the interests of the company. (n) For the purposes of these Regulations, 
an interest of a person who is a relative or an affiliate of a director shall be treated as an 
interest of the director.834 
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Article 3 states “(j) Where there are related parties to a transaction to which these 
Regulations apply, there must be full disclosure of the related party’s interest in the transaction to 
the affected shareholders prior to completion of the transaction. Any such transaction must be on 
arm’s length terms.”835 
B. Under the UK Takeover Code 
While the Takeover Code does not address the issue of interested directors, this issue is 
addressed in the UK Companies Act 2006,836 which states that situations involving conflicts of 
interest shall be avoided by the directors.837 The UK Companies Act states that such conflicts 
must be authorized by the board of directors in a quorum that does not count the interested 
director.838 However, the UK Companies Act stipulates that such an interest may be authorized if 
the constitution (i.e., the Articles of Incorporation) of the public company enables the board of 
directors such authorization under such circumstances.839  
C. Observation 
The Saudi M&A Regulation stipulates a rule concerning interested directors; however, 
the Saudi Companies Law has not properly addressed this issue, as is discussed in Chapter 5. The 
UK Takeover Code also does not address this issue, because it is addressed in the UK 
Companies Act. The author does not recommend changes in this regard. 
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§6.11. The Ability of the Offeror to Execute the Offer 
A. Under the Saudi M&A Regulation 
The Saudi Capital Market Authority is concerned about transparency in the market and 
wants to make sure that announcements do not mislead the market; therefore, the Authority 
requires that the offeror must ensure that it can keep its offer by a financial advisor.840 The 
Regulation states: 
The announcement of a firm intention to make an offer should be made only when an 
offeror has every reason to believe that it can and will continue to be able to implement 
the offer. Responsibility for advising the offeror in this connection rests on the financial 
adviser to the offeror.841 
B. Under the EC Directive 
The Directive requires EC member states to take necessary steps to ensure that before a 
bid is announced, the offeror is financially able to acquire all of the shares of the offeree 
corporation.842 
C. Observations 
The author observes that both the M&A Regulation and the EC Directive require that an 
offer must not be made unless the offeror has every reason to believe that he will be able fulfill 
the offer. The author does not recommend changes in this regard. 
§6.12. The Offer Period and the Right of Withdrawal  
A. Under the Saudi M&A Regulation 
Saudi’s M&A Regulation permits accepting shareholders to withdraw their acceptances 
according to Article 6 (d), which requires that the offeror specify the time in which the 
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acceptances can be withdrawn.843 However, the Regulation does not specify the duration in 
which the acceptances can be withdrawn. Instead, it is left to the offeror to set the timeline of 
acceptance and withdrawal in the offer. The Regulation requires the offeror to state the date on 
which the offer is opened, as well other dates, such as the first closing date of the offer.844 
Regulation Article 6 gives the Capital Market Authority the discretion to review the timeline of 
the bid submitted by the offeror.  
B. Under the EC Directive 
The Directive guides EC member states to use the date on which the offer document is 
published as the date that opens the time period allowed for the acceptance of the bid; this time 
period must be at least two weeks and no longer than 10 weeks.845 The EC Directive states: 
Member States shall provide that the time allowed for the acceptance of a bid may not be 
less than two weeks nor more than 10 weeks from the date of publication of the offer 
document. Provided that the general principle laid down in Article 3(1)(f) is respected, 
Member States may provide that the period of 10 weeks may be extended on condition 
that the offeror gives at least two weeks' notice of his/her intention of closing the bid.846 
C. Observations 
The Saudi M&A Regulation does not specify the duration of the time period 
during which acceptances may be withdrawn. Instead, it is left to the offeror to set the 
timeline of acceptance and withdrawal of the offer. The EC Directive requires that this 
time period must be at least two weeks and no longer than 10 weeks. 
D. Recommendations 
The Saudi M&A Regulation requires the offeror to specify the duration and dates 
of the offer in a timeline that must be approved by the Capital Market Authority. 
                                                          
843 Merger and Acquisition Regulation, art. 34(b). 
844 Id. at art. 6(d). 




However, the Regulation should also require the offeror to specify the time period of the 
offer as not less than two weeks and not more than 10 weeks; or, if not these parameters, 
some limit should be placed on the time allowed for acceptance.  
§6.13. Breakup Fees and Reverse Breakup Fees 
A. Under the Saudi M&A Regulation  
1. The cancellation fee provision (breakup fee) 
The Saudi M&A Regulation permits a “breakup fee,” which may be paid in the event an 
acquisition offer fails; for instance, if the directors of the offeree’s company recommend a higher 
price than was originally offered.847 This fee must not exceed more than 1% of the initial value 
of the offer: 
(b) Break-up Fees, 1) For the purposes of these Regulations a break-up fee is an 
arrangement which may be entered into between an offeror or a potential offeror and the 
offeree company pursuant to which a cash sum will be payable by the offeree company if 
certain specified events occur which have the effect of preventing the offer from 
proceeding or causing it to fail, including, without limitation, a recommendation by the 
offeree company board of a higher competing offer. 2) Any break-up fee that is proposed 
must be of a minimal size (no more than 1% of the offer value) and the offeree company 
board and its financial adviser must confirm to the Authority in writing that the fee to be 
in the best interests of shareholders. Any break-up fee arrangement must be fully 
disclosed in the announcement made under Article 6 (f) and in the offer document. 3) The 
Authority should be consulted prior to all cases where a break-up fee or any similar 
arrangement is proposed.848 
2. The reverse breakup fee849 
Reverse breakup fee provisions have become more important recently in Saudi Arabia as 
a result of the rapid growth in M&A deal activity. Saudi’s M&A Regulation only addresses the 
                                                          
847 Mergers and Acquisitions Regulation, art. 24(b)(1). 
848 Id. at art. 24(b). 
849 Also known as “Reverse Cancelation Fee” or “Reverse Termination Fee.” 
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breakup fee; it does not explicitly regulate the reverse breakup fee.850 Article 24 (b) of the 
Regulation states that any arrangements for a breakup fee shall be made in consultation with the 
Authority;851 however, the Regulation does not cover the reverse breakup fee, which falls on the 
side of the offeror.852 If Article 24 (a) did not state that the breakup fee is an amount of money 
payable by the offeree company should the offeree do something that causes the deal to fail, then 
this Article by default would also cover the reverse breakup fee.  
The reverse breakup fee is a fee paid by the offeror to the offeree should the offeror 
rescind its offer for any one of a certain set of reasons.853 It has become widely important in 
M&A.854 The reverse breakup fee is included by the buyer to demonstrate its confidence and 
readiness to close the deal, and also to show that the buyer is prepared to overcome challenges, 
obstacles and risk in order to complete the acquisition.855 As M&A activity in Saudi increases, 
                                                          
850 ROPERT VYDRA, GUIDE TO PUBLIC TAKEOVERS IN THE KINGDOM OF SAUDI ARABIA, 18 (Saudi Arabian Legal 
Guide Series, 2014). 
851 Mergers and Acquisitions Regulation, art. 24(b). 
852 See Benjamin M. Grossman, Another View: Rethinking Reverse Break-up Fees, DealBook, NEW YORK TIMES, 
(August 11 2009), available at http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2009/08/11/another-view-rethinking-reverse-break-up-
fees/ (last visited December 25, 2015). 
853 See Id. 
854 Id. See also Sonali Basak, Halliburton’s $3.5 Billion Breakup Fee Shows Regulatory Risk, BLOOMBERG 
BUSINESS, November 17, 2014, available at http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-11-17/halliburton-s-3-5-
billion-breakup-fee-highlights-regulator-risk (last visited December 25, 2015), and Rachel Sams, Seller's market in 
M&A brings on 'reverse breakup fees', BALTIMORE BUSINESS JOURNAL, April 24, 2006, available at 
http://www.bizjournals.com/baltimore/stories/2006/04/24/story3.html (last visited December 25, 2015). 
855 A company could also claim that it did not include a reverse breakup fee provision because it was confident that 
the deal would be completed and that the terms of the deal would pass the regulatory reviews, as was apparently the 
case in the $45 billion takeover of Time Warner Cable by Comcast in 2014; see Michael J. De LA Marced, Comcast 
and Time Warner Cable Forgo A Breakup Fee, NEW YORK TIMES, February, 13 2014, available at 
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/02/13/comcast-and-time-warner-cable-forgo-a-breakup-fee/ (last visited 
December 25, 2015). However, in fact, this deal did raise risks and challenges, such as the antitrust concern that 
after the deal, Comcast and Time Warner Cable would control 57% of the broadcast market and 30% of the pay 
television market; see Emily Steel, David Gellse, Rebbeca R. Ruiz and Eric Lipton, Comcast Is Said to End $45 
Billion Bid for Time Warner Cable, NEW YORK TIMES, April 23, 2015, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/24/business/media/comcast-time-warner-cable-merger.html (last visited 
December 25, 2015), and Hilary Stout, Comcast-Time Warner Cable Deal’s Collapse Leaves Frustrated Customers 
Out in the Cold, NEW YORK TIMES, April 26, 2015, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/27/business/media/mergers-collapse-leaves-frustrated-cable-customers-out-in-the-
cold.html (last visited December 25, 2015). Moreover, Charter Communication Inc., made a merger deal for Time 
Warner Cable valued at $55 billion that included a $2 billion reverse breakup fee, signaling Charter 
Communication’s confidence in completing the deal and navigating the regulatory reviews; see Kimberly Johnson, 
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this type of provision likely will be included in future M&A deals. At present, it is not certain 
what the Capital Market Authority might do if the parties began to include a reverse breakup 
clause. As it now stands, the Saudi M&A Regulation contains a general rule stipulating that “The 
Authority should be consulted prior to all cases where a break-up fee or any similar arrangement 
is proposed.”856 This means that the inclusion of a reverse breakup fee could fall under this 
requirement, in which case, the Capital Market Authority would have to be consulted before the 
parties include any provision for a reverse break up fee. 
B. Under the UK Takeover Code 
A breakup fee, also known as an “inducement fee,” of no more than 1% of the value of 
the transaction was permitted before the Takeover Code was amended in 2011.857 Since the 2011 
amendment, the Takeover Codes now prohibits breakup fees in general, under Rule 21.2 (a) 
(b).858 While the Takeover Code prohibits the breakup fee, it excludes arrangements that impose 
obligations on the offeror, such as a reverse breakup fee, under Rule 21.2 (b) (v) of the Takeover 
Code.859 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Charter-Time Warner Merger Makes Breaking Up Hard to Do, THE WALL STREET JOURNAL, May 28, 2015, 
available at http://blogs.wsj.com/cfo/2015/05/28/charter-time-warner-merger-makes-breaking-up-hard-to-do/# (last 
visited December 25, 2015). and Dan Primack, Charter's $2 billion promise to Time Warner Cable isn't worth much, 
FORTUNE, May 26, 2015, available at http://fortune.com/2015/05/26/charters-2-billion-promise-to-time-warner-
cable-isnt-worth-much/ (last visited December 25, 2015). The author includes the examples and information in this 
footnote to show the different reasons and circumstances in which a reverse termination fee may be included in a 
proposed M&A deal, as well as to demonstrate the increase in the use of the reverse termination fee. It is expected 
that this mechanism will begin to see use in Saudi Arabia as well, as M&A activity in Saudi continues to increase. 
856 Mergers and Acquisitions Regulation, art. 24 (b)(3). 






The author observes that while the Saudi M&A Regulation permits a breakup fee of no 
more than 1% of the transaction’s value, the UK Takeover Code prohibits the breakup fee. The 
author does not recommend changes in this regard. 
To reiterate, the UK Takeover Code prohibits arrangements (such as a breakup fee) that 
place obligations on the offeree. However, the UK Takeover Code does allow arrangements that 
impose obligations on the offeror such as reverse breakup fees. The Saudi M&A Regulation’s 
approach toward the reverse breakup fee is not explicitly clear; the author recommends that the 
Saudi Regulation should explicitly permit the reverse breakup fee, or, at the least, it should not 
impose any restrictions on such measures.  
D. Recommendation 
The Saudi Capital Market Authority should include a provision that clearly permits an 
arrangement that imposes an obligation on the offeror such as the reverse breakup fee. This 
provision will make corporations aware of the Saudi approach toward reverse breakup fees, and 
will also help corporations to structure their reverse breakup fee provisions accordingly.  
§6.14. The Competition Provision 
A. Under the Saudi M&A Regulation 
The Saudi M&A Regulation contains an Article that addresses requirements for offers 
that are subject to the Competition Law.860 Article 16 states that a tender offer that is subject to 
the Competition Law must include a statement that the offer will be rescinded if Competition 
Council objects to it or places it under review.861 
                                                          




Because the offer is ended when the Competition Council makes a statement of objection 
or review, a new period for the offer will begin 21 days from the date that the Competition 
Council approves the offer (if it does).862 The offer will end either if the 21 day period lapses 
without a new offer being announced, or if the offeror party announces that it does not intend to 
continue the offer.863 
B. Under the UK Takeover Code 
The Takeover Code also includes a competition provision, which requires that if 
the bid falls under the statutory provisions regarding competition, the terms of the offer 
must state that the offer will lapse in either of the following two conditions: (1) if the 
reference to Phase 2 is made by the Competition and Market Authority; or (2) if a 
concentration with an EU dimension would arise and cause proceedings for Phase 2 to be 
initiated “before the first closing date or the date when the offer becomes or is declared 
unconditional as to acceptances, whichever is the later.”864 The Takeover Codes states 
that after the offeror is cleared, there will be a 21 day period during which the offeror 
may clarify and confirm its intention to make the offer.865 The offer will end if the offeror 
announces that it does not intend to make an offer.866  
C. Observations 
The author observes that the UK Takeover Code and the Saudi M&A Regulation 
include similar competition provisions. The author does not recommend changes in this 
regard. 
                                                          
862 Id. at art. 16(c). 
863 Id. 
864 THOMPSON, JR., supra note 490, at 1089; also see The Takeover Code, 2013, Rule 2.1(a)(b) (U.K.). 




§6.15. Offers and Restrictions on Defensive Measures867 
Saudi’s M&A Regulation is not explicit regarding the issue of hostile offers and the 
defensive measures a target company may take to resist such offers. However, the Saudi M&A 
Regulation places some restrictions on either the offeree or the offeror.868 Moreover, from a 
practitioner’s point of view,869 boards of directors in Saudi are inclined to make decisions 
unanimously, meaning that hostile offers are unusual870 in Saudi Arabia.871 
A. Defensive measures under the Saudi M&A Regulation 
1. Shareholders’ approval (the board neutrality rule) 
Saudi’s M&A Regulation restricts the actions that a board of directors may take when a 
bona fide offer is about to be presented by an offeror.872 For example, directors are prohibited 
from taking any action that could frustrate the offer before the General Assembly meeting is held 
and a vote is conducted.873 The legislature gives the board of directors the discretion to determine 
if the offer is genuine Article 3 (1), which reads as follows: 
At no time after the board of the offeree company has reason to believe that a bona fide 
offer might be imminent may any action be taken by the board of the offeree company in 
relation to the affairs of the company, without the approval of the shareholders in general 
assembly, which could effectively result in any bona fide offer being frustrated or in the 
shareholders being denied an opportunity to decide on its merits.874 
Saudi M&A Regulation Article 3 (i) covers all types of defensive measures, including so-
called poison pills, golden parachutes and many other defensive tactics. None of these measures 
                                                          
867 These restrictions are adopted from Vydra, supra note 850. 
868 Id. 
869 Assad Abedi, an attorney at Hatem Abbas Ghazzawi & Co. 
870 The word “unusual” is not the right word to use here. It would be accurate if there were many M&A offers, and if 
many public M&A transactions occurred that fell under the M&A Regulation. The reality is that there has been only 
one public transaction that fell under the M&A Regulation. 
871 Assad Abedi, Public mergers and acquisitions in Saudi Arabia: overview, Practical Law, available at 
http://uk.practicallaw.com/5-505-9771?source=relatedcontent#a810380. (last visited December 29, 2015). 





may be taken by the board of directors of the offeree company without the approval of offeree 
company’s shareholders. 
Saudi M&A Regulation Article 24 (a) lists other actions that the offeree company’s board 
of directors may not take without the shareholders’ approval: 
During the course of an offer, or even before the date of the offer if the board of the 
offeree company has reason to believe that a bona fide offer might be imminent, the 
board must not, except in pursuance of a contract entered into earlier, without the 
approval of the shareholders in general assembly: 
1) Issue any authorised but unissued shares; 
2) Issue or grant options in respect of any unissued shares; 
3) Create or issue, or permit the creation or issue of, any securities carrying rights of 
conversion into or subscription for shares; 
4) Sell, dispose of or acquire, or agree to sell, dispose of or acquire, assets of a material 
amount; or 
5) Enter into contracts otherwise than in the ordinary course of business. The notice 
convening such a general assembly of shareholders must include information about the 
offer or anticipated offer.875 
2. Gathering of irrevocable commitments876 
The Saudi M&A Regulation stipulates that no party, including the offeree company, may 
contact a private individual for the purpose of gathering irrevocable commitments to accept or 
reject an offer without consulting with the Authority; the exact language reads: “[a]ny person 
proposing to contact a private individual with a view to seeking an irrevocable commitment to 
accept or refrain from accepting an offer or contemplated offer must consult the Authority in 
advance.”877 This provision intends to prevent the offeree company from seeking commitments 
from large shareholders to reject the offer.878 It is also meant to prevent the use of the so-called 
                                                          
875 Id. at art. 24(a).  
876 VYDRA, supra note 850, at 19. 
877 Mergers and Acquistions Regulation, art. 8(c).  
878 VYDRA, supra note 850,  at 19. 
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“White Squire” defense, in which a third company agrees to buy a large stake in the offeree 
company in order to discourage the offeror from making an acquisition bid.879  
3. Other Defensives Measures 
When asked about the legality of the White Knight defensive tactic, the Saudi Capital 
Market Authority verbally answered that such actions may not take place.880 Mr. Vydra believes 
that Saudi does not have a rule that prohibits such a tactic, and he cites the need for more 
clarification from the Authority.881 Article 3 (i) of the Regulation lists protecting the company 
from predatory bidders as one of the actions that an offeree company’s board of directors may 
not take (i.e., the board is prohibited from doing anything without the shareholders’ approval 
that might frustrate an offer).882 
B. Defensive measures under the EC Directive 
The EC Directive aims to protect the shareholders of the offeree company and 
contemplates acquisition bids from the offeree shareholders’ point of view. Therefore, the 
Directive limits the power of the board of the offeree company in terms of the defensive 
measures it may take.883 The Directive requires that the board of the offeree company must not 
take any action that would place barriers against the bid without the prior approval of the 
shareholders: 
During the period referred to in the second subparagraph, the board of the offeree 
company shall obtain the prior authorisation of the general meeting of shareholders given 
for this purpose before taking any action, other than seeking alternative bids, which may 
result in the frustration of the bid and in particular before issuing any shares which may 
result in a lasting impediment to the offeror’s acquiring control of the offeree company. 




882 Mergers and Acquisitions Regulation, art. 3(i). 
883 Council Directive on takeover bids, art. 9(2), 2004 O.J. (L 142) (EC). 
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Such authorisation shall be mandatory at least from the time the board of the offeree 
company receives the information referred to in the first sentence of Article 6(1) 
concerning the bid and until the result of the bid is made public or the bid lapses. Member 
States may require that such authorisation be obtained at an earlier stage, for example as 
soon as the board of the offeree company becomes aware that the bid is imminent.884 
The Directive’s rule requiring that offeree shareholders approve any board action that might 
frustrate a bid offer represents a transfer of power and decision making from the board to the 
shareholders.885 This approach is consistent with the goal of protecting shareholders because it 
provides shareholders the opportunity to decide for themselves what is in their best interests. 
This approach differs from an approach that allows the board of the offeree company to use 
defensive measures. One reason to restrict offeree boards is out of concern that they may only be 
resisting a takeover because they fear they will lose their positions on the board should a bid 
succeed.886  
C. Observations 
The author observes that the Saudi M&A Regulation and the EC Directive include 
similar rules governing defensive measures. The author does not recommend changes in this 
regard. 
§6.16. Disclosures Required During the M&A Period 
A.  Under the Saudi M&A Regulation 
Saudi’s M&A Regulation requires disclosures to either the public or the Authority in the 
following scenarios: 
                                                          
884 Id. 
885 Goergen, M., Martynova, M., and Renneboog, L. D. R. (2005), Corporate Governance Convergence: Evidence 
from Takeover Regulation Reforms in Europe, 17-8 (TILEC Discussion Paper; Vol. 2005-017, Tilburg: TILEC, 
available at https://pure.uvt.nl/portal/en/publications/corporate-governance-convergence(a78ee12f-8ac2-4866-b3d9-
080604c3ab00).html (last visited December 25, 2015). 
886 Id. at 8-9 and 17-9. 
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1. Reportable dealings by the offeror and offeree 
Certain disclosures must be made to the public of any dealings in the relevant securities 
by the offeree or the offeror or any party acting in concert for their accounts during the offer 
period.887 Certain disclosures must be made to the Authority when either the offeree or the 
offeror or any party acting in concert deals in the relevant securities for their clients.888 
2. Reportable ownership 
Any ownership of 1% of a company’s securities by a party or any party acting in concert 
from either the offeror company or the offeree company is obligated to be disclosed to the 
Authority.889 
B. Under the UK Takeover Code 
The UK Takeover Code also requires that disclosures of ownership of 1% or more of the 
securities of the offeror or the offeree must be made.890 
C. Observations 
The author observes that both the Saudi M&A Regulation and the UK Takeover Code 
stipulate that ownership of 1% or more of the securities of the offeror or the offeree must be 
disclosed. The author does not recommend changes in this regard. 
                                                          
887 M&A Regulation, art. 11(a) reads as following: “(a) Dealings by parties and by persons acting in concert 
Dealings in relevant securities by an offeror or the offeree company, and by any person acting in concert with an 
offeror or the offeree company, for their own account during an offer period must be publicly disclosed.”  
888 M&A Regulation, art. 11(b) reads as following: “(b) Dealings by parties and by persons acting in concert for 
non-discretionary account Dealings in relevant securities during an offer period by an offeror or the offeree 
company, and by any person acting in concert with such persons, for the account of clients must be disclosed to the 
Authority.” 
889 M&A Regulation, art. 11(c) reads as following: “(c) Dealings by 1% shareholders or more 1) A person who 
(alone or with any person acting in concert with it), during an offer period, owns 1% or more of any class of relevant 
securities of an offeror or of the offeree company or as a result of any transaction will own 1% or more, has a 
reportable interest. 2) Any reportable interest, and any change in the level of any reportable interest, must be 
reported to the Authority at the end of each trading day. 3) Reports made under this Article 11 may be made public 
by the Authority.” 
890 The Takeover Code, 2013, Rule 8.3(a) (U.K.). 
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§6.17. Disclosures of Ownership of Shares Outside the Offer Period 
A. Under the Saudi system 
The Listing Rules require that any party that acquires 5% or more of the target company 
must, by the end of the business day in which that share is acquired, notify the target company 
and the Authority.891 The Listing Rules also requires that the party that acquires this 5% (or 
more) of the target company must notify the target company and the Authority if its share 
increases or decreases by 1% of the 5% threshold by the end of the business day in which the 5% 
threshold decreases or increases.892 
B. Under the UK system 
The Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) under the UK system is equivalent to the Capital 
Market Authority in Saudi Arabia. The FCA provides Disclosures and Transparency Rules that 
require the disclosure of acquisitions of certain percentages of a UK public company.893 The 
FCA rules stipulate the required percentage that must be disclosed as the following: 
A person must notify the issuer of the percentage of its voting rights he holds as 
shareholder or holds or is deemed to hold through his direct or indirect holding of 
[certain] financial instruments …if the percentage of those voting rights: 
(1) reaches, exceeds or falls below 3%, 4%, 5%, 6%, 7%, 8%, 9%, 10% and each 1% 
threshold thereafter up to 100% … as a result of an acquisition or disposal of shares or 
[certain] financial instruments….894 
C. Observations  
The author observes that both the Saudi Listing Rules and the UK Disclosures and 
Transparency Rules require disclosures when certain percentages of public company’s shares are 
                                                          
891 The Listing Rules, art. 45(a)(1). 
892 Id. at art. 45(a)(2). 
893 THOMPSON, JR., supra note 490, at 1101-02. 
894 Id. at 1102. Also see The Disclosures and Transparency Rules, Rule 5.1.2, the most updated version of FCA 
Handbook as of 2015, November 26, available at 
https://www.handbook.fca.org.uk/handbook/DTR/5/1.html?date=2015-11-26 (last visited March 13, 2016). 
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acquired or disposed of outside the takeover regulations. The author does not recommend 
changes in this regard.  
§6.18. Squeeze Out and Sell Out Rules Under the EC Directive 
A. The squeeze out and sell out  
The Saudi M&A Regulation deals with takeover bids, but it does not include rules 
governing the “squeeze out” and “sell out” scenarios that may follow a bid. The squeeze out 
right applies to the acquirer: when the acquirer acquires a certain percentage of the target 
company following the bid, the acquirer is given the right to force the remaining minority 
shareholders to tender their shares to the acquirer for a fair price.895 The sell out right, on the 
other hand, applies to the minority shareholders: when the acquirer acquires a certain percentage 
of the target company’s shares following the bid, the remaining minority shareholders can force 
the acquirer to buy their shares for a fair price.896 Therefore, the information in this section 
presents principles stipulated in the EC Directive regarding these concepts. The author believes 
Saudi’s M&A Regulation should add squeeze and sell out provisions modeled after those found 
in the EC Directive; such provisions would allow the Saudi Regulation to better meet the 
economic needs of companies and shareholders involved in companies undergoing M&A 
activity. 
The EC Directive sets general rules that the offeror should have the opportunity and the 
right to acquire the rest of the shares of the offeree company if the offeror, as a result of the bid, 
acquires a certain percentage.897 The EC Directive also states that when the offeror acquires a 
certain percentage of the shares of the offeree, the offeree’s minority shareholders should have 
                                                          
895 Clerc, supra note 803 , at 87. 
896 Id. 
897 Council Directive on takeover bids, the Recital (24). 
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the opportunity and right to require the offeror to buy their shares.898 These principles read as 
following: 
Member States should take the necessary measures to enable an offeror who, following a 
takeover bid, has acquired a certain percentage of a company’s capital carrying voting 
rights to require the holders of the remaining securities to sell him/her their securities. 
Likewise, where, following a takeover bid, an offeror has acquired a certain percentage of 
a company’s capital carrying voting rights, the holders of the remaining securities should 
be able to require him/her to buy their securities. These squeeze-out and sell-out 
procedures should apply only under specific conditions linked to takeover bids. Member 
States may continue to apply national rules to squeeze-out and sell-out procedures in 
other circumstances.899 
B. The squeeze out right 
The EC Directive states that an offeror that acquires 90% of a company as a result of a 
bid should be allowed to acquire the remaining minority stake and “squeeze out” the minority 
shareholders at a fair price.900 The EC Directive states that the squeeze right shall be introduced 
under certain specific situations: 
Member States shall ensure that an offeror is able to require all the holders of the 
remaining securities to sell him/her those securities at a fair price. Member States shall 
introduce that right in one of the following situations: 
(a) where the offeror holds securities representing not less than 90 % of the capital 
carrying voting rights and 90 % of the voting rights in the offeree company, or 
(b) where, following acceptance of the bid, he/she has acquired or has firmly contracted 
to acquire securities representing not less than 90 % of the offeree company’ s capital 
carrying voting rights and 90 % of the voting rights comprised in the bid.901 
The EC Directive permits an EC member state, if it chooses, to raise the percentage of shares 
that the offeror must acquire in order to trigger the squeeze right; however, in no case may this 
percentage be higher than 95%.902 
                                                          
898 Id.  
899 Id. 





Because the time period allowed for the acceptance of a bid may not be less than two 
weeks nor longer than 10 weeks,903 the offeror has a specific time period during which it may 
exercise the squeeze out right.904 This time period is within three months from the end of the 
time period that was set for the acceptance of the bid.905  
The EC Directive requires that the price offered to the minority shareholders be fair, and 
that the compensation may either be in cash or the in same form of compensation that was 
provided for payment of the bid.906 
C. The sell out right 
The EC Directive also gives to the shareholders who eventually follow the bid to become 
a 10% minority in the offeree company the right to require the offeror to buy their shares.907 The 
EC Directive states that the when the offeror acquires 90% of the offeree company, the sell out 
right shall trigger and shall proceed in the same manner prescribed for the squeeze out right in 
Article 15.908 
D. Observations 
While the EC Directive includes rules covering the squeeze out rule, the Saudi M&A 
Regulation does not have such rules. The EC Directive sets a percentage of 90% as the threshold 
of ownership at which an acquirer can squeeze out the minority. 
Chapter 5 discusses the merger rules according to the Saudi Companies Law, which 
stipulates that a minimum of 75% of votes is required for approval of a merger. Therefore, the 
author argues that it would be more consistent, logical and efficient for a 75% ownership stake 
                                                          
903 Id. at art. 7(1). 
904 Id. at art. 15(4). 
905 Id. 
906 Id. at art. 16(5). 
907 Id. at art. 16(2). 
908 Id. at art. 16(2)(3). 
302 
 
(after the bid) to also be the percentage of share ownership needed for an acquirer to be eligible 
to squeeze out the minority. This observation should also apply to the sell out rule, which should 
be included in the Saudi M&A Regulation. In other words, the minority should have the right to 
require the offeror to buy their shares if the offeror acquires 75% (or more) of the target 
company’s shares following the bid. Transactions would likely become more efficient in Saudi 
Arabia if such sell out and squeeze out rights were included in the Saudi M&A Regulation, 
because the existence and exercise of such rights would mean that such actions would not require 
approval in a shareholder meeting. 
E. Recommendations  
1- The Saudi Companies Law requires only a 75% majority vote to approve a merger; 
however, adopting a “squeeze out” rule as a specific potential result of the acceptance of 
a tender offer would make the Saudi M&A Regulation more efficient and likely would 
facilitate acquisitions. The squeeze out provision would give the acquiring company the 
ability to acquire the target without the need for a shareholders’ meeting to approve the 
acquisition. The Saudi M&A Regulation should include a provision that gives an offeror 
that acquires 75% or more of a target company via a tender offer the right to squeeze out 
the minority shareholders at a fair price.  
2- The Saudi M&A Regulation also should adopt a “sell out” rule. The Saudi Companies 
Law should include a provision that gives the minority shareholders of the acquired 
company, once it 75% or more of it has been acquired by an offeror’s tender offer, the 
right to be able to sell out their minority shares.  
3- The squeeze out and sell out concepts are important because both provide exit 
mechanisms for minority shareholders in case the minority does not wish to retain stock 
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in a company after 75% of it has been acquired by an offeror. These mechanisms also 
provide a tool that the majority stake may use to squeeze the minority out, giving the 
majority complete control of the management of the corporation. Both concepts provide 
economic advantages.  
§6.19. Summary of the Recommendations 
1- The title of the Saudi M&A Regulation should be changed to “Takeover Regulation.” 
2- The Saudi M&A Regulation states that the offeror shall specify the duration and 
dates of the offer in an offer timeline that the Capital Market Authority must 
approve. The author argues that the M&A Regulation should require the offeror to 
specify that the time period for acceptance of an offer must be not less than two 
weeks and not more than 10 weeks. Some time limit on the acceptance period 
must be required.  
3- The Capital Market Authority should not have the discretionary right to trigger 
the mandatory offer rule in the case of a party that acquires 50% of a target 
corporation. The mandatory offer rule loses its intended purpose and function if it 
is not automatically triggered when the threshold of 50% ownership of the target 
company’s shares is reached. Allowing the mandatory offer rule to trigger 
automatically, rather than at the discretion of the Authority, would allow the rule 
to be exercised objectively, which would promote stability and trust in the Saudi 
stock market. The market would remain more stable if shareholders in the target 
company had confidence that they would have the opportunity to tender their 
shares if a bidder acquired a controlling stake in the target company. Also, the 
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acquiring party likely would only attempt to acquire a stake of 50% or more if it 
were prepared to acquire some or all of the rest of the target shares. 
4- The Saudi Capital Market Authority should include a provision that clearly 
permits, or at the least, does not restrict, a reverse breakup fee. The Saudi Capital 
Market Authority should specify that such a fee, along with arrangements that 
impose obligations on the offeror, are excluded from any restrictions on 
inducement fees; this would bring the Saudi Capital Market Authority in line with 
the UK Takeover Code in this regard. This provision would make corporations 
aware of the Saudi approach to reverse breakup fees, which might help them to 
structure their breakup fee provisions accordingly. 
5- The Saudi M&A Regulation should provide a “squeeze out” rule that could be applied in 
the process of the acceptance of a tender offer as it would make the M&A Regulation 
more efficient and would facilitate acquisitions. A squeeze out provision gives an 
acquiring company the ability to acquire a target without the need to call a meeting of its 
shareholders to approve the acquisition. The Saudi M&A Regulation should include a 
provision that gives an offeror that acquires 75% or more of a target company via a 
tender offer the right to squeeze out the remaining offeree minority shareholders at a fair 
price.  
6- The Saudi M&A Regulation should adopt a “sell out” rule—a provision that gives the 
minority shareholders of the acquired company, when 75% or more of it is acquired via a 
tender offer, the right to sell out their shares to the acquiring party.  
7- The sell out concept is important because it provides an exit mechanism for minority 
shareholders in the offeree company, should they not wish to own stock in a company 
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that may change materially under the leadership of the new 75% (or more) majority 
shareholder. The squeeze out mechanism provides a tool for the majority shareholder to 
squeeze out the minority at a fair price and thus consolidate total control over 
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This chapter focuses on the Saudi tax rules that apply to M&A transactions in Saudi 
Arabia and addresses how Saudi income tax law in particular applies to M&A transactions. The 
chapter begins by enumerating the basic Saudi tax rules in Section 7.2. Section 7.3 deals with the 
application of Saudi tax rules to M&A transactions, provides a general comparison with the US 
tax treatment of M&A, and emphasizes the need for Saudi income tax law to adopt specific rules 
that govern M&A. Section 7.4 provides a summary of the chapter and Section 7.5 outlines 
recommendations. 
§7.2. Basic Introduction to the Tax and Zakat System in Saudi Arabia 
A. Introduction 
According to the EY G20 Entrepreneurship Barometer 2013, “Saudi Arabia ranks at the 
top of the EY G20 Entrepreneurship Barometer 2013 for its tax and regulatory frameworks.”910 
The tax system in Saudi Arabia is not as complex systems found in other countries, but Saudi 
does have two types of taxes. The first, called “Zakat,” applies only to Saudi Arabian citizens or 
Saudi Arabian commercial entities, according to Islamic principles.911 The second type of tax is 
an income tax on non-Saudi Arabian commercial entities.912 
                                                          
910 ASHRAF ABU-SHARKH AND WALEED AL SHUBAILI, THE POWER OF THREE. TOGETHER, GOVERNMENTS, 
ENTREPRENEURS AND CORPORATIONS CAN SPUR GROWTH ACROSS THE G20, 4 (The EY G20 Entrepreneurship 
Barometer, 2013), available at http://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/EY-G20-country-report-2013-Saudi-
Arabia/$FILE/EY-G20-country-report-2013-Saudi-Arabia.pdf (last visited March 6, 2016). 
911 Thinking Beyond Borders, Saudi Arabia (2013), available at 
http://www.kpmg.com/Global/en/IssuesAndInsights/ArticlesPublications/thinking-beyond-
borders/Documents/saudi-arabia-2013.pdf. See also the Saudi Arabian Law Overview, available at 




The Department of Zakat and Income Tax (DZIT) is the government agency in charge of 
all tax and Zakat in the Kingdom and is controlled by the Ministry of Finance.913 It operates 
according to its own income tax law and the Implementing Regulation that governs taxes in 
Saudi Arabia.914 
B. Department of Zakat and Income Tax (DZIT) 
In 2016, the Director of the Department of Zakat and Income Tax, Ibrahim bin 
Mohammed Al Mefleh, stated that Zakat and tax revenues collected during the fiscal year 2015 
increased 7% compared to those collected during the previous year; the 2015 total was SAR 30 
billion.915 For the purposes of this dissertation, when discussing Saudi’s Income Tax Law, this 
paper will address only those details that the reader needs to understand in order to have a 
sufficient grasp of tax and Zakat concepts as they relate to M&A in Saudi Arabia. 
C. Zakat 
Zakat is the third pillar of Islam; it is a mandatory taxation imposed on Muslims by the 
Qur’an, which commands Muslims to “be steadfast in prayer and regular in charity: [a]nd 
whatever good ye send forth for your souls before you, ye shall find it with God. [F]or God sees 
Well all that ye do.”916 Zakat is an annual Islamic taxation of 2.5% of a Muslim’s wealth that is 
to be given to the poor and the needy.917  
1. The people who deserve Zakat 
The Qur'an describes 8 categories of people to whom Zakat should be paid: 
                                                          
913 Department of Zakat and Income Tax, available at https://dzit.gov.sa/en/brief-about-dzit (last visited January 5, 
2015). 
914 Id. 
915 Growth in the Revenue of the Department of Zakat and Income Tax, ALRIYADH NEWSPAPER, January 1, 2016, 
Issue No. 17357, available at http://www.alriyadh.com/1115398. (last visited March 20, 2016). 
916 al-Baqarah Sura, verse 110. 
917 See Imam Kamil Mufti, The Third Pillar of Islam: Compulsory Charity. Available at 
http://www.islamreligion.com/articles/46/third-pillar-of-islam/ (last visited March 6, 2016). 
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Alms are for [1] the poor and [2] the needy, and [3] those employed to administer the 
(funds); for [4] those whose hearts have been (recently) reconciled (to Truth); for [5] 
those in[ ]bondage and [6] in debt; [7] in the cause of God[,][] and for [8] the wayfarer: 
[1299] (thus is it) ordained by God, and God is full of knowledge and wisdom.918 
These are the 8 groups of people that deserve to receive Zakat, which cannot be used for 
purposes other those stated in this verse of the Qur'an.  
2. Zakat base 
In 1950, Saudi Arabia enacted a regulation for Zakat comprising 20 articles.919 The Zakat 
Implementing Regulation stipulates that “[c]apital and its proceeds, receipts, profits and gains of 
Zakat payers are subject to Zakat in accordance with relevant Islamic provisions.”920 
D. Income tax base 
Article 6 of the Saudi Income Tax Law states that income tax is a tax imposed on the 
income of non-Saudi shares,921 and it defines income tax in this way: “[t]axable income is the 
gross income including all revenues, profits, and gains of any type and of any form of payment 
resulted from carrying out an activity, including capital gains922 and any incidental revenues, 
                                                          
918 al-Tawbah Sura, verse 60. 
919 Department of Zakat and Income Tax, available at https://dzit.gov.sa/en/brief-about-dzit (last visited January 5, 
2015). 
920 Zakat Implementing Regulation, art. 2, Issued in 6/8/1370 H (corresponding to 13/5/1950) according to 
Ministerial Resolution number 393. 
921 Article 6 of the Saudi Income Tax states the following:  
“(a) The tax base of a resident capital company is the shares of non-Saudi partners in its taxable income from any 
activity from sources within the Kingdom, minus expenses permitted under this Law. 
(b) The tax base of a resident non-Saudi natural person is his taxable income from any activity from sources within 
the Kingdom, minus expenses permitted under this Law. 
(c) The tax base of a non-resident who performs an activity within the Kingdom through a permanent establishment 
is his taxable income arising from or related to the activity of such establishment, minus expenses permitted under 
this Law. 
(d) The tax base of each natural person is determined separately. 
(e) The tax base of a capital company is determined separately of its shareholders or partners.” 
922 Mr. Arif Saeed describes the Tax on M&A and Capital gains as the following “A capital gain arising out of a sale 
or transfer of assets is likely to be treated as a normal business income and will be taxed at the normal corporate tax 
rate. There is no transfer fee or stamp duty on the acquisition of shares or transfer of assets. There are no specific 
rules under the KSA taxation regime that specifically address mergers and acquisitions.” See Muhammad Arif 
Saeed, Saudi Arabia: Structuring Mergers & Acquisition Transactions in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, April 3, 
2010, available at 
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minus exempted income.”923 In other words, where non-Saudis are concerned, Saudi Arabia 
lumps all different types of income into one category, which it calls “gross income.” 
E. Gross income 
Saudi Arabia used to collect tax on a person’s capital, but it now collects tax on gross 
income instead.924 This approach makes a distinction between tax and Zakat, and it focuses Saudi 
tax collection on gross income, which simplifies the tax process.  
1. Capital gains case 
In 2009, a certain corporation made an appeal to the Department of Zakat and Income 
Tax925, 926, 927 over a dispute regarding the capital gains realized on non-Saudi shares that resulted 
from a merger between Lever Co. and Bin Zagar Ltd. The case was brought by the Department 
of Zakat and Income Tax (the Department), and Lever Co. and Bin Zagar Ltd. (the Parties), 
before the Appeal Committee to review a resolution of the First Instance Committee. This 
resolution dealt with the Parties’ request to deduct employee bonuses from the company’s tax 
base, as well as with the Department’s request to impose capital gains tax on the merger. 
By way of background, Lever Co. merged into Bin Zagar Ltd. (the Company). Before the 
merger, two shareholders owned both companies; these two shareholders owned the same 
percentage of shares in each company. Specifically, Abdullah and Saeed Bin Zagar Co., a Gulf 
State investor, owned 51% of the shares of Lever Co. and of Bin Zagar Ltd. The other investor, a 
foreign investor called Unilever Overseas Co., owned 49% of the shares of each company. The 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
http://www.mondaq.com/x/97194/M+A+Private%20equity/Structuring+Mergers+Acquisition+Transactions+in+the
+Kingdom+of+Saudi+Arabia. (last visited January 12, 2015). 
923 Saudi Income Tax Law, art. 8. 
924 Id. at 34. 
925 Tax Appeal Committee Decision No. 1284 in 2012, on the Appeal No. (1081-1084/ض) in 2009. 
926 This case is being discussed publicly for the first time in this dissertation. The treatment of this case in this paper 
is also the first time the case has been translated from the Arabic. 
927 Even though the decision is rendered by the Appeal Committee, it is still considered an administrative decision, 
which means it is not final and can be appealed before the Board of Grievances.  
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Company appealed before the Appeal Committee to dispute a resolution passed by the First 
Instance Committee. This resolution refused to deduct a bonus, which the Company had paid to 
an employee, from the Company’s tax base; the Company argued that this payment exceeded the 
severance required by the Labor and Workmen928 Law, but the First Instance Committee rejected 
that argument. The Department appeared before the Appeal Committee to dispute the First 
Instance Committee’s resolution that no capital gains tax should be imposed on the Company 
after the merger. For the purposes of this paper, only the dispute over the capital gains issues will 
be addressed. 
2. The Capital Gains Issue 
The Department appealed the First Instance Committee’s resolution that upheld the 
Company’s argument that it should not pay capital gains tax on the merger. The Department 
wanted to impose a capital gains tax of SAR 43,815,692 million (USD 116 million) on Lever 
Co.’s shares, because 49% of Lever Co. was owned by a foreign investor that was subject to 
taxation. The Company argued that the merger did not constitute a taxable event, because the 
two companies that existed before the merger were held by the same shareholders, each of which 
held the exact same percentage of shares in each company (as previously noted, 51% owned by 
Abdullah and Saeed Bin Zagar Co. and 49% owned by the Unilever Overseas Co.). The 
Company further argued that the two companies decided to increase the capital of the merged 
company to SAR 91,400,000 million (USD 24 million), and that they agreed that each 
shareholder would retain the same percentage of ownership in the new Company that each had 
held in each of the two pre-merger companies. The two companies were incorporated according 
to the book value. The merger took the form of an incorporation, in which Lever Co. merged into 
Bin Zagar Ltd. and ceased to exist, resulting in the cancellation its certificate of incorporation. 
                                                          
928 It can also be called the “Employment and Employees Law.” 
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The Appeal Committee confirmed the original judgment of the First Instance Committee and 
stated that such a merger does not involve the transfer of assets or shares, nor does it involve a 
sale or disposal. Most importantly, the Appeal Committee agreed that the merger did not yield 
capital gains. The core of the current transaction under the accounting standards was merely the 
incorporation of interests. Therefore, the Appeal Committee rejected the Department’s argument 
that the merger did result in capital gains. 
F. Shares owned by Saudi Arabian persons in joint stock companies 
Shares in joint stock companies that are held by Saudi Arabian persons are subject to 
Zakat according to Article 1 of the Royal Decree: “Zakat duty shall be collected in full in 
accordance with the provisions of Islamic law (Sharia) from all Saudi persons, shareholders of 
Saudi companies whose all shareholders are Saudi, and Saudi shareholders of joint companies 
whose shareholders are Saudi and non-Saudi.”929 Thus, if any Saudi person owns shares in any 
company, whether that company is fully or partially owned by Saudis, such shares are subject to 
Zakat. 
G. Shares owned by non-Saudi Arabian persons in joint stock companies 
The Saudi Tax Law defines the categories of persons subject to taxation; these persons 
may be natural or corporate entities, and they may be Saudi residents or non-residents who are 
conducting business in the Kingdom.930 The Saudi Tax Law states the following: 
Persons Subject to Taxation: 
(a) A resident capital company with respect to shares of non-Saudi partners. 
(b) A resident non-Saudi natural person who conducts business in the Kingdom. 
                                                          
929 Royal Decree No.17, /2/28/3321, dated in 21/1/1370 H (2/11/1950). 
930 The Saudi Income Tax Law, art. 2.  
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(c) A nonresident who conducts business in the Kingdom through a permanent 
establishment. 
(d) A nonresident with other taxable income from sources within the Kingdom. 
(e) A person engaged in the field of natural gas investment. 
(f) A person engaged in the field of oil and hydrocarbons production.931 
Article 3 of the Law defines in detail what it means to be resident in Saudi Arabia: 
(a) A natural person is considered a resident in the Kingdom for a taxable year if he 
meets any of the two following conditions[:] 
(1) He has a permanent place of residence in the Kingdom and resides in the Kingdom for 
a total period of not less than thirty (30) days in the taxable year. 
(2) He resides in the Kingdom for a period of not less than one hundred eighty three 
(183) days in the taxable year. 
For purposes of this paragraph, residence in the Kingdom for part of a day is considered 
residence for the whole day, except in case of a person in transit between two points 
outside the Kingdom. 
(b) A company is considered resident in the Kingdom during the taxable year if it meets 
any of the following conditions: 
(1) It is formed in accordance with the Companies Law. 
(2) Its central management is located in the Kingdom.932 
Article 4 of the Law describes situations that constitute the creation of a permanent non-resident 
entity in Saudi Arabia: 
a) A permanent establishment of a nonresident in the Kingdom, unless otherwise stated in 
this Article, consists of the permanent place of the nonresident's activity through which it 
carries out business, in full or in part, including business carried out through its agent. 
(b) The following are considered a permanent establishment: 
(1) Construction sites, assembly facilities, and the exercise of supervisory activities 
connected therewith. 
                                                          
931 Id. 
932 Id. at art. 3. 
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(2) Installations, sites used for surveying natural resources, drilling equipment, ships used 
for surveying for natural resources as well as the exercise of supervisory activities 
connected therewith. 
(3) A fixed base where a nonresident natural person carries out business. 
(4) A branch of a nonresident company licensed to carry out business in the Kingdom. 
(c) A place is not considered a permanent establishment of a nonresident in the Kingdom 
if used in the Kingdom only for the following purposes: 
(1) Storing, displaying or delivering goods or products belonging to the nonresident. 
(2) Keeping a stock of goods or products belonging to the nonresident for the purpose of 
processing by another person. 
(3) Purchasing goods or products for the sole purpose of [the] collection of information 
for the nonresident. 
(4) Carrying out other activities of preparatory or auxiliary nature for the interests of the 
nonresident. 
(5) Drafting contracts for signature in connection with loans, delivery of goods or 
activities of technical services. 
(6) Performing any series of activities stated in subparagraphs (1) to (5) of this paragraph. 
(d) A nonresident partner in a resident partnership is considered an owner of a permanent 
establishment in the Kingdom, in the form of an interest in a partnership.933 
Finally, the Law states that if income can be shown to have “accrued” in Saudi Arabia, this 
income is subject to Saudi tax: 
(a) Income is considered accrued in the Kingdom in any of the following cases: 
(1) If it is derived from an activity[,] which occurs in the Kingdom. 
(2) If it is derived from immovable property located in the Kingdom, including gains 
from the disposal of a share in such immovable properties and from the disposal of 
shares, stocks or partnership in a company the property of which consists mainly, directly 
or indirectly of shares in immovable properties in the Kingdom. 
(3) If it is derived from the disposal of shares or a partnership in a resident company. 
(4) If it is derived from lease of movable properties used in the Kingdom. 
                                                          
933 Id. at art. 4. 
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(5) If it is derived from the sale or license for use of industrial or intellectual properties 
used in the Kingdom. 
(6) Dividends, management or directors' fees paid by a resident company. 
(7) Amounts paid against services rendered by a resident company to the company's head 
office or to an affiliated company. 
(8) Amounts paid by a resident against services performed in whole or in part in the 
Kingdom. 
(9) Amounts for exploitation of a natural resource in the Kingdom. 
(10) If the income is attributable to a permanent establishment of a nonresident located in 
the Kingdom, including income from sales in the Kingdom of goods of the same or 
similar kind as those sold through such a permanent establishment, and income from 
rendering services or carrying out another activity in the Kingdom of the same or similar 
nature as an activity performed by a non-resident through a permanent establishment. 
(b) Place of payment of the income shall not be taken into account in determining its 
source. 
(c) For purposes of this Article, a payment made by a permanent establishment of a 
nonresident in the Kingdom is considered as if paid by a resident company.934 
In summary, for the purposes of this paper, the reader should understand that in Saudi Arabia, 
income tax is imposed on joint-stock companies with respect to foreign shares. 
H. The difference between Zakat and income tax 
It is important to recognize the difference between income tax and Zakat, because the two 
concepts are entirely different. The main difference is that Zakat is collected based on wealth, 
while income tax is based only on gross income.935 The Saudi Arabian General Investment 
Authority describes how gross income is examined by the Department of Zakat and Income Tax: 
Saudi Arabian Tax Law does not distinguish between different categories of income. 
Gross income consists of all gains, profits or other net income arising from business 
transactions carried out within Saudi Arabia. If transactions are carried out in part or in 
whole inside Saudi Arabia[,] all income derived from the transactions will be considered 
                                                          
934 Id. at art. 5. 




part of the Saudi Tax Base and potentially taxable in Saudi Arabia. Capital gains are 
treated as ordinary income. The same principle applies to gains derived from the sale of 
shares in partnerships or companies registered in Saudi Arabia. Usually, profits from 
sales are calculated by subtracting the re-evaluated book value (or the market price, if it is 
lower) of the shares from the sale price. In the case of recently established corporations[,] 
sometimes only the historical book value is subtracted from the sale price. The law does 
not, however, prescribe any particular method. Interest earned on capital in Saudi Arabia 
is considered part of gross income. The same applies to rents, licen[s]e fees or royalties 
for the use of patents, copyrights, secret processes, formulae, good will, and trademarks, 
etc., registered in Saudi Arabia. Dividends on shares in corporations registered in Saudi 
Arabia are added to gross income, unless corporate tax or Zakat has already been 
charged. Income derived by Saudi-resident companies from operations outside Saudi 
Arabia is also assessed as gross income.936 
While income tax is imposed on income, Zakat in Saudi Arabia is imposed on “capital and its 
proceeds, receipts, profits and gains of zakat payers from commerce, industrial activity, personal 
endeavors, financial properties and belongings, of whatever type and form, and inclusive of 
financial and commercial deals, dividends, in general any type of receipt that is zakatable 
according to Islamic Jurisprudence, are subject to zakat.”937 In other words, Zakat is imposed on 
the whole wealth of the Zakat payer. Both income tax and Zakat are collected on an annual 
basis.938 A predominant Islamic jurist, Maymun Bin Mahran (660-635),939 summarizes Zakat 
based on his interpretation of Zakat provisions in this way: “When Zakat falls due, a Muslim 
should see his property, whether cash or commodities, and estimate it in cash. If you owe debts 
to others, calculate their value and take them out of the total property and pay Zakat on the 
residual.”940 
                                                          
936 From the Saudi Arabian General Investment Authority, available at 
https://www.sagia.gov.sa/Documents/Laws/Corporate%20Income%20Tax.pdf (last visited March 13, 2015). 
937 Zakat Implementing Regulation, art. 3.  
938 SULTAN ALSULTAN, ZAKAT-PROVISIONS AND APPLICATIONS (IN ARABIC), SAUDI ORGANIZATION FOR 
ACCOUNTING PUBLICATIONS 17, 1st ed, 23 , 43 (Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, 1997). 
939 See Muhammed bin Ahmad, Althahabi A’lam Alnubala, The biographies of Nobles, 72-8 (11th ed, Lebanon, 
Alresallah). The book is in Arabic and 28 volumes that cover the biographies of Islamic scholars since the beginning 
of Islam until the Althahabi’s life (1239-1347); see the first page of the same book. 
940 The Ministry of Islamic Affairs, Endowments, Da`wah, and Guidance, available at http://zakat.al-
islam.com/Loader.aspx?pageid=958&TOCID=14&BookID=696&PID=17(last visited March 19, 2016); SULTAN 
ALSULTAN, ZAKAT-PROVISIONS AND APPLICATIONS (IN ARABIC), SAUDI ORGANIZATION FOR ACCOUNTING 
PUBLICATIONS 17, 89 (1st ed, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, 1997).  
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I. The corporate tax rate in Saudi Arabia 
For Saudi shareholders, the Zakat on shares they hold of commercial entities is 2.5%.941 
Tax on the shares of a non-Saudi shareholder is generally 20% of the company’s annual 
income.942 Tax on natural gas companies is 30% of the company’s annual income, and tax on 
hydrocarbon companies is 85%, as stated in Article 7 of the Saudi Tax Law: 
(a) The tax rate of the tax base is twenty percent (20%) for each of the following: 
(1) A resident capital company. 
(2) A non-Saudi resident natural person who conducts business. 
(3) A nonresident person who conducts business in the Kingdom through a permanent 
establishment. 
(b) The tax rate of the tax base for a taxpayer engaged only in natural gas investment 
activities is thirty percent (30%). 
(c) The tax rate of the tax base for a taxpayer engaged in the production of oil and 
hydrocarbon materials is eighty five percent (85%).943 
However, Article 6 of the Saudi Tax Law sets out a tax base according to the following 
provisions: 
a) The tax base of a resident capital company is the shares of non-Saudi partners in its 
taxable income from any activity from sources within the Kingdom minus expenses 
permitted under this Law. 
(b) The tax base of a resident non-Saudi natural person is his taxable income from any 
activity from sources within the Kingdom minus expenses permitted under this Law. 
(c) The tax base of a non-resident who performs an activity within the Kingdom through 
a permanent establishment is his taxable income arising from or related to the activity of 
such establishment minus expenses permitted under this Law. 
(d) The tax base of each natural person is determined separately. 
                                                          
941 The Ministry of Finance, available at https://www.mof.gov.sa/English/Pages/zakahinterest.aspx (last visited 
January 5, 2015). 




(e) The tax base of a capital company is determined separately of its shareholders or 
partners.944 
Most importantly, Saudi Tax Law does not address the application of taxes on M&A 
transactions.  
J. Tax incentives 
Saudi Arabia has begun to offer tax incentives to attract investors, including conditional 
ten-year tax incentives in certain regions in the north of the Kingdom, such as the Border Area, 
Al-Jawf, Najran, Al-Baha, Jazan and Hail.945 
An article written by two notable experts on Saudi tax laws explains these tax incentives 
and the conditions that pertain to them administratively and legislatively in the following way:  
Foreign investors will be granted tax credit (tax deduction) against the annual tax payable 
in respect of the following costs incurred on Saudi employees for 10 years (the 
"Employment Incentive"), to be calculated as follows: 
50% of the annual cost incurred on [the] training of Saudi employees; and 
50% of the annual salaries paid to Saudi employees, if there is any balance of tax payable 
after applying (1) above.[] In addition, investors will be granted a tax credit for 10 years 
equal to 15% of the paid up capital of industrial projects whether in cash or in kind as 
well as in case of capital increase (the "Capital Incentive"). 
Conditions 
The Council of Ministers[’] Decision empowers the Minister of Finance to issue the 
instructions, procedures and forms (the[] "Conditions") required for the implementation 
of the Council of Ministers[’] Decision. 
The Minister of Finance issued his resolution No. (2106) dated 18 July 2009 with the 
following Conditions in relation to the Tax Incentives: 
The project should be established in any of the regions of (Hai'l, Northern Borders, Jazan, 
Najran, Al Baha and Al Jouf) including the economic cities and industrial areas 
established in these regions. 
                                                          
944 Id. at art. 6. 
945 Ben Cowling and Saud Alrifi, Tax Incentives In The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, July 11, 2012, available at 
http://www.mondaq.com/x/186196/tax+authorities/Tax+Incentives+In+The+Kingdom+Of+Saudi+Arabia (last 
visited January 5, 2015). 
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The project should be licensed from the Saudi Arabian General Investment Authority. 
The project paid up capital - whether in cash or in kind – shall not be less than SAR 1 
million. 
The project shall maintain regular accounts audited by a certified Saudi auditor. 
If the project established in any of the above mentioned regions is a branch of a company 
or a corporation established in another region, it shall be an independent project with an 
independent capital, [and] shall maintain independent accounts to be audited by the 
project auditor and submitted with an independent tax return in addition to the 
consolidated return of the activity. 
The Tax Incentives shall not be extended to other dependent projects established in 
regions other than those stated in the Council of Ministers[’] Decision. 
All the projects established in the regions stated in the Council of Ministers[’] Decision 
shall benefit from the Tax Incentives[,] whether such projects are established before or 
after the issuance of the Council of Ministers[’] Decision.[] The Tax Incentives set out in 
the Council of Ministers[’] Decision shall apply as of the year in which the project starts 
to benefit from the Tax Incentives up to ten years in respect of the taxable years 
commencing and ending on or after the date of issuance of the Council of Ministers[’] 
Decision.946 
K. Note regarding taxes levied on Saudi M&A transactions 
A British lawyer who works in Saudi Arabia, Mr. Abdukhalilov, raises an interesting 
issue regarding tax in Saudi Arabia on M&A transactions; the issue of the limitation period.947 
He advises the acquiring company to make sure that it checks the target company’s certificates 
of Zakat and tax issued by the Department of Zakat and Income Tax, as well as the filings for 
previous financial years.948 He also states that while Zakat has no limitation period, there is a 
five-year limitation period for tax liability, which means that the buyer must ask for “all pre-
completion zakat and tax liabilities of the target company.”949 
                                                          
946 Id.  





L. Tax practice for law firms in Saudi Arabia950 
As mentioned earlier, the author interviewed several lawyers and inquired how they work 
with taxes when they handle M&A transactions in Saudi Arabia. The lawyers explained that they 
include a disclaimer or a note in the engagement letter that they sign with clients that states that 
they are not responsible for tax issues. The author viewed one of these provisions, which stated 
that the firm excludes tax advice from its duty: “Please also note that under KSA laws, we are 
limited in our ability to provide tax advice. Tax specific issues related to any commercial activity 
in KSA should be sought from an accountancy firm licensed to practice in KSA.”951 The author’s 
research has shown that Zakat and income tax advice in Saudi Arabia is provided by accounting 
firms. Law firms do not offer tax-related counsel. The author spoke with several Saudi lawyers 
and also with several British and American lawyers who work in Saudi; all of these sources 
confirmed that law firms operating in Saudi are prohibited from providing Zakat or income tax 
advice in Saudi Arabia.952  
M. The need for expert judges in tax cases—Saudi-British Bank v. Department 
of Zakat and Income Tax953 2013954, 955 
The Saudi-British Bank (the Plaintiff) filed a case against the Department of Zakat and 
Income Tax (the Defendant) to force the Defendant to rescind its decision956 to refuse to deduct 
                                                          
950 During the course of this research, the author interviewed many lawyers, and did not encounter any lawyer who 
advises in tax. In fact, most say that they do not think there are any lawyers in Saudi who advise on Saudi tax 
matters. They say that accountancy firms deal with tax. 
951 A well-known law firm in Saudi Arabia. 
952 Also see Rules Governing Licensing to Provide Zakat and Income Tax Services, available at 
http://www.mci.gov.sa/en/LawsRegulations/LicensingRegulationsAndDecisions/Resolutionsoftheliberaprofessions/
3-11/Pages/3-41.aspx (last visited March 29, 2016). 
953 Decision number 8/E/D/375 for the case number K/1/4917 from the Board of Grievances Administrative Court, 
8th Circle. 
954 The case was initially was filed in 2009 and the decision was made in 2013. 
955 This dissertation is the first scholarly work to discuss this case publicly. One of the difficulties in evaluating such 
a case is obtaining cases records from the court. The public do not have access to search into cases. 
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two sets of losses from the Plaintiff’s 2003 tax base: certain operating losses in the amount of 
SAR 7,659,357 million (USD 2 million), and certain other losses on fixed assets not offered for 
sale in the amount of SAR 3.943.513 million (USD 1 million).  
The plaintiff argued that the Defendant’s decision violated Article 14 (d) of the Income 
Tax Law (1950),957 which states that losses are deductible from taxable income if these losses958 
are realized and not reimbursed in any way. The Plaintiff also argued that the Defendant violated 
Islamic principles by requiring Zakat on capital that should not have been considered subject to 
Zakat, because most of the money in dispute was either debt owed by people who did not have 
the funds to pay it, or it was money that was stolen. The Plaintiff argued that Zakat is only 
required after the passing of one year, and only from those that have the money in hand to pay 
it.959 The Defendant contended that the Plaintiff did not prove that it had exhausted all regulatory 
efforts to retrieve this money, as required by Law and by the precedent of other, similar cases. 
The Plaintiff replied that it had pursued all means to retrieve the funds and provided the court 
and the Defendant with evidence of the detailed process it had followed to try to retrieve the 
money. The court was convinced that the Plaintiff had attempted all methods of retrieving the 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
956 That means that the case is an administrative case before the Board of Grievances, because it was brought against 
a governmental agency’s decision, which is reviewed by the administrative courts in the Board of Grievances. 
957 This Article was in the old Income Tax code. It became Article 9 (3) A, B, C, D, E and F of the Regulation of 
Income Tax Law, which was enacted in 2004. Available in Arabic at https://dzit.gov.sa/regulations. 
958 One of the issues is that the court here uses here the word “losses,” while the law calls loans that were not paid 
“expenses” that are deductible. The conclusion is the same, but using the wrong word confuses the reader and shows 
that the concepts of tax and its disputes are new to Saudi Arabian courts. This also shows that complications may 
arise when there are tax disputes on M&A issues. Finally, this case also demonstrates the need to improve the Saudi 
judicial system in handling tax issues in association with the Department of Zakat and Income Tax. 
959 Another issue evident in this case is that the court used the words “Zakat” and “tax” interchangeably in some 
cases, and they are completely different. Tax is governed by the Income Tax Law and Zakat is governed by Zakat 
regulations, which were enacted in 1950. In the case, the Plaintiff in some places argued that Islamic rules prohibit 
imposing Zakat on money that was loaned to a person if the person went bankrupt because the money did not exist 
anymore. The court did not seem to object the argument. The criticism is that the court should have made it clear 
whether the Plaintiff is subject to tax or Zakat, because the result would be different depending on which set of 
regulations—the Income Tax Law and its regulations or the Zakat regulations—would apply. 
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money, which meant that its losses were deductible. Therefore, the court concluded that the 
decision of the Department of Zakat and Income Tax should be rescinded. 
Judges who review tax cases in Saudi Arabia must be aware of the Saudi tax system and 
its terminology. The writing of a court opinion must conform to Saudi Income Tax Law, 
especially if it uses phrases that are mentioned in the Income Tax Law. In writing opinions, the 
court also must define any phrases that may confuse the reader; the author pointedly raises this 
issue out of an awareness of the difference between Islamic Law and others schools of legal 
thought. Specifically, because most judges in Saudi Arabia have studied Islamic Law, which 
(again) differs in many ways in principle and expression from other legal systems, Saudi judges 
may express their ideas in a manner that uses expressions or makes assumptions that are unique 
to Islamic law. Such language may be natural to these judges, but this language will not be 
natural to readers that are unfamiliar with Islamic law. One example is the Zakat system, which 
originates in Islamic jurisprudence but is quite different in intent and practice from the income 
tax system. Most judges have been introduced to Zakat, but most have not been introduced to the 
Income Tax Law, which did not exist until 2004. As few tax cases have been published, the 
author encourages courts to publish tax cases. Doing so may give the public a better 
understanding of how the courts tend to review tax cases, and it may also provide opportunities 
for judges to learn how their review of tax cases might be enhanced and improved. 
N. An answer published by the Department of Zakat and Income Tax 
The following answer was published by the DZIT to answer a question raised by the 
public. 
Q: “A Bahraini Insurance company whose partners are Bahrainis and Saudis has 
established an insurance company in Saudi Arabia under the Cooperative Insurance 
System. The new company has acquired all operations, customers, offices and staff of the 
Bahraini company in the Kingdom in return for shares in the new company[,] for the 
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partners in the Bahraini company provided those partners dispose [sic] of their shares in 
the Bahraini company to the new company. Is this transaction subject to tax, or is it just 
an exchange of shares that result [sic] in no profit or loss to the Bahraini company? 
A: “There is a taxable disposition in this case. The gain from such disposition is the 
difference between the compensation received for the disposed asset and its cost base. 
Under Article (9) (h, I, and l) of the Income Tax Law, the compensation received is not 
necessarily in cash; in kind compensation in [the] form of shares in the new company is 
deemed to be cash compensation. Therefore, the capital gain realized from this 
transaction is taxable.”960 
O. Questions for the Department of Zakat and Income Tax regarding M&A961 
The author interviewed the Director General of the Department of Zakat and Income Tax, 
Ibrahim bin Mohammed Al Mefleh, on more than one occasion in order to gain a better 
understanding of the role of his Department in the process of an M&A transaction. The author 
was also very interested to learn more about how the Department of Zakat and Income Tax deals 
with forms of transactions (such as M&A) that are relatively new in Saudi Arabia. The author is 
the first person to have approached members of the Department with questions about M&A; 
further, the Department’s answers on various topics are published for the first time here in this 
paper. The author intends in this way to make a significant contribution to M&A lawyers and 
financial and accounting experts who work on M&A in Saudi Arabia. More importantly, the 
information provided in this paper may give corporations and investors, especially foreign 
investors, insight into how to structure their investments in Saudi Arabia.  
                                                          




3%26p_p_col_pos%3D1%26p_p_col_count%3D2 (last visited January 5, 2015). 
961 The author would like to take the opportunity here to thank the representatives of the Department of Zakat and 
Income Tax, in particular its Director General, for their support and great help. They were open to questions and 
very willing to help. They were modern in their methods, and the author would like to note how the Department was 
open to any ideas and suggestions that might help it achieve the best performance possible. 
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1. The relationship between the Department of Zakat and Income Tax 
and M&A transactions 
Before the author’s question and the answer session with members of the Department of 
Zakat and Income Tax, the author requested that the representative from the Department explain 
how the Department views M&A. The representative stated that “[a] merger or acquisition is a 
combination of two entities where one entity is absorbed by another entity. In order to effect an 
acquisition or a merger, the following should be done:  
1- Obtain approval of [the] relevant regulatory agency, such as [the] Ministry of Commerce 
and Industry and/or the Capital Market Authority.  
2- Have a financial statement showing [the] assets, liabilities, and equity of the 
absorbed/acquired entity at the date of [the] acquisition or merger.  
3- Settle all tax and zakat liabilities and close the file of the absorbed/acquired entity with 
the Department of Zakat and Income Tax (DZIT).”962 
2. Filing a tax or Zakat statement before consummating a transaction 
Q1: The author asked the DZIT representative whether, in the case of an M&A 
transaction between two companies of which at least one is foreign, a tax document related to the 
merger showing that the company/companies had paid its/their tax must be filed. The author also 
asked whether companies must file a Zakat document (again, showing that any Zakat owed had 
been paid) before the consummation of a merger or acquisition transaction in a case in which at 
least one of the parties is Saudi. 
A1: “Yes. The absorbed/acquired company should settle all its tax and [Z]akat liabilities, 
close its file and get a final certificate from DZIT.”963 
                                                          
962 A direct statement made to the author by a representative of the Department of Zakat and Income Tax. 
963 A direct answer provided to the author by a representative of the Department of Zakat and Income Tax. 
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3. Does structuring the transaction in a certain way affect the tax and 
Zakat income? 
Q2: The author asked the DZIT representative whether an M&A transaction can be 
structured in any way in Saudi Arabia that would reduce the amount of tax that must be paid. 
The author cited cases in certain other countries in which the structure of the M&A deal can 
affect the amount of tax that is levied. The author proposed a strategy in which a Saudi M&A 
transaction would be structured to include mostly Saudis, who would owe at most the 2.5% 
Zakat, and a minimal number of foreign investors, who would be taxed at 20%, in order to limit 
the number of people (e.g., the foreign investors) taxed at 20%. 
A2: The DZIT representative agreed that “[a]n entity could be formed with most of its 
shares held by Saudis, and there is no legal prevention for that.”964 
Q3: The author asked the DZIT representative how the DZIT views statutes of 
limitations, or the so-called limitation period. The author also asked what the acquirer of a 
company must examine before buying the company, especially in a case in which the acquired 
company did not pay taxes owed or had an incomplete financial report. 
A3: The DZIT representative answered that “[t]he statute of limitations regards the period 
[in which the] DZIT can make an assessment or reassessment on tax or zakat payers. DZIT can 
make a reassessment of a filed return within a period of 5 years of the date of filing. But in case 
of non-filing, incomplete or incorrect filing with the intent of tax evasion, DZIT can make a 
reassessment during a period of 10 years of the date of filing. The Statute of limitations concerns 
the period of assessment and refund[,] not the tax or zakat liabilities. As indicated above, the 
absorbed/acquired entity should settle all its liabilities, close its file and get a final certificate 
                                                          
964 A direct answer provided to the author by a representative of the Department of Zakat and Income Tax. 
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from DZIT before the acquisition or merger transaction.”965 This answer agrees with the advice 
of Mr. Abdukhalilov cited earlier in this chapter that buyers should seek an indemnity if the 
acquired company has an incomplete or incorrect financial report. 
4. Scenarios answered by the Department of Zakat and Income Tax 
a. Question 1 
What is the tax treatment for the following scenario?  
CartCo Company is a listed company with three shareholders: 25% is owned by the 
public, 25% is owned by a foreign investor and 50% is owned by a Saudi investor.  
What would the tax treatment be if CartCo is merged into SoulCo, a Saudi company, and 
100% of the shares of CartCo were transferred to SoulCo, and the consideration were cash? 
Would the tax be due before the deal was completed or rather by the end of SoulCo's financial 
year? Would the companies have to file and pay tax to the Department as a condition of 
consummating the transaction? Would the tax treatment be different if the consideration were 
shares; that is to say, if SoulCo increased its capital and issued shares to CartCo shareholders as 
payment for the merger? Would the tax treatment change if the companies were private or 
closely held?  
The Department of Zakat and Income Tax answered as follows:  
The tax treatment of the above scenario will be as follows:  
First: CartCo is subject to income tax on its income from the beginning of its financial 
period to the date of [the] merge[r] in [sic] regard to the foreign share (25%). CartCo is 
required to file a return based on its accounts for the period up to the date of the merge[r], 
meaning that CartCo should settle that tax and close its file with DZIT prior to 
completing the merge[r] transaction; [it should take these actions] as CartCo, a corporate 
[entity] with [a] financial position independent of SoulCo. The completion of the 
merge[r] means the termination and disappearance of CartCo.  
                                                          
965 A direct answer provided to the author by the Department of Zakat and Income Tax. 
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Second: The capital gain earned by [the] non-resident founding shareholders (Saudis and 
non-Saudis alike) is subject to income tax at a rate of 20% in accordance [with the] 
Income Tax Law (ITL), Article (5) and its Implementing Regulations (IR), Article (1), 
paragraph (2b).  
Third: The capital gain earned by [the] non-resident public shareholders (Saudis [and] 
non-Saudis alike) is subject to income tax at a rate of 20% in accordance [with] ITL, 
Article (5) and IR, Article (1), paragraph (2b)[,] unless it is a tax-exempt income in 
accordance with ITL, Article (10), and IR, Article (7). Companies that are private or 
closely held cannot benefit from the exemption stipulated in ITL, Article (10) or IR, 
Article (7)[,] as merge[r] transaction[s] for these companies will take place outside the 
stock market authority.  
Fourth: SoulCo will be subject to tax or Zakat, as the case may be, on its net income for 
[the entire] financial period during which the merge[r] has taken place. SoulCo is 
required to file its tax and or Zakat return (as the case may be after [the] merge[r]) based 
on accounts for the whole financial period and pay its due Zakat and tax accordingly.  
Fifth: The treatment is the same whether the consideration is cash or shares, taking into 
account that foreign shares transferred to SoulCo will be subject to ITL provisions.966 
b. Question 2 
YukCo is a private company and has three shareholders: 25% is owned by a Saudi 
investor, 25% is owned by a foreign investor and 50% is owned by a Saudi investor. YukCo 
merges into BuCo, a private company.  
What is the tax treatment if the consideration is cash?  
What is the tax treatment if the consideration is stock? 
What is the tax treatment if the transaction were an acquisition?  
The Department of Zakat and Income Tax answered as follows:  
“See the answer[s] to 1 above.  
The merge[r] is the transfer of an entity's (or entities') net assets, liabilities and equity to a 
new or existing company[;] therefore, a merge[r] can be looked at as an acquisition of 
some type.”967 
                                                          




c. Question 3 
In case of a company owned 50% by Saudi shareholders and 50% by foreign 
shareholders, and in which dividends are distributed, when are the taxes on these dividends 
assessed and when must the shareholders pay them? Are taxes filed and paid immediately or at 
the end of the financial year? How is the Zakat assessed? 
The Department of Zakat and Income Tax answered as follows:  
In such case, the non-resident shareholders (Saudis and non-Saudis alike) are subject to 
withholding tax at a rate of 5% of [the] gross amount distributed in accordance with IR, 
Article 63, paragraph 1. The distributing company is required to withhold that tax and 
remit it to DZIT within the first ten days of the month following the month of payment to 
the non-resident beneficiary. This is, of course, separate from the distributing 
company[’s] own tax or zakat; the distributing company will be subject to the ITL 
provisions in regard to non-Saudi shares and to zakat provisions in regard to Saudi 
shares. The company is required to file its [Z]ak[a]t/tax return after the end of its 
financial period and should pay due [Z]akat and tax accordingly.968 
§7.3. Application of Rules to M&A 
A.  Introduction 
This subsection addresses the rules that govern M&A transactions in Saudi Arabia, and it 
also provides a summary of the tax treatment of M&A transactions in the United States. The tax 
system in the US is complicated and unique to that country; its provisions do not fit the situation 
in Saudi Arabia. In comparing the two countries’ M&A regulations, the author wishes only to 
encourage Saudi Arabia to issue a minimum of rules that demonstrate its policy toward M&A 
transactions. This would provide for the equal treatment of all M&A transactions in Saudi, and 
would amend the current situation in which M&A transactions in Saudi are governed only by a 
set of generic rules, which are so broadly worded that their application sometimes varies from 




one transactional situation to another. The following tax rule will apply to the non-Saudi shares 
of a joint-stock company. 
B. Stock acquisition 
1. Acquisition of stock of closely held corporations in Saudi Arabia969 
a. Introduction  
The Saudi Income Tax Law lacks specific rules that govern M&A transactions; it 
contains only general rules that apply to all M&A transactions, regardless of whether the 
consideration is in the form of cash or stock. 
b. Cash  
If a closely held acquiring corporation acquires the stock of a closely held target 
corporation and the consideration is cash, the transaction is taxed on the capital gain realized970 
on the non-Saudi shares, according to Article 8 of the Saudi Income Tax Law. Article 8 of the 
Saudi Income Tax Law reads as follows: 
Taxable income is the gross income including all revenues, profits, and gains of any type 
and of any form of payment resulted from carrying out an activity, including capital gains 
and any incidental revenues, minus exempted income.971 
Also, according to Article 1 (1) (b) of the Implementing Regulation of the Saudi Income Tax 
Law, income is taxed if the income is a capital gain that results from the disposal of assets, or if 
the income is a capital gain that results from the disposal of shares of a resident company.972  
                                                          
969 The following sections regarding the Saudi tax as applied to M&A transactions is addressed only under the Saudi 
Income Tax Law. Therefore, these sections do not discuss the Zakat application on Saudi citizens, because Zakat has 
a different system and approach. The focus here is limited to analyzing and providing solutions or suggestions to 
improve the Saudi Income Tax Law. The main reform needed is to explicitly address M&A transactions in specific 
rules. 
970 As a general rule, capital gains can be calculated by taking the difference between the greater of the transaction 
price or the market price, and the cost basis of the stock or assets, according to Article 9 (a) of the Saudi Income Tax 
Law and according to Article 16 (7) (a), (b) of the Implementing Regulation of the Saudi Income Tax Law. 
971 The Saudi Income Tax Law, art. 8. 




If a closely held acquiring corporation acquires the stock of closely held target 
corporation in exchange for shares of the acquiring corporation, the general rule stipulated in 
Article 8 of the Saudi Income Tax Law and Article 1 (1) (b) applies, which means that any 
capital gain on the non-Saudi shares that is realized is taxed regardless of the form of 
consideration provided, and that therefore, the transaction is a taxable transaction.  
2. Acquisition of stock of closely held corporations in the US 
a. Introduction  
The tax system in the United States is governed by the US Department of the Treasury’s 
Internal Revenue Code.973 M&A transactions are also governed by the Internal Revenue Code.974 
The brief presentation in this section regarding the US tax treatment of M&A focuses on what 
the US tax code recognizes as the C Corporation.975 The difference between a C corporation and 
an S corporation is that a C corporation is taxed separately from its shareholders; this means that 
the C corporation is subject to tax on ordinary income and capital gains at the corporate level at a 
maximum 35% tax rate, while the shareholders of the C corporation are subject to tax on capital 
gain and dividends at the shareholder level at a maximum 20% tax rate.976 The S corporation is 
not subject to tax at the corporate level, because the S corporation passes all of its income and 
losses on to the shareholders.977  
The main factor governing whether a merger or acquisition is taxed or tax free in the US 
is the form of consideration provided in the transaction.978 When a certain percentage of the 
                                                          
973 JOHN A. MILLER AND JEFFERY A. MAINE, THE FUNDAMENTALS OF FEDERAL TAXATION, 3rd ed, 7 (Durham, North 
Carolina, Carolina Academic Press, 2013). 
974 THOMPSON, JR., supra note 490, at 391.  
975 Id. at 392. 
976 Id. at 392-93. 
977 Id. 
978 Id. at 395. 
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consideration provided by the acquiring corporation is in form of “boot” (cash or debt 
instruments other than stock), the transaction is taxable.979 Under specific conditions, if a 
significant part of the consideration provided by the acquiring corporation is stock, the 
transaction receives nonrecognition treatment, known as a “reorganization” under Section 368 of 
the Internal Revenue Code, which gives the transaction a tax-free treatment.980 The 
nonrecognition treatment or tax-free status essentially means that the tax is postponed or deferred 
until a taxable event occurs that triggers the recognition of income or capital gain.981 The reason 
for the tax-free treatment is that no change occurred in the economic position of the parties 
involved as a result of the transaction.982 
b. Cash 
Under US tax law, if stock of a closely held corporation is acquired in consideration of 
cash, the acquisition is considered a taxable stock acquisition.983 The target’s shareholders are 
taxed for capital gain on the money they receive upon the sale of the stock.984 The target 
corporation is not taxed at the corporate level if it sells its stock and the basis of its assets does 
not change, except in a case in which the acquirer elects Section 338 of the Internal Revenue 
Code, which causes the transaction to have an assets acquisition treatment.985 The election of 
Section 338 by the acquiring corporation causes the transaction to be treated like an asset 
transaction and gives it the advantage of receiving a “stepped up” basis for the target’s assets.986 
The stepped up basis means that the acquiring corporation’s basis for the assets acquired is equal 
                                                          
979 Id. 
980 Id. at 395-96. 
981 Id. at 395. See also MILLER AND MAINE, supra note 973, at 317. 
982 Id. 
983 THOMPSON, JR., supra note 490, at 397. 
984 Id. 




to the money paid for the assets.987 The acquirer generally receives the tax basis of the target’s 
stock, unless the acquirer chooses to elect Section 338; in that case, the acquirer will receive the 
new basis of the target’s assets—in other words, the new market value of the target’s assets.988 
c. Stock 
As a general rule, an exchanged stock receives nonrecognition treatment under Section 
354 of the Internal Revenue Code.989 In a case where boot (e.g., money) is also used as 
additional consideration in the transaction, the gain realized from the money received by the 
target’s shareholders is recognized under Section 356 of the Code.990 
Under US tax law, if the stock of a closely held target corporation is acquired and the 
consideration is stock, the transaction is non-taxable.991 A stock for stock acquisition can be 
treated as a tax-free acquisitive reorganization, known as a B reorganization, under Section 368 
(a) (1) (B) of the Code, if the closely held target corporation exchanges 80% of its voting rights 
for stock in the acquiring corporation.992 To qualify under this type of reorganization and have 
tax-free treatment, cash is not allowed as a form of payment.993 Stock received by the 
shareholders of the target and the acquirer is not taxed, which means that the shareholders of the 
closely held target corporation receive the same basis that they had for their shares previously in 
the stock of the acquiring corporation; this is known as a substituted basis.994 Also, the acquiring 
corporation takes the basis of the shareholders of the closely held corporation, which is known as 
a carryover basis.995 
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988 Id. 
989 Id. at 407. 
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991 Id. at 398. 
992 Id. at 412. 
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C. Assets acquisition 
1. Acquisition of assets of closely held corporations in Saudi Arabia 
a. Cash 
If a closely held acquiring corporation acquires the assets of closely held target 
corporation and the consideration is cash, the general rule of Article 8 of the Saudi Income Tax 
Law applies. According to Article 1 (1) (b), any capital gain realized is taxed, regardless of the 
form of consideration provided; therefore, the transaction is also a taxable transaction.996 The 
shareholders of the target corporation are not taxed upon the liquidation of the target as a result 
of the assets acquisition.  
b. Stock 
If a closely held acquiring corporation acquires the assets of a closely held target 
corporation in exchange for shares in the acquiring corporation, the general rule of Article 8 of 
the Saudi Income Tax Law and Article 1 (1) (b) applies; this means that any capital gain realized 
is taxed, regardless of the form of consideration provided, and that therefore, the transaction is a 
taxable transaction. The shareholders of the target corporation are not taxed upon the liquidation 
of the target as a result of the assets acquisition.  
2. Acquisition of assets of closely held corporations in the US 
a. Cash 
Under US tax law, if the assets of a closely held target corporation are acquired in 
exchange for cash, the acquisition is a taxable acquisition.997 The shareholders of the closely held 
target corporation are taxed for the capital gain on the proceeds they receive after the liquidation 
                                                          
996 The Implementing Regulation of the Saudi Income Tax Law, art. 1(1)(b). 
997 THOMPSON, JR., supra note 490, at 399. 
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of the target as a result of the assets acquisition.998 At the corporate level, the target of a closely 
held corporation is taxed on the gain realized for its direct sale of assets.999 The acquiring 
corporation takes the tax basis that is equal to the price paid for the assets of the closely held 
target corporation, which is the cost basis.1000 
b. Stock 
Under US tax law, if all or substantially all of the assets of a closely held corporation are 
acquired in exchange for stock in the acquiring corporation, the acquisition is considered a tax-
free acquisitive reorganization, known as a C reorganization under Section 368 (a) (1) (C) of the 
Code, assuming that the boot condition is met.1001 In order to treat the assets in a stock 
acquisition as a tax-free reorganization, the consideration of cash can be paid but cannot exceed 
20% of the value of the transaction.1002 The shareholders of the closely held target corporation 
are taxed on capital gains realized on any cash they may have received in a case when a portion 
of the consideration was cash.1003 The shareholders of the closely held corporation will receive 
the basis they previously had in their stock for any stock they receive in the acquiring 
corporation; this is also known as the substituted basis, and the acquiring corporation will take 
the basis of the assets of the closely held target corporation, which is the carryover basis.1004 
                                                          
998 Id. at 397. 
999 Id. at 398. 
1000 Id. 
1001 Id. at 410. 
1002 Id. 
1003 Id. at 409 and 411. 
1004 Id. at 411. 
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D. Merger of target corporation into acquiring corporation 
1. Merger of target corporation into acquiring corporation in Saudi 
Arabia 
When a target corporation merges into an acquiring corporation, Article 8’s general rule 
applies; this means that any capital gain that is realized on non-Saudi shares will be taxed 
according to Article 8 of the Saudi Income Tax Law, regardless of whether the consideration is 
cash or stock. No tax is imposed on the shareholders. 
2. Merger of target corporation into acquiring corporation in the US 
Under US tax law, if a closely held corporation merges into an acquiring corporation in 
exchange for stock in the acquiring corporation, the merger may be treated as a tax-free 
reorganization known as an A reorganization under Section 368(a) (1) (A) of the Code, if certain 
conditions are met.1005 The conditions that must be met in order for the merger of closely held 
target corporation into an acquiring corporation to qualify as an A reorganization and receive 
tax-free treatment are that (a) the shareholders of the closely held target corporation receive 
shares in the acquiring corporation in what is known as a “continuity of interest”; (b) the 
business of the closely held target corporation continues after the merger in what is known as the 
“continuity of the business enterprise”; and (c) the transaction must not be structured as such 
only for the purpose of avoiding tax in what is known as “business purpose.”1006 In order for the 
merger of a closely held corporation into an acquiring corporation to qualify as an A 
reorganization, a minimum of 40% of the stock of the acquiring corporation must be paid to the 
closely held target corporation’s shareholders.1007 
                                                          
1005 Id. at 407-08. 




If all of the conditions of an A reorganization are met, the closely held target 
corporation’s shareholders receive nonrecognition treatment on the shares they receive in the 
acquiring corporation, and they receive the basis of the stock of the acquiring corporation—the 
substituted basis—for these shares.1008 The money received by the closely held corporation is 
taxed on any capital gain realized from the merger.1009 The acquiring corporation takes the basis 
of the closely held corporation, which is the carryover basis.1010 
E. Acquisition of stock of publicly held corporations through tender offers 
governed by the M&A Regulation 
1. Acquisition of stock of publicly held corporations through tender 
offers governed by the M&A Regulation in Saudi Arabia 
If a publicly-held target corporation is acquired through a tender offer that falls under the 
Saudi M&A Regulation, any capital gain realized is exempted from income taxation, according 
to Article 10 (a): 
The following types of income are exempt from income tax: 
(a) [C]apital gains realized from disposal of securities traded in the Stock Market in the 
Kingdom in accordance with restrictions specified in the Regulations.1011 
Article 7 of the Implementing Regulation of the Saudi Income Tax Law states that a capital gain 
is exempted from income tax if the gain realized resulted from the disposal of securities traded 
under the following conditions: 1) if the transaction is consummated in the stock market in Saudi 
Arabia; and 2) that the investment in which such securities were disposed did not occur before 
this Law becomes effective.1012 
                                                          
1008 Id. at 408. 
1009 Id. 
1010 Id. 
1011 The Saudi Income Tax Law, art. 10(a).  
1012 The Implementing Regulation of Saudi Income Tax Law, art. 7(1)(2). 
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2. Acquisition of stock of publicly held target corporations through 
tender offers governed by M&A regulations in the US 
Under US tax law, the acquisition of a publicly held corporation is usually accomplished 
through a reverse subsidiary merger.1013 The acquisition can be structured as follows: a 
subsidiary is formed and provided with the consideration needed to make the acquisition.1014 The 
target merges into the acquiring subsidiary and the target shareholders receive cash.1015 Under 
this transactional structure, the tax treatment is as follows: there is no tax levied against the 
subsidiary, and the target is treated as tax free and takes the same basis for its assets that it held 
before the acquisition—except in cases in which the acquirer elects Section 388, which gives the 
target’s assets a stepped basis and recognizes capital gain on the assets.1016 The shareholders of 
the target are taxed on the cash they receive as capital gains.1017 If the consideration paid to the 
shareholders of the target company comprises a mix of at least 80% stock in the acquiring 
company’s parent and 20% boot, the transaction qualifies as a tax-free transaction under the E 
reorganization.1018 
In the case of the acquisition of a publicly-held corporation via a tender offer followed by 
a reverse subsidiary merger, the tender offer is taxed, because it is in cash; the reverse subsidiary 
merger is taxed the same as a taxable stock acquisition, which was discussed above.1019 
                                                          
1013 THOMPSON, JR., supra note 490, at 400-01. 
1014 Id. at 400. 
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1019 2 SAMUEL THOMPSON, JR., MERGERS, ACQUISITIONS AND TENDER OFFERS, § 9:11.2 9-104 (Practicing Law 




M&A is a relatively new financial concept in Saudi Arabia, and Saudi law does not 
contain specific tax rules that govern it. Therefore, the Department of Zakat and Income Tax 
applies general rules as stipulated in the Income Tax Code and the Implementing Regulation of 
the Income Tax Law; the Department also applies the general principles of Zakat. Moreover, the 
Department of Zakat and Income Tax deals with M&A transactions on a case-by-case basis. This 
practice may cause unequal treatment for companies that enter into M&A deals, as there is no 
single, known standard. Finally, most often, companies do not know precisely the final tax 
treatment that their transaction may receive; they can only make an educated guess and then wait 
for the DZIT to render decision. 
An overview of the US tax system’s treatment of M&A has been presented to show that it 
focuses mostly on the consideration provided by the acquirer to determine if a transaction is 
taxable or tax free. If the transaction does not cause an economic change for a taxpaying party, 
then US law holds that the taxpayer should have the opportunity to defer the tax. The author 
argues that Saudi legislators should adopt rules that make clear Saudi’s approach to governing 
M&A transactions. For instance, a provision should be enacted that states that when no cash is 
involved in the transaction, it shall be deemed tax free. Overall, the Saudi legislature should 
develop rules for handling M&A transactions that support the Kingdom’s intentions toward 
M&A activity in Saudi Arabia—does the legislature want to encourage M&A or not? In addition 
to the need for rules specific to M&A in Saudi Arabia, Saudi Arabia also needs to revise its tax 
policies. The tax rate is crucial for two reasons. First, Saudi Arabia does not need to rely 
substantially on tax for its economy, given its leadership in global energy; therefore, Saudi 
Arabia should reduce its tax rate and provide corporate incentives so that the Kingdom may 
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become more competitive in attracting foreign investors and multi-national corporations to invest 
in Saudi Arabia. 
§7.5. Recommendations1020 
1- The Saudi legislature should adopt rules that govern M&A transactions and demonstrate 
its position regarding M&A. For instance, if no cash is involved, a transaction should be 
deemed tax free. Saudi Arabia needs to amend its Income Tax Law and incorporate rules 
that cover the issues likely to arise in the course of M&A transactions. M&A in Saudi has 
been increasing rapidly; the lack of a clear, known standard of rules and requirements for 
M&A activity may cause difficulties for companies engaging in these transactions and 
may also cause unequal and/or unfair treatment of various companies from one deal to 
the next. The author makes these recommendations after concluding that the Department 
of Zakat and Income Tax has only the general rules contained in the Income Tax Law to 
refer to in regulating M&A. The Income Tax Law should include a chapter devoted 
specifically to M&A issues. 
2- Under the Saudi Income Tax Law, a merger is taxable regardless of whether the 
consideration is cash or stock. The Department of Zakat and Income Tax applies a 
general rule to mergers without any regard to the consideration provided. The Saudi 
Income Tax Law does not provide any special treatment for a merger in which the 
consideration provided to the target’s shareholders is stock in the acquiring corporation. 
The Saudi Income Tax Law should not tax a merger if the consideration provided is stock 
in the acquiring corporation.  
                                                          
1020 The author proposes these recommendations because the law is silent regarding M&A issues. 
342 
 
3- The Saudi Zakat Regulation contains 20 articles that were enacted in 1950 during the 
founding King’s lifetime; this means that the current Zakat Regulation is not written to 
cope with the modern corporate era. Moreover, Islamic jurisprudence is currently 
overwhelmed by a deep and highly contentious set of arguments among the different 
Islamic schools over various Zakat issues. Saudi Arabia should update its old Zakat code, 
including codifying rules that have emerged recently in Islamic jurisprudence, into a 
single modern Zakat code written using modern terminology that includes and addresses 
modern corporate practices. This suggested revision of the Zakat code should be 
undertaken after the Department has reached a conclusion about how M&A transactions 
fit within the context of Zakat principles.1021 
4- Courts should be more efficient (i.e., timely) in making decisions, especially in cases that 
involve corporate taxes. As noted in the case study described earlier in this paper, the 
court in some cases has taken up to 5 years to reach a decision. 
5- Ministerial decisions and instructions regarding income tax and Zakat are made either by 
the Minister of Finance or the Director of the Department of Zakat and Income Tax. 
These decisions and instructions should be incorporated into the Income Tax Law and 
Zakat Regulation in the form of amendments. 
  
                                                          
1021 Reaching a conclusion within Islamic jurisprudence about where M&A falls in terms of Zakat rules will have to 
occur in several stages. First, the new situation (Nazilah or Nawazil) must be well understood as it is (takyeef). 
Second, it must be determined whether a given situation is mentioned in the Qur’an or Sunnah. If it is mentioned, 
then rules will be applied. If it is not mentioned, research should be done within the community of Islamic 
jurisprudence to determine whether Islamic scholars and jurists have discussed the issue or something similar to it, 
and, if so, what rules or standards they have applied. Third, if there is no mention of the issue or a similar issue in 
Islamic jurisprudence, then the issue need not involve any prohibitions by the Qur’an or Sunnah, keeping in mind 
that the default rule is that any dealing or action is permissible under Sharia Law unless the Qur’an or Sunnah 
contains text that specifically stipulates otherwise. 
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This chapter summarizes all of the foregoing chapters and recommendations in this 
dissertation.  
§8.1. Chapter 1 
Chapter 1 provides an introduction to the dissertation. 
§8.2. Chapter 2 
Chapter 2 provides a comprehensive description of Saudi Arabia’s legal system and 
introduces basic information about how Saudi Arabia handles mergers and acquisitions (M&A) 
transactions. The Chapter focuses primarily on the ministries, authorities and agencies most 
relevant to Saudi’s M&A activity. The Chapter also describes the structure of Saudi Arabia as a 
kingdom (the Kingdom) and briefly discusses how the Kingdom functions.  
§8.3. Chapter 3 
Chapter 3 introduces the various business organizations that exist in Saudi Arabia, and it 
also presents information regarding changes that have been made recently to the Saudi 
Companies Law 1965—i.e., the enactment of the Saudi Companies Law 2015—that affect these 
organizations. The Chapter provides introductory information about Saudi’s economy, business 
activities, stock market and business sectors. Most importantly, Chapter 3 discusses various 
M&A activities that have occurred in Saudi Arabia in the past three years in order to demonstrate 
the rise and importance of M&A activity in the Kingdom. As Chapter 3 demonstrates, Saudi has 
more M&A activity in a given year than any other country in its region.  
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§8.4. Chapter 4 
Chapter 4 focuses on Saudi Antitrust law and how it affects the occurrence of M&A 
activity in the Kingdom. The Chapter discusses the pre-merger notification process, and it 
considers how the substance of M&A transactions is evaluated in Saudi Arabia under the Saudi 
Competition Law. In this Chapter, the author argues that significant reforms to the Saudi 
Competition Law and its Implementing Regulation are needed in order for Saudi to develop 
efficient M&A laws that are specific, well-defined and serve a clear purpose. 
Recommendations 
1. Pre-merger notification 
1- The Competition Council should choose one method for the pre-merger notification. It 
should change the Competition Law to require either that every M&A transaction be 
approved by the Council before the transaction is completed, or to stipulate that the 
Council does not need to approve every M&A transaction. The author argues that as 
Saudi’s Competition Law, and the practice of that Law, currently stands, the Council’s 
approach does not comply with the Competition Law and its Implementing Regulation. 
For example, the Council has begun to require that every M&A transaction be filed, 
which is not what the Competition Law requires.  
2- The Competition Council should make the full text of the cases it considers and the 
decisions it renders available to companies, lawyers, professors, economists, investors 
and many other parties. Doing so would raise awareness and transparency about the 
Council’s policy, strategy and deliberations, as well as about the accuracy of its 
decisions. This would help companies and investors ensure that their investments comply 
with Saudi policy, and it would also help the Saudi government develop its policy toward 
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competition in the marketplace and develop appropriate protection measures through a 
process of case study, arguments, feedback, research and appeals. 
3- The Competition Council should adopt a threshold system analogous to that used in the 
South African system, in which thresholds are set for various sizes of transactions, and 
transactions are reported to the Council only if they exceed a threshold. This change 
would require an amendment to the Competition Law to replace the 40% economic 
concentration doctrine with a threshold standard.  
4- If the Competition Council adopts a threshold method, it will need to revise the threshold 
annually and modify it according to various factors: the size of the market, the size of the 
companies involved, consideration of consumer benefits, changes in pricing and certain 
other factors that tend to fluctuate from year to year. 
5- The Competition Council needs to base its regulations, decisions and pre-notification 
requirements on rational economic reasoning that raises general awareness of the 
concepts of fair competition and monopoly. Simply setting a threshold for notification of 
an intended transaction, such as SAR 200 million (equivalent to USD 53 million), will 
not solve the 40% economic concentration issue. A transaction that occurs at a threshold 
of far less than SAR 200 million could give a company monopoly control in Saudi 
Arabia, especially if that company is engaged in a business sector that is struggling or has 
particularly high barriers to entry. 
6- The Competition Council should state the methods it uses to evaluate whether an M&A 
transaction violates the Competition Law in Saudi Arabia, and these methods should be 
reliable and widely accepted. The Council should publish outlines or guidelines that 
companies may use to evaluate their proposed transactions at the beginning of the 
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transaction process. Most, if not all, articles (from both the academic and business 
sectors) that discuss issues of competition related to M&A activity in Saudi Arabia only 
touch upon broad issues; this does not add value to the field. However, the problem 
continues to be that even experts are not able to write about the specifics of M&A activity 
in Saudi Arabia because they lack of information about how the Competition Council 
evaluates requests for M&A transactions. 
7- When it announces a new M&A application, the Competition Council should provide 
information regarding the value of the transaction and the value of the companies 
involved, so that the public can understand the size of the proposed transaction. Having 
read most of the Council’s announcements published over the past 14 years, the author of 
this dissertation finds that none of them contains information regarding the value of the 
transaction or of the companies that seek to merge or acquire; this information is 
especially difficult to discover about private companies. The Competition Council should 
make amendments that specify what information it will provide regarding an economic 
concentration request. Because the Competition Law requires a transaction to be 
submitted for approval when it will result in a concentration that exceeds 40% of the 
market, the Law should specify what method companies should use to determine if their 
transaction will result in such a concentration. This will make entities aware of whether 
they need to notify the Competition Council of an intended transaction. 
8- The Saudi Competition Council could provide an electronic calculator similar to the 
service provided by the South African Competition Commission’s website. Such a tool 
may facilitate the process of the pre-merger notification and help parties determine 
whether they must notify the Competition Council of their proposed transaction. The 
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parties may need to consult with legal advisors as well, but a service such as an online 
calculator could serve as a basic tool, as well as facilitate a measurement of value that is 
more sophisticated than the simple 40% concentration standard. 
9- The Competition Council should clarify whether it differentiates between the notification 
of the M&A transaction and the request concerning economic concentration. The 
Competition Council should state when companies must notify the Council, when 
companies must submit an economic concentration request, and when companies do not 
need to notify the Council about a transaction. 
10- Filing fees should be determined relative to the size of the merger, as is the case in the 
South African Competition Act. The Saudi Arabian Competition Council imposes a flat 
fee of SAR 1000 for all types of transactions. A tiered fee system would benefit the 
Competition Council as M&A activity in Saudi grows. 
11- The Saudi Competition Law should guide the Council as to how economic concentration 
should be reviewed in different regions. The law should determine if economic 
concentration in Saudi Arabia should be reviewed based on the 13 administrative areas, 
or based on the largest cities, such as Riyadh, Jeddah, Damam, Mecca and Medina.  
12- The Saudi Competition Law should specify whether the Council should focus only on 
horizontal mergers, or whether it should also review vertical mergers and conglomerates. 
Neither the Law nor the Council specifies the types of mergers on which the Council 
should focus. Vertical and conglomerate mergers generally do not affect competition as 
much as horizontal mergers do. Including detailed guidelines would make the Saudi 
Competition Law more efficient both economically and administratively and would raise 
the awareness of investors and corporations about the focus of Saudi economic policy. 
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2. The substance 
13- Categorizing mergers into small, intermediate and large, as the South African 
Competition Act does, is necessary for a country like Saudi Arabia. These categories 
would give Saudi Arabia a better understanding of the M&A activity in its market. It 
would also facilitate the process of the pre-merger notification for the Competition 
Council and also for the parties and investors concerned. Categorization would raise 
awareness of the scope and mechanisms of M&A transactions in Saudi Arabia, which 
would benefit interested investors, economists and lawmakers. 
14- The Saudi Competition Law should require the Competition Council to choose a clear 
and certain mathematical or economic method for the evaluation of pre-merger 
notifications and merger review, and this method should be disclosed to the public. The 
author refers again to the example set by the South African Competition Act, Section 11 
Subsection 3 (a), which requires the Minister of Trade and Industry and the Competition 
Commission to publicly “[set] out the proposed threshold and method of calculation for 
the purpose of this section.” 
15- The Competition Council should provide a better explanation of some of the terms used 
in the Implementing Regulation of the Competition Law. This Regulation defines the 
concept of a relevant market by using the term “relevant products.” Defining a term by 
using the same term in the definition is generally considered faulty logic and may result 
in a definition that lacks precise meaning. 
16- The Competition Council, by means of its proper authority and the stated legislative 
process, should make amendments to the Competition Law and its Implementing 
Regulation regarding definitions and vague terminology. Certain terms are critical to the 
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precise and proper application of the Competition Law and its Implementing Regulation, 
but many of these terms, as currently used (written) in the Law and the Regulation, are 
unclear or contradictory. Terms such as “relevant market,” “relevant product,” “economic 
concentration,” “dominance” and “geographical area” should be defined using proper 
technical language. Definitions should refer to clear standards that companies, experts, 
professors and others can use to evaluate a transaction before going forward with a 
transaction application. Also, parties should have the right to argue and appeal when a 
transaction is not approved. All of these reforms may help the Board of Grievances (the 
designated court) assure fair competition in Saudi Arabia. 
17- The Competition Council has translated the Arabic version of the Saudi Competition Law 
into English. This English version is provided only as a guideline; the Arabic version is 
the only formally accepted version. However, the English version should still reflect the 
same meaning as the Arabic version. This issue becomes even more crucial when a law 
or legal term is adapted (borrowed) from a law that was originally written in English, 
translated into Arabic, and added to the Saudi Competition Law. For example, the term 
“relevant market” in English is a term of art for M&A; it means a specific thing. 
However, this term means nothing in Arabic unless the law explains what it is and 
attaches a specific meaning to it in the Arabic language. This recommendation—that 
translations must accurately reflect the de facto meaning of the original language’s terms 
of art—should be applied whenever the Saudi Competition Law attempts to follow 
another country’s legal model for the purpose of drafting or amending Saudi legislation. 
18- The author recommends that the Competition Council use consistent terminology 
throughout all of the Articles in the Competition Law and its Implementing Regulation. 
351 
 
For example, the author recommends that the word “ownership,” as used in Article 9 (1), 
be replaced with the word “acquisition.” 
19- The Competition Council should define the terms it uses in its decisions, such as “unified 
marketing” and “pricing policy.” It should also use more precise language. For example, 
the word “discretion” is used in this way in Article 32(5) of the Implementing Regulation 
of the Competition Law (note that the use of italics is the author’s): “If the Council 
concludes that the economic concentration will restrict the freedom of competition, it 
shall decide the following: 5) Take the necessary precautions to terminate, prevent or 
mitigate the economic concentration, at the [discretion] of the Council." This use of the 
word “discretion” here is broad. Therefore, the law should explain to what extent 
“discretion” is given to the Council. The word “discretion” should not be left with a 
broad meaning. 
20- The Competition Council should use the words “mergers” and “acquisitions” properly to 
reflect the exact terms of the proposed transaction. Since M&A activity has increased in 
Saudi, the Competition Council should make amendments to the Competition Law and its 
Implementing Regulation, or create an outline, to define more clearly the forms of that 
mergers and acquisitions may take. This would make investors and the public aware of 
the terms that the Council uses in its announcements or decisions. 
21- The Competition Council should use its power as designated by the Competition Law and 
its Implementing Regulation. However, the author also encourages attorneys and 
companies to appeal Council decisions about their requests, and also to appeal any 
requirements made by the Council that go beyond its authority or are not supported by 
the Saudi Competition Law. This would help improve fair competition in the Kingdom. 
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22- The Competition Council should be a separate and independent authority that reports 
directly to the Ministers’ Council and not to the Ministry of Commerce and Industry. 
Also, the Council should employ experts from different fields such as law, economics, 
accounting, finance and business. This would enhance fair competition and make the 
Competition Council more efficient, professional, independent and modern. 
23- The Competition Law should include rules governing independency issues. The members 
of the Competition Council should not be investors, or, at the least, they should not be 
allowed to participate in evaluating an M&A transaction in which they have an interest. 
Also, they should be fiscally independent. There should be mandatory disclosure 
requirements when any member has an interest that might affect his ability to conduct his 
Council duties, either generally or regarding a specific transaction that is under review. 
To reiterate, this recommendation becomes especially important if Council members 
have investments in one or more of the companies involved in an M&A transaction about 
which they are required to make a decision. 
24- The Competition Council’s purview should be limited to making recommendations to the 
Board of Grievances only; it should leave decisions regarding transactions to the courts. 
As an example, the author refers to the relationship between the South African 
Competition Commission and the South African Competition Tribunal. This will make 
the review of transactions more independent. Establishing an independent competition 
tribunal that reviews issues of competition that arise in connection with M&A 
transactions would accomplish this change. 
25- Unlike the South African Competition Act, the Saudi Competition Law does not cover 
the Competition Council’s right to revoke its own decisions, even though such a right is 
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crucial and cannot exist without the regulatory grounds for it. Therefore, the Saudi 
Competition Law should include a specification giving the Council the right to revoke a 
decision if the Council discovers that information submitted regarding a merger was false 
or deceptive, or if it discovers that one or more of the parties involved did not comply 
with conditions attached to the decision. 
26- The Saudi Competition Law does not provide rules or guidelines that help the 
Competition Council handle different types of mergers, such as horizontal, vertical and 
conglomerate. The Saudi Competition Law should provide principles that guide the 
Competition Council.  
27- The Saudi Competition Law should have a theme and purpose that it aims to achieve. 
Demonstrating the purpose of the Competition Law would help the Competition Council 
when it reviews mergers, and it would also help judges review cases if a Council decision 
is appealed.  
28- The Saudi Competition Law should state explicitly that the law does not cover mergers 
that involve a failing company merging with another company. 
29- The Saudi Competition Law should state explicitly that the law does not apply to mergers 
between small businesses. 
§8.5. Chapter 5 
Chapter 5 focuses on the corporate aspects of M&A activity in Saudi Arabia. The 
Chapter reinforces the substance of its discussion by referencing the Model Business Corporation 
Act and certain provisions from the law of the US state of Delaware to show how other systems 
derive solutions for M&A issues that arise. In this Chapter, the author argues that while the Saudi 
Companies Law 2015 is a new law, it has not solved all of the issues that were problematic under 
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the previous Saudi Companies Law 1965. The Saudi Companies Law 2015 needs to be amended 
by the addition of provisions that allow it to be applied with transparency, which would help to 
foster financial transactions and make transactions economically efficient. 
Recommendations 
1- The Ministry of Commerce and Industry issued an order in the Saudi Chemical case 
stating that the transaction required shareholder authorization at the general meeting; the 
transaction ultimately did not receive this approval. However, the transaction should not 
have been sent to the Ministry of Commerce and Industry, because Article 69 of the 
Saudi Companies Law 1965 states that a shareholder vote is required in a case that 
involves a conflict of interest. Contentious debate and disagreement arose because of this 
case over how an interested acquisition transaction should be handled; this debate was 
caused in large part by the broad language of the Saudi Companies Law 1965 regarding 
conflicts of interest. The board of directors of the acquiring company argued that because 
the interested director would not be attending the board meeting at which the vote on the 
transaction would be taken, there was no conflict, and that therefore, it (the board of 
directors) should not have needed to obtain shareholder approval of the transaction. The 
adoption of a rule similar to Rule 144 of Delaware’s law would clearly define how such 
an issue should be handled, and had Saudi had such a rule at the time of this case, the 
controversy may have been prevented. Indeed, a rule such as Rule 144 could help guide 
other corporations in their future transactions in Saudi Arabia. Further, the Saudi 
Companies Law 2015 does not address the issue of whether interested directors may be 
counted for the purpose of a board quorum, and it should do so. The Saudi Companies 
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Law 2015 should also specify that “interest” means specifically (and only) financial 
interest. 
2- The Saudi Companies Law 2015 should provide mechanisms that facilitate stock 
acquisitions that are economically efficient and attractive. If the acquiring corporation is 
not able to acquire 100% of a target corporation, the stock acquisition may become less 
desirable to the acquirer.  
3- The Saudi Companies Law 2015 should provide a mechanism for stock exchange 
between/among closely held corporations via stock purchase agreements that requires 
only the majority (not 100%) of the acquired corporation’s shareholders to approve. 
4- The Saudi Companies Law 2015 should make it lawful and enforceable for companies to 
include in their bylaws a mechanism for selling shares and ownership interests; for 
example, instruments such as buy/sell orders and put/call options. These agreements help 
companies respond to various financial changes. The Saudi Companies Law 2015 does 
not recognize agreements that may be taken to facilitate share exchanges or the disposal 
of minority or ownership interests, nor does it distinguish between minority and majority 
shareholders.  
5- Regarding the acquiring company, the Saudi Companies Law 2015 should model the 
NYSE rules and not require shareholder approval of a transaction unless a significant 
issuance of shares, such as 20% or more, is involved. This would give acquiring 
companies the latitude to guide their organizations according to efficient business 
strategies. Again, an exception here would be a case in which a significant issuance of 
stock is involved. 
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6- The Saudi Companies Law 2015 should adopt a dissenting right in a case of a stock 
exchange plan. It should also stipulate that those who dissent have the right to have their 
shares appraised, so that they may obtain fair value for their shares. 
7- The rule that the courts currently may invoke to prohibit squeezing out minority shares, 
which it applies according to the Islamic rule that no shareholder may be forced to sell his 
shares, should not be applicable. The Saudi Companies Law 2015 should be amended 
such that it adopts the right to force minority shares to be sold when the majority 
shareholders vote in favor of a stock acquisition. The proposed amendment would 
enhance the attractiveness and competitiveness of companies and help to regulate 
efficient combinations between corporations.  
8- The Saudi Companies Law 2015 should incorporate a rule requiring an acquiring 
corporation to obtain the majority of its shareholders’ votes before issuing a significant 
number of shares. 
9- The Saudi Companies Law 2015 should adopt a provision that gives shareholders the 
right to vote on the acquisition of all or substantially all of the corporation’s assets. 
10- The Saudi Companies Law 2015 should give those who dissent an acquisition the right to 
have their shares appraised and also the right to obtain fair value for their shares, unless 
the corporation is going to be dissolved as a result of the assets acquisition plan. 
11- The Saudi Companies Law 2015 should provide a proper test to determine when a 
disposition of assets requires the approval of the shareholders of the target company.  
12- The Saudi Companies Law 2015 does not provide the appraisal right, which should be 
included in Saudi law. The appraisal right would play a crucial role in ensuring a balance 
among majority and minority shareholders, and it would provide a relatively equitable 
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mechanism by which dissenters could exit the corporation and be fairly compensated for 
their shares. The appraisal right would be the most suitable remedy for minority 
shareholders who vote against a merger. 
13- The Saudi Companies Law 2015 does not give a parent entity the right to merge with its 
90%-owned subsidiary without the approval of shareholders, even though the conclusion 
of such a merger is automatic. The adoption of a rule that permits a parent corporation to 
merge with its 90%-owned subsidiary without shareholder approval would facilitate 
efficient transactions. Requiring the approval of shareholders in cases in which a parent 
corporation wishes to merge with a 90%-owned subsidiary has no basis in corporate 
governance. The Saudi Companies Law 2015 should adopt rules that can fill the 
legislative gaps regarding circumstances such as this one; these gaps have been ignored 
thus far, because issues such as (for example) mergers between a parent corporation and a 
90%-owned subsidiary were not in play when the law was enacted. 
§8.6. Chapter 6 
Chapter 6 focuses on the Saudi M&A Regulation. The Chapter compares the Regulation 
with the Directive of the European Commission (EC) on Takeover Bids and finds that the Saudi 
M&A Regulation generally is in accordance with the EC’s Directive. However, Saudi’s M&A 
Regulation lacks several crucial rules that the author argues must be added, as well as some rules 
that should be amended, in order to protect the shareholders of the offeree company.  
Recommendations 
1- The title of the Saudi M&A Regulation should be changed to “Takeover Regulation.” 
2- The Saudi M&A Regulation states that the offeror shall specify the duration and 
dates of the offer in an offer timeline that the Capital Market Authority must 
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approve. The author argues that the M&A Regulation should require the offeror to 
specify that the time period for acceptance of an offer must be not less than two 
weeks and not more than 10 weeks. Some time limit on the acceptance period 
must be required.  
3- The Capital Market Authority should not have the discretionary right to trigger 
the mandatory offer rule in the case of a party that acquires 50% of a target 
corporation. The mandatory offer rule loses its intended purpose and function if it 
is not automatically triggered when the threshold of 50% ownership of the target 
company’s shares is reached. Allowing the mandatory offer rule to trigger 
automatically, rather than at the discretion of the Authority, would allow the rule 
to be exercised objectively, which would promote stability and trust in the Saudi 
stock market. The market would remain more stable if shareholders in the target 
company had confidence that they would have the opportunity to tender their 
shares if a bidder acquired a controlling stake in the target company. Also, the 
acquiring party likely would only attempt to acquire a stake of 50% or more if it 
were prepared to acquire some or all of the rest of the target shares. 
4- The Saudi Capital Market Authority should include a provision that clearly 
permits, or at the least, does not restrict, a reverse breakup fee. The Saudi Capital 
Market Authority should specify that such a fee, along with arrangements that 
impose obligations on the offeror, are excluded from any restrictions on 
inducement fees; this would bring the Saudi Capital Market Authority in line with 
the UK Takeover Code in this regard. This provision would make corporations 
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aware of the Saudi approach to reverse breakup fees, which might help them to 
structure their breakup fee provisions accordingly. 
5- The Saudi M&A Regulation should provide a “squeeze out” rule that could be applied in 
the process of the acceptance of a tender offer; such a provision would make the M&A 
Regulation more efficient and would facilitate acquisitions. A squeeze out provision 
gives an acquiring company the ability to acquire a target without the need to call a 
meeting of its shareholders to approve the acquisition. The Saudi M&A Regulation 
should include a provision that gives an offeror that acquires 75% or more of a target 
company via a tender offer the right to squeeze out the remaining offeree minority 
shareholders at a fair price.  
6- The Saudi M&A Regulation should adopt a “sell out” rule—a provision that gives the 
minority shareholders of the acquired company, when 75% or more of it is acquired via a 
tender offer, the right to sell out their shares to the acquiring party.  
7- The sell out concept is important because it provides an exit mechanism for minority 
shareholders in the offeree company, should they not wish to own stock in a company 
that may change materially under the leadership of the new 75% (or more) majority 
shareholder. The squeeze out mechanism provides a tool for the majority shareholder to 
squeeze out the minority at a fair price and thus consolidate total control over 
management of the company. Both concepts have economic advantages.  
§8.7. Chapter 7 
Chapter 7 discusses the Saudi tax system and its application in relation to M&A activity 
in Saudi Arabia. The Chapter begins with a basic description of the rules of the Saudi tax system 
and the rules that govern M&A transactions in Saudi Arabia. It provides an overview of the US 
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tax model as a comparison. In this Chapter, the author notes that Saudi does not have specific 
rules that govern M&A transactions. Rather, only general tax rules are applied. Therefore, 
Chapter 7 provides recommendations for ways that the Saudi legislature could improve Saudi 
Income Tax Law and how it interacts with M&A transactions.  
Recommendations 
1- The Saudi legislature should adopt rules that govern M&A transactions and demonstrate 
its position regarding M&A. For instance, if no cash is involved, a transaction should be 
deemed tax free. Saudi Arabia needs to amend its Income Tax Law and incorporate rules 
that cover the issues likely to arise in the course of M&A transactions. M&A in Saudi has 
been increasing rapidly; the lack of a clear, known standard of rules and requirements for 
M&A activity may cause difficulties for companies engaging in these transactions and 
may also cause unequal and/or unfair treatment of various companies from one deal to 
the next. The author makes these recommendations after concluding that the Department 
of Zakat and Income Tax has only the general rules contained in the Income Tax Law to 
refer to in regulating M&A. The Income Tax Law should include a chapter devoted 
specifically to M&A issues. 
2- The Saudi Zakat Regulation contains 20 articles that were enacted in 1950 during the 
founding King’s lifetime; this means that the current Zakat Regulation is not written to 
cope with the modern corporate era. Moreover, Islamic jurisprudence is currently 
overwhelmed by a deep and highly contentious set of arguments among the different 
Islamic schools over various Zakat issues. Saudi Arabia should update its old Zakat code, 
including codifying rules that have emerged recently in Islamic jurisprudence, into a 
single modern Zakat code written using modern terminology that includes and addresses 
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modern corporate practices. This suggested revision of the Zakat code should be 
undertaken after the Department has reached a conclusion about how M&A transactions 
fit within the context of Zakat principles.1022 
3- Under the Saudi Income Tax Law, a merger is taxable regardless of whether the 
consideration is cash or stock. The Department of Zakat and Income Tax applies a 
general rule to mergers without any regard to the consideration provided. The Saudi 
Income Tax Law does not provide any special treatment for a merger in which the 
consideration provided to the target’s shareholders is stock in the acquiring corporation. 
The Saudi Income Tax Law should not tax a merger if the consideration provided is stock 
in the acquiring corporation.  
4- Courts should be more efficient (i.e., timely) in making decisions, especially in cases that 
involve corporate taxes. As noted in the case study described earlier in this paper, the 
court in some cases has taken up to 5 years to reach a decision. 
5- Ministerial decisions and instructions regarding income tax and Zakat are made either by 
the Minister of Finance or the Director of the Department of Zakat and Income Tax. 
These decisions and instructions should be incorporated into the Income Tax Law and 
Zakat Regulation in the form of amendments. 
  
                                                          
1022 Reaching a conclusion within Islamic jurisprudence about where M&A falls in terms of Zakat rules will have to 
occur in several stages. First, the new situation (Nazilah or Nawazil) must be well understood as it is (takyeef). 
Second, it must be determined whether a given situation is mentioned in the Qur’an or Sunnah. If it is mentioned, 
then rules will be applied. If it is not mentioned, research should be done within the community of Islamic 
jurisprudence to determine whether Islamic scholars and jurists have discussed the issue or something similar to it, 
and, if so, what rules or standards they have applied. Third, if there is no mention of the issue or a similar issue in 
Islamic jurisprudence, then the issue need not involve any prohibitions by the Qur’an or Sunnah, keeping in mind 
that the default rule is that any dealing or action is permissible under Sharia Law unless the Qur’an or Sunnah 
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Appendix to Chapter 2: Relevant Laws Cited 
§2.1 Saudi Constitution, Articles 1, 7, 5, , 20, 21, 22, 24, 32 and 44 
A. Article 1 
The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is a sovereign Arab Islamic State. Its religion is Islam. Its 
constitution is Almighty God's Book, The Holy Qur'an, and the Sunnah (Traditions) of the 
Prophet (PBUH). Arabic is the language of the Kingdom. The City of Riyadh is the capital. 
B. Article 7 
Government in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia derives its authority from the Book of God 
and the Sunnah of the Prophet (PBUH), which are the ultimate sources of reference for this Law 
and the other laws of the State. 
C. Article 5 
• Monarchy is the system of rule in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia 
• Rulers of the country shall be from amongst the sons of the founder King Abdulaziz bin 
Abdulrahman Al-Faisal Al-Saud, and their descendants. 
• The most upright among them shall receive allegiance according to Almighty God's 
Book and His Messenger's Sunnah (Traditions). 
• The Crown Prince shall devote himself exclusively to his duties as Crown Prince and 
shall perform any other duties delegated to him by the King. 
• Upon the death of the King, the Crown Prince shall assume the Royal powers until a 
pledge of allegiance (bay'a) is given. 
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D. Article 44 
The Authorities of the State consist of: 
- The Judicial Authority 
- The Executive Authority 
- The Regulatory Authority 
These Authorities will cooperate in the performance of their functions, according to this 
Law or other laws. The King is the ultimate arbiter for these Authorities. 
E. Article 20 
No taxes or fees shall be imposed, except in need and on a just basis. Imposition, 
amendment, cancellation or exemption shall take place according to the provisions of the Law. 
F. Article 21 
Zakat shall be collected and spent for legitimate expenses. 
G. Article 22 
Economic and social development shall be carried out according to a fair, wise plan. 
H. Article 32 
The State shall work towards the preservation, protection and improvement of the 
environment, as well as prevent pollution. 
I. Article 24 
The State shall develop and maintain the Two Holy Mosques. It shall provide care and 
security to pilgrims to help them perform their Hajj and Umra and visit to the Prophet's Mosque 
in ease and comfort. 
 377 Appendix to Chapter 2 
 
§2.2 Succession Commission Law, Articles 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9 
A. Article 5 
The Commission’s chairman, members and secretary general shall take the following 
oath before the King and prior to assuming their duties in the Commission: 
I swear to God Almighty to be loyal to my religion and then to my King and country and 
shall not disclose any of the State’s secrets, protect its interests and laws, safeguard the solidarity 
and cooperation of the royal family and the national unity and discharge my duties with 
truthfulness, integrity, sincerity and fairness.  
B. Article 6 
Upon the King’s death the Commission shall call for the pledge of allegiance to the 
Crown Prince as King of the country in accordance with this Law and the Basic Law of 
Governance. 
C. Article 7 
(a) After receiving the pledge of allegiance and after consultation with members of the 
Commission, the King shall choose one or two or three he deems fit to be crown prince. Such 
choice shall be brought before the Commission which shall exert effort to agree on one nominee 
to be named Crown Prince. In case the Commission does not nominate any of them, then it shall 
nominate whom it deems fit to be crown prince. 
(b) The King may at any time ask the Commission to nominate whom one it deems fit to 
be crown prince. In case the King disapproves the Commission’s nominee in accordance with 
any of paragraphs (a) and (b) of this Article, then the Commission shall vote on its nominee and 
another chosen by the King, and the one with the majority of votes shall be named crown prince. 
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D. Article 8 
A nominee for crown prince must satisfy the provisions of paragraph (b) of Article 5 of 
the Basic Law of Governance. 
E. Article 9 
The crown prince shall be chosen in accordance with the provision of Article 7 within a 
period not exceeding thirty days from the date of the pledge of allegiance to the King. 
§2.3 Council of Ministers Law, Articles 1 and 24 
A. Article 1 
The Council of Ministers is a regulatory authority presided over by the King. 
B. Article 24 
The Council, being the direct executive authority, shall have full power over all executive 
and administrative affairs. The following shall be included in its executive powers: 
(i) Monitoring the implementation of laws, regulations and resolutions. 
(ii) Establishing and organizing public institutions. 
(iii) Following up on the implementation of the general development plan. 
(iv) Setting up committees for the review of the ministries’ and other governmental 
agencies’ conduct of business as well as any specific case. Said committees shall submit the 
findings of their review at the time set by the Council. The Council shall consider such findings 
and shall have the right to set up committees of investigation accordingly to draw a final 
conclusion, subject to laws and regulations. 
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§2.4 Law of the Judiciary, Article 1, 16, and 19-22 
A. Article 1 
Judges are independent and, in the administration of justice, they shall be subject to no 
authority other than the provisions of Sharia and laws in force. No one may interfere with the 
judiciary. 
B. Article 16 
The courts of appeals panels are: 
(1) Jural panels. 
(2) Penal panels. 
(3) Family panels. 
(4) Commercial panels. 
(5) Labor panels. 
C. Article 19 
General courts in provinces shall consist of specialized panels that include panels for 
execution and for ex parte and similar cases, which are outside the jurisdiction of other courts 
and notaries public, and decide on traffic accident cases and violations provided for in the Traffic 
Law and its Implementing Regulations. Each panel therein shall consist of a single judge or three 
judges as determined by the Supreme Judicial Council. 
D. Article 20 
A penal court shall be composed of specialized panels as follows: 
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(a) Panels for qisas (lex talionis retribution) and hadd („Qur‟anic prescribed 
punishment‟) cases. 
(b) Panels for ta’zir („discretionary punishment‟) cases. 
(c) Panels for juvenile cases. 
Each panel shall be composed of three judges except for cases determined by the 
Supreme Judicial Council which shall be reviewed by one judge. 
E. Article 21 
A family court shall be composed of one or more panels, and each panel shall consist of 
one or more judges as determined by the Supreme Judicial Council and may include specialized 
panels as needed. 
F. Article 22 
A commercial court and a labor court shall be composed of specialized panels, and each 
panel shall consist of one or more judges as determined by the Supreme Judicial Council. 
§2.5 Law of the Board of Grievances, Article 1, 2, 8 and 13 
A. Article 1 
The Board of Grievances is an independent administrative judicial body reporting 
directly to the King and its seat shall be the City of Riyadh. The Board‟s judges and judgments 
shall enjoy the guarantees provided for in the Law of the Judiciary and shall observe the duties 
provided for therein. 
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B. Article 2 
The Board of Grievances consists of a president of the rank of minister, one or more vice 
presidents and a sufficient number of judges in addition to the necessary number of researchers, 
specialists, administrators and the like. 
C. Article 8 
Courts of the Board of Greivances shall consist of the following: 
(1) The High Administrative Court. 
(2) The Administrative Courts of Appeal. 
(3) The Administrative Courts. 
Administrative courts of appeal shall be formed of a chief judge and a sufficient number 
of judges whose rank shall not be less than the rank of an Appeals Judge. Administrative courts 
shall consist of a chief judge and a sufficient number of judges. The Administrative Judicial 
Council may establish other specialized courts with the approval of the King. 
D. Article 13 
Administrative courts shall have jurisdiction to decide the following: 
(a) Cases relating to rights provided for in civil service, military service and retirement 
laws for employees of the Government and entities with independent corporate personality or 
their heirs and their other beneficiaries. 
(b) Cases for revoke of final administrative decisions issued by persons concerned when 
the appeal is based on grounds of lack of jurisdiction, defect in form or cause, violation of laws 
and regulations, error in application or interpretation thereof, abuse of power, including 
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disciplinary decisions and decisions issued by quasi-judicial committees and disciplinary boards 
as well as decisions issued by public benefit associations – and the like – relating to their 
activities. The administrative authority‟s refusal or denial to make a decision required to be 
made by it in accordance with the laws and regulations shall be deemed an administrative 
decision. 
(c) Tort cases initiated by the persons concerned against the administrative authority‟s 
decisions or actions. 
(d) Cases related to contracts to which the administrative authority is party. 
(e) Disciplinary cases filed by the competent authority. 
(f) Other administrative disputes. 
(g) Requests for execution of foreign judgments and arbitral awards. 
§2.6 M&A Regulation, Article 2 
A. Article 2: Extent & Scope of the Regulations 
(a) The Regulations apply in any situation where there is a restricted purchase of, or a 
restricted offer for shares relating to any listed company.  
(b) The persons to whom the Regulations apply include:  
1) Exchange participants, including (without limitation) issuers, shareholders, authorised 
persons, and any person involved directly or indirectly in, or giving an opinion on, any 
transaction regulated by these Regulations;  
2) Directors of companies which are subject to these Regulations; and  
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3) Any person who seeks to or consolidate effective acquisition of such companies.  
(c) These Regulations should be read in conjunction with and in addition to the 
provisions of the Listing Rules. 
§2.7 Qualified Foreign Financial Institutions Investment in Listed Shares Rules, Articles 
1,2, 6 and 21 
A. Article 1: Preliminary  
a. The purpose of these Rules is to set out the procedures, requirements and conditions 
for the registration of qualified foreign investors (“QFIs”) with the Authority and the approval of 
their clients to invest in listed shares, and to specify their obligations and the obligations of 
authorised persons in this regard.  
b. These Rules shall be read in conjunction with and in addition to the Capital Market 
Law and its Implementing Regulations, including, the Listing Rules, the Market Conduct 
Regulations, the Authorised Persons Regulations, the Merger and Acquisition Regulations and 
the Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorist Financing Rules.  
c. These Rules shall not apply to Citizens of the Cooperation Council for the Arab States 
of the Gulf.  
d. Subject to sub-paragraph b (1) of Article 7 of these Rules, QFIs and approved QFI 
clients are entitled to exercise all rights related to listed shares owned by them, including trading 
in rights issues.  
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B. Article 2: Definitions  
a. Any reference to the “Capital Market Law” in these Rules shall mean the Capital 
Market Law issued by Royal Decree No. M/30 dated 2/6/1424H.  
b. Subject to paragraph (c) of this Article, expressions and terms in these Rules have the 
meaning which they bear in the Capital Market Law and the Glossary of defined terms used in 
the Regulations and Rules of the Capital Market Authority, unless the contrary intention appears.  
c. For the purpose of implementing these Rules, the following expressions and terms 
shall have the meaning they bear as follows unless the contrary intention appears:  
- QFI assessment agreement: an agreement between the assessing authorised person and 
the QFI meeting the requirements set out in Article 12 of these Rules.  
- bank: a financial institution that has a legal personality which engages in banking 
business.  
- assessing authorised person: an authorised person who has agreed with an applicant to 
assess its application for registration as a QFI, or an authorised person who has executed a QFI 
assessment agreement with a QFI.  
- insurance company: a financial institution that has a legal personality which engages in 
insurance business.  
- brokerage and securities firm: a financial institution that has a legal personality which 
engages in securities business.  
- investment fund: means any of the following legal persons: 1) a sovereign wealth fund 
that is fully owned by a government entity, or by a legal person fully owned by a government 
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entity. 2) a pension fund in which its main objective is to collect fees or periodic contributions 
from participants or for their interest, for the purpose of compensating them according to a 
specific mechanism. 3) a collective investment scheme aimed at providing investors therein with 
an opportunity to participate collectively in the profits of the scheme.  
- approved QFI client: a client of a QFI who has been approved in accordance with these 
Rules.  
- Fund manager: a financial institution that has a legal personality which manages the 
assets of an investment fund.  
- qualified foreign investor: a foreign investor registered with the Authority in accordance 
with these Rules to invest in listed shares.  
- applicant: a foreign investor that submits an application for registration to an assessing 
authorised person.  
- Citizens of the Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf: natural persons 
who hold the citizenship of one of the Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf 
countries, or legal persons that (i) capital of which is majority owned by citizens or governments 
of the Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf; and (ii) holding the citizenship of one 
of the Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf countries, in accordance with the 
definition set out in the resolution of the Supreme Council of the Cooperation Council for the 
Arab States of the Gulf in its 15th session approved by the Council of Ministers Resolution 
number (16) dated 20/01/1418H. 
C. Article 6: The registration conditions  
a. Type of the financial institution  
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1) The applicant must be a financial institution that has a legal personality which falls 
within one of the following types:  
a) banks;  
b) brokerage and securities firms;  
c) fund managers; and  
d) insurance companies.  
2) The financial institutions referred to in sub-paragraph a (1) of this Article must be 
licensed or otherwise subject to regulatory oversight by a regulatory authority and incorporated 
in a jurisdiction that applies regulatory and monitoring standards equivalent to those of the 
Authority or acceptable to it. For the purposes of this paragraph, the Authority may, at its 
absolute discretion, determine whether the regulatory and monitoring standards are equivalent to 
those of the Authority or acceptable to it, and the Authority shall provide authorised persons duly 
authorised to conduct dealing activities with a list of jurisdictions that applies regulatory and 
monitoring standards equivalent to those of the Authority or acceptable to it, and any update 
occurs to that list.  
b. Size of the financial institution  
1) The applicant must have assets under management of SAR 18,750,000,000 eighteen 
billion seven hundred and fifty million Saudi Riyals (or an equivalent amount) or more. The 
Authority may reduce the minimum for these assets to SAR 11,250,000,000 eleven billion two 
hundred and fifty million Saudi Riyals (or equivalent amount).  
2) For the purposes of these Rules, assets under management include:  
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a) assets owned by the applicant or its group for the purpose of investment; and  
b) assets managed by the applicant or its group for the account of another person or 
persons.  
c. Investment experience  
The applicant or any of its affiliates must have been engaged in securities activities and 
investment therein for a minimum of 5 years.  
D. Article 21: Investment limits  
a. Investments of QFIs and approved QFI clients shall be subject to the following 
limitations:  
1) Each QFI, together with its affiliates, or each approved QFI client together with its 
affiliates may own a maximum of 5% of the shares of any issuer whose shares are listed.  
2) Where a QFI invests on behalf of an approved QFI client, it must not execute a 
transaction which would result in the relevant client, together with its affiliates, owning more 
than 5% of the shares of any issuer whose shares are listed.  
3) The maximum proportion of the shares of any issuer whose shares are listed that may 
be owned by all foreign investors (in all categories, whether residents or non-residents) in 
aggregate is 49%, including interests under swaps.  
4) The maximum proportion of the shares of any issuer whose shares are listed that may 
be owned by QFIs and approved QFI clients is 20%.  
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5) The maximum proportion of the shares of all issuers whose shares are listed that may 
be owned by QFIs and approved QFI clients in aggregate is 10% by market value, including any 
interests under swaps.  
6) Other legislative limitations on foreign ownership in joint stock companies.  
7) The limitations set forth in the articles of association or by-laws of the listed 
companies or any instructions issued by the supervisory or regulatory authorities to which these 
companies are subject.  
b. The Exchange shall publish on its website, as determined by the Authority in this 
regard, the following information:  
1) A statistic reflecting the ownership percentages specified in sub-paragraphs a (3); a (4) 
and a (5) of this Article.  
2) The limitations specified in sub-paragraphs a (6) and a (7) of this Article, according to 
the information received by the Exchange from listed companies in this regard. 
§2.8 Foreign Investment Law Article 1 
A. Article 1 
The following terms and expressions shall have the meanings assigned to them, unless 
the context requires otherwise: 
(a) The Council: The Supreme Economic Council.  
(b) Board of Directors: The Board of Directors of the General Investment Authority. 
(c) The Authority: The General Investment Authority. 
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(d) The Governor: The Governor of the General Investment Authority. 
(e) Foreign Investor: A natural person who is not of Saudi nationality or a legal person 
whose partners are not all Saudi. 
(f) Foreign Investment: Investment of foreign capital in an activity licensed by this Law. 
(g) Foreign Capital: In this Law, foreign capital shall mean, for example, but not limited 
to, the following funds and rights so long as they are owned by a foreign: 
(1) Cash, securities and negotiable instruments. 
(2) Foreign investment profits, if invested to increase capital, expand existing projects, or 
establish new ones. 
(3) Machinery, equipment, furnishings, spare-parts, means of transport and production 
requirements related to the investment. 
(4) Intangible rights, such as licenses, intellectual property rights, technical know-how, 
administrative skills and production techniques. 
(h) Commodity Firms: enterprises that produce industrial, agricultural, plant and animal 
commodities. 
(i) Service Firms: Service and contracting enterprises. 
(j) Law: The Foreign Investment Law. 
(k) Regulation: The Implementing Regulation of this Law. 
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§2.9 Listing Rules, Article 45(a) 1 
A. Article 45 
Notification Related to Substantial Holdings in Shares or Convertible Debt Instruments 
(a) Where a person is subject to one or more of the following events, the person must notify the 
issuer and the Authority at the end of the trading day of the occurrence of the relevant event: 1) 
becoming the owner of, or interested in, 5% or more of any class of voting shares or convertible 
debt instrument of the issuer… 
§2.10 Capital Market Authority Law, Article 3 
A. Article Three 
Commercial bills such as cheques, bills of exchange, order notes, documentary credits, 
money transfers, instruments exclusively traded among banks, and insurance policies shall not be 
considered Securities. 
§2.11 Saudi Certified Public Accountants Law, Articles 19, 24, 29 and 32 
A. Article (19) 
An organization shall be established under the name of (Saudi Organization for Certified 
public Accountants). It shall operate under the supervision of the Ministry of Commerce in order 
to promote the accountancy and auditing profession and all other related matters that might lead 
to the development of this profession and raising its status. 
This Organization shall be specifically entrusted with the following:  
1. Review , develop and approve accounting and auditing standards. 
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2. Establish the necessary rules for fellowship certificate examination provided that such rules 
cover the professional , practical , theoretical aspects of the audit profession including all 
Regulations pertaining to the profession. 
3. Organize courses of continuous education. 
4. Conduct special research work and studies covering accounting , auditing and other allied 
subjects. 
5. Publish periodicals, books and bulletins covering accounting and auditing subjects. 
6. Establish an appropriate quality review program in order to ensure that Certified Public 
Accountants comply with accounting and auditing standards and the provisions of these 
Regulations and its by - laws. 
7. Participate in local and international committees and symposiums relating to the profession 
of accounting and auditing. 
B. Article (29) 
Subject to the provisions of other Regulations , investigations for non - compliance with 
the provisions of these regulations shall be carried out by a committee to be formed by the 
Minister of Commerce. The Committee shall be chaired by the Deputy Minister of Commerce 
with membership consisting of a Saudi legal advisor and one member of the board of directors of 
SOCPA . Should the committee decide that the non - compliance act constitutes a crime it shall 
refer it to the competent authority . Following issue of a ruling , the forecited committee shall 
consider the non - compliance act in terms of professional ethics and may impose any of the 
following penalties : Reprimand , Warning , or suspension from practicing the profession for a 
period not to exceed six months . The non - compliant member have a right to appeal to the 
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Grievance Board against the resolution issued imposing any of the foregoing penalties. However 
, should the investigation committee determine that the non - compliance act does not constitute 
a crime , it may impose one of the following penalties upon completion of investigation : 
Reprimand , Warning , or suspension from practicing the profession for a period not to exceed 
six months. In case the committee beleived that the non - compliance act does not deserve any of 
the specified penalties it shall dismiss the case . The committee's decision should be in all cases 
based on just causes , and the non - compliant member shall have the right to appeal to the 
Grievance Board against the penalty decision . In the event that the committee is of the opinion 
that the penalty of removal of the name of the non - compliant from the Register should be 
imposed , it shall refer the matter to the Grievance Board for taking the appropriate decision. 
C. Article (32) 
The Grievance Board shall have the jurisdiction to impose the penalty of the removal of 
the name from the Register provided for in these Regulations . It shall also have the jurisdiction 
to consider all claims filed by or against the certified public accountant for any reason relating to 
the practice of the profession in conformity with the provisions of these Regulations . 
D. Article (24) 
The Organization's affairs shall be managed by a Board of Directors consisting of Fifteen 
members , as follows :  
1. The Minister of Commerce or his delegate - Chairman 
2. The Deputy Minister of Commerce - Member 
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3. The Deputy Minister of Finance and National Economy for Financial Affairs and Accounts 
or any official of grade 14 and above appointed by the Minister of Finance and National 
Economy. - Member 
4. The Vice President of the General Controller's Bureau or any official of grade 14 and above 
appointed by the President of the General Controller's Bureau. - Member 
5. Two Saudi members of the teaching staff of the accounting department of one or more of the 
universities of the Kingdom , to be appointed by the Minister of Commerce upon the 
nomination of the Minister of Higher Education. 
6. A representative for the Council of Chambers of Commerce and Industry , to be appointed by 
the Minister of Commerce upon nomination by the said Council. - Member 
7. Six members from among Saudi practitioner Certified Public Accountants to be elected by 
the Organization's general meeting for a term of three years , renewable for one more term. 
By way of exception , these members shall be appointed in the first Board of Directors for 
five years by a resoultion to this effect from the Minister of Commerce 
The Secretary General of the Organization shall attend the meetings of the Board of 
Directors without having the right to vote on decisions taken . 
The Board of Directors meets once at least every ninety days at the invitation of its 
Chairman or his designated representative . The chairman shall invite the Board for a meeting if 
requested to do so in writing by at least four members. 
Meetings of The Board of Directors shall be valid only if attended by the majority of 
members including the chairman or his designated representative. Decisions of the Board shall 
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be adopted by the majority vote of members present , and in case of equal votes , the chairman 
shall have the casting vote. 
§2.12 Competition Law, Articles 8 and 9 
A. Article Eight 
1) An independent council named "Competition Protection Council" shall be established. 
It shall be located in the Ministry of Commerce and Industry. 
2) A Royal Order shall be issued for the formation of the Council as follows: 
• The Minister of Commerce and Industry Chairman 
• A representative of the Ministry of Commerce and Industry Member 
• A representative of the Ministry of Finance Member 
• A representative of the Ministry of Economy and Planning Member 
• A representative of the General Investment Authority Member 
• Four members of expertise and competence selected for their merits and nominated by 
the Minister 
3) The term of membership in the Council shall be four years renewable for one term. 
The Council member shall remain in his post upon expiration of his term until a success or is 
appointed. 
4) The Council shall convene headed by the chairman or whomever he deputizes of the 
members and with the attendance of two thirds of the members. Council's decisions shall be 
taken by majority vote, and in case of equal votes, the chairman shall have the casting vote. 
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5) Council members may not disclose any information they obtain as a result of their 
membership in the Council. 
6) A Council member may not participate in the deliberation of any case or subject matter 
in which he has an interest or with which he has a relation, or if he is related by blood or 
marriage to any of the parties involved, or if he has represented any of the parties concerned. 
B. Article Nine 
Subject to provisions of other laws, the Council shall have jurisdiction over the following 
tasks: 
1) Approving cases of merger, acquisition, or combining two managements or more into 
one joint management resulting in a dominant position in the market. 
2) Ordering the undertaking of proceedings of inquiry, research and collection of 
evidence pertaining to complaints and practices in violation of provisions of this Law, and 
ordering the investigation and prosecution thereof. 
Competition Law, Promulgated under the Royal decree No. M/25, Date 4/5/1425H and 
the amending based on Royal decree No. M/25, Dated 11/4/1435H Page no:6 
3) Approving the initiation of criminal case procedures against violators of provisions of 
this Law. 
4) Forming the Council's bodies and issuing the financial and administrative regulations, 
in coordination with the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Civil Service. 
5) Proposing relevant draft laws that affect competition in light of the variables occurring 
in the market, and proposing necessary amendments to provisions of this Law. 
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6) Issuing the Implementing Regulations of this Law. 
7) Preparing an annual report of Councils activities and plans, to be submitted to the 
Council of Ministers by chairman of the Council. 
§2.13 Execution Law, Articles 11, 8 and 96 
A. Article 11  
Notwithstanding the provisions of treaties and conventions, the execution judge may not 
enforce any court judgments and orders passed in any foreign country except in cases of equal 
treatment and after verifying the following: 1. That the Saudi courts are not competent to hear 
the case in respect of which the court judgment or order was passed and that the foreign courts 
which passed it are competent in accordance with the international rules of jurisdiction set down 
in the laws thereof. 2. That the litigants to the case in respect of which the judgment was issued 
were duly summoned, properly represented and enabled to defend themselves. 3. That the court 
judgment or order has become final in accordance with the law of the court that passed it. 4. That 
the court judgment is in no way inconsistent with any judgment or order previously passed by the 
Saudi courts. 5. That the judgment does not provide for anything which constitutes a breach of 
Saudi public order or ethics. 
B. Article 8 
1. The execution department in every general court shall undertake execution and its 
procedures. More than one department may be constituted when needed. 2. The single judge in 
the general court shall undertake execution and its procedures. 3. Foreign judgments, orders and 
writes shall be executed by one judge or more, as needed. The Supreme Judicial Council may, 
when necessary, create special courts for execution. 
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C. Article 96 
This law shall supersede articles from 96 thru 232 of the Law of Procedure before 
Sharee'ah Courts issued by Royal Decree No. M/21 dated 20.5.1421 AH and paragraph g of 
article 13 of the Law of the Board of Grievances No. M/78 dated 19.9.1428 AH and all other 
contradicting provisions. 
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Appendix to Chapter 3: Relevant Laws Cited 
§3.1 Saudi Companies Law 2015, 1023 Articles 2, 3, 48, 52, 54, 55, 68, 108, 149, 151, 153, 154, 
155, 157, 161, 164, 182, 184 and 186 
D. Article (2) 
A company is defined as a contract under which two or more persons undertake to 
participate in an enterprise for profit, with each contributing a share in the form of money, 
services or both, with a view to dividing any profits (realized) or losses (incurred) as a result 
of such enterprise. 
E. Article (3) 
1. The Company established in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia shall have one of the following 
forms:  
a.General Partnerships  
b. Limited partnership  
c. Partnerships (Un-registered)/ Mahasa Company; 
d. Joint Stock Company; 
e. Limited liability Company  
2. Subject to the provisions of paragraph (3) of this Article, a company in any form other 
than the ones stated in paragraph (1) hereinabove shall be considered void, and people who 
have contracted in its name shall be jointly and severally responsible for the obligations 
arising from such contract. 
                                                          
1023 This is not the official translation. 
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3. Without prejudice to such companies as are known in Islamic jurisprudence, any 
company that does not assume one of the forms mentioned in paragraph (1) hereinabove 
shall not be subject to the provisions of these regulations. 
F. Article (48) 
A third party shall have recourse only against the Partner with whom he has dealt. But if 
the partners have acted in a certain way that disclose the existence of the partnership company to 
a third party, the partnership company shall be considered a de facto general partnership in 
regard to such third party, without prejudice to the effectiveness of the conditions of the 
partnership company’s articles of association between the partners. 
G. Article (52) 
A Joint Stock Company’s capital shall be divided into negotiable shares of equal value. 
The Joint Stock Company shall be solely responsible for the debts and liabilities resulted from its 
activities. 
H. Article (54) 
The capital of the joint stock company at the time of incorporation shall be enough to 
achieve its objective. In all cases, the capital may not be less than 500,000 Riyals, 25% of which 
shall be paid at the date of incorporation. 
I. Article (55) 
Notwithstanding article 2 of these regulations, the state and public juristic personality and 
the companies full owned by the state and the companies with a capital of no less than 5 million 
Riyals, may establish a single person joint stock company, provided that the said person has all 
the powers of the shareholders’ assemblies including the constituent general meeting powers. 
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J. Article (68) 
1. A Joint Stock Company shall be administered by a board of directors whose number is 
specified in the company’s bylaws, provided that it is not less than three and not more than 
eleven.  
2. Each director may nominate himself/herself, another or more for the membership of 
the Board of Directors, within the limits of their share in the capital.  
3. The regular general assembly shall appoint the directors for the term specified in the 
company bylaws, provided that it does not exceed three years. Directors, however, shall always 
be eligible for re-appointment, unless the company bylaws provide otherwise. The company 
bylaws shall specify the manner upon which the board membership ends or terminated upon the 
request from the Board of Directors. In any case, the regular general assembly may, at any time, 
remove all or any of the board of directors members even if the company’s bylaws provide 
otherwise, without prejudice to the right of a removed board member to claim compensation 
against the company if the removal is made without acceptable justification or at an improper 
time. A director may resign, provided that such resignation is made at a proper time; otherwise, 
he/she shall be responsible before the company for damages that occur out of such resignation. 
K. Article (108) 
The Company’s bylaws may provide for the imposition of restrictions on the negotiability 
of shares provided these do not permanently prohibit such negotiability. 
L. Article (149) 
If all the shares of a Joint Stock Company are transferred to a single shareholder to whom 
the requirements stipulated for in Article (55) of these Regulations do not apply, the company 
solely shall be responsible for all its debts and obligations. Nevertheless, such shareholder must 
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adapt the situation of the company to the provisions stipulated for in this Part or convert it to a 
limited liability company of one person within a period of no more than one year; otherwise, the 
company shall be dissolved by force of these Regulations. 
M. Article (151) 
1. A limited liability company is a company, consisting of no more than fifty 
shareholders. Its financial entity shall be separate of the financial entity of each shareholder 
therein. The company solely shall be responsible for the subsequent debts and obligations, and its 
owner or shareholders shall not be held responsible for such debts and obligations. 
2. If the number of shareholders exceeds the number specified in paragraph (1) of this 
Article, the company shall be converted into a joint stock company, within a period of no more 
than one year. In case this period passes without such conversion, the company shall be 
dissolved by force of these Regulations, unless such excess is the result of succession or will. 
N. Article (153) 
The purpose of limited liability company may not consist in carrying out any banking 
business, financing, saving, insurance or investment of fortune on behalf of third parties. 
A limited liability company may not resort to public subscription to form or increase its 
capital or to get a loan, nor to issue negotiable instruments. 
O. Article (154) 
1- Notwithstanding the provisions of Article (2) of these Regulations, a limited liability 
company may be constituted of one person or all its shares may be transferred to one person. In 
such a case, the responsibility of this person shall be restricted to the fortune he allocates for the 
company’s capital. Such a person shall have the powers and authorities of the director, Board of 
Directors, and the General Assembly of Shareholders, stipulated for in this Part. Furthermore, He 
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shall be entitled to appoint one (or more) director who shall be a representative before juridical 
and arbitration bodies and third parties, in addition to being responsible for managing the 
company before the shareholder, owner of company shares. 
2- In all cases, the natural person may not establish or own more than one limited liability 
company of one person, and the limited liability company, owned by one person (of natural or 
legal entity) shall not establish or own another limited liability company of one person. 
P. Article (155) 
The person who owns a limited liability company shall be responsible in his fortune for 
the company’s liabilities against any third parties, with whom he transacts in the name of the 
company, in the following cases: 
a- If he, in bad faith, liquidates the company or stops its activity before the expiration of 
its term or achievement of the objective, for which it is incorporated. 
b- If he does not separate the business of the company from his own businesses. 
c- If he carries out businesses of the company before it gains the corporate body. 
Q. Article (157) 
1. Subject to Article (14) of the Regulations, a limited liability company shall not be 
incorporated unless all contributions in cash and in kind are distributed among all shareholders 
and are entirely fulfilled. The contributions in cash shall be deposited in a licensed bank, which 
shall not be entitled to release them prior to the finalization of the procedures of the company’s 
publication and registration in the commercial register.  
2. To evaluate the contributions in kind, the provisions, stipulated for evaluating these 
shares in the joint stock company, shall apply. Nevertheless, shareholders who submit these 
contributions shall be jointly liable in all their fortune against any third parties for the fair 
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evaluation of the contributions in kind they submit. Nevertheless, a Liability Action shall in this 
case be disregarded after the lapse of five years from the date of company publication and 
registration in the commercial register, pursuant to Article (158) of these Regulations. 
R. Article (161) 
1. A shareholder may assign his share to a co-shareholder or to a third party in 
accordance with the terms of the Company’s Articles of Association. Nevertheless, if a 
shareholder wishes to assign his share to a third party for valuable consideration, he must notify 
his co-shareholders through the manager of the Company, of the terms of such assignment in 
which case every shareholder shall have the right to recover the share at its fair value, within 
thirty days of the date of being notified of the same, unless the company’s Articles of 
Association shall stipulate for another evaluation method or period of time. If the right of 
recovery is exercised by more than one shareholder and the assignment involves a number of 
shares, these shall be divided among the applicants for recovery in proportion to the interest of 
each of them in the capital. The right of recovery provided for in this Article shall not apply to 
the transmission of shares by inheritance or bequest, or by virtue of a judgement of a competent 
judicial body. 
2. In case the prescribed time for the exercise of the right of recovery is expired without 
being used by any shareholder, the holder of the share shall have the right to waive it for a third 
party. 
S. Article (164) 
1. The Company shall be administered by one or more managers who may or may not be 
shareholders in the Company. The shareholders shall appoint the managers in the Articles of 
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Association or in a separate contract for a specified or unspecified term. Shareholders may issue 
a resolution to form a board of managers, if management is entrusted to several persons. 
2. The Company's Articles of Association or Shareholders' resolution shall specify the 
manner in which this board shall operate and the majority necessary for the adoption of its 
resolutions. The Company shall be bound by the acts performed by the managers within the 
scope of company's purposes. 
T. Article (182) 
1. The holding company is a joint stock or limited liability company that aims to have 
control over other joint stock or limited liabilities companies, so-called “subsidiaries”, through 
owning more than half of the capital of these companies or controlling the formation of their 
boards of directors. 
2. The name the company chooses, in addition to its type, shall be coupled by the word 
(Holding). 
U. Article (184) 
A subsidiary may not own shares or stakes in the holding company. Every disposition to 
transfer shares or stakes from the holding company to a subsidiary shall be deemed void.  
V. Article (186) 
The holding company shall be governed by the provisions set forth in this chapter and 
any other provisions that do not contradict with the provisions of these Regulations, according to 
the legal form adopted by the company. 
§3.2 Saudi Companies Law 1965, articles 1, 2 and 157 
A. Article (1) 
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A company is defined as a contract under which two or more persons undertake to 
participate in an enterprise for profit, by contributing a share in the form of money or work, with 
a view to dividing any profits (realized) or losses (incurred) as a result of such enterprise. 
B. Article (2) 
The provisions of this Law, as well as such conditions laid down by the partners and such 
customary rules that are consistent with this Law, shall apply to the following companies: 
A. 1) General partnership; 2) Limited partnership; 3) Joint venture; 4) Joint-stock 
corporation; 5) Partnership limited by shares; 6) Limited liability partnership; 7) company with 
variable capital; and 8) Cooperative company. 
Without prejudice to such companies known in Islamic jurisprudence, any company that 
does not assume one of the mentioned forms shall be (considered) null and void, and the persons 
who have made contracts in its name shall be personally and jointly liable for the obligations 
arising from such a contract. 
The Council of Ministers may, by a decision, amend the minimum and maximum limits 
of the capital of companies provided for in this Law. 
The provisions of this Law shall not be applied to companies incorporated in whole or in 
part by the Government or by any other public legal person, provided that a Royal Decree shall 
be issued authorizing its incorporation and containing the provisions which the company shall 
subject to. 
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C. Article (157) 
A limited liability company is a company that consists of two or more partners who are 
responsible for the debts of the company as much as their shares in the capital. The number of 
partners in this company does not exceed fifty. 
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Appendix A to Chapter 4: Relevant Laws Cited 
§4.1 Saudi Competition Law, Articles 7, 8, 9 and 15 
A. Article (7) 
The firm referred to in Article Six of this Law may complete the procedures of merger, 
acquisition or combining two or more managements into one joint management in the following 
cases: 
1) Upon notification in writing of the approval by the Council. 
2) Upon expiration of sixty days from the date of notification without being notified by 
the Council in writing of its objection to the deal or of that it is under study and investigation. 
Competition Law, Promulgated under the Royal decree No. M/25, Date 4/5/1425H and 
the amending based on Royal decree No. M/25, Dated 11/4/1435H Page no:5 
3) Upon expiration of ninety days from the date of notification with the deal being under 
review and investigation, without being notified by the Council in writing of its approval or 
rejection. 
B. Article (8) 
1) An independent council named "Competition Protection Council" shall be established. 
It shall be located in the Ministry of Commerce and Industry. 
2) A Royal Order shall be issued for the formation of the Council as follows: 
• The Minister of Commerce and Industry Chairman 
• A representative of the Ministry of Commerce and Industry Member 
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• A representative of the Ministry of Finance Member 
• A representative of the Ministry of Economy and Planning Member 
• A representative of the General Investment Authority Member 
• Four members of expertise and competence selected for their merits and nominated by 
the Minister 
3) The term of membership in the Council shall be four years renewable for one term. 
The Council member shall remain in his post upon expiration of his term until a successor is 
appointed. 
4) The Council shall convene headed by the chairman or whomever he deputizes of the 
members and with the attendance of two thirds of the members. Council's decisions shall be 
taken by majority vote, and in case of equal votes, the chairman shall have the casting vote. 
5) Council members may not disclose any information they obtain as a result of their 
membership in the Council. 
6) A Council member may not participate in the deliberation of any case or subject matter 
in which he has an interest or with which he has a relation, or if he is related by blood or 
marriage to any of the parties involved, or if he has represented any of the parties concerned. 
C. Article (9) 
Subject to provisions of other laws, the Council shall have jurisdiction over the following 
tasks: 
1) Approving cases of merger, acquisition, or combining two managements or more into 
one joint management resulting in a dominant position in the market. 
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2) Ordering the undertaking of proceedings of inquiry, research and collection of 
evidence pertaining to complaints and practices in violation of provisions of this Law, and 
ordering the investigation and prosecution thereof. 
Competition Law, Promulgated under the Royal decree No. M/25, Date 4/5/1425H and 
the amending based on Royal decree No. M/25, Dated 11/4/1435H Page no:6 
3) Approving the initiation of criminal case procedures against violators of provisions of 
this Law. 
4) Forming the Council's bodies and issuing the financial and administrative regulations, 
in coordination with the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Civil Service. 
5) Proposing relevant draft laws that affect competition in light of the variables occurring 
in the market, and proposing necessary amendments to provisions of this Law. 
6) Issuing the Implementing Regulations of this Law. 
7) Preparing an annual report of Councils activities and plans, to be submitted to the 
Council of Ministers by chairman of the Council. 
§4.2 Implementing Regulation of Competition Law, Articles 2, 10, 11, 19, 20, 21, 26, 27, 28, 
31, and 33 
A. Article (2) 
Wherever they occur in these Regulations, the following terms shall have the meanings 
expressed next to them unless the context requires otherwise: 
Law: Competition Law promulgated under Royal Decree No. (M/25) dated 4/5/1425 AH.  
Council: Competition Council. 
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Ministry: Ministry of Commerce (Trade) and Industry. 
Minister/Chairman of the Council: Minister of Commerce and Industry /Chairman of 
Competition Council. 
Regulations: Provisions stipulated herein.  
Committee: Committee for Settlement of Violations of Competition Law. 
Relevant Market: The Market that consists of two elements: relevant products and 
geographical area.  
Commodity / Commodities: any good or service or a combination thereof which may, in 
terms of price, characteristics and uses, substitute each other to meet a specific consumer need in 
a given geographical area of homogenous competition conditions. 
Implementing Regulations of the Competition Law, Promulgated under the resolution of 
Competition Council No. 126, Dated 4/9/1435 AH (1/7/2014 AD) Page no:2 
Economic Concentration: any act resulting in full or partial transfer of ownership rights 
or usufruct of an entity’s properties, rights, stocks, shares or obligations to another entity that 
puts an entity or a group of entities in a position of domination of an entity or a group of entities, 
by way of merger, takeover, acquisition, or combining two or more managements into one joint 
management or any other means which leads to having a market share of 40% of the total sales 
of a commodity in the market. 
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B. Article (10) 
When studying the impact of a practice of a violating dominant entity on the fair 
competition, the Council may take into consideration any or some of the following items or 
decide the appropriate study approach: 
1) The impact on competition;  
2) Whether a practice is or not consistent with the normal competitive behavior when it is 
possible to construe that fact based on the normal commercial concerns and interests in the 
situations in which the person who commits such practice is not in a position that enables it to 
influence the total demand or supply of the relevant goods or services or influence the prevailing 
price in the market;  
3) Whether a practice is or not complying with the direct protection of intellectual 
property rights while the usage of intellectual property rights by market players to commit the 
practices stipulated herein constitutes violation to the Law. 
Exemptions  
C. Article (11) 
The Council, upon the request of the relevant entities, may exempt from the application 
of article (4) of the Competition Law and article (4) of the Implementing Regulations thereof any 
anticompetitive practice and agreement that will lead to the improvement in the performance of 
entities and realize benefits to the consumer exceeding the impacts of restriction of free 
competition. 
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D. Article (27) 
The Council shall study the concentration application to ensure that it will not affect the 
competition. Such study shall be through evaluating one or more of the following factors: 
1) The level of competition in the market;  
2) The entry possibility of new entities to the market;  
3) The effect of demand on the price of the commodity;  
4) The existence of any regulatory or realistic barriers to enter the market;  
5) The level and historical trends of the anticompetitive practices in the market;  
6) The possibility of acquiring power in the market by the concentrating parties due to the 
economic concentration;  
7) The variable characteristics of the market including the growth, innovation and 
creativity.  
8) The opinions of the related entities in accordance to article 26 hereof. 
E. Article (26) 
The Council shall receive the opinions of entities related to the economic concentration 
application. The council will not take into consideration any opinions that are not supported by 
reasons, not clarifying the anticompetitive impacts of the concentration, or not including full date 
about the entity which provide such opinions. 
F. Article (28) 
The Council shall take into consideration the following upon evaluating the impacts of 
the economic concentration: 
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1) Maintaining and promoting the effective competition among the producers and 
distributors of goods and services in the market;  
2) Enhancing the interests of the consumers with regard to quality and price;  
3) Encouraging, through competition, for decreasing costs, improving new commodities, 
and facilitating the entry of new competitors in the market. 
G. Article (33) 
Subject to the provisions of article 30 hereof, the entities, which apply for the economic 
concentration may complete the concentration transaction after the elapse of 90 days from the 
application date if not notified in writing by the Council with the approval or refusal.  
The entity applying for the concentration may decline the application by notifying the 
Council in writing with such desire whether during the review period or after the issuance of 
approval decision by the Council. 
H. Article (19) 
Any entity intending to realize the economic concentration shall submit a written 
application to the Council 60 days prior to the accomplishment of the concentration transaction 
and shall fill in a form including the following: 
1) Names of parties related to the concentration transaction;  
2) The description of the requested concentration and the effectiveness date;  
3) Relevant goods and services in addition to its sale volume and percentage;  
4) The relevant market and the volume thereof; 
5) The main commodities dealt in by the applicant entity;  
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6) The positive impacts of the concentration;  
7) The negative impacts of the concentration and the proposed procedures to limit such 
impacts;  
8) The markets that will be affected by the concentration transaction;  
9) The name, capacity, and official domicile of the applicant.  
I. Article (20) 
The applicant shall provide, with the application, information about each entity involved 
in the concentration transaction, particularly the following information: 
1) The name, nationality, address, number of branches, commercial register number, and 
the licensed activity of the entity;  
2) List of the main commodities dealt in by the entity;  
3) List of the names of the board of directors; 
4) The main clients and their percentage in the market;  
5) The volume, value, and percentage of the sales in the market;  
6) List of the competitors and their market shares;  
Implementing Regulations of the Competition Law, Promulgated under the resolution of 
Competition Council No. 126, Dated 4/9/1435 AH (1/7/2014 AD) Page no:7 
7) The existing concluded agreements;  
8) The factors that affect market entry;  
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9) The nature of distribution channels;  
10) The factors that affect price fixing during the last five years;  
11) The volume of the available production capacity and the percentage of its utilization;  
12) The volume of demand on the commodity and the structure thereof;  
13) The alternative/substitute commodity;  
14) Types of clients. 
J.Article (31) 
The applicant shall be informed in writing with the decision of the Council, which shall 
be any of the following: 
1) The approval on the economic concentration application, supported by reasons; 
2) The refusal of the economic concentration application, supported by reasons;  
3) The conditional approval on the economic concentration. 
§4.3 M&A Regulation, Article 16 
A. Article 16: Compliance of the Offer with Competition Law  
(a) Notification  
Where an offer would, if completed, be subject to the Competition Law, the offeror must 
state that this is the case in its announcement. The offeree company and the offeror must notify 
the Council of Competition Protection pursuant to the provisions of the Competition Law.  
(b) Requirement for Appropriate Term in Offer  
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Where an offer would, if completed, be subject to the Competition Law, it must be a term 
of the offer that it will lapse if the Council of Competition Protection notifies the offeror or the 
offeree company in writing that it objects to the deal or has placed it under study and review as 
specified in the Competition Law.  
(c) Offer Period Ceases During Competition Reference Period  
When an offer or possible offer is objected to by the Council of Competition  
Protection, placed under study or forms the subject of proceedings or inquiries pursuant to 
paragraph (b), the offer period will end. Any new offer must be announced within 21 days after 
the announcement of a final decision made that the transaction is permissible under the 
Competition Law. A new offer period will be deemed to begin on the date on which a final 
decision made that the transaction is permissible under the Competition Law. If there is no 
announcement of a new offer within 21 days after 22 Capital Market Authority the 
announcement of a final decision made that the transaction is permissible under the Competition 
Law, this offer period will last until either the expiry of the 21 day period or the announcement 
by all relevant offerors (affected by the decision that the transaction is permissible under the 
Competition Law) that they do not intend to make an offer, whichever is earlier. 
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Appendix B to Chapter 4: Rules Governing Economic Concentration 
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Appendix C to Chapter 4: Form of Economic Concentration Request 
Form of Economic Concentration Request 
 نموذج خدمة طلب تركز اقتصادي
 .نأمل االطالع على وصف خدمة طلب تركز اقتصادي )نبذه عن الخدمة( قبل الشروع بتعبئة النموذج
 معلومات عن مقدم الطلب
Form of Economic Concentration Request 
Please read the description of Economic Concentration Request (About the service) before proceeding 
to fill the form 
Applicant information 
 
 Full Name االسم الرباعي
  
 
  رقم الهوية الوطنية/اإلقامة




 صفة مقدم الطلب







_________Mobile Number 966 رقم الجوال
 Example: 9665XXXXXXX  
 مثال:
 9665 XXXXXXX 
 
  البريد اإللكتروني
Email Address   
  Email Address Confirmation تأكيد البريد
  اإللكتروني
 معلومات عن المنشآت المشاركة في التركز االقتصادي
Information about the establishments involved in the Economic Concentration 
Names and data of the establishments involved in the Economic Concentration (including the 
applicant’s establishment) 
  أسماء وبيانات المنشآت المشاركة في التركز االقتصادي )بما فيها مقدمه الطلب : (





المبيعات/اإليرادات   نشاط المنشأة رقم السجل التجاري  اسم المنشأة
  آخر سنة











Year  Sales/Last Year Incomes Establishment Activity 
Commercial Register Number  Establishment Name 
 معلومات عن التركز االقتصادي وآثاره
Information about the Economic Concentration and its implications  
 
 وصف التركز اإلقتصادي المطلوب




 مبررات طلب التركز االقتصادي




ما هي حصة المنشآت بعد التركز ألعلى سلعة/خدمة على 
أو األحياء مستوى السوق المعني )المناطق أو المحافظات 
 السكنية ... إلخ(؟
What is the highest commodity/service 
allocation to the establishments after 
Concentration at the level of the related 
market (regions, governorates, residential 
areas, etc.)? 
 
30أقل من  رفأكث 30% %  
 
 
التركز ألعلى سلعة/خدمة على ما هي حصة المنشآت بعد 
 مستوى المملكة؟
What is the highest commodity/service 
allocation to the establishments after 
Concentration at the Kingdom level? 
30أقل من    %30أكثر من %
More 30% Less 30% 
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 المستندات والوثائق المطلوب إرفاقها
 Documents to be Attached 
 
الميزانيات المالية للمنشآت المشاركة بعملية التركز االقتصادي 
 ()بما فيها مقدمه الطلب
Financial Budgets of the establishments 
involved in the Concentration process 
(including the applicant’s establishment)  
 باإلمكان جمع ميزانيات كل المنشآت بملف واحد مضغوط 
 وإرفاقه 
The budgets of all of the establishments may 




عقود تأسيس المنشآت المشاركة بعملية التركز االقتصادي 
 ()بما فيها مقدمه الطلب
Articles of Association of the establishments 
involved in the Concentration process 
(including the applicant’s establishment) 
باإلمكان جمع عقود تأسيس كل المنشآت بملف واحد مضغوط 
 وإرفاقه
Articles of Association of all of the 
establishments may be gathered and attached 
in one compressed file 
  
 مالحظة عامة تود إيصالها لنا  
A general notice you would like to deliver 
  
 
  كود التحقق
Verification Code 
 الرجاء كتابة ما يظهر لك في الصورة
Please enter the code shown here  
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Appendix A to Chapter 5: Relevant Laws Cited 
§5.1 Saudi Companies Law 2015, 1024 Articles 1, 12, 60, 65, 68, 70, 71, 74, 75, 76, 78, 86, 87, 
90, 92, 93, 94, 95, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 161, 190, 191, 192, 219, 224, 225, 226 
and 161 
A. Article (1) 
The following terms and expressions shall have the definitions and meaning affixed 
thereto hereunder, wherever mentioned in these regulations unless the context requires 
otherwise. 
The Ministry: The Ministry of Commerce and Industry 
The Minister: The Minister of Commerce and Industry 
CMA: The Capital Market Authority 
The Chairman: The Chairman of the Board of the CMA 
The Competent Authority: The Ministry of Commerce and Industry, except for the 
matters related to the joint stock companies which is listed before the CMA, the competent 
authority shall mean the Capital Market Authority 
Regulations: The Companies’ Regulations 
B. Article (12) 
1. Save the partnerships (un-registered)/Mahasa Company, a company’s Articles of Association 
as amended must be in writing and attested before the relevant competent authority; otherwise 
such Articles of Association shall not be valid vis-à-vis third parties.  
                                                          
1024 This is not the official translation. 
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2. The company’s managers or directors, as the case may be, shall be held jointly responsible for 
damages sustained by the company, by the shareholders or by third parties as a result of the 
failure to record the Articles of Association in accordance with paragraph (1) hereinabove. 
C. Article (60) 
1. The Ministry shall decide upon licensing the incorporation of the joint stock 
company, including the joint stock company in which the state of other juristic persons is part. In 
case the activity of the joint stock company requires a license from the competent authority 
before licensing its arbitration, the decision for the incorporation of joint stock company shall not 
be issued before obtaining such license of approval. 
2. The joint stock company may not exercise its activities unless the incorporation 
procedures are completed and the final licenses necessary for the activity is obtained by the 
competent entity, if any. 
3. In case the incorporation applications form of the joint stock company in which 
the state or the juristic persons are part includes exemption of any of the regulations’ provisions, 
the licensing request shall be referred to the Cabinet to consider the same. 
D. Article (65) 
1. The Ministry shall issue a decision to announce the incorporation of the company, 
after verifying that all the requirements stated in the provisions of this regulations regarding 
establishment of joint stock company are met. The decisions shall be published on the Ministry’s 
website. 
2. The board members must, within fifteen days of the date (of issue) of the above 
decision as stated in paragraph 1 above, apply for the registration of the company in the 
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companies commercial registry. Such registration shall specifically contain the following 
information: 
a) The company’s name, object, head office and term.  
b) The founders’ names, residence addresses, occupations, and nationalities. 
c) The classes, value and number of shares, the amount of paid-in capital 
d) The Ministry’s decision number and date concerning the incorporation of the 
company. 
e) The Ministry’s decision number and date concerning the announcement of 
incorporation of the company. 
E. Article (68) 
1. A Joint Stock Company shall be administered by a board of directors whose 
number is specified in the company’s bylaws, provided that it is not less than three and not more 
than eleven.  
2. Each director may nominate himself/herself, another or more for the membership 
of the Board of Directors, within the limits of their share in the capital.  
3.  The regular general assembly shall appoint the directors for the term specified in 
the company bylaws, provided that it does not exceed three years. Directors, however, shall 
always be eligible for re-appointment, unless the company bylaws provide otherwise. The 
company bylaws shall specify the manner upon which the board membership ends or terminated 
upon the request from the Board of Directors. In any case, the regular general assembly may, at 
any time, remove all or any of the board of directors members even if the company’s bylaws 
provide otherwise, without prejudice to the right of a removed board member to claim 
compensation against the company if the removal is made without acceptable justification or at 
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an improper time. A director may resign, provided that such resignation is made at a proper time; 
otherwise, he/she shall be responsible before the company for damages that occur out of such 
resignation. 
F. Article (70) 
1. Unless the company’s bylaws provide otherwise, if a board member seat becomes 
vacant, the board may - temporarily - appoint a member in accordance with the order in votes, 
provided that this member shall have the required experience and competence. The Ministry 
shall be informed of such, as well as the authority if the company is listed in the financial market, 
within five working days as of the appointment date, and it shall be laid before the first regular 
general assembly. The new member shall complete the unexpired term of his predecessor.  
2. If the number of directors falls below the minimum prescribed in these 
Regulations or in the company’s bylaws, the rest of the board members must call the regular 
general assembly to convene within sixty days to elect the required number of members. 
G. Article (71) 
1. A director may not have any interest, whether directly or indirectly, in the 
transactions or contracts concluded for the company, unless through prior authorization from the 
regular/ordinary general assembly, to be renewed annually. A director must declare to the board 
(of directors) any direct or indirect interest that he may have in the transactions or contracts 
concluded for the company. Such declaration must be recorded in the minutes of the (board) 
meeting, and this member shall not participate in voting for the resolution to be adopted in this 
respect in the board of directors and the shareholders’ meetings. The chairman of the board of 
directors shall inform the regular/ordinary general assembly upon convening, of the transactions 
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and contracts in which any director has a direct or indirect interest. Such notification shall be 
accompanied by a special report from the company's external auditor. 
2. If the board member fails to declare its interest referred to in Paragraph 1 of this 
Article, the company or any interested party may claim before a competent judicial entity 
voidance of the contract or oblige such member to pay any profit or benefit gained thereto from 
it. 
H. Article (74) 
Directors may not disclose outside of general assembly meetings the secrets related to the 
company; and they shall not exploit what has come to their knowledge by reason of their 
membership, to achieve an interest for themselves or their relatives or third parties; otherwise, 
they will be removed and held liable for damages. 
I. Article (75) 
1. With due regard to the prerogatives vested in the general assembly, the board of 
directors shall enjoy full powers in the administration of the company to achieve its objectives, 
except where explicitly stipulated by law or the company's articles of association that acts or 
actions are within the competence of the general assembly; The board shall also be entitled, 
within the scope of its competence, to delegate one or more of its members or others to perform 
an act or certain acts.  
2. The board of directors may contract loans for any periods of time, or sell or 
mortgage the assets or the place of business of the company, or release the debtors of the 
company from their liabilities, unless the articles of association of the company or the ordinary 
general assembly limit the powers of the board. 
J. Article (76) 
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1. The company’s bylaws shall specify the manner of remunerating directors. Such 
remuneration may consist of a specified amount, or meeting attendance fee, material benefits, or 
a percentage of the net profits; and it may also be a combination of two or more of these benefits.  
2. If such remuneration represents a certain percentage of the company’s profits, it 
must not exceed 10% of the net profits after the deduction of the reserves as are determined by 
the general assembly pursuant to the provisions of these Regulations and the company’s bylaws, 
and after distribution of a dividend of not less than 5% of the company’s paid capital to 
shareholders, provided that the entitlement to this remuneration is proportional to the number of 
sessions attended by the member. Any determination (of remuneration) made in violation of this 
(provision) shall be null and void.  
3. In all cases, the total remunerations and financial or in kind benefits that a director 
receives shall not exceed an amount of 500,000 Riyals annually, according to the regulations set 
by the competent entity.  
4. The board of directors’ report to the regular/ordinary general assembly must 
include a comprehensive statement of all the amounts received by directors during the financial 
year in the way of remuneration, expenses, and other benefits, as well as of all the amounts 
received by the directors in their capacity as officers or executives of the company, or in 
consideration of technical, administrative or advisory services. It must also include the number 
of sessions of the board and the number of sessions each director attended as of the date of the 
last general assembly.  
5. The general assembly may – upon the recommendation of the board – terminate 
the membership of the members who are absent for more than three consecutive board meetings 
without a legitimate excuse. 
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K. Article (78) 
1. Directors shall be jointly responsible for damages to the company, or the 
shareholders, or third parties, arising from their maladministration of the affairs of the company, 
or their violation of the provisions of these Regulations or of the company’s bylaws. Any 
stipulation contrary to this provision shall be considered nonexistent. (Joint) liability shall be 
assumed by all directors if the wrongful act arises from a resolution adopted unanimously. With 
respect to resolutions adopted by majority vote, dissenting directors shall not be liable if they 
have expressly recorded their objection in the minutes of the meeting. Absence from the meeting 
during which such resolution is adopted shall not constitute cause for release from liability, 
unless it is established that the absentee was not aware of the resolution, or, on becoming aware 
of it, was unable to object to it.  
2. The ordinary general assembly's approval to discharge the board members from 
their liability shall not hinder any liability actions.  
3. Such action shall be disregarded after the lapse of three years from the date of 
discovering such wrongful act. Except for fraud and forgery, such action shall be disregarded in 
all cases after the lapse of five years from the end date of the financial year in which such act 
took place or three years as of the end of membership of the concerned director, whichever is 
later. 
L. Article (86) 
1. The shareholders’ general assembly meetings shall be chaired by the Chairman, or 
the vice chairman in his absence, or any board member delegated by the Board of Directors for 
this purpose in the absence of the chairman and vice chairman.  
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2. Each shareholder is entitled to attend the shareholders’ general assembly meeting 
even if the company’s bylaws states otherwise. The shareholder may authorize another person 
other than the directors or the company’s employees to attend the meeting on his behalf. 
3. Shareholders’ general assembly meetings may be held and the shareholder may 
participate in its deliberations and vote on its resolutions through modern technology methods, 
according to the regulations set by the relevant entity.  
4. The Ministry of Commerce, as well as the Authority for companies listed in the 
financial market, may delegate one or more representatives to attend the general assembly 
meetings as observers, in order to ensure the application of the provisions. 
M. Article (87) 
Except for matters falling within the competence of the extraordinary general assembly, 
the regular/ordinary assembly shall be competent in all matters related to the company and shall 
convene at least once a year within six months from the end of the company’s financial year. 
Other regular/ordinary general assemblies may be called for whenever the need arises. 
N. Article (90) 
1- Shareholders general or special meetings shall be convened at the invitation of the 
board of directors, as stipulated for in the bylaws of the company. The board of directors must 
call for a regular/ordinary general assembly, if so requested by the auditor or the Audit 
Committee or a number of shareholders representing at least 5% of the capital. Meetings shall be 
convened at the invitation of the auditor if the board did not call for it within thirty days of the 
auditor’s request.  
2- The competent authority may by its decision invite the regular/ordinary general 
assembly to be convened in the following cases:  
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a. After the lapse of the term set out in Article 87 of the law without being 
convened. 
b. If the number of the board of directors is reduced to less than the 
minimum number required for its validity to convene, taking into account the 
provisions of Article 69 of the law.  
c. If there are violations of the provisions of the law or the bylaws of the 
company or maladministration of the affairs of the company. 
d. If the board did not call for the general assembly meeting within fifteen 
days from the date of the auditor's request or the Audit Committee or a number 
of shareholders representing at least 5% of the capital. 
3- A number of shareholders representing at least 2% of the capital, may submit a 
request to the relevant entity to call for a meeting of the ordinary general assembly if any of the 
cases mentioned in Paragraph 2 of this Article apply. The competent entity shall within thirty 
days as of the shareholders’ request, send invitations, provided that the invitation includes the 
meeting agenda and the items to be approved by the shareholders. 
O. Article (92) 
Shareholders - wishing to attend a general or special assembly - shall register their names 
at the company’s head office before the time fixed for such meeting to convene, unless the 
bylaws of the company provide for another place and means. 
P. Article (93) 
1. The regular general assembly meeting shall be valid only if attended by 
shareholders representing at least a quarter of the company’s capital, unless the bylaws of the 
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company provide for a higher proportion, provided not to exceed one half of the company’s 
capital. 
2. If this quorum was not achieved as stated in Paragraph 1 of this Article, a notice 
shall be sent for a second meeting to be held within thirty days of the date of the previous 
meeting. This notice shall be published in the manner prescribed in Article (91). However, the 
second meeting may be held one hour after the lapse of the term specified for holding the first 
meeting, provided that this is permitted in the bylaws, and that the notice of the first meeting 
includes the possibility of holding this meeting. In all cases, the second meeting shall be valid no 
matter the number of shares represented therein.  
3. Resolutions of the regular general assembly shall be adopted by absolute majority 
vote of the shares represented thereat, unless the bylaws of the company provide for a higher 
proportion. 
Q. Article (94) 
1. An extraordinary general assembly meeting shall be valid only if attended by 
shareholders representing at least one half of the company’s capital, unless the company’s 
bylaws provide for a higher proportion, on condition not to exceed two thirds of the company’s 
capital. 
2. If this quorum was not achieved as stated in Paragraph 1 of this Article, a notice 
shall be sent for a second meeting with the same conditions as stipulated for in Article 91. 
However, the second meeting may be held one hour after the lapse of the term specified for 
holding the first meeting, provided that the notice of the first meeting includes the possibility of 
holding this meeting. In all cases, the second meeting shall be valid if attended by a number of 
shareholders representing at least a quarter of the company’s capital. 
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3. If this quorum was not achieved in the second meeting, a notice shall be sent for a 
third meeting with the same conditions as stipulated for in Article 91 of the law. However, the 
third meeting shall be valid no matter the number of shares represented therein, after the 
approval of the competent entity. 
4. Resolutions of an extraordinary general assembly shall be adopted by a two-thirds 
majority vote of the shares represented thereat. But if a resolution pertains to an increase or a 
decrease in capital, or to extension of the term of the company, or the dissolution of the company 
prior to expiry of the term specified in its bylaws or the merger of the company with another 
company, it shall be valid only if adopted by a three-fourths majority vote of the shares 
represented at the meeting. 
5. The board of directors must publish, in accordance with the provisions of Article 
65 of the law, the resolutions adopted by the extraordinary general assembly if they provide for 
alteration of the company’s bylaws. 
R. Article (95) 
1. The company’s bylaws shall state the manner of voting at shareholders’ meetings. 
Cumulative voting shall be used in electing the board of directors, i.e. the right of vote for one 
share may not be used more than one time.  
2. Directors may not participate in voting on assembly resolutions pertaining to their 
discharge from liability for their administration of the company or pertaining directly or 
indirectly to their interest. 
S. Article (111) 
1. The company’s bylaws may provide for the redemption of shares during the 
company’s existence if it is a gradually exhaustible type of project or based on temporary rights. 
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Shares shall be redeemed only out of profits or of a disposable reserve fund. Redemption shall be 
effected successively either by way of annual draw or by any other method insuring equality 
among shareholders. 
2. Redemption may be effected by the company’s purchasing its own shares either at 
a discount or at par value, and shall destroy the shares so obtained. 
3. A shareholder whose shares were redeemed in accordance with paragraph (1) of 
this Article shall be granted enjoyment shares (actions de jonissance). A certain percentage of the 
annual net profit shall be set aside for the unredeemed shares by priority over the enjoyment 
shares in accordance with the Company's bylaws.  
4. Upon the dissolution of the company, the holders of unredeemed shares shall have 
priority in receiving the par value of their respective shares out of the company assets. 
T. Article (112) 
1. The company may purchase or pledge its own shares in accordance with rules established 
by the competent authority. The shares purchased by the company shall not have any votes in 
shareholders’ meetings. 
2. The shares may be pledged in accordance with rules to be established by the competent 
authority. The hypothecary creditor may receive the profits and use the rights attached to the 
share unless otherwise agreed in the pledge contract. However, the hypothecary creditor may 
not attend the shareholders' general meetings or vote therein. 
U. Article (113) 
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1. A shareholder shall exercise the right of voting at general or special meetings in 
accordance with the provisions of the company’s bylaws. Each share shall have one vote in the 
shareholders’ meetings.  
2. The company’s bylaws may prescribe a maximum limit for the number of votes 
vested in the holder of several shares on behalf of a third party. 
V. Article (114) 
The company's extraordinary general meeting may, based on a provision in the 
company's bylaw and in accordance with the rules established by the competent authority, issue 
preferred shares or resolve to purchase the same or convert ordinary shares to preferred shares or 
convert the preferred shares to ordinary shares. The preferred shares shall not give the right to 
vote in the shareholders' General Assemblies. Such shares shall give their holders the right to 
obtain a percentage more than the holder of the ordinary shares in the company's net profits after 
setting aside the statutory reserve. 
W. Article (115) 
If the capital includes preferred shares, no new shares with prior preference to these may 
be issued except with the consent of a special meeting formed, in accordance with Article (89) of 
the Regulations, of the holders of the preferred shares who would be harmed by such issue, and 
with the consent of a general meeting representing all classes of shareholders, unless the 
company’s bylaws provide otherwise. This rule shall also apply to alteration or cancellation of 
the priorities established in favour of preferred shares in the bylaws of the company. 
X. Article (116) 
1. In case of no dividends are distributed for any fiscal year, the profits for the 
coming years may only be distributed after paying the holders of the preferred shares the 
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percentage stated in accordance with the provision of Article (114) of the Regulations for that 
year. 
2. Where the company fails to pay the percentage stated in accordance with the 
provision of Article (114) of the Regulations out of the profits for three consecutive years, the 
special meeting of the holders of these shares convened in accordance with the provisions of 
Article (89) of the Regulations may resolve that they either attend the general meetings and vote 
or delegate representatives on their behalf to the board of directors in proportion to the 
percentage of their shares in the capital until the company is able to pay in full all priority profits 
prescribed for these shareholders for the previous years. 
Y. Article (117) 
1. A shareholder is obligated to pay the value of his share on the dates set for such 
payment. If a shareholder defaults in payment when it becomes due, the board of directors may, 
after notifying him by the means stated in the Company's bylaws or notifying him by a registered 
letter, sell the share at a public auction or stock market – as the case may be- in accordance with 
the rules to be established by the competent authority. 
2. The company shall recover from the proceeds of the sale such amounts as are due 
to it and shall refund the balance to the shareholder. If the proceeds of the sale fall short of the 
amounts due, the company shall have a claim on the entire fortune of the shareholder for the 
unpaid balance.  
3. A shareholder defaulting on payment till the sale day may pay the value payable 
thereby in addition to the expenses spent by the company in this regard. 
4. The company shall cancel the share sold in accordance with the provisions of this 
Article and issue a new share bearing the serial number of the cancelled share to the purchaser. It 
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shall make a notation to this effect in the shares register along with the statement of the new 
holder's name. 
Z. Article (118) 
The company may not ask any shareholder to pay any sums in excess of the amount to 
which he has committed himself upon the issue of his share, even if the company’s bylaws 
provide otherwise. A shareholder may not recover his interests in the capital of the company. 
The company may not release any shareholder from his liability for the unpaid balance of the 
value of his share. Nor may this liability be offset against any rights due to the shareholder from 
the company. 
AA. Article (161) 
1. A shareholder may assign his share to a co-shareholder or to a third party in 
accordance with the terms of the Company’s Articles of Association. Nevertheless, if a 
shareholder wishes to assign his share to a third party for valuable consideration, he must notify 
his co-shareholders through the manager of the Company, of the terms of such assignment in 
which case every shareholder shall have the right to recover the share at its fair value, within 
thirty days of the date of being notified of the same, unless the company’s Articles of 
Association shall stipulate for another evaluation method or period of time. If the right of 
recovery is exercised by more than one shareholder and the assignment involves a number of 
shares, these shall be divided among the applicants for recovery in proportion to the interest of 
each of them in the capital. The right of recovery provided for in this Article shall not apply to 
the transmission of shares by inheritance or bequest, or by virtue of a judgement of a competent 
judicial body. 
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2. In case the prescribed time for the exercise of the right of recovery is expired 
without being used by any shareholder, the holder of the share shall have the right to waive it for 
a third party. 
BB. Article (190) 
Taking into account the other relevant laws, a company, may even during the liquidation 
stage, merge into another of the same or different type. 
CC. Article (191) 
1. Merger shall be affected by the combination of one or more companies into 
another existing company, or by the consolidation of two or more companies into a new 
company under formation. The merger agreement shall specify the terms of merger and sets out 
specifically the method to follow in evaluating the merged company’s liabilities, and the number 
of interests or shares to be allotted for it in the capital of the absorbing company or the company 
resulting from merger.  
2. The merger shall only be valid upon evaluating the net assets of the merged 
company and the absorbing company if the value, or part thereof, of quotas and shares of the 
merged company are versus those quotas or shares of the absorbing company.  
3. In all cases, each company that is a party to a merger shall pass a resolution 
approving such merger, subject to the conditions prescribed for the amendment of the Articles of 
Association or by-laws of such company. 
4. The shareholder who own shares or stakes in the absorbing company and the 
merged company may not vote on the resolution except in one of the two companies. 
DD. Article (192) 
 449 Appendix A to Chapter 5 
  
All rights and liabilities of the merged company shall be transferred to the absorbing 
company or the new company resulting from merger after making all merger procedures and 
registration of the company according to provisions of these Regulations. The absorbing 
company or the company resulting from merger shall be deemed a successor of the merged 
company within the limits of transferred assets, unless otherwise agreed to in merger agreement. 
EE. Article (219) 
Without prejudice to the provisions of these Regulations, and the powers of the Saudi 
Arabian Monetary Agency pursuant to any relevant regulations, particularly banks control 
system, Cooperative Insurance Companies Control System and the finance institutions control 
system, the Authority shall be competent to supervise joint stock companies listed on the Saudi 
Stock Market companies and their control, and issue governing regulations thereof, including the 
organization of mergers if one of the parties is listed on the Saudi Stock market 
FF. Article (224) 
Existent companies as of the effective date of these Regulations shall adjust their 
conditions, in accordance with the provisions of these Regulations within one year as maximum 
commencing from the effective date of these Regulations. Notwithstanding, the Ministry and 
Board of the Authority, each within its own jurisdiction, shall identify the provisions contained 
therein governing such companies during such period. 
GG. Article (225) 
1- The Minister shall issue a resolution with indicative forms of articles of association 
and by-laws for each type of companies within one hundred and twenty days from the date of 
issuance of these Regulations. Such forms shall be published at the Ministry's Web Site, and 
shall be effective as of the effective date of these Regulations. 
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2- The Minister and Board of the Authority shall issue necessary resolutions to 
implement their respective provisions of these Regulations. 
HH. Article (226) 
These Regulations shall supersede the Companies Law, issued by Royal Decree No. M/6 
dated 22/3/1385 AH. Any provisions inconsistent with or in contrary to these Regulations shall 
be repealed 
§5.2 Saudi Companies Law 1965, Articles 10, 74, 52, 51, 65, 66, 67,69, 87, 83, 88,72,72, 
91,92, 95, 165, 213 and 214 
A. Article (10) 
With the exception of a joint venture, a company’s contract shall be recorded in writing 
before a notary public. Otherwise, such contract shall be null and void in relation to third parties. 
This article was amended by the Royal Decree No. M/22 dated 30/7/1412H (corresponding to 
4/2/1992AD). 
The partners may not invoke the invalidity of the contract, or any amendment thereto that 
was not recorded in the above manner, against third parties, but the latter may invoke it against 
the partners.  
The directors or the members of the board of directors shall be jointly responsible for 
damages sustained by the company, the partners, or third parties, as a result of failure to record 
the contract or any amendment thereto. 
B. Article (74) 
The company’s bylaws shall specify the manner of remunerating directors.  
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Such remunerations may consist of a specified salary, a fee for attending the meetings, 
material benefits, a certain percentage of the profits, or a combination of two or more of these 
benefits. 
If, however, such remuneration represents a certain percentage of the company’s profits, 
it must not exceed l0% of the net profits after deduction of expenses, depredations, and such 
reserves determined by the general meeting pursuant to the provisions of this Law or the 
company’s bylaws, and after distribution of a dividend of not less than 5% of the company’s 
capital to the stockholders. Any determination of remuneration made in violation of this 
provision shall be null and void. 
The board of directors’ report to the regular general meeting must include a 
comprehensive statement of all the amounts received by directors during the financial year in the 
way of salaries, share in the profits, attendance fees, expenses, and other benefits, as well as all 
the amounts received by the directors in their capacity as employees or executives of the 
company, or in consideration of technical, administrative, or advisory services. 
C. Article (52) 
The following joint-stock corporations may be incorporated only by virtue of an 
authorization issued upon a royal decree based on the approval of the Council of Ministers and 
the recommendation of the Minister of Commerce, with due regard to the provisions of the 
Regulations: 
a) Chartered corporations.  
b) Corporations managing a public utility. 
c) Corporations receiving subsidy from the government.  
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d) Corporations in which the government or any other public legal person participates, 
except for General Organization for Social Insurance and Pension Fund. 
e) Corporations practicing banking activities. 
Other corporations may be incorporated only by an authorization to be issued by the 
Minister of Commerce and published in the Official Gazette.  
The Minister of Commerce shall issue the said authorization only after reviewing a study 
proving the economic feasibility of the company’s objectives, unless the company has submitted 
such study to another competent government agency that has authorized the establishment of the 
enterprise. 
The application for such authorization shall be signed by at least five partners of the 
corporation and submitted in the manner to be prescribed by a decision of the Minister of’ 
Commerce.  
The application shall state the manner of subscription in the corporation’s capital, the 
number of shares reserved by the founders to themselves and the amount subscribed by each 
founder. The applicant should attach thereto a copy of the corporation’s contract and bylaws both 
signed by the partners and other founders.  
The said application shall be recorded in the register kept for that purpose by the 
Companies General Department.  
The said General Department may request that modifications be made to the 
corporation’s bylaws so as to be consistent with the provisions of this Law or conformable to the 
standard form referred to in Article 51. 
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D. Article (51) 
The Minister of Commerce shall issue a decision in a form for joint-stock corporation 
bylaws. Such form may not be violated except for reasons satisfactory to the said minister. 
E. Article (65) 
The decision of the Minister of Commerce and Industry announcing the incorporation of 
the company shall, together with a copy of its memorandum of association and bylaws, be 
published in the Official Gazette at the expense of the company. 
The directors must, within 15 days of the date of issue of the above decision, apply for 
the registration of the company in the Register of Companies at the General Department of 
Companies. Such registration shall specifically contain the following particulars: 
1) The company’s name, object, head office, and term.  
2) The founders’ names, residence of place, occupations, and nationalities.  
3) The types, value, and number of shares, as well as the amount offered for public 
subscription, the amount subscribed by the founders, the amount of paid-in capital, and the 
restrictions imposed on the circulation of shares.  
4) Method of the division of profits and losses.  
5) The particulars concerning contributions in kind and the rights attached thereto, and 
special privileges granted to the founders or others.  
6) The date of the royal decree authorizing the incorporation of the company, and the 
issue number of the Official Gazette in which the royal decree was published.  
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7) The date of the decision issued by the Minister of Commerce announcing the 
incorporation of the company, and the issue number of the Official Gazette in which the decision 
was published.  
The directors must also register the company in the Commercial Register in accordance 
with the provisions of the Law of Commercial Register. 
F. Article (66) 
A corporation shall be administered by a board of directors whose number shall be 
specified by the bylaws of the company, provided that it is not less than three directors. 
The regular general meeting shall appoint the directors for the term specified in the 
company bylaws, which shall not exceed 3 years. 
The Council of Ministers may determine the number of the boards of directors on which 
a director may serve. 
Directors, however, shall always be eligible for re-appointment, unless the company 
bylaws provide otherwise. 
The company bylaws shall specify the manner of retirement of directors; but the regular 
general meeting may, at any time, remove all or some of the directors even if the company’s 
bylaws provide otherwise, without prejudice to the right of a removed director to hold the 
company liable if the removal is made without acceptable justification or at an improper time. 
A director may resign, provided that such resignation is made at a proper time; otherwise, 
he shall be responsible to the company for damages. 
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G. Article (67) 
Unless the company bylaws provide otherwise, if the position of a director becomes 
vacant, the board of directors may appoint a temporary director to fill the vacancy, provided that 
such appointment shall be laid before the first regular general meeting. The new director shall 
complete the unexpired term of his predecessor. 
If the number of directors falls below the minimum number prescribed in this Law or in 
the company’s bylaws, the regular general meeting must be convened as soon as possible to 
appoint the required number of directors. 
H. Article (69) 
A director may not have any interest whether directly or indirectly, in the transactions or 
contracts made for the account of the company, except with an authorization from the regular 
general meeting, to be renewed annually.  
Transactions made by way of public bidding shall, however, be excluded from this 
restraint if the director has submitted the best offer. 
The director must inform the board of directors of any personal interest he may have in 
the transactions or contracts made for the account of the company. Such declaration must be 
recorded in the minutes of the board meeting, and the interested director shall not participate in 
voting on the resolution to be adopted in this respect. 
The chairman of the board of directors shall inform the regular general meeting when it 
convenes of the transactions and contracts in which any director has a personal interest. Such 
communication shall be accompanied by a special report from the auditor. 
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I. Article (87) 
Stockholders' general or special meetings shall be convened at the summons of the board 
of directors in the manner prescribed in the bylaws of the company. 
The board of directors must call for a regular general meeting, if so requested by the 
auditor or by a number of stockholders representing at least 5% of the capital. 
The General Department of Companies may, at the request of a number of stockholders 
representing at least 2% of the capital or pursuant to a decision by the Minister of Commerce, 
call for a general meeting if such a meeting is not called within one month from the date set 
therefore. 
J.Article (83) 
The bylaws of the company shall specify the classes of stockholders entitled to attend 
general meetings. Nevertheless, every stockholder who holds 20shares shall have the right to 
attend, even if the bylaws of the company provide otherwise. 
A stockholder may, in writing, give proxy to another stockholder other than a director to 
attend the general meeting on his behalf. 
The Ministry of Commerce may delegate one or more representatives to attend the 
general meetings as observers. 
K. Article (88) 
Notices of general meetings shall be published in the Official Gazette and in a daily 
newspaper distributed in the locality of the head office of the company, at least 25 days prior to 
the date set for the meeting. 
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Nevertheless, if all the stock of the company is registered as nominative, a notice sent by 
registered mails at least 25 days before the date of the meeting shall suffice. The notice shall 
contain an agenda of the meeting. A copy of both the notice and the agenda shall be sent to the 
General Department of Companies at the Ministry of Commerce within the period specified for 
publication. 
L. Article (72) 
Directors may not disclose to the stockholders or to third parties outside a general 
meeting, such secrets of the company because they are liable for its administration; otherwise, 
they must be removed and held liable for damages. 
M. Article (73) 
With due regard to the prerogatives of the general meeting, the board of directors shall 
enjoy full powers in the administration of the company. It shall be entitled, within the scope of 
its competence, to delegate one or more of its members or others to perform an act or certain 
acts. 
Nevertheless, the board of directors may not contract loans for terms exceeding 3 years, 
or sell or mortgage the real property or the place of business of the company, or release the 
debtors of the company from their liabilities, unless so authorized in the bylaws of the company 
and subject to the terms set forth therein. If the company’s bylaws do not contain any provisions 
in this regard, the board may perform the above acts with an authorization from the regular 
general meeting, unless such acts fall by virtue of their nature within the scope of the company’s 
objects. 
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N. Article (91) 
The regular general meeting shall be valid only if attended by stockholders representing 
at least one half of the company’s capital, unless the bylaws of the company provide for a higher 
proportion. If this quorum has not been obtained at a first meeting, a notice shall be sent for a 
second meeting to be held within 30 days of the previous meeting. This notice shall be published 
in the manner prescribed in Article (88). The second meeting shall be considered valid, 
regardless of the number of shares represented thereat. 
Resolutions of the regular general meeting shall be adopted by absolute majority vote of 
the shares represented thereat, unless the bylaws of the company provide for a higher proportion. 
O. Article (92) 
An extraordinary general meeting shall be valid only if attended by stockholders 
representing at least one half of the company’s capital, unless the company’s bylaws provide for 
a higher proportion. If this quorum has not been obtained at the first meeting, a notice shall be 
sent for a second meeting in the manner prescribed in Article (91). The second meeting shall be 
valid if attended by a number of stockholders representing at least one quarter of the company’s 
capital. 
Resolutions of an extraordinary general meeting shall be adopted by a two-thirds majority 
vote of the shares represented thereat. But if a resolution pertains to an increase or a decrease in 
capital, or to extension of the term of the company, or to dissolution of the company prior to 
expiry of the term specified in its bylaws or to merger of the company into another company or 
firm, it shall be valid only if adopted by a three-fourths majority vote of the shares represented at 
the meeting. 
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The board of directors must publish, in accordance with the provisions of Article (65), the 
resolutions adopted by an extraordinary general meeting if these provide for amendment of the 
company’s bylaws. 
P. Article (95) 
Minutes shall be kept for every general meeting, showing the names of stockholders 
present or represented thereat, the number of shares held by each of them, whether personally or 
by proxy, the number of votes allotted thereto, the resolutions adopted, the number of consenting 
and dissenting votes, and a comprehensive summary of the debate conducted at the meeting. 
Following every meeting, the minutes shall be regularly entered in a special book, which 
shall be signed by the chairman, the secretary, and the teller of the meeting. 
Q. Article (165) 
A partner may waive his portion to one of the partners or others in accordance with the 
terms of the company's contract, however if he wants to waive his portion to others with a 
compensation, he shall notify the other Partners through the director of the company with the 
terms of the waiver. In this case, each partner may ask for refund the money of the portion with 
its true value. If thirty days passed from the date of notification without any of the partners using 
his right of restitution, the owner of the portion has the right to dispose of it, taking into account 
the provisions of the second paragraph of  
Article (157). If more than one of the partners used the right of restitution and the waiver 
was related to a group of portions, these portions shall be divided between those who asked for 
restitution by the portion of each of them in the capital. If the waiver was related to one portion, 
it shall be given to the partners who have asked for restitution, taking into account the provisions 
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of the second paragraph of Article (158). If the waiver of the portion was without compensation, 
then the asking partner shall pay the value according to the latest inventory conducted by the 
company. 
The right of restitution provided for in this article on shall not be applied to the transfer of 
ownership of the portions by inheritance or a will. 
R. Article (213) 
It is permissible for the company, even if it is in the phase of liquidation, To integrate 
into another company of its kind or of another kind, but the cooperative company shall not be 
integrated into a company of another kind. 
S. Article (214) 
The integration is conducted by the annexation of one or more Companies to another 
existing company or by combining two or more companies in a new company under foundation. 
The integration contract determines the conditions and shows, in particular, the method of 
evaluating the security of the integrated company and the number of portions or the shares 
belong to it in the capital of the integrating company. The integration shall not be valid unless the 
decision made by each company is issued in accordance with the conditions of transforming the 
company prescribed in the contract of the company or its regulation. This decision shall be 
registered and declared in the set ways of registering of the amendments that occur to the 
contract of the integrated company or its regulation. 
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§5.3 Corporate Governance Regulation, Articles 1(b), 11 and 18. 
A. Article 1: Preamble  
(a) These Regulations include the rules and standards that regulate the management of 
joint stock companies listed in the Exchange to ensure their compliance with the best governance 
practices that would ensure the protection of shareholders’ rights as well as the rights of 
stakeholders. 
 (b) These Regulations constitute the guiding principles for all companies listed in the 
Exchange unless any other regulations, rules or resolutions of the Board of the Authority provide 
for the binding effect of some of the provisions herein contained.  
(c) As an exception of paragraph (b) of this article, a company must disclose in the Board 
of Directors` report, the provisions that have been implemented and the provisions that have not 
been implemented as well as the reasons for not implementing them. 
B. Article 11: Responsibilities of the Board  
(a) Without prejudice to the competences of the General Assembly, the company’s Board 
of Directors shall assume all the necessary powers for the company’s management. The ultimate 
responsibility for the company rests with the Board even if it sets up committees or delegates 
some of its powers to a third party. The Board of Directors shall avoid issuing general or 
indefinite power of attorney.  
(b) The responsibilities of the Board of Directors must be clearly stated in the company’s 
Articles of Association.  
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(c) The Board of Directors must carry out its duties in a responsible manner, in good faith 
and with due diligence. Its decisions should be based on sufficient information from the 
executive management, or from any other reliable source.  
(d) A member of the Board of Directors represents all shareholders; he undertakes to 
carry out whatever may be in the general interest of the company, but not the interests of the 
group he represents or that which voted in favor of his appointment to the Board of Directors.  
(e) The Board of Directors shall determine the powers to be delegated to the executive 
management and the procedures for taking any action and the validity of such delegation. It shall 
also determine matters reserved for decision by the Board of Directors. The executive 
management shall submit to the Board of Directors periodic reports on the exercise of the 
delegated powers.  
(f) The Board of Directors shall ensure that a procedure is laid down for orienting the 
new board members of the company’s business and, in particular, the financial and legal aspects, 
in addition to their training, where necessary.  
(g) The Board of Directors shall ensure that sufficient information about the company is 
made available to all members of the Board of Directors, generally, and, in particular, to the non-
executive members, to enable them to discharge their duties and responsibilities in an effective 
manner.  
(h) The Board of Directors shall not be entitled to enter into loans which spans more than 
three years, and shall not sell or mortgage real estate of the company, or drop the company’s 
debts, unless it is authorized to do so by the company’s Articles of Association. In the case 
where the company’s Articles of Association includes no provisions to this respect, the Board 
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should not act without the approval of the General Assembly, unless such acts fall within the 
normal scope of the company’s business. 
C. Article 18: Conflict of Interest Within the Board  
(a) A Board member shall not, without a prior authorization from the General Assembly, 
to be renewed each year, have any interest (whether directly or indirectly) in the company’s 
business and contracts. The activities to be performed through general bidding shall constitute an 
exception where a Board member is the best bidder. A Board member shall notify the Board of 
Directors of any personal interest he/ she may have in the business and contracts that are 
completed for the company’s account. Such notification shall be entered in the minutes of the 
meeting. A Board member who is an interested party shall not be entitled to vote on the 
resolution to be adopted in this regard neither in the General Assembly nor in the Board of 
Directors. The Chairman of the Board of Directors shall notify the General Assembly, when 
convened, of the activities and contracts in respect of which a Board member may have a 
personal interest and shall attach to such notification a special report prepared by the company’s 
auditor. 
(b) A Board member shall not, without a prior authorization of the General Assembly, to 
be renewed annually, participate in any activity which may likely compete with the activities of 
the company, or trade in any branch of the activities carried out by the company.  
(c) The company shall not grant cash loan whatsoever to any of its Board members or 
render guarantee in respect of any loan entered into by a Board member with third parties, 
excluding banks and other fiduciary companies. 
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§5.4 Listing Rules, Article 32 
A. Article 32 
Conditions Related to Capital Increase for Acquiring a Company or Purchasing an Asset: 
Where the purpose of a capital increase is to acquire a company or purchase or an asset, the 
following additional requirements must be complied with as applicable:  
1) the issuer must submit to the Authority a report prepared by the issuer’s financial 
advisor comprising the issuer’s valuation and a valuation of the target company to be acquired or 
the asset to be purchased;  
2) the issuer must submit to the Authority a financial due diligence report and a legal due 
diligence report issued by the legal advisor for the target company to be acquired or assets to be 
purchased; and  
3) the prospectus shall include:  
(a) the general structure of the transaction;  
(b) the rationale behind the acquisition or purchase;  
(c) an outline of the business of the target company to be acquired and market Listing 
Rules 33 details of its relevant industry and trends;  
(d) a management discussion and analysis section on the target company to be acquired 
or the target asset to be purchased;  
(e) annual audited financial statements for the past three years (if any) preceding the date 
of the application for the target company to be acquired;  
(f) disclosure of any related parties;  
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(g) pro forma financial statements reflecting the financial position of the issuer following 
the acquisition or the purchase;  
(h) any change in the issuer or the target company to be acquired as a result of the 
transaction (including changes to the board or senior executives);  
(i) the risk factors related to the acquisition transaction or to the asset to be purchased;  
(j) the valuation of the company to be acquired or the asset to be purchased;  
(k) the time period of the acquisition process; and  
(l) the issuer’s share price performance. 
§5.5 Offers of Securities Regulations, Articles 9 and 11 
A. Article 9: Categories of Private Placement  
(a) An offer of securities is a private placement in any of the following categories:  
1) The securities are issued by the government of the Kingdom, or a supranational 
authority recognised by the Authority;  
2) The offer is restricted to sophisticated investors; or  
3) The offer is a limited offer.  
(b) The Authority may, in circumstances other than those described in paragraph (a) of 
this Article and upon application of a person seeking to make an offer of securities, determine 
that such an offer shall be treated as a private placement subject to compliance with such 
limitations as the Authority may impose. 
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B. Article 11: Limited Offers  
(a) An offer of securities is a limited offer if:  
1) (a) It is directed at no more than 60 offerees excluding sophisticated investors; and  
(b) the minimum amount payable per offeree is not less than one million Saudi Riyals or 
an equivalent amount. The minimum amount payable per offeree may be less than one million 
Saudi Riyals or an equivalent amount where the total value for the securities being offered does 
not exceed Saudi Riyals five million or an equivalent amount;  
2) The offeree is an employee of the issuer or its affiliate;  
3) The offeree is an affiliate of the issuer; or  
4) The offer complies with any other requirement prescribed by the Authority.  
(b) Securities of the same class may not be offered as a limited offer under paragraph (a-
1) of this Article more than once in a 12 month period ending with the date of the offer in 
question. 
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Appendix B to Chapter 5: Relevant Memoranda of Understanding of the Jurisdiction of 
MOCI & CMA 
The Memorandum of Understanding of the Jurisdiction of the Ministry of Commerce and 
Industry and the Capital Market Authority over companies in Saudi Arabia 
Due to the vagueness and blurriness of the lines between what falls under the Ministry 
Commerce and Industry and falls under the Capital Market Authority, The following 
memorandum sets steps and explanations of when a company is under the Ministry Commerce 
and Industry’s authority and when the company is required to comply with the Capital Market 
Authority. This memorandum is not provided for the public which required efforts to be found. 
A. The Memorandum1025 
Firstly: the stages and steps of establishing stock companies according to companies Law 
and Capital market Law: 
In accordance with the ministry of commerce and industry jurisdictions and authorities 
which are obtained from companies Law, what is related to licensing and establishing the 
company and its enrolling in the commercial register for the ministry is of the specialization of 
the ministry of commerce and industry according to the two articles (52, 53) of the companies 
Law. As for what is related to listing and offering securities and the approval it is of the terms of 
reference and the specialization of the Capital Market Authority which are obtained from the 
Capital Market Law. The two articles: A/6, 6A/3. The stages and steps of establishing stock 
companies and its listing, 
                                                          
1025 This memorandum is written in Arabic and had to be translated to English to contribute in understanding when 
M&A transactions fall under both authorities and when it only falls under the Ministry of Commerce and Industry. 
Even though the memorandum helped to unveil part of the vagueness of the jurisdictions of the Ministry of 
Commerce and Industry and the Capital Market Authority, there still several contradictions between the two 
authorities which needs to be solved through legislation not by memorandums. 
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A- The founders make a request of establishing the company to the ministry of commerce 
and industry, and the ministry takes this request into consideration according to the 
companies Law. 
B- The request is transferred to the Capital Market Authority to study the placement and the 
approval of it. 
C- Then, the minister of commerce and industry makes his decision about the license of 
establishing the company, and it should be taken into consideration the perfecting of the 
procedures that are mentioned above within a maximum period of time which is about 22 
working days. 
D- As for the company that needs to issue a royal decree, the minister of commerce and 
industry displays this request for the Royal Highness to issue a royal decree about the 
warrant of establishing the company. The ministry of commerce and industry is 
specialized for applying the article (60) of the companies system concerning what have 
been existed of the in kind shares or advantages belonging to the founders or others. 
E- After issuing the ministerial decision or the royal decree about the license of establishing 
the company, the Capital Market Authority organizes the placement of the company 
shares, makes such shares specialized, and repays the surplus according to the Capital 
Market Law and its regulations. 
F- After holding the constituent general assembly of the company according to the article 
(61) of the companies Law, the minister of commerce and industry issues a decision 
about the declaration of establishing the company, making such declaration to be 
published in the official newspaper, and enrolling the company in the commercial record 
for the ministry of commerce and industry. 
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G- The company makes a request of enrolling, inserting, and trading its shares in the market 
for the Capital Market authority according to the Capital Market Law and its regulations. 
Secondly: the amendment of the capital of the stock company according to the companies 
system and the Capital Market Law: 
A- The company board of directors issues a recommendation of reducing or increasing the 
capital and the placement of the shares (the capital should be fully paid). The Ministry of 
Commerce and Industry is specialized for applying the article (137) of the companies 
system which is related to the calibration of the in kind shares. 
B- The company makes a request for the Capital Market Authority for the approval of the 
placement of the shares according to the Capital Market Law and its regulations. 
C- After the approval by the Authority, the company makes a request of setting a date of 
holding an extraordinary general assembly for the Ministry of Commerce and Industry 
and making the call be accredited. 
D- The matter of increasing the capital of the company should be displayed for the 
shareholders of the extraordinary general assembly with the aim of approving it. 
E- The Authority becomes responsible for the supervision of organizing of the placement of 
the increasing shares, specializing it, and repaying the surplus according to the Capital 
Market Law and its regulations. 
F- The Authority informs the Ministry of Commerce and Industry about the result of 
increasing the capital and the placement of the company shares to amend the capital in 
the commercial record for the Ministry of Commerce and Industry. 
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Thirdly: Companies' transference: in the case of making a request for the transferring into 
a public joint-stock company, the procedures and steps that are mentioned in (firstly) above 
should be taken into consideration. 
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Appendix C to Chapter 5: Safola Case 
(Safola Case in Arabic) 
 الدائرة التجارية اخلامسة/ع
 ه1427لعام  5/د/تج/38حكم رقم 
 ه1426/ق لعام 3021/1الصادر يف القضية رقم 
 املقامة من/ م
 ضد/ ع
ددحم  لدد  د دد     ددن ابدددو لمددد  ددن هل ددد  دهل ددحم  احلمددد و دحدددل دالصددسة دالسددسم هل
 أمجعني د عد: 
اجتمعدد  رقددر ديددسا  املايدداد ئلددر  الدددائرة ه 1427/ 4/2 املسافدد  ففددي يددسم السدد  
 -التجارية اخلامسة املشكدة من :
 رئيسا ً ب المستشـــار 
 عضوا ً أ المستشارًالمساعد 
 عضوا ً س المستشارًالمساعد 
للسر ص بحضـــور   ً  أمينا
اعًواطلعتًعلىًالقضيةًالموضحًرقمهاًوطرفاًنزاعهاًأعاله ً ًوبعالدًسالم
-:ًالدعوىًواإلجابةًوالدراسةًوالتأملًوالمداولةًأصدرتًبشأنهاًحكمهاًالتالي  
ةًعالدًتالتلصصًوقالائذًهالل ًالالدعوىًفاليًأدً ل ًتقالد ًللالديوادًبالدعوىًبالوكالال
هالالـًحاصالاللهاًأدًموكلالالشً   ًشالالريةًفالاليًشالالركةً د 23/7/1426ًالمالالدعيًبتالالاري ً
عمالاللًبهالالل ًشالالركةًلاتًمسالالئوليةًمحالالدوداًباإلضالالافةًلوالالالد ًوتصوتالالشًوقالالدًتالالرةًال
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أدًالشركةًأثرًصهفًمالذًوالالد ًحالولًاإلداراًوأنالشًفالوج ًقباللًأيالا ًبمالدًيصبالر ًبال
قالا ًبال بهلًك اتالبًوالد ًقدًباعًالشالركةًبكاماللًحصصالهاًعلالىًشالركةً ع ًوفالوراً 
ثًلال ًيبالذًعدلًوزاراًالتجاراًبأنشًمعترضًعلىًالبيذًفيًحصتشًالتيًيملكهاًحيال
حصالالصًأنالالشًمعتالالرضًعلالالىًبيالالذًبالالاقيًالكمالالاًًبنفسالالشًولالال ًيوكالاللًوالالالد ًللقيالالا ًبالالللة
وقالدًأبلهالشًك  ً ونظاما  ً مدًحقًالشفعةًالمقررًشرعا  ً اتالبًويطلبًاستردادهاًانطهقا
 ًقالدًالعدلًبأنشًلدًيجريًأيًتصرفًعلىًالحصالصًلكنالشًفالوج ًبالأدًشالركةً ع
بًفاليًأعلنتًبالصحفًعدًشرائهاًللشركةًوأنهاًسجلتهاًلدىًكاتالبًالعالدلً وطلال
ائيةًبصفةًعاجلالةًبوضالذًالشالركةًتحالتًالحراسالةًالقضالصتا ًهل ًالدعوىًالحك ًو
كةًأيًلالالئهًتتصالالرفًشالالركةً ع ًفيهالالاًبالالأيًتصالالرفًيضالالرًبهالالاًأوًبتحميالاللًالشالالر
ًقالالروضًأوًمسالالتحقاتًماليالالةًوجالالردًالمسالالتودعاتًوالمصالالازدًالتالاليًتحتالالويًعلالالى
  بضائذًبمهييدًالرياالتًحتىًالًيت ًتصفاؤهاًمدًقبلهاً 
طالالالًشالالركااًالسالالابقيدًبشالالركةً د ًب بوالحكالال ًكالالللةًفالاليًمواجهالالةًشالالركةً ع ًوال
عهالاًوننالشًالتصرفًالواقذًعلىًحصصًموكلشًفيًالشركةًلعالد ًموافقتالشًعلالىًبي
قًلال ًيحضالرًالعقالدًولال ًيصالدرًعنالشًوالًعالدًوكياللًشالرعيًعنالشًأيًتيجالابًمتعلال
لموكلالشًًبالبيذً ًمذًرفذًيدًالمدعىًعليهاًشركةً ع ًعدًباقيًالحصالصًوالحكال 
نحكالا ًا صالالصًلشالالفعةًفالاليًالفقالشًاإلسالهميًوأحكالا ًاسالالتردادًالحباسالتردادهاًوفقالاً 
للماداً]  ً دً[ًالتيًنصتًعلىًتلزا ًكلًشريةًيري165الوارداًبنظا ًالشركاتًطبقا




بالالنصًالمالالاداً  (ًمالالدًنظالالا ًالشالالركاتًوموكلالالش165ًاسالالتردادًتلالالةًالحصالالصًعمالالهً 
 473 Appendix C to Chapter 5 
  
لشالالركةً ع ًمالالاًدفعتالالشًكقيمالالةًللحصالالصًمحالاللًالالالدعو ىًمسالالتعدًبالالأدًيالالدفذًفالالوراً 
لرق ًالشالالفعةًحسالالبماًهالالوًواردًبعقالالدًالمبايعالالةً ًفسالالجلتًهالالل ًالالالدعوىًقضالاليةًبالالاب
حالوًالمشارًتليشًأعه ًوأحيلتًأوراقهاًلهل ًالدائراًحيالثًباشالرتًنظرهالاًعلالىًالن
هالـًحضالرًالمالدعي12/9/1426ًالمبيدًفيًدفاترًالضبطًوبجلسةًالسالبتًالموافالقً
يًعالدً ة ًوبالاق   ًووكيلشً ل ًوحضرًلحضورهماًكلًمدً ح ًبصفتشًوكاليهً 
هالـ19/4/1425ًوتالاري 262ًًالشركااًالسابقيدًبشركةً د ًبموجبًالوكالةًرق ً
 ًالمرفقًصوراًمنشًبانوراقًو ف ًالليًأفالادًالالدائراًأنالشًوكياللًعالدًشالركةً ع
باللاتًوسيقو ًب حضارًالوكالةًفيًالجلسةًالقادمةًو ج ًوالليًأفادًالالدائراًأيضال  ً ا
فترًيالةًبشالركةً ع ًالمالدودًاسالماؤه ًوهويالاته ًبالدالجلسةًأنشًمالديرًاإلداراًالقانون
أدًدعال وا ًالًالضبطًوبلاتًالجلسةًسألتًالدائراًالمدعيًعدًدعوا ًفأجابًقالائهً 
هالاًتصرجًعماًوردًبهئحالةًالالدعوىًالمقدمالةًللالديوادًمالدًوكيلالشً ل ًالسالالفًلكر
 ً ز ًوهيًفيًمواجهةًكلًمدًالشركااًالسابقيدًبشالركةً د ًباسالتثنااًوالالد ًوهال
مالالالدًً%6 ر ًو د ًو هالالالـ ًو ي ًو ق ًأبنالالالااً ة ًالالالالليًيملكالالالودًمالالالاًمقالالالدار ًو
ًحصصًهل ًالشركةًوفيًمواجهةًشركةً ع ًوأشارًبلاتًالجلسةًأدًوالالد ً ة 
وهالالوًالًيراالالبًبالمطالبالالةًً د مالالدًحصالالصًشالالركةًً%93كالالادًيملالالةًمالالاًنسالالبتشً
 ًلحصالالصًوالالالد ًاسالالتجابةًلرابالالةًوالالالد ًبالالللةًوقالالدًانحصالالرتًمطالبتالالشًفالاليًهالالل
دًسالماعًىًبحصصًبقيالةًالشالركااًالماللكوريدًباسالتثنااًحصالصًوالالد ًوبعالالدعو
ادًعالدًالحاضالرًفاليًهالل ًالجلسالةًوالحاضالرً د وكيلًالشركااًالسالابقيدًبشالركةً
هً قالالائً د لالالدعوىًالمالالدعيًأجالالابًوكيالاللًالشالالركااًالسالالابقيدًبشالالركةًً ع شالالركةً
لده ًةًوابماًفيهاًحصةًالمدعيً   ًبصفً د ببيذًشركةًً ة بصحةًقيا ًموكلشً
لجلسالةًفعقالبًوكياللًالمالدعيًباللاتًاً ع وكيلًعدًابنائشًوقالتًالتبالايذًمالذًشالركةً
هالـ13/3/1423ًقائه ًأدًموكلشًقالدًقالا ًبفسال ًوكالتالشًالتاليًأعطاهالاًلوالالد ًبتالاري ً
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لمالالاًهالالوًمالالدودً ع وقبالاللًقيالالا ًوالالالد ًببيعالالشًلحصالالصًهالالل ًالشالالركةًلشالالركةً  ً ًوفقالالا
ً ة مهالالشًلمراجعالةًموكلالشًبالوكالالةًالتاليًأرفالقًصالوراًمنهالاًعنالدهاًطلالبً ح ًأ
ً ع والتأكدًمدًصحةًماًلكالر ًالمالدعيًبهاللاًانمالرًوأمالاًالحاضالرادًعالدًشالركةً
تىًف نهماًطلباًمدًالدائراًبلاتًالجلسةًوبعدًسماعهماًلدعوىًالمدعيًتمهالهماًح




حسالالبماًجالالااًبالوكالالالةًً ع حضالالرهاًوكيالاللًالمالالدعيًو ف ًبالوكالالالةًعالالدًشالالركةً
كمالالالاًً د اًمنهالالالاًو ح ًالوكيالالاللًعالالالدًالشالالالركااًالسالالالابقيدًبشالالالركةًالمرفالالالقًصالالالور
سالابقيدً ج ًوقدًأفادًوكيلًالشركااًالً ع حضرهاًمديرًاإلداراًالقانونيةًبشركةً
شًوالالدًالمالدعيًعنالدماًقالا ًببيالذًوتنالازلًعالدًحصصالالً ة أدًموكلالشًً د بشالركةً
مثاللًوحصصًبقيةًالشركااًبالشركةًل ًيكالدًوكياللًعالدًالمالدعيًوتنمالاًكالادً   ًي
تًمالدًأدًالمالدعيً   ًلال ًيحضالرًوقالً ة نفسشًفيًهلاًالعقدًوحسبًتفاداًموكلشً
بالرا ًللالةًتبرا ًللةًالعقدًوموكلشًل ًيستصد ًالوكالةًالتيًلديشًعدًابنشً   ًوقتًت
ًأدًوقالتًقالائه ًً ع لعقدًوبلاتًالجلسةًأفادًالدائراًمديرًاإلداراًالقانونيةًبشركةًا
دًيكالالً ع لشالالركةًً د التوقيالالذًعلالالىًعقالالدًالبيالالذًوالتنالالازلًعالالدًحصالالصًشالالركةً
وتنماًجااًلكر ًبصالفتشًحاضالرًوقالتًللالةًالبيالذًكالودًواً   المدعيً لالد ًحاضراً 
وتالالالالاري 257ًًًأفالالالالاده ًبأنالالالالشًوكيالالالاللًعالالالالدًابنالالالالشً   ًوأبالالالالرزًوكالالالالالةًعنالالالالشًبالالالالرق 
بادًش25/3/1426  ً ركةًهـًوعلىًتثرًللةًت ًتوقيذًكافةًانطرافًعلىًللةًعلما
لتاليًأعطاهالاًل ًتعل ًوقتًالتوقيذًعلىًهلاًالعقدًبقيا ًالمدعيًبفسال ًوكالتالشًاً ع 
ابقيدًوبعدًسماعًوكيلًالمدعيًلماًأدلىًبشًكلًمدًوكيلًالشركااًالسالً ة لوالد ً
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أنالوً ع ووكياللًشالركةًً د بشالركةً شًلالوًمالديرًاإلداراًالقانونيالةًفيهالاًعقالبًقالائهً 
مالاًلكرتالشًشالركةً  ً ًاشالترتً ع فاليًهالل ًالجلسالةًلكانالتًشالركةًً ع كالادًصالحيحا
ًلكالدًالثابالتًمالدًانوراقً   بماًفيهالاًحصالصًموكلالشًً د كاملًحصصًشركةً
معهالالاًبحصالالةًقالالدرهاًً   أدًموكلالالشًً ع واإلعالالهدًومالالاًأقالالرتًبالالشًشالالركةً  ً شالالريكا
ركةًوبالتاليًيتضحًعد ًصحةًماًلكرتشًشالً د شركةًمدًأجماليًحصص1%ًً
صًتصوانالالشًوموكلالالشًالًزالًيتمسالالةًبطلباتالالشًالمتمثلالالةًبأحقيتالالشًبالشالالفعةًلحصالالً ع 
أدًالمالاً ع فعقبًوكيلًشركةًً د بشركةً [20ًداً]بعدًللةًوبلاتًالجلسةًقالائهً 
هالالـًتضالالمنتًأنالالشًفالاليًحالالالة3/1/1421ًالمالالؤرفًفالاليًً د مالالدًعقالالدًتأسالاليسًشالالركةً
كالي ًحسالبماًعًل ًيت ًتسويتشًبالطرقًالوديةًف نشًيحالًللالةًالنالـزاعًللتحوجودًنـزا
هالـًوالئحتالشًالتنفيليالةًومالد12/7/1403ًوتالاري 46ًًجااًبالمرسو ًالملكيًرق ً /
عيًباللاتًث ًف دًموكلتشًتطالبًبالالتحكي ًلنظالرًللالةًالنالـزاعً ًفأجالابًوكياللًالمالد
أدًشالركةً فاليًللالةًالعقالدلال ًتكالدًطرً ع الجلسالةًعلالىًللالةًالالدفذًقالائهً   ً الالليًًفالا
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تسالالالويةًهالالاللاًالنالالالـزاعًأوًالصالالالهفًأوًالمطالبالالالةًبموجالالالبًنظالالالا ًالتحكالالالي ًالصالالالادرً
هـًوالئحتشًالتنفيليةً(ً.14/7/1403ًوتاري 46ًًبالمرسو ًالملكيًالكري ًرق ً /  
يدًشالركةًكماًنصًالبندًالثالثًعشرًمدًعقالدًالبيالذًوالتنالازلًالمبالر ًباليدً ة ًوبال




عقالدًالبيالذًواال  ً لتنالازلًالمشالارًلكرًيتبيدًأدًعقدًتأسيسًالشركةًوتعديهتشًوأيضا
ًتليهمالالاًقالالدًنصالالاًصالالراحةًعلالالىًطالالرقًتسالالويةًجميالالذًالنالالـزاعاتًالناشالالئةًعنهمالالاًأو
لحاللًالالوديًالمتعلقةًبهماًعلىًسبيلًالحصرًبالتسويةًالوديالةً ًوفاليًحالالةًتعاللرًا
ظالالا ًبصالالوراًنهائيالالةًبموجالالبًنف نالالشًيالالت ًتسالالويةًالنالالـزاعًأوًالصالالهفًأوًالمطالبالالةً





 ًالقبالولًصالفًالطريقًالصحيحًلتسويةًالنـزاعًفمدًثال ًتكالودًدعالوا ًجالديراًبعالد
بمالاًنصالت بنظالرًدعالوا ًعمالهً   ً لعد ًاصتصالاصًديالوادًالمظالال ًنوعيالا شًعليالًنظراً 
(46ً(ًمالالدًنظالالا ًالتحكالالي ًالصالالادرًبالمرسالالو ًالملكالاليًالكالالري ًرقالال ً  /7المالالاداً 
قيا ًًهـًمدًأنشً ًتلاًكادًالصصو ًقدًاتفقواًعلىًالتحكي ًقبل14/7/1403وتاري ً
نحكا ًهلاًالنظ ا ً(ًً.النـزاعً.....ًفهًيجوزًالنظرًفيًموضوعًالنـزاعًتالًوفقاً   
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النالـزاعًًجبًالمطالبةًبالتحكي ًقبلًاإلجابالةًعلالىوماًلكر ًوكيلًالمدعيًمدًأنشًي
بنظالالرًالالالدعو  ً ىًمالالردودًعليالالشً بالالأدًالالالدفذًبعالالد ًاصتصالالاصًديالالوادًالمظالالال ًنوعيالالا
بالالولًوانعقالالادًاالصتصالالاصًبنظرهالالاًتلالالىًلجالالادًالتحكالالي ًبالمملكالالةًأوًالالالدفذًبعالالد ًق
دًسالالفةًالدعوىًلعد ًسلوةًالمدعيًالطريقًالصحيحًالمنصوصًعليشًفاليًالعقالو
يجالبًتبالداؤ ًقباللًاإلجابالةًعلالىًمالاللكرًلت  ً شالكليا  ً وضالوعًسالويةًالنالـزاعًلاليسًدفعالا
يًأيًالالدعوىًولكنالشًدفالذًتحكال ًبالشًالمحكمالةًمالدًتلقالااًنفسالهاًويجالوزًالالدفذًبالشًفال
بماًنصتًعليشًالماداً  (ًمدًنظا ًالمرافعالات72ًمرحلةًتكودًفيهاًالدعوىًعمهً 
ً ًالتسالويةالشرعيةً ًوموكلتشًفيًجميذًالجلساتًالسابقةًكانتًبصالددً الوديالةًطبقالا
د ًلتوجيهاتًالدائراًوأولًتجابةًلموكلتشًعلىًالدعوىًكانتًهاليًأنالشًفاليًحالالةًعال
بنصوصًالتسويةًالوديةًتطلبًموكلتشًتسويةًالنـزاعًبموجبًنظا ًالتحكي ًعم هً 
حالقًأدًمالاًلكالر ًالمالدعيًبأنالشًالًيً ع العقدًسالفةًاللكرً ًوأضافًوكيلًشالركةً
فاليًالعقالدًمالردودًعليالشًأيضاللموكلتالشًالتقالد ًبهاللاًال  ً بالأدًطلالبًننهالاًليسالتًطرفالا  ً ا
تًعليالشًطرفاًفيًعقالدًتأساليسًالشالركةًبموجالبًالتعالديهتًالتاليًأدصلالً ع شركةً
لعالدلًومهحقشًوالتيًت ًتدقيقهاًمدًتداراًالشركاتًوالمصالدقًعليهالاًلالدىًكاتالبًا
 ًًلالىًأدوالتيًقررًفيهاًالشركااًالمالكيدًللشالركةً كمالاًنصالتًهالل ًالتعالديهتًع
عليالشًدودًًتبقىًموادًعقدًالتأسيسًالتيًل ًيشملهاًالتعديلًفيًهلاًالقرارًكماًهالي
ي ًلال ً(ًمدًالعقدًالصاصةًبتسويةًالنـزاعًبموجبًنظالا ًالتحكال20تعديلً(ًوالماداً 
يًعقدًالبيالذًطرفاًفً ع يشملهاًالتعديلًف نهاًتكودًواجبةًالنفالً ًوموكلتشًشركةً
 ًوالليًبموجبشًباعًوتنالازل8/6/2005ًلموافقًهـًا1/5/1426والتنازلًالمؤرفً
نالدً ة ًلهاًعالدًجميالذًحصالصًالشالركةًوالمصالانذًالماللكوراًفاليًالعقالدًونالصًالب
فال د  ً تعاللرًًالثالثًمدًالعقدًتحتًعنالوادًحاللًالصهفالاتًعلالىًتسالويةًالنالـزاعًوديالا
كالاللًمالالاًًللالالةًينعقالالدًاالصتصالالاصًلهيئالالاتًولجالالادًالتحكالالي ًبالمملكالالةًممالالاًيتضالالحًأد
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ظالا ًدعيًفاليًايالرًمحلالشًومصالالفًلنصالوصًالعقالودًوللشالرعًوالنلكر ًوكيلًالمال
بالرفضً ًأماًعدًمطالبةًالمالدعيًب بطالالًالتصالرفًا لواقالذًومدًث ًيكودًجديراً 






بالقاعداًالشالر مدًاضرار ًعمهً   ً عيةًالتاليًحقًتفريقًالصفقةًعلىًالمشتريًمنعا








بقولًالرسولًصلىًهللاًعليالشًوسالل ً ًالضالررًوالًضال  ً رارًوالضررًمحر ًشرعا
قالدرً(ًوأدً ًالضالررًيالدفذًبً(ًوالقواعالدًالشالرعيةًالتاليًتقالررًأدً ًالضالررًيالزال
(ًمالدًنظالا ًالشالركات165ًاإلمكادً(ً وأماًعدًاستنادًالمالدعيًتلالىًنالصًالمالاداً 
لًالًفهوًفيًايرًمحلشًتلًأدًوالد ًلديشًوكالةًعنالشًوتصالرفًالوكياللًملالز ًللموكال
ًتعاملتًمعشًبموجالبًهالل ً ع سيماًوتلاًكادًالوكيلًهوًوالدًالمدعيًوأدًشركةً
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ذًانصاليلًيةًوبالقاعداًالشالرعيةًالتاليًتقالررًأدً ًالوكياللًمالالوكالةًبمبدأًحسدًالن
 ًبفسال ًكالشصصًالواحدً(ًوالمدعيًل ًيقد ًماًيثبتًأنشًقا ًب صطالارًالوكياللًوالالد
لماًوردًبصةًفس ًالوك  ً الةًالالليًوكالتشًوعزلشًواإلعهدًعدًللةًبالجريداًطبقا
دًأدًمالً د ركةًاستندًتليشًفيًدعالوا ًوأمالاًمالاًلكالر ًوكياللًالشالركااًالسالابقيدًبشال
لسالةًل ًيستصد ًالوكالةًالممنوحةًلشًمدًالمالدعيًف نالشًمنالاقضًلمالاًأقالرًبالشًبجً ة 
قالالا ًببيالالذًحصالالصًً ة  ًمالالدًأدًموكلالالش15/10/2005ًهالالـًالموافالالق12/9/1426ً
بالقواعدًالشالرعيةًالتاليًتقالررًأنالشً ًالًحجالةًمالذًالتنال اقضً(ًجميذًأبنائشً ًوعمهً 
مالاًايالرًصالحيحًوً ة يكالودًمالاًلكالر ًوكياللًوأنشً ًالًتنكارًبعدًتقرارً(ًفمدًث ً
تقرارًالمدعيًنفسالشًبالأدًوالالد ًقالا ًببيالذًحصالتشًو  ً المتمثلالةًيؤكدًعد ًصحتشًأيضا
دودًالرجالالوعًتليالالشًأوًتصبالالار ًبالالالالبيذًبموجالالبًوكالالالةًً د مالالدًشالالالركةًً%1فالاليً
بالالاعًً ة أدًالالالليًيؤكالالدًأدًً ع صالالادراًمالالدًالمالالدعيًلالالشًوأضالالافًوكيالاللًشالالركةً
يهالاًسالوااًالمملوكالةًلالشًأوًلجميالالذًالشالركااًبمالاًفًلموكلتالشًجميالذًحصالصًالشالركة
قًحصةًالمدعيًهوًتقرار ًالصريحًبللةًوبموجالبًهاللاًاإلقالرارًالصالريحًالًيحال
بالقواعدًالشرعيةًالتيًتقررً ًأدًالمراًمؤاصلًبال قرار  (ًوأدً ًًلشًمصالفتشًعمهً 
شًبًبالاإلقرارًهوًسيدًاندلالة(ًوأنالشً ًالًتنكالارًبعالدًتقالرارً(ًومالدًثال ًفال دًمالاًيطالال
طالارًالمالدعيًمصالالفًللشالرعًوللنظالا ًالًساليماًوأنالشًلال ًيقالد ًمالاًيثبالتًأنالشًقالا ًب ص
مطالبتالشًوالد ًبفس ًوكالتشًوعزلشًومدًث ًف نشًليسًلشًسوىًالرجوعًعلىًوالد ًل
بالقاعداًالشرعيةًالتيًتقالررً ًكاللًمالدًأرت كالبًصطالأًبالتعويضًعدًحصتشًعمهً 
بالالتعويضً(ً  ً للهيرًيكودًملزمالا يًصتالا ًفالً ع وطلالبًوكياللًشالركةًسببًضرراً 
عالالد ًاصتصالالاصًديالالوادًالمظالالال ًبنظالالرًً-هالالل ًالمالاللكراًبمالالاًيلالاليً:  ً :ًأصالالليا أوالً 
 الدعوىًوانعقادًاالصتصاصًبنظرهاًتلىًالتحكي ً.ً
ردًالدعوىًوعد ًسماعهاًبالنسبةًلموكلتشً.ً  ً :ًاحتياطيا  ً  ثانيا






اإلمالا ًًيقس ًف لاًوقعالتًالحالدودًوصالرفتًالطالرقًفالهًشالفعةً ًمتفالقًعليالشًوروى
لًشالرةًيًكالمسل ًرحمةًهللاًقالًقضىًرسولًهللاًصلىًهللاًعليشًوسل ًبالشالفعةًفال
ااًأصاللًوتدًل ًيقس ًريعشًأوًحائطًالًيحلًلشًأدًيبيذًحتىًيستألدًشالريكشًفال دًشال
مناللرًشااًترةًف دًباعًول ًيسالتألنشًفهالوًأحالقًبالشً ًواإلجمالاعًفقالالًاإلمالا ًابالدًال
مدًأرضًأوًًأجمذًأهلًالعل ًعلىًتثباتًالشفعةًللشريةًالليًل ًيقاس ً ًفيماًبيذ
ثبالتًنعل ًأحدًصالفًهلاًتالًانص ًف نشًقالًالًتًدارًأوًحائطً ًقالًابدًقدامشًوال
واإلجمالاعًًالشفعةًننالشًتضالرارًبالمالالةًوهاللاًلاليسًبشالياًلمصالفتالشًا ثالارًالثابتالة
قاليًأوًأدًمدًترةًالشفعةًلعد ًعلمشًبالالثمدًالحقيً–رحمشًهللاًً–ولكرًابدًقدامشً
الحقيقالة ً ًبلعد ًعلمشًبمقدارًالسها ًالمبيعشًأوًنحالوًللالةًفال دًلالشًالشالفعةًمتالىًعلال
لًوقالدًالًيكالودًف نشًترةًالشفعةًلعلرًقدًاليرضاهاًبالثمدًالكثيرًويرضاهاًبالقليال
ثيالراًثال ًقالالًمعشًالكثيرًفل ًتسقطً ًوكللةًتدًظهرًأدًالمبيذًسها ًقليلةًفبانالتًك
هالرًأنالشًبهلاًقالًالشافعيًوزفرًوأبوًحنيفةًوصاحبا ً ًوأضافًرحمشًهللاًوتلاًظ
الشالفعةًًننشًقدًرضيًشركةًتنسادًدودًاير ًلال ًتسالقطاشترىًتنسادًفبادًاير ً
جاللًمالدًبللةًوأماًعدًطريقًتفريقًالصالفقةً:ًفقالالًفاليًالمهناليً:ًوتلاًاشالترىًر










يذًوالًل ًيت ًتعه ًموكلشًالًمدًقباللًالشالركااًوالًمالدًقباللًالمالدعىًعليهالاًبالالبً-أ
مالدًهنالاًوبالسعرًالليًبيعتًبشًالحصصً ً هنالاةًوتنماًكادًموكلشًيسمذًأصبالاراً 
 ًوبعالالضًالشالالركااًوكالالادًينتظالالرًأدًيلتالالزً ع أدًهنالالاةًمفاوضالالاتًبالاليدًشالالركةً
بالرابته ًفاليًالبيالذًحسالبما  ً يقضاليًبالشًًشالركاؤ ًالسالابقودًبالنظالا ًويشالعرو ًصطيالا
 النظا ًوهلاًل ًيحدثً.ً
هالاًحصالتشًفيقدًاشترتًكاملًالشركةًبماًً ع عل ًموكلشًبعدًفتراًبأدًشركةًً-ب
ابًالصاصةًبشًفاليًحاليدًأنالشًلال ًيصالدرًعنالشًوالًعالدًوكياللًشالرعيًيمثلالشًأيًتيجال
عالالدلًبالالالبيذً ًولهالاللاًتقالالد ًموكلالالشًباعتراضالالشًعلالالىًللالالةًلالالوزيرًالعالالدلًولكاتالالبًال
ت ًتيقافًتفرالًحصتشًلشركةً .ًً ع بوزاراًالتجاراًعلىًالفورًوفعهً   
فاليًًالبيالذًوأنالشًيراالبقالا ًموكلالةًبالاإلعهدًفاليًالصالحفًبعالد ًموافقتالشًعلالىًً-ج
ًاسالتردادًكامالاللًالحصالالصً ًمالالذًالعلال ًأنالالشًحتالالىًلحظالالةًتعهنالشًفالاليًالصالالحفً(ًلالال 




القتضالالااًح  ً بالالالبيذًودصالالولًالشالالريةًالجديالالدًوتاركالالا قالالشًفالاليًيعتبالالرًالشالالريةًمقالالراً 
دًاسال ًالشالريةًالجديالدً ًمقالدارًثمالًالشالفعةًالبالدًمالدًتصبالار ًبعالداًمعطيالاتًأهمهالا
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لًاًل ًيحدثًحتىًرفذًهل ًالدعوىًومدًهناًيبطلًمالاًدفالذًبالشًوكيالالحصةًوهوًم








يدًأوًشالهرً ًواتفالاقًشالريكًا صريدًعدًرابتشًفاليًالبيالذًولهال ًاسالتردادهاًصالهل

















ً ع قد ًللدئرااًبلاتًالجلسةًملكراًأصالرىًعمالاًدفعالتًبالشًالمالدعىًعليهالاًشالركةً
ناةًشرطًفيماًيتعلقًبعد ًاصتصاصًالديوادًتضمنتًأنشًومذًعد ًاإلقرارًبأدًه
فال دًمالدًشالروطًتعمالالًشالرطًالتحكالي ًأدًالًيصالتحكالي ًباليدًالطال وضًرفيدًأصالهً 
علالىًالتمسالةًبال  ً التحكي ًالمتمسةًبشًفيًموضوعًالنالـزاعًوأدًيكالودًدفعالشًمنصالبا
أمالاًتلاًأجالابًعالدًالالدعوىًأوًصالاضًفالاليًموضالوعًالنالـزاعًفال دًهاللاًيعالدًتنالالازالً 
عالالدًشالالرطًالتحكالالي ًوعلالالىًهالاللاًالمبالالدأًسالالارًعليالالشًالقضالالااًفالاليًالالالديواد  ً ًضالالمنيا
ًومالدًللالةًمالاًقررتالشًهيئالةًالتالدقيوال وقضالاا   ً قًمحاك ًالعامةًوهوًمبدأًمقالررًفقهالا
ًهـًمدًأنشًيجبًالتمسةًبشرطًالتحكي 1413لعا 4ًً/ت/95بالديوادًبحكمهاًرق ً
هالـًالاللي1413ًلعالا 4ًً/ت/29قبلًالتكل ًفيًالموضالوعًوحكال ًهيئالةًالتالدقيقًرقال ً
ازلًضالمنيًالموضالوعًتنالًجااًفيشًأدًعد ًالتمسةًبشالرطًالتحكالي ًقباللًالالتكل ًفالي
هالـًوجالااًفيالشًأد1411ًلعالا 4ًً/ت/72عدًهلاًالشرطً ًوحك ًهيئالةًالتالدقيقًرقال ً
ممالاًيسالقطًًالمدعىًعليهاًل ًتتمسالةًبشالرطًالتحكالي ًتالًبعالدًالالتكل ًفاليًالموضالوع
ةًالثالثالةًل ًتدفذًبهلاًالدفذًتالًفاليًالجلسالً ع حقهاًفيًهلاًالدفذًوحيثًادًشركةً
لسالةًالجلسالةًانولالىًوطلبالواًمهلالةًل جابالةًوفاليًالجفاليًحاليدًحضالرًممثلوهالاًفاليً
حصالةًًالثانيةًأجابواًعدًالالدعوىًبالأنه ًقالدًاشالترواًالشالركةًبالكاماللًبمالاًفاليًللالة
رأواًأنهاًتدع ًدفعه ًوهلاًصوضًفيًموضوعًالنالـزاعً ثال  ً  ًموكلشًوقدمواًأوراقا
قالطًطلبواًمدًالدائراًمهلةًللصلحًمذًموكلشًوكالادًللالةًمالدًأجاللًضالياعًالوقالتًف
للةًلجالأتًًفل ًيتصلًأيًمسئولًمدًالشركةًبشًأوًبموكلشًلمناقشةًالصلحً ًوبعد
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ًالشركةًلهلاًالدفذً ًولهلاًفهالوًدفالذًفالاتًأوانالشًوهدفالشًتضالاعةًالوقالتً ًوأضالاف




فيالالشًالًأصالالالةًوالًوكالالالةً ًوأضالالافًوكيالال  ً لًالالالليدًأبرمالالو ًولالال ًيكالالدًموكلالالشًطرفالالا
شً ًبرا ًهاللاًالعقالدًبالمصالفالةًلرابالةًموكلالالمدعيًأدًسببًرفذًهل ًالدعوىًهوًت
قالالدًأكالالدًبالالأدًصوضالالشًفالاليًموضالالوعًالنالالـزاعًالًً ع وممثالاللًالمالالدعىًعليهالالاًشالالركةً
حالاليدًلكالالرًادًالالالدفذًب عالالد ًيمنعالالشًمالالدًالالالدفذًبعالالد ًاالصتصالالاصًوقالالررًمبالالدأًجديالالداً 





لجهالةًالقضالقبلًالصوضًفيًالنـز ااًنظالرًاعً ًففيًالحالةًانولىًالًيجالوزًأصالهً 




وضًفالاليً ًأمالالاًفالاليًالحالالالةًالثانيالالةًف نالالشًالًيجالالوزًالتمسالالةًبشالالرطًالتحكالالي ًبعالالدًالصالال
ًموضوعًالنـزاعًوهلاًمبدأًمقررًومتفقًعليشًوماًلكالر ًممثاللًالمالدعىًعليهالاًأد
فيًعقدًالتأسيسًبموجبًالتعديً ع شركةً  ً شًوبالتالاليًهتًالتيًأدصلالتًعليالطرفا




ااًوكالالللةًعقالالدًالبيالالذًوالتنالالازلً ًوبعالالدًتزويالالدًكالاللًمالالدً ح ًالوكيالاللًعالالدًالشالالرك




ًمالاللكراًجوابيالالةًمكونالالةًمالالدًصالالفحتيدًجالالااًفيهالالاً ًأدًموكلتالالشً ع وكيالاللًشالالركةً
هالالالـًالموافالالالق29/11/1426ًتتمسالالالةًبجميالالالذًمالالالاًأدلالالالىًبالالالشًفالالاليًالمالالاللكراًالمالالالؤرفً
والتالالاليًملصصالالالهاًوجالالالوبًتحالالالالةًالصالالالهفًتلالالالىًالتحكالالالي ًالتفالالالاقً 31/12/2005ً
بالمالاداً] [ًمالدًعقالدًتأساليسًالشالركةًوندًالمالادا20ًانطرافًعلىًالتحكالي ًعمالهً 
ً (ًمدًنظا ًالتحكي ًنصتًعلىًعد ًجوازًالنظرًفيًموضوعًالنالـزاعًتالًو7  فقالا






 ً ًولالال ًيثبالالتًأد8/6/2005ًهالالـًالموافالالق1/5/1426ًثابالالتًبعقالالدًالبيالالذًالمالالؤرفً
ةًبالشفعةًالمدعيًأعل ًوالد ًبعزلشًعدًالوكالةًقبلًالبيذًوالًيحقًللمدعىًالمطالب
صًالمبيعالةًباللًهاًولتفريقًالصفقةًننشًل ًيطالبًبجميذًالحصلتأصر ًبالمطالبةًب
باللاتًالماللكراًأدًهالل ًالالدعوىًيسالتوجبًً ع بجزاًمنهاًوأضالافًوكياللًشالركةً
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ىًردهالاًوصالرفًالنظالرًعنهالاًلعلالةًالتنالاقضًفالمالدعيًطلالبًفاليًعريضالةًالالدعو









ً ع كةًمالاًقدمالشًوكياللًشالرً د و ح ًالوكيلًعدًبقيةًالشركااًالسالابقيدًبشالركةً
ًأفادًوكيلًالمدعيًمدًصهلًماًأدلىًبشًفيًجلسةًتصالدارًهاللاًالحكال ًومالدًصالهل
ًوالمتمثلالةًبأحقيالةً ع ملكراًجااًفيهاًأدًدعالوىًموكلالشًهاليًفاليًمواجهالةًشالركةً
هالـ ًوً ي ًو ق ًأبنالااًموكلالشًفاليًاسالتردادًحصالصًكاللًمالدً ز ًو ر ًو د ًو 
شًبالدفذًمالذًاسالتعدادًموكلالً ع والتاليًانتقلالتًملكيتهالاًلشالركةًً د  ة ًفيًشالركةً
دًحيالثًباليدًوكياللًالمالدعيًمالً ع قيمةًهالل ًالحصالصًالمشالترااًمالدًقباللًشالركةً
ً 10.500.000ًصهلًالملكراًأدًمجموعًقيمةًالحصصًالمشفوعًفيهاً لايرًطبقالا
رًثبوتًلملكراًوموكلشًمستعدًبدفعهاًفولماًهوًموضحًفيًالجدولًالمبيدًبلاتًا
شاليةًًب فرااهاًلالدىًكاتالبًالعالدلًبموجالبً ع الشفعةًوقيا ًالمدعىًعليهاًشركةً
واجهالةًمصرفيًوحصرًمطالبةًموكلتشًفيًتثباتًهالل ًالشالفعةًواإللالزا ًبهالاًفاليًم
قديمالشًفيماًقررًأطرافًالنالـزاعًفاليًهالل ًالالدعوىًاكتفالائه ًبمالاًسالبقًتً ع شركةً
تنداتًوماًأدلواًبشًفيًمحاضرًالضبطً.مدًملكراتًومس  
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ةًحيالالثًتدًمالالاًيهالالدفًتليالالشًالمالالدعيًمالالدًدعالالوا ًبطلباتالالشًالصتاميالالةًب ثبالالاتًالشالالفع
لحصالالالالصًتصوانالالالالشً ز ًو ر ًو د ًو هالالالالـ ًوً ي ًو ق ًأبنالالالالااً ة ًالشالالالالركااً
مالدًرأسًمالالًً%6والبالالغًقالدر ًهالل ًالحصالصًبمالاًنسالبتشًً د السابقيدًبشركةً
لالبًوالتيًانتقلالتًملكيالةًهالل ًالحصالصًالمطاً ع هل ًالشركةًفيًمواجهةًشركةً
مبلالغًبهاًللشركةًالمدعىًعليهاًعدًطريقًشرائهاًمدًقبلًأصالحابهاًالماللكوريدًب
لماًهوًمبيدًبعقدًالبيالذًمالذًاسالتعدادًالمالدعي10.500.000ًقدر ً  ً بالدفذًًلايرًطبقا
شفعةًالمدعىًعليهاًفيًهل ًالدعوىًفورًثبوتًالً ع قيمةًهل ًالحصصًلشركةً
تدًدفالذًً ًالشركةًب فرالًالحصصًالمشفوعًفيهالاًلالدىًكاتالبًالعالدلً ًوحيالثوقيا
ً-المدعىًعليهاًعلىًدعوىًالمدعيًتضمدًماًيليً:  
:ًالطلالالالبًانصالالالليًعالالالد ًاصتصالالالاصًالالالالديوادًبنظالالالرًهالالالل ًالالالالدعوىًالنعقالالالادً أوالً 
 االصتصاصًبنظرهاًتلىًالتحكي ً.ً
:ًالطلالالبًاالحتيالالاطيًردًالالالدعوىًوعالالد ًسالالماعهاًبالنسالال  ً ًبةًلهالالاً ًوحيالالثًتدثانيالالا
مالدعيًالمدعىًعليهاًقدًاستندتًبدفعهاًمدًحيثًعد ًاالصتصاصًبنظرًدعوىًال
ليًابالر ًالالً د لتمسكهاًبشالرطًالتحكالي ًالالواردًببنالودًعقالدًبيالذًالحصالصًشالركةً





ًقبالاللًالأدًالتمسالالةًبشالالرطً أدًيالالدفذًبالالشًابتالالداا   ً صضالالوعًأوًالتحكالالي ًيقتضالاليًأيضالالا
دعىًالتطرقًلموضوعًالنـزاعً ًوحيثًتنشًب طهعًالدائراًعلىًماًدفعالتًبالشًالمال
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ركةًعليهاًفيًهلاًالجانبًوماًأجابًبشًالمدعيًتبيدًلهاًأدًعقالدًبيالذًحصالصًشال
هالالـًهالالوًمحالالورًالنالالـزاعًفالاليًهالالل ًالالالدعوىًفالمالالدعي1/5/1426ًالمالالؤرفًفالاليًً د 
شالركااًعيًأدًالطريقالةًالتاليًبيعالتًفيهالاًحصالصًهالل ًالشالركةًوبصالفتشًأحالدًاليد
ل جراااتًالسليمةًالمتبذًفيًهلاًالش  ً ل ًتت ًوفقا  ً وحاليا  ً أدًفهوًلال ًيبالـذًفيهاًسابقا
لمالاًحصصشًبهل ًالشركةًول ًيوكلًأحدًعنشًول ًيشعرًوقتًالبيذًفاليًللالةًط  ً بقالا
ادتًبالشًالثابالتًللالدائراًلمالاًأفالنالصًعليالشًنظالا ًالشالركاتًوعقالدًتأساليسًالشالركةًو
للالةًًعد ًحضورًالمدعيًوقتًتبالرا ً د والشركااًالسابقيدًبشركةًً ع شركةً
عهاًحيثًالعقدًوعد ًقيامشًبتوكيلًأحدًعنشًومدًث ًف دًحصصًالمدعيًل ًيت ًبي
بمقدارًحصتشًالتيًتعادلًماًنسالبتشً  ً مالدًرأسًمالالًهالل ًالشالركةًً%1ضلًشريكا
لبنالودًعقالد  ً البيالذًوعقالدًًوبالتاليًيكودًمطالبةًالمدعىًعليهالاًبشالرطًالتحكالي ًطبقالا








منهاًعدًشالرطًالتحكالي ًممالاًيسالق  ً ضمنيا طًحقهالاًموضوعيًمماًيعتبرًللةًتنازالً 
ص.بالمطالبةًبالتحكي ًوهلاًماًاستقرتًعليشًأحكا ًالديوادًفيًهل ًالصصو  
اتًوبالنسالالبةًلموضالالوعًهالالل ًالالالدعوىًالتالاليًحصالالرهاًالمالالدعيًفالاليًمطالبتالالشًب ثبالالً
 ي ًو ق ًأبنالااً ة ًفاليًالشفعةًفاليًحصالصًتصوانالشً ز ًو ر ًو د ًو هالـ ًوً
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مالدًرأسًمالالًهالل ًالشالركةًوالتاليًهلالالتًً%6والتاليًتعالادلًمالاًنسالبتشًً د شالركةً
أوراقهاًملكيتهاًللمدعىًعليهاًف دًالثابتًللدائراًمدًوقائذًهل ًالدعوىًوماًجااًب
ركةًمدًأنشًسبقًل ة ًأدًقا ًهوًوسبعةًمدًأبنائشًبمالاًفاليه ًالمالدعيًبتأساليسًشال
هالالـ3/1/1421ًأبالالر ًعقالالدًتأسيسالالهاًفالاليًً ً د ةًتحمالاللًاسالال ًتجالالاريًهالالوً شالالرك






 ًحسالبماًهالو8/6/2005ًهـًالموافالق1/5/1426ًلحصصًهل ًالشركةًالمبر ًفيً
وبوكالتشًًدًبيدً ة ًبانصالةًعدًنفسشًوبواليتشًعدًابنشً ي مدودًفيًلاتًالعق
المدعيًفيًهل ًالالدعوىًو ر ًً   عدًأبناا ً ز ًو د ًو ق ًوبحضورًكلًمدً








لمقدمالةًوفقًالقالوائ ًالماليالةًاً د للةًأدًالطرفًانولًباعًللطرفًالثانيًشركةً





كةًأحالدًالشالركااًبشالرً   اإلطهعًعلىًمضمودًللةًالعقدًيفه ًمنالشًأدًالمالدعيً
صًالحضالورًوقالتًتبالرا ًعقالدًبيالذًحصالالسابقيدًوالحالالييدًكالادًمالدًضالمدًً د 
ركااًوالثابتًللدائراًممالاًجالااًب فالاداًالمالدعىًعليهالاًوالشالً ع لشركةًً د شركةً
ورًوماًجااًبانوراقًأدًالمالدعيًلال ًيكالدًمالدًضالمدًالحضالً د السابقيدًبشركةً
بتوكياللًأحالدًعنالشًلبيالذًحصصالشًفال  ً يًهالل ًوقتًتبرا ًهلاًالعقدًولال ًيقال ًهالوًايضالا
قالدًالتصرفًأوًالتجاوزًالليًحدثًمدًأطرافًللالةًالعًالشركةًوعلىًضواًللة
فضالوليًببيذًحصصًالمدعيًوه ًيعلمودًبعالد ًحضالور ًقالدًعالد ًالفقهالااًببيالذًال
لحصالالصًً ع صاضالالذًلموافقالالةًالمالالدعيًمالالدًعدمالالشًومالالدًثالال ًفالال دًشالالرااًشالالركةً
علىًرضاًصاحبًهل ًالحصصًومتالىًوً د المدعيًفيًشركةً  ً افالقًيبقىًمعلقا
افاللً ًلهالل ًالحصالصًايالرًنً ع صاحبهاًعلىًللةًالبيذًوتالًيكودًشرااًشالركةً
علالىًبيالذًحصصالشًباللًتنالشًأصال  ً الًولماًكالادًالثابالتًأدًالمالدعيًلال ًيكالدًموافقالا هً 
لفتهالاًهالل ًلمصاً د يرىًوجاهةًللطريقةًالتيًاتبعتًفيهاًعندًبيذًحصصًشركةً
ةً[ًمدًنظا ًالشركاتًوالماداًالثامنةًمدًعقدًتأساليسًالشالرك165يقةًللماداً]الطر
بشالالركةً  ً عالالادلًمالالاًبقالالدرًحصالالتشًالتالاليًتً د وبالتالالاليًفالال دًالمالالدعيًالًيالالزالًشالالريكا
مدًرأسًمالًهل ًالشركةًوهلاًانمرًل ًيكالدًمحاللًمنازعالةًومالدًثال ًً%1نسبتشً
حصالصًعوىًبشرائهاًلالًيحقًللشركةًالمدعىًعليهاًأدًتلكرًفيًدفعهاًعلىًالد
وقالتًالتبالايذًحسالبماًجالااًب قرارهالاًبال لًتنالشًالمدعيًوهيًتعل ًأنشًل ًيكدًحاضراً 
 ًالمتضالالمد17/8/2005ًمالالدًصالالهلًتعهنهالالاًفالاليًصالالحيفةًالالالبهدًاليوميالالةًبتالالاري ً
مالدًللالةًالً د قرارًالشالركااًبتعالديلًعقالدًتأساليسًشالركةً  ً قالرارًقالدًأدًالبنالدًثالثالا
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بالدًً   تأسيسًالصاصةًبالرأسًالمالالًجالااًلكالرً(ًمدًعقد6ًتضمدًتعديلًالماداً 
حصالالة12.335ًًيملالالةًمالالاًمقالالدار ًًالمالالدعيًفالاليًهالالل ًالالالدعوىًبصالالفةًشالالريةً ة 
مدًالمدعىًً%1تعادلًماًنسبتشً مدًرأسًمالًهل ًالشركةًوهلاًبحدًلاتشًتقراراً 
معهالاًبشالركةً  ً مقالدارًبً د عليهاًمدًأدًحصصًالمدعيًل ًيت ًبيعهاًوظلًشريكا
صالالشًالمالالدعيًبالشالالفعةًفالاليًحصًلمالالاًكالالادًانمالالرًكالالللةًفالال دًحالالقنسالالبتشًالسالالابقةًو













بمالاًجالااًفاليًالمالاداً] [ًمالد165ًالشركااًويجوزًله ًاستردادًتلةًالحصصًعمهً 
تشًنحالدًنظا ًالشركاتًالتيًنصتًعلىًأنشً ًيجوزًللشريةًأدًيتنازلًعالدًحصال
لشالرو  ً نالازلًطًعقالدًالشالركةًومالذًللالةًتلاًأرادًالشالريةًالتالشالركااًأوًللهيالرًوفقالا















لمالاًيتوقعالشًمالدًضالررًمحتماللًالًيالزولًتالًبأصاللًالشالفيذًبحالقًا  ً لشالفعةًالحقًوفقالا
دًبشالركةًدًالثابتًللدائراًمدًواقعةًهل ًالدعوىًتدًقيا ًالشركااًالسابقي ولماًكا
المالالدعىًعليهالالاًفالاليًهالالل ًالالالدعوىًباعتبالالارًأدًً ع ببيالالذًحصالالصًالشالالركةًً د 
ت ًالحصصًمحاللًمطالبالةًالمالدعيًقالدًانتقلالتًتليهالاًعالدًطريالقًالشالرااًدودًأدًيال




ً ًيبقالاليًحالالقًالمالالدعيً ع لحصصالاله ًلشالالركةًً د الشالالركااًالسالالابقيدًبشالالركةً قائمالالا
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ةًالبيالالذًبالمطالبالةًبالشالفعةًأوًباإلسالالتردادًلحصالصًالشالالركااًمتالىًمالالاًعلال ًفالاليًللال
دًأوراقًوعل ًبالمشتريًوعلال ًبمقالدارًثمالدًالمبيالذً ًوحيالثًتدًالثابالتًللالدائراًمال
قالدًهل ًالدعوىًوماًأفادًبشًأطرافًالنـزاعًأنشًل ًيت ًتعه ًالمدعيًوقتًتبالرا ًع
فاليًهاللاًالشالً ع شالركةًًبيذًحصصًشركائشًعلى  ً أدًوأدًالمالدعيًقالدًعلال ًالحقالا
فلال ًيسالتجابًتلالىًطلبالشًباسالتر دادًحصالصًومدًث ًف نشًتقد ًللجهاتًالمعنيةًحاالً 
لالبًفيهالاًوتقد ًللالديوادًمباشالراًفاليًهالل ًالالدعوىًطً د شركائشًالسابقيدًبشركةً
ثالال ًً ع ًبأحقيتالالشًبالشالالفعةًفالاليًجميالالذًحصالالصًشالالركائشًالتالاليًانتقلالالتًتلالالىًشالالركة
مالالدًرأسًمالالالًً%6اًبحصالالصًتصوانالالشًالسالالتةًوالالالليدًيملكالالودًمالالاًمقالالدار ًقصالالره
لةًوأدًتلبيةًلرابةًوالد ًبعد ًالمطالبةًبحصصشًولمالاًكالادًانمالرًكاللً د شركةً
علالقًبحالقًمطالبةًالمدعيًقدًجااتًموافقةًلماًجااتًبشًالنصوصًالفقهيةًفيماًيت
كالالالودًيونظالالالا ًالشالالالركاتًفبالتالالالاليًً د الشالالالفعةًولنصالالالوصًعقالالالدًتأسالالاليسًشالالالركةً
المالالدعيًأحالالقًبحصالالصًتصوانالالشً ز ًو ر ًو د ًو هالالـ ًوً ي ًو ق ًأبنالالااً ة ً
مالدًرأسًمالالًهالل ًالشالركةًمالدًشالركةًً%6والتاليًتعالادلًمالاًنسالبتشًً د بشالركةً
شًعلالىًالتيًانتقلتًملكيةًهل ًالحصصًلهاًعدًطريقًالشرااًمماًيتعيدًمعالً ع 
ً د بشركةًًلسابقيدالدائراًوالحالًكللةًالقضااًبانتقالًملكيةًحصصًالشركااًا
لاير10.500.000ًًالملكوريدًللمدعيًبالشفعةًوتلزامشًبدفذًقيمتهاًالبالغًقالدرهاً
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ً فيًجميذًحصصًتصوانشًالتيًت ًبيعهاًعلىًالمالدعىًعليهالاًالًيعتبالرًللال ةًتفريقالا
المالاداًًللصفقةًومدًث ًالًيعتدًبماًدفعتًبشًالمالدعىًعليهالاًفاليًهاللاًالشالأدًمالذًأد
ً[ًمالدًنظالا ًالشالركاتًقالدًأشالارتًأنالشًعنالدًقيالا ًأحالدًالشالركااًبالتنالازلًعالد165]




ل جرااا  ً علالىًاوالنظا ًوفقا لمشالتريًتًالمنبثقةًفيًهلاًالشأدًول ًيرتالبًضالرراً 
صاصةًوأدًالمدعىًعليهالاًتعلال ًأنهالاًوقالتًشالرااًهالل ًالحصالصًلال ًيكالدًالمالدعيً
ولالال ًيثبالالتًقيامالالشًببيالالذًحصصالالشًوالًيصفاهالالاًمالالدًأحقيالالةًالشالالريةًال مالالدعيًحاضالالراً 
لمالاًقضالتًبالشًالمالاداً]  ً [ًمالدًنظالا ًالشالركات165ًباستردادًحصصًشركائشًطبقالا
ًصاصالةًوأدً د كرهاًومالاًجالااًبالمالاداًالثامنالةًمالدًعقالدًتأساليسًشالركةًالسالفًل
بالايذًالمدعىًعليهاًالشركاتًالكبرىًأماًماًلكرتشًالمدعىًعليهاًمالدًأنالشًوقالتًالت
هالالالـًعالالدًابنالالالش25/3/1426ًوتالالاري 257ًًوكالالالةًبالالرق ًً ة أبالالرزًوالالالدًالمالالدعيً
هالل ًالوكالالةًال ًمرفالقالمالدعيًفاليًهالل ًالالدعوىًتصولالشًحالقًبيالذًحصصالشًفأصالهً 
بانصالالةًعالدًً ة صوراًمنهاًأعطيالتًلكاللًمالدً ج ًو ل ًو ت ًمالدًقباللًكاللً
جالبًو ر ًو ق ًو د ًبموً   نفسشًوعدًابنشًالقاصرً ي ًوبالوكالةًعالدًابنائالشً
والتيًت ًفسصهاًمالدًً د هـًبشركة10/10/1420ًوتاري 124046ًًالوكالةًرق ً
5146ً ًالثانيالةًبالرققبلًالمدعيًبالوكالةًالتاليًأصالدرتًمالدًكتابالةًعالدلًالريالاضً
تشًهالـًوبالتالالاليًلال ًيعالدًلوالالدًالمالدعيًصالفةًعنالشًفيمالاًتضالمن13/3/1423وتالاري ً
عالالدًأدًهالالل ًالوكالالالةًلالال ًيالالت ًاسالالتعمالهاًعنالالدًبيالالذًحصالال صًالوكالالالةًالسالالابقةًفضالالهً 
نفسالشًًقدًأبر ًللالةًالعقالدًبانصالالةًعالدً ة فالثابتًمدًللةًالعقدًأدًً د شركةً
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يرًتليالشًاشالً   كالةًعدًبعضًمدًأبنائشًوالمالدعيًوبالوصايةًعدًأحدًأبنائشًوبالو
 ًوقالتًفيًللةًالعقدًأنشًمدًضمدًالحضورًوالثابتًكماًسلفًبيانشًعد ًحضالور




 ز ًو ر ًو د ًو هالـ ًوً ي ًو ق ًبانتقالالًحصالصًكاللًمالدًً-حكمتًالالدائراً:
مالالدًرأسًمالالالًً%6والبالالالغًقالالدرهاًً د الشالالركااًالسالالابقيدًفالاليًشالالركةًأبنالالااً ة ً
مالالذًً ع بالالد ة ًبالشالالفعةًوا ليالالةًملكيتهالالاًبالشالالرااًلشالالركةًً   الشالالركةًللمالالدعيً
عشراًمهياليد10.500.000ًًتلزا ًالمدعيًبدفذًقيمةًهل ًالحصصًالبالغًقدرهاً
وبال عهدًًننظمةًالتهليفًلماًهوًمبيدًبانسبابً ع وصمسمائةًألفًلايرًلشركةً
هاًفقررًمنطوقشًعلىًالطرفيدًقررًوكيلًالمدعيًقناعتشًبشًأماًوكيلًالمدعىًعلي
حمدً.ًىًهللاًوسل ًعلىًنبيناًمعد ًالقناعةًبشًوباهللًتعالىًالتوفيقًوصل  
 رئيس الدائرة  عضو  عضو  أمني السر
 
  "ب" "أ" "س" "ص" 
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Appendix A to Chapter 6: Relevant Laws Cited 
§6.1 The Saudi M&A Regulation Article 6(b)  
A. Article 6: Announcements and Takeover Timetable  
(b) When a Public Announcement is Required  
A public announcement is required:  
1) When a company is considering a potential takeover and an approach to a potential 
offeree company has been made and the parties have reached an understanding (including the 
relevant conditions) that an offer will be made;  
2) When a firm intention to make an offer (the making of which is not, or has ceased to 
be, subject to any pre-condition) is notified to the board of the offeree company from a serious 
source, irrespective of the attitude of the board to the offer;  
3) Immediately upon an acquisition of shares by that person which gives rise to an 
obligation to make an offer under Article 12 or a permission to make an offer under Article13. 
The announcement should not be delayed while full information is being obtained; additional 
information can be the subject of a later supplementary announcement;  
4) When, following a bid approach, a company’s shares are the subject of rumour and 
speculation or where there is a price movement of 20% or more above the lowest share price 
since the time of the approach or a price movement of 10% or more in a single day;  
5) When, before a bid approach has been made, the offeree company is the subject of 
rumour and speculation or where there is a price movement of 10% or more in a single day and 
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there are reasonable grounds for concluding that it is the potential offeror’s actions which have 
led to the situation;  
6) When negotiations or discussions are about to be extended to include more than a very 
restricted number of people (outside those who need to know in the companies concerned and 
their immediate advisers); or  
7) When a purchaser is being sought for a holding, or aggregate holdings, of shares listed 
on the Exchange carrying 30% or more of the voting rights of a company or when the board of a 
listed company is seeking one or more potential offerors; and  
i. The company is the subject of rumour and speculation or there is a price movement of 
20% or more above the lowest share price since the time of the approach or a price movement of 
10% or more in a single day; or  
ii. The number of potential purchasers or offerors approached is about to be increased to 
include more than a very restricted number of people. 
§6.2 Mergers and Acquisitions Regulation, Article 6(c)(4) 
A. Article 6: Announcements and Takeover Timetable 
(c) Responsibilities of Offeror and the Offeree Company 
4) The responsibility to make an announcement under Article 6 (b)(1) is a joint 
responsibility of the potential offeror and offeree company. 
§6.3 Mergers and Acquisitions Regulation, Article 8(a)(b) 
A. Article 8: Prohibitions and Restrictions on Dealings  
(a) Prohibited dealings by persons other than the offeror  
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1) No dealings of any kind in securities or shareholding control of securities of the 
offeree company by any person, not being the offeror, who is privy to confidential price-sensitive 
information concerning an offer or contemplated offer may take place between the time when 
there is reason to suppose that an approach or an offer is contemplated and the announcement of 
the approach or offer or of the termination of the discussions. This prohibition includes dealings 
in securities of the offeror unless the offer is sufficiently small in the context of the business of 
the offeror that the fact of the proposed offer, if it were made public, would not have a significant 
impact on the market price of the securities of the offeror.  
2) No person who is privy to confidential price-sensitive information concerning an offer 
or contemplated offer may make any recommendation to any other person as to dealing in the 
relevant securities.  
(b) Restriction on dealings by the offeror and concert parties  
During an offer period, the offeror and persons acting in concert with it must not sell any 
securities in the offeree company except with the prior consent of the Authority.  
Sales below the value of the offer will not be permitted.  
(c) Gathering of irrevocable commitments  
Any person proposing to contact a private individual with a view to seeking an 
irrevocable commitment to accept or refrain from accepting an offer or contemplated offer must 
consult the Authority in advance.  
(d) Dealings in offeree company’s securities by certain persons  
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During the offer period, no financial adviser (or any Affiliate or Subsidiary of such 
adviser) to an offeree company (or any other person in its group, or any person acting in concert 
with it) shall: 
1) Either for its own account or on behalf of discretionary account, purchase offeree 
company shares or deal in derivatives referenced to such shares;  
2) Make any loan to a person to assist him in making any such purchases or carrying out 
any such dealings referred to in sub-paragraph (d)(1) above save for lending in the ordinary 
course of business and on normal commercial terms to persons with which they have an 
established client relationship and in accordance with Article 44 of the Authorised Persons 
Regulations; or  
3) Enter into any indemnity or option arrangement or any arrangement, agreement or 
understanding, formal or informal, of whatever nature, which may be an inducement for a person 
to retain, deal or refrain from dealing in relevant securities of the offeree company. 
§6.4 Mergers and Acquisitions Regulation, Article 12(a) 
A. Article 12: The Mandatory Offer  
(a) Where a person or a group of persons acting in concert increase ownership of shares 
in a given company through a restricted purchase of shares or a restricted offer for shares so that 
such person or those with whom such person is acting in concert become the owner of 50% or 
more of a given class of voting shares listed on the Exchange, the Board shall have the right to 
exercise its power in accordance with Article 54 of the Capital Market Law to order such person 
to offer to purchase the shares of the same class it does not own on the terms set out in this 
Article 12 and in accordance with the other relevant provisions of these Regulations. 
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§6.5 Mergers and Acquisitions Regulation, Article 12(d) 
A. Article 12: The Mandatory Offer  
(d) Payment to be Offered  
1) An offer made under this 12 must, in respect of each class of share capital involved, be 
in cash or be accompanied by a cash alternative at not less than the highest price paid by the 
offeror or any person acting in concert with it for shares of that class during the offer period and 
within 12 months prior to its commencement. The Authority should be consulted where there is 
more than one class of share capital involved.  
2) If the offeror considers that the highest price as specified in sub-paragraph (d)(1) 
above should not apply in a particular case, the offeror should approach the Authority which has 
discretion to agree an adjusted price.  
3) In no case will the offeror be compelled under this Article 12 to offer to purchase the 
remaining shares at a price exceeding the highest price he or a party acting in concert with him 
paid to purchase any of the shares of that company during the (a) of this Article 12. 
12 months preceding the date of the board order in accordance with paragraph 
§6.6 The Mergers and Acquisitions Regulation, Article 6(f)(2) 
A. Article 6: Announcements and Takeover Timetable 
(f) The Announcement of a Firm Intention to Make an Offer  
1) The announcement of a firm intention to make an offer should be made only when an 
offeror has every reason to believe that it can and will continue to be able to implement the offer. 
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Responsibility for advising the offeror in this connection rests on the financial adviser to the 
offeror.  
2) When a firm intention to make an offer is announced, the announcement must contain:  
i. The terms of the offer;  
ii. The identity of the offeror;  
iii. Details of any existing holding in the offeree company:  
(a) Which the offeror owns or over which it has shareholding control;  
(b) Which is owned or where the shareholding is controlled by any person acting in 
concert with the offeror;  
(c) In respect of which the offeror has received an irrevocable commitment to accept the 
offer;  
(d) In respect of which the offeror or any person acting in concert with it holds an option 
to purchase;  
iv. All conditions (including any conditions relating to acceptances, listing and increase 
of capital and any consent required by law) to which the offer or the publication of the offer 
document is subject; and  
v. Details of any indemnity arrangement involving the offeror, the offeree company or 
any person acting in concert with the offeror or the offeree company in relation to relevant 
securities.  
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3) The announcement of an offer under Article 12 or 13 should include confirmation by 
the financial adviser or by another appropriate third party that resources are available to the 
offeror sufficient to satisfy full acceptance of the offer. The party confirming that resources are 
available must act responsibly in accordance with Article 3(d) and Article 26(d) and take all 
reasonable steps to assure itself that resources are available. 
§6.7 M&A Regulation Article 26 
A. Article 26: Offer Documents  
(a) Financial and other Information on the Offeror, the Offeree Company and the Offer  
1) The offer document (including, where relevant, any revised offer document) must 
include:  
i. A heading stating that an independent financial adviser authorised by the  
ii. The date when the document is published, the name and address of the offeror  
iii. Details of the securities for which the offer is made, including whether they will  
Authority must be consulted if there is any doubt about the offer; and, if any, of the 
person making the offer on behalf of the offeror; be transferred with or without any dividend;  
iv. The total payment proffered;  
v. Particulars of all documents required, and procedures to be followed, for acceptance of 
the offer;  
vi. The closing market price for the securities to be acquired, and (in the case of a 
securities exchange offer) securities offered, for the first day in each of the six months 
immediately before the date of the publication of the offer document, for the last day before the 
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commencement of the offer period and for the latest available date before the publication of the 
offer document (quotations stated in respect of securities listed on the Exchange should be taken 
from the official list and, if any of the securities are not so listed, any information available as to 
the number and price of transactions which have taken place during the preceding six months 
should be stated together with the source, or an appropriate negative statement);  
vii. In the case of a securities exchange offer, particulars of the first dividend or interest 
payment in which the new securities will participate and how the securities will rank for 
dividends or interest, capital and redemption and a statement indicating the effect of acceptance 
on the capital and income position of the offeree company’s shareholders. If the new securities 
are not to be identical with an existing security listed on the Exchange, full particulars of the 
rights attaching to the securities must also be included together with a statement of whether an 
application for listing has been or will be made to the Authority; and  
viii. In the case of a securities exchange offer, the effect of full acceptance of the offer 
upon the offeror’s assets, profits and business which may be significant for a proper appraisal of 
the offer.  
2) The offer document must contain a prominent disclaimer in the form set out below: 
“The Capital Market Authority and the Saudi Stock Exchange do not take any responsibility for 
the contents of this offer document, do not make any representation as to its accuracy or 
completeness, and expressly disclaim any liability whatsoever for any loss arising from, or 
incurred in reliance upon, any part of this offer document.”  
3) Where the payment includes securities and the offeror is a company whose shares are 
not listed on the Exchange, the offer document must contain:  
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i. For the last 3 financial years for which the information has been published, turnover, 
net profit or loss before and after taxation or Zakat, the charge for tax or Zakat, extraordinary 
items, minority interests, the amount absorbed by dividends and earnings and dividends per 
share;  
ii. A statement of the assets and liabilities shown in the last published audited accounts;  
iii. A cash flow statement if provided in the last published audited accounts;  
iv. All material changes in the financial or trading position of the company subsequent  
v. Details relating to items referred to in sub-paragraph (i) above in respect of any to the 
last published audited accounts or a statement that there are no known material changes; interim 
statement or preliminary announcement made since the last published audited accounts;  
vi. Inflation-adjusted information if any of the above has been published in that form;  
vii. Significant accounting policies together with any points from the notes to the 
accounts which are of major relevance to an appreciation of the figures, including those relating 
to inflation-adjusted information; where, because of a change in accounting policy, figures are 
not comparable, this should be disclosed and the approximate amount of the resultant variation 
should be stated;  
viii. The names of the offeror’s directors;  
ix. The nature of its business and its financial and trading prospects; and  
x. A summary of the principal contents of each material contract (not being a contract 
entered into in the ordinary course of business) entered into by the offeror or any of its 
subsidiaries during the period beginning two years before the commencement of the offer period, 
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including particulars of dates, parties, terms and conditions and any payment passing to or from 
the offeror or any of its subsidiaries.  
4) The offer document must contain information on the offeree company on the same 
basis as set out in sub-paragraphs (a)(3)(i) to (vii) of this Article.  
5) All offer documents must contain a description of how the offer is to be financed and 
the source of the finance. The principal lenders or arrangers of such finance must be named. 
Where the offeror intends that the payment of interest on, repayment of or security for any 
liability (contingent or otherwise) will depend to any significant extent on the business of the 
offeree company, a description of the arrangements contemplated will be required. Where this is 
not the case, a negative statement to this effect must be made.  
6) Where the payment includes securities which are to be admitted to trading on the 
Exchange, or includes securities issued by a company whose shares are listed on the Exchange, a 
prospectus in respect of the new securities must be prepared in accordance with the Listing 
Rules.  
7) If any document issued to shareholders of the offeree company in connection with an 
offer includes a recommendation or an opinion of a financial adviser for or against acceptance of 
the offer, the document must, unless issued by the financial adviser in question, include a 
statement that the financial adviser has given and not withdrawn his consent to the issue of the 
document with the inclusion of his recommendation or opinion in the form and context in which 
it is included.  
8) Where, in order to complete the proposed offer, the offeror is a company and intends 
to increase the amount of its share capital, the board of the offeror must make a presentation to 
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the shareholders, during the General Assembly Meeting to approve the offer, of the following 
issues:  
i. A transaction overview, including a description of the following:  
(a) The transaction structure;  
(b) The valuation of the offeree and method of payment proposed;  
(c) The company name (if new);  
(d) Any approval required;  
(e) The expected date of closing;  
(f) Employee consideration, if any;  
(g) Any proposed new management; and  
(h) Any proposed new board representative;  
ii. The offeror’s rationale for the proposed takeover, especially:  
(a) A strength, weakness, opportunities and threats analysis; and  
(b) A description of any synergies believed to be realisable by virtue of the  
iii. An overview of the offeree company and the industry of which it forms a part, 
including a description of the following:  
(a) Products;  
(b) Location; takeover;  
(c) History;  
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(d) Sales;  
(e) Market share; and  
(f) Combination;  
iv. Financial highlights:  
(a) Of the offeree company (revenues, net income, asset and dividends) for the  
(b) Of the offeror (revenues, net income, asset and dividends) for the past three  
(c) Contribution analysis;  
(d) Earning per share analysis of the offeree (to the extent known); and  
(e) Accretion & dilution analysis, to the extent known; and v. growth outlook and  
9) Such presentation must have been disclosed to, and approved by, the Authority in 
advance of such presentation.  
(b) Shareholdings and Dealings  
1) The offer document must state:  
i. The shareholdings, and the size of any controlled shareholding, of the offeror in  
ii. The shareholdings, and the size of any controlled shareholding, in the offeror (in past 
three financial years; financial years; next steps.  
iii. The shareholdings, and the size of any controlled shareholding, in the offeror (in  
iv. The shareholdings, and the size of any controlled shareholding, in the offeror the 
offeree company; the case of a securities exchange offer only) and in the offeree company in 
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which directors of the offeror are interested; the case of a securities exchange offer only) and in 
the offeree company which any persons acting in concert with the offeror own or have 
shareholding control of (with the names of such persons acting in concert); (in the case of a 
securities exchange offer only) and in the offeree company owned or shareholding controlled by 
any persons who, prior to the publication of the offer document, have irrevocably committed 
themselves to accept the offer, together with the names of such persons; and  
v. The shareholdings, and the size of any controlled shareholding, in the offeror (in the 
case of a securities exchange offer only) and in the offeree company owned or shareholding 
controlled by a person with whom the offeror or any person acting in concert with the offeror has 
an arrangement of the kind referred to in 0Article 8(d)(3).  
2) If in any of the above categories there are no shareholdings, this fact should be stated 
in the offer document. This will not apply to categories described in (iv) and (v) of sub-
paragraph (b)(1) if there are no such irrevocable commitments or arrangements.  
3) If any party whose shareholdings are required by this Article 26 to be disclosed 
(whether there is an existing holding or not) has dealt for value in the shares in question during 
the period beginning 12 months prior to the offer period and ending with the latest day prior to 
the publication of the offer document, the details, including dates and prices, must be stated in 
the offer document. If no such dealings have taken place, this fact should be stated in the offer 
document.  
(c) Special Arrangements  
The offer document must contain a statement as to whether or not any agreement, 
arrangement or understanding (including any compensation arrangement) exists between the 
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offeror or any person acting in concert with it and any of the current directors or shareholders or 
any person who had been a director or shareholder of the offeree company within the last 12 
months prior to the date of publication of the offer document, and full particulars of any such 
agreement, arrangement or understanding.  
(d) Cash Confirmation  
When the offer is for cash or includes cash, the offer document must contain a bank 
guarantee issued by a local bank guaranteeing the offeror’s ability to satisfy full acceptance of 
the cash offer.  
(e) Ultimate Owner of Securities Acquired  
The offer document must contain a statement as to whether or not any securities acquired 
in pursuance of the offer will be transferred to any other persons, together with the names of the 
parties to any such agreement, arrangement or understanding and particulars of all securities in 
the offeree company held by such persons, or a statement that no such securities are held.  
(f) Estimated Value of Unlisted Securities Payment When the offer involves the issue of 
unlisted securities which are intended to remain unlisted, the offer document and any subsequent 
circular from the offeror must contain an estimate of the value of such securities by a financial 
adviser. 
§6.8 The Mergers and Acquisitions Regulation, Article 6(d)(1) and (2) 
A. Article 6: Announcements and Takeover Timetable 
(d) Takeover Timetable  
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1) By no later than the date of the announcement required under Article 6 (b)(2) or (3), 
the offeror must approach the Authority for the purpose of establishing the takeover timetable. 
The Authority will adopt the takeover timetable in accordance with the provisions of these 
Regulations, including, without limitation, the timing for the following:  
i. The delivery of the final offer document to the Authority for approval;  
ii. The publication of the offer document approved by the Authority and the sending out 
of the same to the board of the offeree company;  
iii. The publication of the board of the offeree company board circular;  
iv. Shareholders approval (if required);  
v. The earliest permitted first closing date of the offer;  
vi. The last date on which the offeree company may announce profit or dividend 
forecasts, asset valuations or proposals for dividend payments;  
vii. The withdrawal of acceptances if the offer has not become unconditional as to 
acceptances;  
viii. The publication of “no increase” in the offer statements;  
ix. The last date on which the offer can be declared unconditional as to acceptances;  
x. The last date for satisfaction of all other conditions;  
xi. The last date for money or other consideration to be provided to the offeree 
shareholders; and  
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2) All Parties related to the offer must comply with the takeover timetable as specified in 
6(d)(1).  
§6.1. Mergers and Acquisitions Regulation, Article 3(k) 
A. Article 3: General Principles 
(k) Directors of an offeror and the offeree company must always, in advising their 
shareholders, act only in their capacity as directors and not have regard to their personal or 
family shareholdings or to their personal relationships with the offeror or offeree company, as 
applicable, and must at all times have regard to advice given in accordance with Article 7. It is 
the shareholders’ interests taken as a whole, together with those of employees and creditors, 
which should be considered when the directors are giving advice to shareholders. Directors of 
the offeree company should give careful consideration before they enter into any commitment 
with an offeror (or anyone else) which would restrict their freedom to advise their shareholders 
in the future.  
§6.2. Mergers and Acquisitions Regulation, Article 3(m) 
A. Article 3: General Principles 
(m) A director shall not vote at a meeting of directors or of a committee of directors or a 
general assembly meeting on any resolution concerning an offer made under these Regulations 
or any other relevant matter where the director or any relative of his has a conflict of interest. In 
this context such a conflict of interest would arise if he had, directly or indirectly, an interest 
(including his shareholding in the offeree company, if the director is a director of the offeror 
company, or his shareholding in the offeror company, if the director is a director of the offeree 
company) or duty (including where the director of the offeror company holds a position of a 
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director or a manager of the offeree company, and where the director of the offeree company 
holds a position as a director or a manager of the offeror company) which is material and which 
conflicts or may conflict with the interests of the company.  
§6.3. Mergers and Acquisitions Regulation, Article 3(j) 
A. Article 3: General Principles 
(j) Where there are related parties to a transaction to which these Regulations apply, there 
must be full disclosure of the related party’s interest in the transaction to the affected 
shareholders prior to completion of the transaction. Any such transaction must be on arm’s 
length terms.  
§6.4. Mergers and Acquisitions Regulation, Article 6(f) 
A. Article 6: Announcements and Takeover Timetable 
(f) The Announcement of a Firm Intention to Make an Offer  
1) The announcement of a firm intention to make an offer should be made only when an 
offeror has every reason to believe that it can and will continue to be able to implement the offer. 
Responsibility for advising the offeror in this connection rests on the financial adviser to the 
offeror.  
2) When a firm intention to make an offer is announced, the announcement must contain:  
i. The terms of the offer;  
ii. The identity of the offeror;  
iii. Details of any existing holding in the offeree company:  
(a) Which the offeror owns or over which it has shareholding control;  
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(b) Which is owned or where the shareholding is controlled by any person acting in 
concert with the offeror;  
(c) In respect of which the offeror has received an irrevocable commitment to accept the 
offer;  
(d) In respect of which the offeror or any person acting in concert with it holds an option 
to purchase;  
iv. All conditions (including any conditions relating to acceptances, listing and increase 
of capital and any consent required by law) to which the offer or the publication of the offer 
document is subject; and  
v. Details of any indemnity arrangement involving the offeror, the offeree company or 
any person acting in concert with the offeror or the offeree company in relation to relevant 
securities.  
3) The announcement of an offer under Article 12 or 13 should include confirmation by 
the financial adviser or by another appropriate third party that resources are available to the 
offeror sufficient to satisfy full acceptance of the offer. The party confirming that resources are 
available must act responsibly in accordance with Article 3(d) and Article 26(d) and take all 
reasonable steps to assure itself that resources are available. 
§6.5. Merger and Acquisition Regulation, Article 34(b) 
A. Article 34: Right of Withdrawal  
A person who has accepted an offer must be entitled to withdraw his acceptance from the 
time prescribed in the takeover timetable adopted by the Authority under Article 6(d). 
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§6.6. Mergers and Acquisitions Regulation, Article 24(b)(1) 
A. Article 24: Restrictions on Frustrating Action  
(b) Break-up Fees  
1) For the purposes of these Regulations a break-up fee is an arrangement which may be 
entered into between an offeror or a potential offeror and the offeree company pursuant to which 
a cash sum will be payable by the offeree company if certain specified events occur which have 
the effect of preventing the offer from proceeding or causing it to fail, including, without 
limitation, a recommendation by the offeree company board of a higher competing offer.  
§6.7. Mergers and Acquisitions Regulation, Article 24(b) 
A. Article 24: Restrictions on Frustrating Action  
(a) Shareholders’ Consent in the General Assembly  
During the course of an offer, or even before the date of the offer if the board of the 
offeree company has reason to believe that a bona fide offer might be imminent, the board must 
not, except in pursuance of a contract entered into earlier, without the approval of the 
shareholders in general assembly:  
1) Issue any authorised but unissued shares;  
2) Issue or grant options in respect of any unissued shares;  
3) Create or issue, or permit the creation or issue of, any securities carrying rights of 
conversion into or subscription for shares;  
4) Sell, dispose of or acquire, or agree to sell, dispose of or acquire, assets of a material 
amount; or  
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5) Enter into contracts otherwise than in the ordinary course of business.  
The notice convening such a general assembly of shareholders must include information 
about the offer or anticipated offer.  
(b) Break-up Fees  
1) For the purposes of these Regulations a break-up fee is an arrangement which may be 
entered into between an offeror or a potential offeror and the offeree company pursuant to which 
a cash sum will be payable by the offeree company if certain specified events occur which have 
the effect of preventing the offer from proceeding or causing it to fail, including, without 
limitation, a recommendation by the offeree company board of a higher competing offer.  
2) Any break-up fee that is proposed must be of a minimal size (no more than 1% of the 
offer value) and the offeree company board and its financial adviser must confirm to the 
Authority in writing that the fee to be in the best interests of shareholders.  
Any break-up fee arrangement must be fully disclosed in the announcement made under 
Article 6 (f) and in the offer document.  
3) The Authority should be consulted prior to all cases where a break-up fee or any 
similar arrangement is proposed. 
§6.8. The Mergers and Acquisitions Regulation, Article (24)(b)(3) 
A. Article 24: Restrictions on Frustrating Action  
(b) Break-up Fees  
3) The Authority should be consulted prior to all cases where a break-up fee or any 
similar arrangement is proposed. 
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§6.9. M&A Regulation, Article 16(b) 
A. Article 16: Compliance of the Offer with Competition Law  
(b) Requirement for Appropriate Term in Offer  
Where an offer would, if completed, be subject to the Competition Law, it must be a term 
of the offer that it will lapse if the Council of Competition Protection notifies the offeror or the 
offeree company in writing that it objects to the deal or has placed it under study and review as 
specified in the Competition Law. 
§6.10. M&A Regulation, Article 16(c) 
A. Article 16: Compliance of the Offer with Competition Law  
(c) Offer Period Ceases During Competition Reference Period  
When an offer or possible offer is objected to by the Council of Competition Protection, 
placed under study or forms the subject of proceedings or inquiries pursuant to paragraph (b), the 
offer period will end. Any new offer must be announced within 21 days after the announcement 
of a final decision made that the transaction is permissible under the Competition Law. A new 
offer period will be deemed to begin on the date on which a final decision made that the 
transaction is permissible under the Competition Law. If there is no announcement of a new offer 
within 21 days after the announcement of a final decision made that the transaction is 
permissible under the Competition Law, this offer period will last until either the expiry of the 21 
day period or the announcement by all relevant offerors (affected by the decision that the 
transaction is permissible under the Competition Law) that they do not intend to make an offer, 
whichever is earlier. 
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§6.11. M&A Regulation, Article 3(i) 
A. Article 3: General Principles 
(i) At no time after the board of the offeree company has reason to believe that a bona 
fide offer might be imminent may any action be taken by the board of the offeree company in 
relation to the affairs of the company, without the approval of the shareholders in general 
assembly, which could effectively result in any bona fide offer being frustrated or in the 
shareholders being denied an opportunity to decide on its merits.  
§6.12. M&A Regulation, Article 24(a) 
A. Article 24: Restrictions on Frustrating Action  
(a) Shareholders’ Consent in the General Assembly  
During the course of an offer, or even before the date of the offer if the board of the 
offeree company has reason to believe that a bona fide offer might be imminent, the board must 
not, except in pursuance of a contract entered into earlier, without the approval of the 
shareholders in general assembly:  
1) Issue any authorised but unissued shares;  
2) Issue or grant options in respect of any unissued shares;  
3) Create or issue, or permit the creation or issue of, any securities carrying rights of 
conversion into or subscription for shares;  
4) Sell, dispose of or acquire, or agree to sell, dispose of or acquire, assets of a material 
amount; or  
5) Enter into contracts otherwise than in the ordinary course of business.  
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The notice convening such a general assembly of shareholders must include information 
about the offer or anticipated offer.  
§6.13. M&A Regulation, Article 3(i) 
A. Article 3: General Principles 
(i) At no time after the board of the offeree company has reason to believe that a bona 
fide offer might be imminent may any action be taken by the board of the offeree company in 
relation to the affairs of the company, without the approval of the shareholders in general 
assembly, which could effectively result in any bona fideoffer being frustrated or in the 
shareholders being denied an opportunity to decide on its merits.  
§6.14. M&A Regulation, Article 8(c) 
A. Article 8: Prohibitions and Restrictions on Dealings  
(c) Gathering of irrevocable commitments  
Any person proposing to contact a private individual with a view to seeking an 
irrevocable commitment to accept or refrain from accepting an offer or contemplated offer must 
consult the Authority in advance. 
§6.15. M&A Regulation, Article 11(c) 
A. Article 11: Disclosure of Dealings During the Offer Period, Indemnity and 
other  
(c) Dealings by 1% shareholders or more  
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1) A person who (alone or with any person acting in concert with it), during an offer 
period, owns 1% or more of any class of relevant securities of an offeror or of the offeree 
company or as a result of any transaction will own 1% or more, has a reportable interest.  
2) Any reportable interest, and any change in the level of any reportable interest, must be 
reported to the Authority at the end of each trading day.  
3) Reports made under this Article 11 may be made public by the Authority. 
Arrangements 
§6.16. The Listing Rules, Article 45(a)(1) 
A. Article 45: Notification Related to Substantial Holdings in Shares or 
Convertible Debt Instruments  
(a) Where a person is subject to one or more of the following events, the person must 
notify the issuer and the Authority at the end of the trading day of the occurrence of the relevant 
event:  
1) becoming the owner of, or interested in, 5% or more of any class of voting shares or 
convertible debt instrument of the issuer;  
§6.17. The Listing Rules, Article 45(a)(2) 
A. Article 45: Notification Related to Substantial Holdings in Shares or 
Convertible Debt Instruments  
(a) Where a person is subject to one or more of the following events, the person must 
notify the issuer and the Authority at the end of the trading day of the occurrence of the relevant 
event:  
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2) the ownership or interest of the person referred to in sub-paragraph (1) of paragraph 
(a) of this Article increasing or decreasing by 1% or more of the shares, or convertible debt 
instruments of the issuer; 
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Appendix B to Chapter 6: Disclosure Form of Notice of Ownership 
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Appendix C to Chapter 6: Disclosure Form of Notice Relating to a Change in the 
Percentage of Ownership 
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Appendix to Chapter 7: Relevant Law Cited 
Saudi Income Tax Law Articles 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6  
A. Article 2: Persons subject to taxation 
a. a resident capital company with respect to shares of non-Saudi partners. 
b. a resident non-Saudi natural person who conducts business in the Kingdom. 
c. a non-resident who conducts business in the Kingdom through a permanent 
establishment. 
d. a non-resident with other taxable income from sources within the Kingdom. 
e. a person engaged in the field of natural gas investment. 
f. a person engaged in the field of oil and hydrocarbons production. 
B. Article 3: Concept of Residency 
(a) A natural person is considered a resident in the Kingdom for a taxable year if he 
meets any of the following conditions: 
1. He has a permanent place of residence in the Kingdom and resides in the Kingdom for a 
total period of not less than thirty (30) days in the taxable year; 
2. He resides in the Kingdom for a period of not less than one hundred eighty-three (183) 
days in the taxable year. 
For the purpose of this paragraph, residence in the Kingdom for part of a day is 
considered residence for the whole day, except in the case of a person in transit between two 
points outside the Kingdom. 
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(b) A company is considered resident in the Kingdom during the taxable year if it meets 
any of the following conditions: 
1. It is formed in accordance with the Companies Law; 
2. Its central management is located in the Kingdom. 
C. Article 4: Permanent Establishment 
(a) A permanent establishment of a non-resident in the Kingdom, unless otherwise stated 
in this Article, consists of the permanent place of the non-resident's activity through which it 
carries out business, in full or in part, including business carried out through its agent. 
(b) The following are considered a permanent establishment: 
1. construction sites, assembly facilities, and the exercise of supervisory activities connected 
therewith; 
2. installations or sites used for surveying for natural resources, drilling equipment, or ships 
used for surveying for natural resources, as well as the exercise of supervisory activities 
connected therewith; 
3. a fixed base where a non-resident natural person carries out business; 
4. a branch of a non-resident company licensed to carry out business in the Kingdom. 
(c) A place is not considered a permanent establishment of a non-resident in the Kingdom 
if it is used in the Kingdom only for the following purposes: 
1. storing, displaying, or delivering goods or products belonging to the non-resident; 
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2. keeping a stock of goods or products belonging to the non-resident for the purpose of 
processing by another person; 
3. purchasing goods or products for the sole purpose of collection of information for the 
non-resident; 
4. carrying out other activities of preparatory or auxiliary nature for the interests of the non-
resident; 
5. drafting contracts for signature in connection with loans, delivery of goods, or activities 
of technical services; 
6. performing any series of activities stated in subparagraphs 1 to 5 of this paragraph. 
(d) A non-resident partner in a resident partnership is considered an owner of a 
permanent establishment in the Kingdom in the form of an interest in a partnership. 
D. Article 5: Source of Income 
(a) Income is considered accrued in the Kingdom in any of the following cases: 
1. If it is derived from an activity which occurs in the Kingdom. 
2. If it is derived from immovable property located in the Kingdom, including gains from 
the disposal of a share in such immovable properties and from the disposal of shares, 
stocks or partnership in a company the property of which consists mainly, directly or 
indirectly of shares in immovable properties in the Kingdom. 
3. If it is derived from the disposal of shares or a partnership in a resident company. 
4. If it is derived from the lease of movable properties used in the Kingdom; 
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5. If it is derived from the sale or license for use of industrial or intellectual properties used 
in the Kingdom. 
6. Dividends, management or directors' fees paid by a resident company. 
7. Amounts paid against services rendered by a resident company to the company's head 
office or to an affiliated company. 
8. Amounts paid by a resident for services performed in whole or in part in the Kingdom. 
9. Amounts for exploitation of a natural resource in the Kingdom. 
10. If the income is attributable to a permanent establishment of a non-resident located in the 
Kingdom, including income from sales in the Kingdom of goods of the same or similar 
kind as those sold through such a permanent establishment, and income from rendering 
services or carrying out another activity in the Kingdom of the same or similar nature as 
an activity performed through such a permanent establishment. 
(b) The place of payment of the income shall not be taken into account in determining its 
source. 
(c) For purposes of this Article, a payment made by a permanent establishment of a non-
resident in the Kingdom is considered as if paid by a resident company. 
E. Article 6: Tax Base 
(a) The tax base of a resident capital company is the shares of non-Saudi partners in its 
taxable income from any activity from sources within the Kingdom, minus expenses permitted 
under this Law. 
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(b) The tax base of a resident non-Saudi natural person is his taxable income from any 
activity from sources within the Kingdom, minus expenses permitted under this Law. 
(c) The tax base of a non-resident who performs an activity within the Kingdom through 
a permanent establishment is his taxable income arising from or related to the activity of such 
establishment, minus expenses permitted under this Law. 
(d) The tax base of each natural person is determined separately. 
(e) The tax base of a capital company is determined separately of its shareholders or 
partners. 
F. Article 8: Income Subject To Tax 
Taxable income is the gross income including all revenues, profits, and gains of any type and of 
any form of payment resulted from carrying out an activity, including capital gains and any 
incidental revenues, minus exempted income. 
 
